People v. Zepeda CA2/4

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Filed 5/1/25 P. v. Zepeda CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336320

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA066801)
v.

LETICIA MARIE MONTOYA
ZEPEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2012, a jury convicted appellant Leticia Marie Montoya
Zepeda (Montoya)1 of first degree premeditated murder, and she
was sentenced to 51 years to life. In 2022, the Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
recommended recall of her sentence and resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1)2 based on her
exceptional conduct during incarceration. The resentencing court
recalled Montoya’s sentence, dismissed three enhancements, and
resentenced her to 25 years to life. Montoya appeals from the
recall and resentencing order. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
“At about 2:00 a.m. on December 28, 2008, Kevin
Montenegro, Nick Perez, and Abraham Guerrero were standing
outside Guerrero’s house on Correnti Street in Pacoima. A white
car drove by the house, made a U-turn, and returned with its
headlights off. A rifle was protruding from the front passenger
window. The car stopped and the front passenger asked the men

1 Appellant changed her last name to Zepeda after trial. We refer
to her as “Montoya” because it is her preferred surname and because
our prior opinions referred to her by this name.
2 In this opinion, undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code, and undesignated references to rules are to the California
Rules of Court.
3 Much of the background and procedural history is taken from
our opinion in Montoya’s direct appeal from her conviction, People v.
Montoya (Jan. 7, 2015, B243042) [nonpub. opn.] (Montoya I), and our
opinion in People v. Zepeda (Nov. 21, 2022, B299071) [nonpub. opn.]
(Montoya II), which involved a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6.

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where they were from. Perez replied, ‘“‘We are not from
anywhere.’”’ Perez grabbed the barrel of the rifle and tried to
wrestle it away. Three or four shots were fired, and Perez let go
of the barrel. Guerrero was shot in the arm and chest and died
from his injuries.” (Montoya I, supra, at pp. 2–3.)
Montoya, a member of the PSSL gang, drove the car, and
Sergio Flores, a fellow gang member, pulled the trigger.
(Montoya I, supra, at pp. 4–5.) Earlier, the two had discussed
recent violent altercations with rival gang members, and “both
felt they had to do something.” (Ibid.) After the shooting,
Montoya told the gang’s shot-caller, Jose Andalon, that she
accompanied Flores to retrieve a rifle from his home, and she
drove Flores and another gang member to the place where they
believed rival gang members were congregating. (Id. at p. 5.)
Flores reported to Andalon that he had killed a rival gang
member. (Id. at p. 4.)
Montoya and Flores “were tried for willful, deliberate and
premeditated murder (§ 187, count 1) and shooting from a motor
vehicle (former § 12034, subd. (b), count 3)).” (Montoya II, supra,
at pp. 2–3, fns. omitted.) “Firearm allegations were included in
count 1 (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), (e)(1)), and criminal
street gang allegations were included in counts 1 and 3 (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(c)).” (Id. at p. 3.) “The jury was presented with two
theories of direct aiding and abetting with regards to Montoya
and the first degree murder charge: (1) aiding and abetting a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and (2) aiding and
abetting a first degree murder committed by means of shooting
from a motor vehicle.” (Id. at p. 4, citing § 189, subd. (a).) The
jury was also presented with the natural and probable
consequence theory. (Id. at p. 4.)

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The jury found Montoya guilty in count 1 of first degree
murder, and in count 3 of shooting from a motor vehicle, with
sustained findings on the firearm and criminal street gang
allegations. (Montoya II, supra, at p. 4.) Montoya also was found
to have suffered a prior prison term. (Ibid.) The court sentenced
her to 51 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for murder,
25 years to life for the gang and firearm enhancements, and one
year for the prior prison term. The sentence on count 3, shooting
from a motor vehicle, was stayed under section 654. (Ibid.)
In her direct appeal, Montoya challenged the admissibility
of her extrajudicial statements to Andalon and a jury instruction
about the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Montoya I, supra, at pp. 9, 20.) We found no reversible error in
admitting the statements (id. at pp. 11–12), and though we found
instructional error, we concluded it was harmless.4 (Id. at p. 22.)
We modified the judgment to correctly reflect custody credits and
affirmed it as modified. (Id. at p. 23.)

B. Petition for Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In 2019, Montoya filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). (Montoya II, supra,
at p. 6.) The resentencing court summarily denied the petition

4 We explained: “[Montoya’s] actions were identical to those of
Flores, except that she drove the car while he pulled the trigger. The
evidence showed that after actively planning and preparing to kill rival
gang members on Correnti Street, Montoya and Flores executed their
plan by going to that location and committing a drive-by shooting
against suspected rival gang members. By her own conduct and
incriminating statements to Andalon, Montoya demonstrated that she
possessed the necessary mental state to be convicted of first degree
premeditated murder.” (Montoya I, supra, at pp. 21–22.)

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without appointing counsel or holding a hearing (ibid.), and we
affirmed. (People v. Zepeda (July 20, 2020, B299071) [nonpub.
opn.], review granted, Sept. 30, 2020, S264170.) Our high court
granted Montoya’s petition for review and ordered us to vacate
our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952. (People v. Zepeda (Oct. 12, 2022, S264170)
[nonpub. opn.].) In November 2022, we reversed the lower court’s
order and remanded with instructions for it to appoint counsel for
Montoya, issue an order to show cause, and proceed in accordance
with section 1172.6. (Montoya II, supra, at p. 13.)
In March 2023, the resentencing court set a hearing on the
possible modification of Montoya’s sentence pursuant to section
1172.6.

C. The CDCR Recommends Recall and Resentencing
On December 14, 2022, the secretary of the CDCR wrote to
the superior court to provide it with the authority to resentence
Montoya pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) based on
her “exceptional conduct while incarcerated.” The letter did not
recommend a particular sentence. However, the People
understood the CDCR to be recommending a time-served
sentence.
The resentencing court appointed counsel for Montoya. At
a conference in September 2023, it acknowledged three pending
resentencing matters: (1) dismissal of the prior prison term,
firearm use, and street gang enhancements (§§ 1172.75, 667.5,
subd. (a)); (2) resentencing under section 1172.6; and
(3) resentencing after receipt of the CDCR letter (§ 1172.1). The
People and Montoya jointly proposed that the court reduce the
first degree murder conviction to a second degree murder

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conviction with a sentence of 15 years to life and that Montoya
forego relief under section 1172.6. The court set a hearing on
recall and resentencing pursuant to the CDCR letter and for
setting an order to show cause on section 1172.6 relief. The
People and Montoya filed briefs.
At the hearing, 15 people gave statements about Montoya’s
rehabilitation. By all accounts, she was a model prisoner.
Montoya gave a statement and expressed remorse. The victim’s
family was represented by counsel, and his relatives gave
statements or had written statements read on their behalf. They
reminded the court that Guererro, who was 22 when he died, had
not been a gang member or drug user. He had participated in the
Los Angeles Police Department’s Explorer program for years with
aspirations of a career in law enforcement. None expressed
support for a reduction of Montoya’s sentence, and some
affirmatively opposed leniency.
The resentencing court dismissed the prior prison term,
street gang, and firearm use enhancements. It did not alter the
first degree murder conviction and sentenced Montoya to 25
years to life.5 Montoya appealed from the resentencing order.
She argues that the resentencing court improperly relied on the
statements from Guererro’s relatives, and the order was
“arbitrary because the overwhelming evidence of [Montoya’s]
exemplary rehabilitation far outweighs the continued feelings of
loss experienced by the victim’s family.”

5 The trial court continued the section 1172.6 proceedings. It set
a schedule for the parties to file evidentiary briefs and a January 31,
2024 review hearing.

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DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
The statutory recall and resentencing procedure are “an
exception to the common law rule that the court loses
resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun.”
(Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455.) Section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a trial court, “at any time upon the
recommendation of” the CDCR to “recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in
the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced,
whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the
new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” The
court is empowered, in the interest of justice, to “[r]educe a
defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(A); People v. McMurray (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040 (McMurray) [CDCR recommendation
under former § 1170.036 furnishes the court with jurisdiction it
would not otherwise have to recall and resentence and is an
invitation to the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction].)
When a request for recall and resentencing is initiated, the
statute provides for “a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a
court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); McMurray, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) This presumption, however “is intended
to apply to the initial determination of whether to grant a request

6 Recall and resentencing language appeared in former section
1170, subdivision (d)(1). This language was moved to section 1170.03,
which was renumbered as section 1172.1. (See People v. E.M. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1080 and fn. 3.)

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to recall and resentence, but . . . the sentence ultimately imposed
by the court is left to its discretion without any further
application of the presumption.” (People v. Braggs (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 809, 819.) In this case, the People conceded they
could not overcome the presumption with evidence that Montoya
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and the
resentencing court in fact recalled Montoya’s sentence and
resentenced her. Thus, we focus on the particular terms of the
new sentence.
A court, in recalling and resentencing under subdivision (a)
of section 1172.1, “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The Judicial
Council’s sentencing rules (see rule 4.401, et seq.) state that the
“[g]eneral objectives of sentencing include: (1) Protecting society;
[¶] (2) Punishing the defendant; [¶] (3) Encouraging the
defendant to lead a law-abiding life in the future and deterring
him or her from future offenses; [¶] (4) Deterring others from
criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences; [¶]
(5) Preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by
isolating him or her for the period of incarceration; [¶]
(6) Securing restitution for the victims of crime; [¶] (7) Achieving
uniformity in sentencing; and [¶] (8) Increasing public safety by
reducing recidivism through community-based corrections
programs and evidence-based practices.” (Rule 4.410(a).)
“Because in some instances these objectives may suggest
inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing judge must consider
which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case.
The sentencing judge should be guided by statutory statements of

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policy, the criteria in these rules, and any other facts and
circumstances relevant to the case.” (Rule 4.410(b).)
Relevant to this appeal, when resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.1, the court also “shall consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(5).)
In general, we review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
312, 323.) “‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by
two fundamental precepts. First, “‘[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’” [Citations.] Second, a “‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’”
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 571 (Strother),
quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)

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B. The Recall and Resentencing Order Was Not
Arbitrary or Irrational
Applying these legal principles, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. The dismissal of enhancements more
than halved Montoya’s original sentence. She argues that the
resentencing court abused its discretion by refusing to reduce the
prison term further. Citing section 1191.1,7 she argues
statements made by the victim’s family “are only relevant if they
concern the ‘safety of the victim, the victim’s family, and the
general public.’ (Cal. Const. art. 1, § 28, subd. (b)(16).)” She
argues that the court “afforded more weight to the continued
emotional loss experienced by the victim’s family than
[Montoya’s] exceptional rehabilitative progress and, thus,
irrationally put emotion over reason.” Montoya asserts the court
should have only considered “that ‘information relative to the
circumstances of the crime and the convicted person’s life and
characteristics[ ]’ [citation].”
As Montoya acknowledges, section 1191.1 permits the
victim’s next of kin to participate in sentencing proceedings and
“express . . . their views concerning the crime . . . .” The statute
states that the court “shall” consider these statements “in
imposing sentence . . . .” (Ibid.) While it is true that Guerrero’s

7 “Section 1191.1 codified the Victims’ Bill of Rights and requires
that the victim or a family representative be notified of all sentencing
proceedings and be given an opportunity to appear and express views
concerning the crime.” (People v. Mockel (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 581,
586.) “The statute mandates that the court consider the victim’s
statement” (ibid., italics added), or if the victim has died, the
statement of the victim’s next of kin. (§ 1191.1 [court, “in imposing
sentence shall consider the statements of . . . next of kin made
pursuant to this section . . . ,” italics added].)

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family members expressed their feelings of loss, they also
provided the court with information about the circumstances of
the crime. Their testimony showed that Montoya participated in
the targeting and murder of an innocent, 22-year-old member of
the public. Because Guerrero was randomly murdered, he did
not have the opportunity to serve as a law enforcement officer as
he hoped. The testimony of family members illustrated the
senselessness of the crime for which Montoya was being punished
and need to deter similar crimes.
Montoya concedes that “punishing the defendant” is a
proper sentencing objective,8 and it is apparent from the record
that the trial court examined this factor closely. Dismissal of the
enhancements reduced Montoya’s sentence by more than 50
percent, the court observed, which left for determination
“whether or not 13 years in prison from the time that she was
arrested to today’s date is enough to pay for the murder of an
innocent young man.”9 The court answered this question in the
negative.

8 Punishment as a sentencing objective is well-grounded in
California law. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (5) [victims have a
“right to expect that persons convicted of committing criminal acts are
sufficiently punished in both the manner and the length of the
sentences”]; § 1170, subd. (a)(1) [“the purpose of sentencing is public
safety achieved through punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative
justice. . . .”]; Rule 4.410(a)(2) [objectives of sentencing include
“[p]unishing the defendant”].)
9 Punishment is often described as making defendants “pay for”
their crimes, and we understand that to be the resentencing court’s
meaning. (See, e.g., People v. Valenzuela (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 358,
365 [provisions of sentencing law “exist to punish according to
culpability;” the defendant killed two victims, and “the trial court
should have the discretion to make [him] ‘pay’ for both deaths”].)

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The resentencing court explained that the facts presented
to the jury indicated that she “was part of the planning,
preparation and implementation of this murder.” She drove to
Guererro’s home knowing her confederate was armed with a rifle,
approached their targets “in a stealth manner,” and “used the
element of surprise to murder this poor young man and injure the
two others who were present.” She drove away with the shooter
as Guererro lay dying. Montoya worked for a business that
painted over gang graffiti, permitting the inference that she used
the position as a cover for her participation in gang-related
activities, including the murder. She kept her role in the killing
secret for more than a year.
The resentencing court also considered the mandatory
factors described in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), as
indicated by its recognition that Montoya had “made positive
changes in her life in an effort to set her up for success when
released.” Indeed, it commended her efforts and her acceptance
of responsibility, as do we. However, the resentencing court was
not obligated to make its decision based solely upon her
exemplary record while incarcerated. The court weighed all the
sentencing factors before it, which we do not reweigh. (See
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 355 [reviewing courts do not
reweigh sentencing factors].) After considering the record before
it, the court stated that it understood its discretion and would not
exercise it.
Montoya fails to show that no reasonable court would
decline to reduce her sentence to less than 25 years to life as
punishment for her part in the planned murder of an innocent,
22-year-old man. That is the minimum base term for first degree
murder (§ 190, subd. (a)) and is not inconsistent with the base

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terms imposed for similar crimes. (See, e.g., People v. Sepulveda
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291, 297 [25 years to life base term for
premeditated first degree murder where defendant shot someone
he believed to be part of a rival gang]; People v. Beckley (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 509, 512 [25 years to life base term for first
degree murder where defendant shot victim from a vehicle in
retaliation for earlier fist fight].) On this record, the resentencing
order was not arbitrary or irrational.

DISPOSITION
The resentencing court’s order is affirmed.

MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

**DAUM, J.

** Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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