People v. Minchaca CA4/3

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Filed 5/1/25 P. v. Minchaca CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062776

v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB20004362)

KENNY MINCHACA, JR., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE,
(Super. Ct. No. FSB20004363)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA ANTHONY GUERRERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeals from judgments of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Ronald M. Christianson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Law Office of Alex Coolman and Alex Coolman, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Kenny
Minchaca, Jr.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Joshua Anthony Guerrero.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Stephanie H. Chow and Christine Levingston Bergman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Kenny Minchaca, Jr., and Joshua Anthony Guerrero appeal after
a jury convicted them of first degree felony murder with various firearm
enhancements. The jury also found them guilty of being felons in possession
of firearms and that the murder and possession offenses were committed for
the benefit of a criminal street gang.
Guerrero contends his first degree felony-murder conviction must
be reversed because the court committed prejudicial error by admitting
Minchaca’s out-of-court statements concerning their involvement in the
murder as declarations against penal interest. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Guerrero
asserts without these statements the evidence was insufficient to support his
felony-murder conviction. He also argues the gang enhancements on his
convictions must be vacated because of instructional error. Minchaca joins in
this last argument.
Minchaca contends the court abused its discretion by denying a
mistrial motion after the late discovery a prosecution witness was a paid
police informant. In his opening brief, Minchaca also asserted the bifurcation

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provisions in Penal Code section 11091 applied retroactively and the failure to
bifurcate the gang enhancements required the reversal of the substantive
counts. He withdrew this argument after our Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1.
We agree the gang enhancements must be reversed due to
instructional error. We vacate the defendants’ sentences and remand for the
potential retrial of the gang allegations but otherwise affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE MURDER
Video surveillance at a San Bernardino motel shows a black car
pull into the parking lot at 9:02 p.m. on October 8, 2020. S. Ginez, who had
been staying at the motel earlier that day, gets out of the car and walks to
the motel’s night window. The car’s driver, Minchaca, reparks the car by
backing into a spot near room 137. Ginez returns to the car after about three
and a half minutes; Minchaca, and the rear passenger, Guerrero, then exit
the car wearing face coverings and walk up to room 137. Minchaca knocks on
the door and motions for Guerrero, who is holding a sawed-off shotgun, to
stand to the side of the door. Minchaca knocks several times. When the door
starts to open, Minchaca and Guerrero enter the room.
The room’s interior cannot be seen in the surveillance video.
However, the video shows swinging arms and the movement of feet in and
near the room’s doorway, suggesting a struggle in the room. Guerrero backs
out of the room and points the shotgun into the room. Minchaca and Guerrero

1 Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.

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then run to the car, and Minchaca puts a handgun in the front of his pants.
The two men get inside the car and drive away at 9:08 p.m.
Motel occupants called the police, who responded and found the
victim, Marvin Gundlach, dead from a shotgun wound to the chest.
Gundlach’s wallet, laptop computer, cellular phone, and bicycle were in the
room.
II.
THE INVESTIGATION
Homicide detective Darren Sims responded to the motel and
viewed the surveillance video. After watching the video, he determined the
black car was a four-door Mercedes Benz with some distinct characteristics.
He was also able to get the car’s license plate number.
The following day, a police officer in an unmarked car saw
Minchaca driving the black Mercedes Benz seen in the motel’s surveillance
video. The police surveilled the car until Minchaca got out and left as a
passenger in a truck. The police impounded the black car and towed it to the
police department.
Shortly after Minchaca got into the truck, a police officer
conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle. When searching the truck, the police
found a loaded firearm under the passenger side floormat, where Minchaca
had been sitting. Minchaca was transported to the police station, where he
was interviewed by Sims.
Seeing Minchaca in person, Sims observed Minchaca’s
appearance matched that of the car’s driver from the surveillance video.
While Minchaca was at the police station, he received numerous
communications on his cellular phone through a social media application.

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Sims noticed one of the notifications was from “Ant Guerrero,” whose profile
picture roughly matched the shooter’s appearance.
Sims found Minchaca and Guerrero on the social media
application and with a search warrant, obtained their profile information and
communications. The social media records included photographs of Minchaca
and Guerrero together and communications between them. In one
photograph Minchaca sent Guerrero, Minchaca has two handguns and is
making a gang sign with his hand. About a week before the homicide,
Guerrero sent Minchaca a video of a 12-gauge shotgun shell being rolled on a
surface. Guerrero received a video taken by someone else of him holding a
sawed-off shotgun and Minchaca holding a handgun.
The police also looked for evidence of a motive in the social media
records. In a message thread about a month prior to the homicide, Guerrero
stated he was broke, just got kicked out of his room, and was with two people
he was “probably going to rob” that night. Guerrero’s social media records
showed that less than three weeks prior to the homicide he was involved in a
high-speed chase. He got away, but in the process, he injured his arms and
hands, lost his friend’s truck he was driving, and threw away two guns. His
messages after the chase show he was looking to buy guns because the guns
he lost belonged to someone else and “they [were] not happy.” He stated they
wanted four because he lost two. He also promised to repay his friend for the
truck. Guerrero indicated in a message Minchaca and Ginez said they would
pay for the guns.
About eight days prior to the homicide, Guerrero indicated in a
message he had a shotgun and wanted to shorten its barrel. A few days later,
he sent a photograph of a shotgun with the barrel still intact. The day before
the murder, Guerrero said, in a message, he had his shotgun with him.

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Around noon the day of the murder, Guerrero and Minchaca
exchanged messages. At 7:59 p.m., Ginez sent Guerrero a message she
needed a ride to go get her stuff. She was at a location about a mile from the
motel where the murder later occurred. Guerrero immediately answered, “We
are coming.” Around 8:40 p.m., Ginez responded to a message from Guerrero
and indicated she still needed a ride. At 8:51 p.m., Guerrero sent her a
message stating, “Coming up,” and then at 8:56 p.m., he stated they were
outside. At 8:57 p.m., she replied, “Coming.” A few minutes later, she is seen
getting out of the black car at the motel where the murder occurred.
The social media records showed communication between
Guerrero and Minchaca after the murder, first at 1:40 a.m., and about an
hour later, Guerrero sent Minchaca a message, stating: “Bro I love you foo
you are my real brother I’ll be mad asf if anything happens to you now you
know wassup but keep in contact I’ll let you know what happens on my end
okay . . . .”
The police processed the black car Minchaca drove at the time of
the murder for forensic evidence. Minchaca’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
was found on the car’s exterior driver door handle. Guerrero’s DNA and that
of two others were on the car’s interior rear driver’s side door handle and
seatbelt.
III.

MINCHACA’S STATEMENTS TO A CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS
AND SUBSEQUENT GUN POSSESSION

The day after the murder, following the traffic stop of the truck,
Minchaca was arrested for possession of a firearm. After he bailed out, he
talked to a confidential witness (CW) and others who were at his residence.

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CW was a convicted felon and associated with members of Westside Verdugo,
a criminal street gang.
Minchaca told CW he killed a guy inside a motel room. He said he
and “Oso,” who CW identified as Guerrero, went to the motel to rob someone
but it “went wrong” and they killed him. Minchaca asserted the victim was
fighting back and they did what they had to do. Minchaca stated he was the
one who shot and killed the victim. He told CW the person got aggressive and
he had to shoot him. Minchaca claimed responsibility for what happened. He
appeared anxious when talking about the incident because he believed the
police were after him.
CW subsequently told Sims about Minchaca’s statements, after
she was detained at an illegal gambling establishment raided by the police.
After talking to the police about this case, CW became a paid informant for
the San Bernardino Police Department.2
On December 3, 2020, nearly two months after the murder, an
officer conducted a traffic stop on a car in which Minchaca was riding as a
passenger. After Minchaca was removed from the car, a loaded pump-action
shotgun was found on the vehicle’s floorboard. The shotgun’s serial number
had been removed, and the number seven and “ESV” were etched into the
gun.
IV.
THE CHARGES AND TRIAL
Minchaca and Guerrero were charged with Gundlach’s murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1). The second amended information alleged

2 CW’s status as a paid police informant was not timely disclosed,

as discussed post.

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numerous firearm enhancements, including: both defendants were armed
with firearms (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), personally used firearms (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)), carried a firearm on their person and in a vehicle (§ 12021.5,
subd. (a)), a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b),
(e)(1)), a principal intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c),
(e)(1)), a principal personally and intentionally discharged a shotgun causing
death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and Guerrero personally and
intentionally discharged a shotgun causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)).
In count 2, Guerrero was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, and
Minchaca was charged with the same offense in counts 3 and 4 (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged all the offenses were committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (C).) As to counts
1, 3, and 4, it was alleged Minchaca had two prior convictions that qualified
as prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and “strikes” under the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
During the joint trial, to prove the charges, the prosecution
presented the motel surveillance video, testimony concerning the police
investigation, Minchaca’s statements to CW, and Minchaca’s and Guerrero’s
social media records. As to the gun possession charges, the parties stipulated
Minchaca and Guerrero were convicted felons “at all relevant times.” The
parties also stipulated the Mount Vernon clique of Westside Verdugo is a
criminal street gang as defined in section 186.22. The prosecutor stated they
intended the stipulation to encompass Assembly Bill No. 333’s (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333) then-upcoming amendments to the definition
of a criminal street gang in section 186.22. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699.)
Sims, the prosecution’s gang expert, testified in his opinion,
Minchaca was an active member of the Westside Verdugo Mount Vernon

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clique at the time the murder was committed because Minchaca had tattoos
consistent with membership in the gang; in 2013, he had gang paraphernalia
and writings related to the gang in his room; in 2016, he admitted being a
member; he was arrested about two months after the murder with a shotgun
that had the gang’s symbols etched on it; and there were references to the
gang in his social media postings.
Sims, however, did not believe Guerrero was a member of the
Westside Verdugo gang. Instead, he believed Guerrero was an associate of
the gang. This belief was based on Guerrero’s association with Minchaca and
his presence in photographs where Minchaca was “throwing” gang signs. But
Guerrero did not have any tattoos indicating gang membership and he,
himself, did not make gang signs in the photographs.
Presented with a hypothetical based on the evidence presented,
Sims opined the gang member and associate committed the robbery for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or association with a criminal street gang and
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by the
gang’s members. He also testified gang members carry guns to be used for
offensive purposes, like intimidating a robbery victim, and defensive
purposes, like protection when selling narcotics.
The jury convicted Guerrero of first degree felony murder and, in
a special finding, found he was the actual killer. The jury convicted Minchaca
of first degree felony murder and found he was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life in the attempted robbery of
Gundlach. The jury found true multiple firearm allegations connected to the
murder offense. The jury also convicted the defendants of the firearm
possession charges and found all four offenses were committed for the benefit
of a criminal street gang.

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Minchaca waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction
allegations, and a court trial was conducted. The court found the prior
conviction allegations to be true. At sentencing, pursuant to the Three
Strikes law, the court imposed a term of 75 years to life on the murder
conviction and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the gang firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The court stayed the other
firearm enhancements, and the term for the gang enhancement on the
murder conviction was stayed under section 654. As to the firearm possession
conviction in count 3, the court imposed a term of 25 years to life and four
years for the gang enhancement on this count but stayed these terms under
section 654. As to the firearm possession conviction in count 4, the court
imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life and imposed an additional one
year for the gang enhancement on this count. The court also imposed 10
consecutive years for the two prior serious felony enhancements. Minchaca’s
total sentence was 125 years to life, plus 11 years.

As to Guerrero, the court imposed 25 years to life for the murder
conviction, a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and an additional 10 years for the gang enhancement,
for a total term of 50 years to life plus 10 years. The court stayed the
remaining firearm enhancements. For count 2, the court imposed a three-
year term for the firearm possession conviction and a four-year term for the
gang enhancement but stayed these terms under section 654.
DISCUSSION
I.
ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY UNDER EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1230
Guerrero contends the court abused its discretion by admitting
CW’s testimony concerning Minchaca’s statements to her under the

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declaration against penal interest exception. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Guerrero
asserts this testimony was critical evidence in the jury finding him guilty of
felony murder, and therefore, the erroneous admission of this evidence
requires his murder conviction be reversed. We disagree. We conclude the
court properly admitted the testimony under Evidence Code section 1230.

A. Additional Background
Prior to trial, the prosecution sought admission of out-of-court
statements Minchaca made to CW about the murder as declarations against
penal interest. In his written motion, the prosecutor explained Minchaca told
CW he and Guerrero attempted to rob the victim but it went bad and the
victim fought back. Minchaca told CW he and Guerrero were responsible for
the murder and Minchaca admitted using a shotgun. The prosecutor argued
Minchaca’s statements to CW inculpating himself and Guerrero in the
murder were declarations against Minchaca’s penal interest as “[a]
reasonable person would not have made those statement unless they were
true . . . .” The prosecutor asserted the statements were reliable as they were
corroborated by the physical evidence and the context and timing in which
the statements were made also bolstered their reliability.
Over the objection of Guerrero’s counsel, the court ruled the
evidence was admissible. The court indicated, “[b]ased on the briefing,” the
statement was admissible as to both defendants. The court found Minchaca’s
statements to CW were declarations against interest and trustworthy.
During the trial, the prosecution’s gang expert testified, on cross-
examination, it is part of gang culture for gang members to boast about their
crimes, how they occurred, and to exaggerate and lie about their own
participation in the crime. Based on this testimony, Guerrero’s counsel moved
for a mistrial, arguing Minchaca’s statements were not statements against

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penal interest and the court should have excluded CW’s testimony concerning
Minchaca’s statements. The court found Minchaca’s statements were
admissible as to both defendants and denied the mistrial motion.
B. Governing Principles
Minchaca’s statements to CW were hearsay as they were out-of-
court statements offered for the truth of the matter stated. (Evid. Code,
§ 1200.) While hearsay is generally inadmissible (ibid.), an out-of-court
statement against the declarant’s penal, pecuniary, proprietary, or social
interest, may be admissible under Evidence Code section 1230, an exception
to the hearsay rule. (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1055
(Masters); People v. Smith (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 297, 303.) This “exception
permits the admission of any statement that ‘when made, was so far contrary
to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected [the
declarant] to the risk of civil or criminal liability, . . . or created such a risk of
making [the declarant] an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the
community, that a reasonable [person] in [that] position would not have made
the statement unless [the declarant] believed it to be true.’ (Evid. Code,
§ 1230.) As applied to statements against the declarant’s penal interest, in
particular, the rationale underlying the exception is that ‘a person’s interest
against being criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the
veracity of his statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the
dangers usually associated with the admission of out-of-court statements.”
(People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 710–711 (Grimes).)

“To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is admissible as
a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of such evidence must show
that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the
declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration was

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sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.’
[Citation.] ‘In determining whether a statement is truly against interest
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently
trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the
words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible
motivation of the declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the
defendant.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711.)
“We review a trial court’s decision whether a statement is
admissible under Evidence Code section 1230 for abuse of discretion”
(Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711), and we will not disturb the court’s
decision “‘“‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’”’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1056.)
C. The Trial Court Properly Admitted the Testimony
Guerrero contends the court erred by admitting Minchaca’s
statements to CW under Evidence Code section 1230 because “considered in
context and in light of the testimony of the prosecution gang expert, Sims,
and the prosecutor’s closing argument, it is apparent that Minchaca’s
statements to CW would have advanced his standing within the gang, were
not ‘trustworthy,’ and would not have made him ‘an object of hatred, ridicule,
or social disgrace in the [relevant] community.’” Guerrero’s appellate
contention is premised on the gang expert’s testimony and the prosecutor’s
closing argument—things that took place after the trial court ruled the
evidence admissible. Our review of a trial court’s ruling on the admission of
evidence “is limited to the evidence before the court when it heard the
motion.” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 491.) Here, the court ruled
on the pretrial motion based on the prosecutor’s offer of proof. Thus, the gang

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expert’s testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argument are immaterial to
the court’s initial ruling on the evidence’s admissibility.
Looking at the evidence before the court when it ruled, we
conclude the court properly admitted Minchaca’s statements to CW under
Evidence Code section 1230. First, Minchaca was unavailable to testify as he
was a defendant in the case and had a constitutional right not to be called as
a witness and not to testify. (People v. Merfeld (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1440,
1443.) Second, Minchaca’s statements to CW were declarations against his
penal interest as a reasonable person in Minchaca’s position would believe
his admissions to CW would subject him and Guerrero to criminal liability for
Gundlach’s murder. When Minchaca made the statements, according to the
prosecutor’s proffer, Minchaca was panicked because he had been released
from custody on other charges and feared being arrested for the murder for
which he and Guerrero were responsible. Minchaca was concerned he was
going to be charged with the murder; thus he was cognizant of the criminal
liability he faced when he made the statements. Minchaca did not try to
minimize his role or shift the blame to Guerrero. “[A] statement is more likely
to satisfy the against-interest exception when the declarant accepts
responsibility and denies or diminishes others’ responsibility.” (Grimes,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716.) Thus, the court properly found Minchaca’s
statements were against his penal interest.
Third, the prosecution showed Minchaca’s statements to CW
were “‘sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite [their] hearsay
character.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711.) The prosecution’s proffer
indicated Minchaca and Guerrero’s involvement in the murder was
corroborated by physical evidence and the context in which the statements
were made provided indicia of reliability. Minchaca made the statements to

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friends and people he trusted within a few months of the murder.
“‘“Declarations against penal interest are received notwithstanding that they
were spoken in confidence in the expectation they would not be repeated to
the authorities. [Citations.] Indeed, that makes such declarations more
trustworthy.”’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1056.)
Accordingly, the court properly admitted Minchaca’s statements
to CW under Evidence Code section 1230 as declarations against interest.
Because the evidence was properly admitted, there is sufficient evidence to
support Guerrero’s felony-murder conviction. He does not contend otherwise.
II.
DENIAL OF MISTRIAL MOTION
Minchaca contends the court abused its discretion by denying a
mistrial motion, which was based on the late discovery CW, who testified
Minchaca confessed to the murder, was a paid police informant. He asserts
the court’s curative actions were insufficient because the jury was not
informed of this impeachment evidence until several days after CW’s
testimony. The Attorney General argues the court’s corrective actions were
sufficient and the court properly denied the mistrial motion. We agree with
the Attorney General.
A. Additional Background
On November 29, 2021, CW testified Minchaca made statements
to her inculpating himself and Guerrero in Gundlach’s murder at the motel.
During her testimony, some impeaching evidence was elicited, including she
was a convicted felon, she was on probation, and she was potentially in “some
trouble” when she spoke to Sims about this case. But she denied she talked to
Sims because she was afraid she was going to get into trouble for violating

15
her federal probation. She disavowed the police did her “any favors after” she
came forward and implicated Minchaca.
On redirect, the prosecutor attempted to clarify why CW came
forward with information in the case, eliciting testimony she told Sims she
wanted to help because she had friends who were shot and killed. CW
testified the reason she talked to Sims about what she heard Minchaca say
was her cousin was shot and they had not found his killer.
After each party rested its case, the court instructed the jury on
the law and informed the jury closing arguments would be heard the
following day, December 2, 2021.
The following morning, before closing arguments were to begin,
the prosecutor informed the court he just learned CW was a paid confidential
informant for the San Bernardino Police Department. He proffered when CW
first spoke to Sims about this case, she was not an informant but became one
sometime after that and provided information to the police department
regarding certain individuals and criminal activity. The prosecutor indicated
he did not have the full details and Officer Grant Miles, who had been acting
as CW’s handler, could provide further information.
The court stated its intent to reopen for further examination of
CW and to hear Miles’s testimony. Both Guerrero and Minchaca moved for a
mistrial. The court denied the motions because it concluded the late discovery
could be cured by reopening the evidence and instructing the jury further on
the credibility of witnesses and on the prosecution’s late disclosure. The court
indicated the jury would be released for the day and ordered to return on
December 8 for further testimony because the court was unavailable until
that day. The court rejected the suggestion of Minchaca’s counsel that the
court read the late discovery instruction to the jury before releasing them

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that day. The court, instead, informed the jury an issue had arisen that
required additional testimony and they would hear this testimony and
receive more instructions regarding the evidence on December 8.
CW was recalled as a witness on December 8. She was in custody
on a federal probation violation hold. She testified that after speaking to
Sims she contacted Miles about five days later because she wanted to become
a paid confidential informant. She talked to Miles about the case, and he paid
$300 for the information she already provided. She signed up with the police
department as a confidential informant on December 21, 2020. She provided
information to Sims and Miles concerning the defendants’ involvement in the
murder and received additional payments. The information she provided
Miles related only to this case. She did not recall giving Miles information
about other individuals unrelated to this case.
Miles testified he met CW on December 16, 2020, when he was
serving a search warrant on a location where illegal gambling was taking
place. CW lived at the location and was detained during the search. While he
was interviewing her, she stated she had possible information about a
murder and mentioned Minchaca. She indicated she was willing to speak to a
detective about the case and she was transported to the police station.
Miles contacted CW in the following days about her being an
informant, and he ultimately became her handler. She signed an agreement
to be a confidential informant for the police department and was paid $300.
Pursuant to the agreement, CW would provide information about subjects
committing crimes, and if the information led to seizures, arrests, or search
warrants, she would be paid money. On January 7, 2021, the police
department gave her $100 to pay her phone bill so she could stay in contact
with them concerning the ongoing investigation in this case. On subsequent

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dates in January, April, and May 2021, the police department paid CW
money for information unrelated to this case. Miles did not tell Sims CW had
signed up as a paid informant. Miles assumed Sims knew CW was an
informant and Sims would tell the prosecutor.
Sims was also recalled to testify. He testified he gave CW’s phone
number to a narcotics division sergeant at the conclusion of his interview
with her because she requested to speak to Miles further. He did not vouch
for her as a potential informant. He did not find out she was a paid informant
for his police department until the morning of December 2, 2021.
The court gave the jury additional instructions relating to CW’s
testimony. It added a factor to the instruction on witness credibility
(CALCRIM No. 226), telling the jury an additional factor it might consider
was whether “the witness [was] promised any type of special treatment or
provided any incentive in exchange for his or her testimony.” Using a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 306, the court instructed the jury the
prosecution failed to timely disclose to the defense information about CW’s
status as a paid police informant.3
Guerrero’s counsel renewed his mistrial motion, based on the
admission of Minchaca’s hearsay statements to CW, who counsel described as
“a thoroughly tainted source for information.” Counsel argued the evidence

3 The court instructed the jury as follows: “Both the People and

the defense must disclose their evidence to the other side before trial within
the time limits set by law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the other side
the chance to produce all relevant evidence to counter opposing evidence or to
receive a fair trial. [¶] Within the legal time period, the People failed to
disclose to the defense information about [CW] working as a paid informant
for law enforcement. In determining the weight and significance to give to
this evidence, you may consider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.”

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concerning Minchaca’s statements was “enormously prejudicial” and had
little probative value. The court denied the motion.
B. Governing Principles
Minchaca contends the court erred by refusing to grant a
mistrial. “[A] court should grant a mistrial if it ‘“is apprised of prejudice that
it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.”’ [Citation.] Whether an
incident is prejudicial and requires a mistrial is ‘by its nature a speculative
matter,’ and the ‘“trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling
on mistrial motions.”’ [Citation.] Thus, courts should grant a mistrial when
defendant’s ‘“‘“chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably
damaged.”’”’” (People v. Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1185.) We review the
trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial motion under the abuse of discretion
standard. (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 488, 561.)
C. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Mistrial Motion
Minchaca contends the court abused its discretion by denying the
mistrial motion because CW’s testimony was “extremely damaging” and the
jury was exposed to her testimony for several days before the full context of
her involvement was provided.4 He asserts “it was impossible to undo the
structural impact of [CW’s] role on the case merely by permitting her to be
impeached after the fact” and the court’s additional instructions did not cure
the harm. We find no abuse of the court’s discretion.

4 Minchaca argues “the denial of the mistrial motion should be

assessed at the time it was made by counsel for Guerrero on December 8.” He
acknowledges his counsel did not formally join in that motion but made a
prior mistrial motion that was denied, and Minchaca asserts a further
objection would have been futile. The Attorney General does not argue
Minchaca forfeited his appellate argument by failing to join in the
December 8 mistrial motion; thus, we will address the issue on its merits.

19
The court exercised its sound discretion in concluding a mistrial
was unwarranted. The court properly managed the issue by reopening the
evidence, having CW, Miles, and Sims testify further, and by providing the
jury further instructions relating to the late disclosure and witness
credibility. (See People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198–199 [trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying mistrial motion because prejudicial
effect of testimony could be cured by admonition].)
Minchaca contends “[t]he amount of time the jury was exposed to
[CW’s testimony Minchaca admitted committing the felony murder] before
learning that CW was a paid informant, in itself, is indicative of its potential
to cause prejudice, regardless of the court’s eventual efforts to repair that
damage.” Although there was a span of six court days between CW’s initial
testimony concerning Minchaca’s admission and the new evidence of her
status as a paid police informant, we do not see how this length of time
prejudiced the defendants or diminished the court’s curative actions. The
court was unavailable during this time, and the additional days provided the
defendants time to prepare their cross-examinations based on the newly
discovered evidence. The defendants were able to thoroughly cross-examine
CW, Miles, and Sims and elicited evidence severely damaging CW’s

20
credibility. The court’s actions cured any prejudice caused by the late
disclosure of CW’s status as a paid police informant.5
Earlier access to the information concerning CW’s status as a
paid police informant would not have altered the outcome of the trial. The
jury saw videos showing both defendants’ involvement in the murder.
Minchaca’s argument earlier disclosure of this evidence might have altered
the trial strategy of Minchaca’s counsel is purely speculative and not grounds
for reversal. We conclude the court properly exercised its discretion by
denying the mistrial motion.
III.
GANG ENHANCEMENTS
Guerrero argues the gang enhancement findings on his
convictions must be reversed because changes to section 186.22 resulting
from the enactment of Assembly Bill 333 apply retroactively to his trial and
the jury was instructed under the prior law. Specifically, he notes the jury
was not instructed on the new requirement the prosecution must prove the

5 In his reply brief, Minchaca contends “[t]he nature of the

problem . . . was more akin to a violation of . . . Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373
U.S. 83,” and he presented a similar contention at oral argument. By failing
to raise this argument in his opening brief, Minchaca has forfeited this claim.
(People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1114.) In any event, the Brady
claim is meritless. “[E]vidence that is presented at trial is not considered
suppressed, regardless of whether or not it had previously been disclosed
during discovery.” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715.)

21
benefit to the gang from his offenses was more than reputational. (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).) Minchaca joins in this argument.6
The Attorney General agrees Assembly Bill 333’s changes to
section 186.22 apply retroactively but asserts the instructional error was
harmless. We conclude the gang enhancements must be reversed, and the
matters remanded for further proceedings.
A. Governing Principles
Section 186.22 “makes it a crime to actively participate in a
‘criminal street gang,’ and the statute provides for enhanced punishment
when a defendant is convicted of an enumerated felony committed ‘for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street
gang.’” (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 476.) “Effective January 1,
2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22’s definition of a
‘criminal street gang.’” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 448 (Lamb).)
As relevant here, “Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense
to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any ‘common
benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169,
1206 (Tran).) The statute now requires the jury find that when the defendant
committed the offense for the benefit of or in association with a criminal

6 Minchaca did not raise this issue in his opening brief and his

effort in his reply brief to join Guerrero’s argument was inadequate. (People
v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26 [generally, “‘points raised in
the reply brief for the first time will not be considered’”]; People v. Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 [“‘Joinder may be broadly
permitted [citation], but each appellant has the burden of demonstrating
error and prejudice’”].) The Attorney General was given an opportunity, but
declined, to brief whether the gang enhancements imposed on Minchaca’s
convictions must be reversed because the jury was instructed on the former
elements of section 186.22.

22
street gang, “the defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal
conduct by gang members” and “[t]o benefit, promote, further, or assist
means to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common
benefit is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g), as amended by
Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4; CALCRIM No. 1401.) “The revised statute also
provides, ‘[e]xamples of a common benefit that are more than reputational
may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation,
targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a
potential current or previous witness or informant.’” (Lamb, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
“By requiring proof for a gang enhancement that the benefit to
the gang was more than reputational, Assembly Bill No. 333 essentially adds
a new element to the enhancement.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
657, 668.) Here, the trial occurred prior to Assembly Bill 333’s effective date,
and the court instructed the jury with the 2016 version of CALCRIM
No. 1401, which did not include this new element. The parties agree, as do
we, Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to the definition of a criminal street
gang in section 186.22 apply retroactively to this appeal. (Tran, supra, 13
Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.)
“When jury instructions are deficient for omitting an element of
an offense, they implicate the defendant’s federal constitutional rights, and
we review for harmless error under the strict standard of Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.” (People v. Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 668;
accord, Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 448; Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.)
“In this assessment, we ‘conduct a thorough examination of the record. If, at
the end of that examination, [we] cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error—for

23
example, where the defendant contested the omitted element and raised
evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding—[we] should not find the
error harmless.’ [Citation.] Conversely, where we conclude ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.’”
(Lamb, at p. 449.)
“‘In assessing prejudice in this context, the question is not
whether there is evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of
the missing element. Instead, we ask whether we can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that “the jury verdict would have been the same” had the
jury been instructed on the missing element.’ [Citations.] ‘Our task, then, is
to determine “whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead
to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.”’” (Lamb, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
B. The Omission of the Nonreputational Element Was Prejudicial
Here, we cannot say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the gang enhancements found true on Guerrero’s robbery and
firearm possession convictions. The prosecution’s gang expert, when
presented with a hypothetical reflecting the facts of this case and asked why
a gang associate would commit an attempted robbery “with the specific intent
to promote or further or assist criminal conduct by gang members,” testified
the crime could be “committed on a personal level” or for the associate to
enhance his reputation with the gang and its members. The prosecution’s
gang expert also testified the gang associate committing the robbery with the
gang member benefits the gang’s reputation. The gang expert did not
separately discuss how the associate using a gun in the robbery benefited the

24
gang other than reputationally. Based on the evidence in this case, a
reasonable juror could have concluded Guerrero committed the robbery and
possession offenses for his own personal reasons or to bolster his reputation
and the gang’s reputation.
The Attorney General asserts the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the prosecution did not emphasize the reputational
evidence in its closing argument. The prosecution’s failure to highlight an
invalid theory or omitted element does not render the instructional error
harmless. “It is elementary . . . that the prosecutor’s argument is not evidence
and the theories suggested are not the exclusive theories that may be
considered by the jury.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126.) While
the gang expert testified the hypothetical robbery benefits the gang
monetarily, we cannot “rule out the possibility that the jury relied on
reputational benefit to the gang as its basis for finding the enhancements
true.” (People v. Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 669.) The record contains
evidence that could lead to a contrary finding as to whether the common
benefit from the robbery and possession offenses was more than reputational.
(Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 453.) Accordingly, the jury’s true findings on
the gang enhancements as to Guerrero’s convictions must be reversed.
We reach the same conclusion at to the gang enhancement
findings on Minchaca’s convictions. The gang expert testified as to both
reputational and nonreputational benefits to the gang from the robbery and
possession offenses. Concerning the gang member’s involvement in the
hypothetical robbery, the gang expert testified the gang member benefits the
gang’s reputation and monetarily. Regarding the firearm possession offenses,
the gang expert testified there is an expectation gang members carry guns for
the gang for offensive and defensive purposes like protecting themselves

25
during narcotic sales or to intimidate a robbery victim. When asked if the
transportation of a firearm by a gang member the day after a robbery was for
the benefit of the gang, the expert testified “it could be for the benefit of the
gang” as it would permit the gang member to commit other crimes of
opportunity. On the record before us, where the jury heard evidence of both
reputational and nonreputational benefits to the gang, we cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless. (People v. E.H., supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
“The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where newly
required elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the
People an opportunity to retry the affected charges.” (People v. E.H., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.) Thus, we reverse the true findings on the gang
enhancements and remand for the prosecution to retry them if they elect to
do so.
The reversal of the gang enhancements also invalidates the
firearm enhancement imposed on Minchaca’s murder conviction pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). (People v. Montano (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 82, 104, disapproved on another ground in People v Burgos,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 31.) Should the prosecution elect to retry the gang
enhancement allegations, we note the 10-year gang enhancement under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) cannot be imposed on the first degree
murder conviction because a life sentence is imposed on the murder and
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) controls. (People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1002, 1011.)

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DISPOSITION
The true findings on the gang enhancements as to both
defendants are reversed, and their sentences are vacated. The matters are
remanded to the trial court to provide the prosecution an opportunity to retry
the defendants on the gang allegations. If the prosecution elects not to retry

the gang allegations or at the conclusion of a retrial, the court shall impose
an appropriate disposition. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

SCOTT, J.

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