People v. Williams CA2/4

CourtListener 10423286CalctappApr 30, 2025

Full text

Filed 4/30/25 P. v. Williams CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336916

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA088486)
v.

DARRELL LEE WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Darrell Lee Williams appeals
from the denial of his petition for resentencing under former
Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The trial court
found Williams was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because
he was the actual killer. Williams primarily contends that
“[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that appellant was the actual
perpetrator, . . . the denial of the petition at the prima facie stage
of proceedings was error” because the court did not consider
“youth-related mitigating factors” in assessing whether he made
a prima facie showing for relief. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges and Conviction2
In December 2012, a Pasadena Police Department officer
and Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent were on patrol
in an unmarked police car in Pasadena. The officers saw a Dodge
Durango that matched the description of a vehicle connected with
a shooting that occurred earlier in the area.
Williams was driving the Durango and had three
passengers.3 When Williams committed a traffic code violation,

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive
changes to the statute. All further references to the statute will be to
the new section number.
2 We have taken judicial notice of the record from Williams’s
direct appeal, People v. Williams (Oct. 19, 2017, B271591 [nonpub.
opn.]). The following facts are taken from the opinion of the direct
appeal. We do not rely on the facts in resolving this appeal.
3 It was later determined that neither Williams nor his
passengers were involved in the shooting from earlier in the day.

2
the officers activated blue and red police lights. They saw a
passenger furtively reach down towards the floorboards and up
towards the driver’s area, which concerned them. When the
Durango stopped, the officers exited their vehicle with their
weapons drawn, announced they were police, and directed
Williams and the passengers to show their hands. Williams
drove away at a high speed. The officers returned to their vehicle
and followed with police lights and sirens activated. Williams
drove 85 miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was
35 miles per hour. Passengers in the Durango told Williams to
stop or slow down.
Kenric Ng was stopped at an intersection, waiting to turn
left, when Willams’s Durango came racing towards his minivan.
Williams applied the brakes but did not stop in time to avoid
running a red light and colliding with the minivan. The minivan
slammed into a pole. The impact caused the death of two
minivan passengers and serious injuries to the driver and two
other passengers.
A handgun was found on a street where the pursuit
occurred. It bore markings indicating it was thrown from the
Durango during the pursuit.
Williams was charged by amended information with two
counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), five counts of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of possession of
a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). It was further alleged
as to each count of assault with a deadly weapon that Williams
personally inflicted great bodily injury on each victim.
The jury was instructed on murder with malice
aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520) and the lesser included
offenses of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM

3
No. 570) and involuntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 580).
The jury was not instructed on any theory of accomplice or aider
and abettor liability.
The jury convicted Williams of two counts of voluntary
manslaughter and five counts of assault with a deadly weapon.
On the assault with a deadly weapon counts, the jury found true
that Williams personally inflicted great bodily injury on each
victim, including the two victims that died. He was found not
guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon.
The trial court sentenced Williams to a term of 30 years to
life for the first voluntary manslaughter count, which included a
five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. He
was sentenced to 25 years to life for the second voluntary
manslaughter count and 25 years to life for the five counts of
assault with a deadly weapon, each to run concurrently. The two
assault with a deadly weapon convictions related to the victims
that died were stayed under section 654 as arising from the same
act for which Williams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.

B. Petition for Resentencing
In 2023, Williams filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6. The People opposed the petition, and
Williams’s court appointed counsel filed a reply.
The trial court denied the petition, finding Williams
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The court reasoned, “The
entire theory and presentation of the case was as Mr. Williams as
the only perpetrator and the actual perpetrator, and there was no
instruction as to aiding, abetting, and any suggestion that he was

4
anything other than the actual perpetrator.” Williams timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “‘to more equitably sentence offenders in
accordance with their involvement in homicides.’” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) SB 1437 “amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Ibid., quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Under
this framework, a “person’s culpability for murder must be
premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
SB 1437 also added now section 1172.6 to provide “a
procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be convicted
of murder under the amended laws to seek retroactive relief.”
(People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.) Effective
January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 1172.6 to “‘clarif[y]’ that ‘persons who were
convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of
felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences
doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted
of murder under the same theories.’” (People v. Saibu (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)

5
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the
trial court must issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary
hearing. (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891;
§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) However, if the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively the defendant is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law, the court may deny the petition. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong); People v. Harden
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)

B. Williams is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6
as a Matter of Law
Williams argues that even if he was the actual killer, the
trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage without considering whether “youth-related
mitigating factors” preclude a finding that he “acted with
conscious disregard for human life,” which he asserts undercuts
his conviction for voluntary manslaughter.4 We reject Williams’s
contention.
Williams is incorrect that actual killers are entitled to
resentencing relief under section 1172.6. Through SB 1437, the
legislature eliminated murder liability for those “who were

4 Williams acknowledges his counsel did not raise this argument
in the trial court. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [“A
party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it
was not asked to conduct”].) However, the People do not argue
Williams forfeited the argument by not raising it. We exercise our
discretion to consider the argument in determining whether the court
erred by denying the petition.

6
neither the actual killers nor intended to kill anyone.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 707.) “As a matter of law, resentencing
relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’”
(People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 (Garcia); People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 (Delgadillo) [petitioner
“not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6” because he “was
the actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].)
Here, the record of conviction conclusively establishes that
Williams was prosecuted and convicted of voluntary
manslaughter as the actual killer. The prosecution tried the case
exclusively on the theory that Williams was the sole and direct
perpetrator. The evidence at trial focused on Williams being the
driver of the Durango, fleeing from the officers, and colliding with
the victims’ minivan at high speed. Moreover, defense counsel
stipulated Williams was the driver. During closing argument,
there was no dispute that Williams was the direct perpetrator of
the offenses and caused the collision that killed the two victims.
Consistent with the theory that Williams was the actual
killer, the jury was instructed on murder with malice
aforethought and the lesser included offenses of voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. The jury was not instructed on the
felony murder or natural and probable consequences doctrine,
accomplice liability, aiding and abetting, or any theory of
imputed malice. Further, the jury found that Williams
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victims.
Consequently, the jury could only have convicted Williams of
being the actual killer, making him ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. (Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 973; see Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52 [“if the record
shows that the jury was not instructed on either the natural and

7
probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
Indeed, Williams does not deny he was the actual killer.
Instead, he argues the trial court erred by failing to consider
youth-related mitigating factors in denying his petition. He
asserts that case law concerning implied malice murder with
regard to youthful defendants has evolved since he was convicted,
and a factfinder is now required to consider youth in assessing
whether a defendant formed the requisite mental state for second
degree murder. He contends that as a result, he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing for the trial court to consider how youth-
related mitigating factors impacted his ability to form the
requisite mens rea for implied malice.
Williams’s claim rests on the premise that the jury
convicted him of second degree implied malice murder after
finding he acted with conscious disregard for human life.
However, this is incorrect. The jury convicted Williams of
voluntary manslaughter, not second degree implied malice
murder. They found that he acted without malice when he killed
two people. (§ 192, subd. (a) [“Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice”]; see People v. Milward
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 580, 587 [“Malice is negated when the
defendant kills as a result of provocation . . .”].) As his conviction
was not based upon a finding of malice, implied or otherwise,
there is no such finding to be revisited. Williams was the actual
killer and is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
Finally, Williams argues the denial of his petition at the
prima facie stage violated his right to equal protection under the
federal and state Constitutions. He argues that as a petitioner
convicted of implied malice murder, he has been treated more

8
harshly than a petitioner convicted of felony murder with a
special circumstance finding that the petitioner was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference for human life,
as the latter would be granted relief under section 1172.6. Again,
Williams was not convicted of implied malice murder; he was
convicted of manslaughter as the actual killer. There is no
factual basis for his equal protection claim, and thus, we reject
it.5 (See In re Edward R. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 116, 124
[because underlying premise of unequal treatment was absent,
the issues of similarly situated classes and rational basis versus
strict scrutiny analysis were moot].)

5 Williams also asserts his trial counsel was prejudicially
ineffective by failing to object to the trial court’s failure to consider
whether youth-related mitigating factors undercut Williams’s
conviction for voluntary manslaughter. However, there is no
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in postconviction
proceedings or proceedings to obtain collateral relief from a judgment
of conviction. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–227.) Even if
there were, the record of conviction reflects that Williams was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and an
attorney is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections.
(People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)

9
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

DAUM, J. **

** Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

10

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.