In re H.J. CA2/3

CourtListener 10404023CalctappApr 29, 2025

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Filed 4/29/25 In re H.J. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B337665 c/w B338805
In re H.J. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00772A–D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Dismissed as to B337665;
vacated in part and remanded as to B338805.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A.J. (mother) challenges a juvenile court finding that the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) does
not apply in the dependency matters concerning her four
children: H.J., K.W., D.W., and R.W. Mother believes her
grandmother belongs to the Yaqui Tribe. Although the tribe
responded to notices and indicated that the children are neither
members nor eligible for membership in the tribe, mother
contends substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court
finding because DCFS failed to interview available maternal
relatives when it was gathering information about the mother’s
Indian ancestry.
Mother’s oldest child, H.J., was placed in the custody of his
father and, while the appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated dependency jurisdiction in his matter. We dismiss
mother’s appeal in H.J.’s case as moot. As to the appeal
regarding mother’s three younger children, we conclude there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s ICWA
finding. We vacate the finding and remand for further
proceedings.
THE APPEAL AS TO H.J. (B337665) IS MOOT
In March 2023, DCFS filed a petition alleging H.J., K.W.,
and D.W. were persons described by Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), based on ongoing
domestic violence between mother and Robert W., the father of

2
K.W. and D.W., and due to Robert W.’s substance abuse.1 At the
jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained an amended
petition as to H.J. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the
juvenile court removed H.J. from mother and released him to his
father, T.W. In October 2024, while this appeal was pending, the
juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction.2
DCFS contends the appeal as to H.J. is now moot and
should be dismissed. We agree.
In In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 (D.P.), the California
Supreme Court explained that the critical factor in deciding
whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether an appellate
court can grant effective relief if it finds reversible error—that is,
whether reversal can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ legal status. (Id. at pp. 276–277.) Here, our decision on
mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding can have
no practical, tangible effect on any party’s legal status.
Beyond the first contact with a child, ICWA imposes
obligations on a child welfare agency and the juvenile court only
when a child is placed in temporary custody and when the court
is presiding “over any juvenile proceeding that could result in
placement of an Indian child with someone other than a parent
. . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) H.J. is placed with a parent.
Dependency jurisdiction is terminated. Even if we reversed the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2 We previously granted DCFS’s request that we take
judicial notice of juvenile court orders from September and
October 2024 terminating dependency jurisdiction over H.J. and
staying the order pending receipt of a juvenile custody order, the
order lifting the stay, and the final juvenile custody order.

3
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply to H.J., it would
have no effect on any relevant party. Mother asserts the appeal
is not moot because there could be another dependency case in
the future concerning H.J. and whether he is an Indian child
would again be relevant. This possibility is entirely speculative
and insufficient to avoid mootness. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 278.) As to H.J. and ICWA, there is no ongoing harm and no
actual controversy to be decided.
Mother’s appeal as to H.J. is dismissed.
APPEAL AS TO K.W., D.W., AND R.W. (B338805)
I. Relevant Background
During DCFS’s initial contacts with mother and the
maternal grandmother in February 2023, both reported that the
maternal family has Native American ancestry with the Yaqui
Tribe. The social worker “requested . . . any information that is
available from mother and [maternal grandmother].” At the
March 2023 initial hearing, mother submitted a parental
notification of Indian status form indicating she is or may be a
member of, or eligible for membership in, the Yaqui Tribe. On
the form, mother provided the maternal great-grandmother’s
name and telephone number.3 The juvenile court ordered DCFS

3 Robert W. also indicated he is or may be eligible for
membership in several federally recognized Indian tribes. DCFS
made inquiries regarding the potential Indian ancestry of K.W.,
D.W., and R.W. (collectively, the children) through their paternal
family and sent ICWA notices to the tribes identified. On appeal,
mother does not argue DCFS or the juvenile court failed to
comply with their obligations under ICWA with respect to the
children’s paternal lineage. We therefore do not discuss in detail
the evidence or proceedings related to the investigation of Robert
W.’s Indian ancestry.

4
to contact mother’s family members to investigate Indian
heritage. The court also ordered DCFS to contact the relevant
Indian tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to determine
whether ICWA applied to the case.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report, DCFS indicated
ICWA might apply. On April 3, 2023, the investigating social
worker interviewed mother about Indian ancestry. Mother again
reported that she believed her maternal grandmother—the
maternal great-grandmother—belongs to the Yaqui Tribe.
Mother was not registered with the tribe. The social worker
attempted to contact the maternal great-grandmother at the
telephone number mother had provided. The voicemail did not
allow her to leave a message.
Although the investigating social worker spoke with
maternal grandmother on April 4, 2023, the report indicated
maternal grandmother was upset that DCFS was considering
removing the children from mother’s care. Although the social
worker tried to explain that DCFS was not seeking to remove the
children, maternal grandmother “would not listen.” The social
worker was “unable to interview [her] regarding the allegations.”
The report did not indicate whether the social worker also
attempted to ask further questions about the family’s Indian
ancestry.
Although the detention and jurisdiction and disposition
reports mentioned that mother had extended family living in
Arizona, including the children’s maternal aunt and great-uncle,
the record does not indicate that DCFS attempted to interview
those relatives about the family’s Indian ancestry. DCFS was
also in contact with at least one maternal great-aunt in Los

5
Angeles, but there is no report that DCFS attempted to interview
her about the family’s Indian ancestry.
On April 6, 2023, the social worker mailed ICWA notices to
the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, using judicial council form
ICWA-030. With respect to the maternal family, the ICWA
notices provided mother’s name, current and former addresses,
and birth date; the maternal grandmother’s name; the maternal
grandfather’s name; and the maternal great-grandmother’s name
and date of birth. The notices listed as “unknown” mother’s
birthplace, maternal grandmother’s current and former
addresses, maternal grandmother’s date of birth, maternal
grandmother’s birthplace, maternal grandfather’s date of birth,
maternal grandfather’s current and former addresses, maternal
grandfather’s birthplace, maternal great-grandmother’s current
and former addresses, maternal great-grandmother’s birthplace,
and all information about the maternal great-grandfather. For
each relative, the form included a space for DCFS to identify
“tribe or band and location,” and a tribal membership or
enrollment number, if known. For mother and all maternal
ancestors, DCFS wrote “does not apply” for the tribe or band and
location, and “unknown” for the tribal membership or enrollment
number. No other information was provided for any maternal
relatives.4 As relevant here, the notices were sent to the Pascua
Yaqui Tribe and the BIA in Sacramento and Washington D.C.
In April 2023, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe responded to the
notices by letter. The tribe indicated that mother and the

4 Optional questions such as whether any of the child’s
family members attended an Indian school or lived on “federal
trust land, a reservation or rancheria, or an allotment,” were left
blank.

6
children are not members of the tribe and did not have
applications for membership pending. The letter further
explained: “Based upon the family information provided and the
current enrollment records, the children are not eligible for
membership and the Tribe will not intervene in this matter.”
In June 2023, mother gave birth to her third child with
Robert W. DCFS filed a petition concerning the new baby, R.W.
According to the detention report, a social worker again asked
mother about Indian ancestry. Mother again said she believed
her family belongs to the Yaqui Tribe but denied that she was
registered with the tribe. Mother filed another parental
notification of Indian status form identifying her possible
membership in the Yaqui Tribe and providing maternal great-
grandmother’s name and telephone number. DCFS sent a new
ICWA-030 form to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe and BIA offices
regarding R.W. The form contained the same information as the
prior set of notices. In August 2023, the tribe responded by
letter, notifying the court that R.W. is not a member of the tribe
or eligible for membership based on the family information
provided and current enrollment records.
In January 2024, the juvenile court conducted an
adjudication hearing on the petitions then pending. The court
sustained the amended petitions, but stated it understood there
were “outstanding ICWA issues.” The children’s counsel asked
the court to continue the disposition hearing because of ICWA.
She had been in communication with the county’s counsel
“regarding what I found and notice not being proper” and asked
that the matter be continued “until we can work out the ICWA
status.” County counsel agreed: “I think the ICWA issue
addresses both [sic] children, so it does need to be updated.” She

7
further explained that there was “a lot of information that was
missing that I think we didn’t have in the beginning.” Neither
the court nor counsel explained on the record what they viewed
as the deficiencies in the prior ICWA notices.
There is no record of DCFS’s further efforts to gather
information about mother’s Indian heritage. However, in
February 2024, DCFS sent new ICWA notices to the Pascua
Yaqui Tribe. In addition to the information included on the prior
notices regarding the maternal relatives, the new notices
indicated that mother, maternal grandmother, and the maternal
great-grandmother claimed Yaqui heritage. The notices included
mother’s birthplace. Maternal grandmother was identified with
an additional, alternative last name. Her date of birth was listed
with a note, presumably related to her birthplace, that
“[maternal grandmother] refused to provide the info.” The notice
additionally indicated that the maternal great-grandmother was
reported to have lived on an “unknown reservation.”
At the continued March 2024 disposition hearing, DCFS
asked for a further continuance because ICWA notice was not
proper and more information was needed, at least as to Robert
W.’s potential membership in a tribe. Neither counsel nor the
court described in detail the status of any ICWA investigation or
notice. The court continued the disposition hearing to April.
In March 2024, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe responded to the
second set of ICWA notices. A letter from the tribe’s Attorney
General notified the court: “The Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s Enrollment
Department has completed a preliminary enrollment check for
this family.” The tribe indicated the children are not members of
the tribe and are not eligible for enrollment. The tribe further

8
informed the court it would not intervene in the children’s
matters.
At the continued April 2024 hearing, DCFS reported it had
not received responses to ICWA notices sent to two tribes related
to Robert W.’s Indian ancestry. The juvenile court again
continued the disposition hearing.5
At the continued June 2024 disposition hearing, the
juvenile court found it did not have a reason to know the children
are Indian children. The court ordered the parents to keep
DCFS, their attorneys, and the court aware of any new
information relating to possible ICWA status. The court removed
the children from both parents and ordered reunification services.
DISCUSSION
I. ICWA Inquiry and Notice
“Section 224.2 codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of
inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian child.”6 (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131, fn. omitted (Dezi C.).) An
“ ‘Indian child’ ” is “any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);
§ 224.1, subd. (a).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (a), provides that both the
juvenile court and child welfare agency have an “affirmative and

5 The matter was continued only as to the three youngest
children. The juvenile court proceeded to disposition as to H.J.
The court removed H.J. from mother, released him to his father,
and set a hearing pursuant to section 364.
6 Section 224 et seq., is the California Indian Child Welfare
Act.

9
continuing duty” to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child, beginning with the “initial contact.” Under
section 224.2, subdivision (b), if a child is placed in the agency’s
temporary custody, the agency must inquire whether the child is
or may be an Indian child, by asking a nonexclusive group that
includes the child, the parents, and extended family members.
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e), if the juvenile court or
social worker has reason to believe an Indian child is involved in
the proceeding, but does not have enough information to
determine there is a reason to know the child is an Indian child,
the court or the social worker must make further inquiry, as soon
as practicable. “[R]eason to believe” means the court or social
worker has information “suggesting that either the parent of the
child or the child is a member . . . or may be eligible for
membership . . . in an Indian tribe.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).)
“Further inquiry” includes actions such as “[i]nterviewing
the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members” to
gather information that would be necessary to provide notice to
any relevant tribes. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
That information includes “[a]ll names known of the Indian
child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents,
or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former
names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses,
birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment,
membership, or citizenship information of other direct lineal
ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).)
Further inquiry also includes contacting the BIA and State
Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying
contact information of relevant tribes, and contacting the “tribe

10
or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected
to have information regarding the child’s membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B)–(C).)
There is “reason to know” a child is an Indian child when: a
person having an interest in the child informs the court the child
is an Indian child; the residence of the child, the child’s parents,
or the child’s Indian custodian, is on a reservation or in an
Alaskan Native village; a participant in the proceeding, officer of
the court, Indian tribe or organization, or agency informs the
court it has discovered information indicating the child is an
Indian child; the child gives the court reason to know that the
child is an Indian child; the court is informed that the child is or
has been a ward of a tribal court; or the court is informed either
the parent or the child possesses an identification card indicating
membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
Formal notice to a tribe or tribes is required only when there is a
reason to know the child is an Indian child. (§§ 224.2, subd. (f);
224.3, subd. (a).) An Indian tribe’s determination that a child is
or is not a member, or eligible for membership in the tribe, is
conclusive. (§ 224.2, subd. (h).)
Under section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), if “the court makes a
finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence as required in this section have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,
the court may make a finding that [ICWA] . . . does not apply to
the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.”
II. Standard of Review
In In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005
(Ezequiel G.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., a panel

11
of this court concluded that a juvenile court’s finding that there is
no reason to know a child is an Indian child is reviewed for
substantial evidence. The court concluded, however, that the
determination of whether the child welfare agency has engaged
in a “proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as
required” under section 224.2 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
In In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101 (Kenneth
D.), the California Supreme Court declined to determine the
proper standard for reviewing a trial court’s finding under
section 224.2, subdivision (i). However, the court adopted
relevant reasoning from In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566,
589: “ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes. When . . . the court’s implied
finding that the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly
diligent rests on a cursory record and a patently insufficient
inquiry that is conceded, the only viable conclusion is that the
finding is unsupported by substantial evidence and the court’s
conclusion to the contrary constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion.’ ” (Kenneth D., at pp. 1101–1102.)
Similarly, while not addressing the proper standard of
review, the Dezi C. court noted “that the juvenile court’s fact-
specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and
duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[quoting Ezequiel G.] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

12
III. The Record Fails to Support the Juvenile Court
Finding that DCFS’s Inquiry was Proper, Adequate,
and Duly Diligent
On appeal, mother contends DCFS failed to comply with its
obligation to conduct further inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision (e), and the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS’s
inquiry was adequate. We agree.
It is undisputed that after DCFS’s initial inquiry, there was
reason to believe the children are Indian children. Further
inquiry was therefore necessary to help the court and DCFS
determine whether there is reason to know the children are
Indian children. Under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2), that
further inquiry was to include, but was not limited to,
interviewing extended family members, contacting the BIA, and
contacting the relevant tribe. As relevant here, an extended
family member is a legal adult who is the child’s “grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1,
subd. (c)(1).)
Although providing formal notice to the tribe was not
necessary at this stage, DCFS used judicial council form ICWA-
030, Notice of Child Custody Proceedings for Indian Child, to
contact the Pascua Yaqui Tribe. While this was a permissible
means of completing one required step of the further inquiry
process (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C)), the first version of the form sent
to the tribe in April 2023 was largely incomplete. It was missing
information DCFS was required to gather under section 224.2,
subdivision (e)(2)(A) and section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5),
including mother’s birthplace, the maternal grandparents’ birth
dates, all information about the maternal great-grandmother

13
besides her name and date of birth, and all information about the
maternal great-grandfather. The record does not indicate that
DCFS attempted to obtain the missing information from mother
or any extended family member prior to sending the form to the
tribe.
Although DCFS sent a second set of ICWA-030 notices to
the tribe, they provided little additional information. Still
missing was the maternal great-grandmother’s current or former
address; her maiden, married, or former names; and any
information about the maternal great-grandfather.
We may infer that DCFS spoke with someone in mother’s
family to obtain the additional information included on the
second set of ICWA notices, but the record is silent on who that
might have been. DCFS did not provide the court with a written
or oral report explaining what steps it took to obtain additional
information about the maternal great-grandparents, as required
under sections 224.2 and 224.3. DCFS did not inform the court
whether it attempted to contact the maternal great-grandmother
more than once. The record further indicates social workers were
aware of several extended family members, including some who
lived in Arizona, where the Yaqui Tribe is located. DCFS had
contact with some of these relatives. Yet, there is no evidence
that DCFS attempted to ask these relatives about the family’s
claimed Yaqui heritage.
While the juvenile court had significant discretion to
determine the adequacy of DCFS’s further inquiry, the record
before us fails to provide evidence of anything the agency did to
further inquire, except sending incomplete notice documents to
the Yaqui Tribe. On appeal, DCFS concedes that the record “does
not reflect that DCFS conducted ICWA inquiries with respect to

14
maternal great-grandmother and other maternal relatives.”
However, the agency contends the further inquiry was
nonetheless sufficient because the Yaqui Tribe concluded the
children are not members of the tribe “based on the names and
dates of birth of the children’s direct maternal lineal ancestors
including maternal great-grandmother.”
We disagree. Although DCFS provided the tribe with the
names and dates of birth of mother, maternal grandmother,
maternal grandfather, and the maternal great-grandmother, it
provided no information about the maternal great-grandfather.
The record does not indicate whether DCFS asked mother,
maternal grandmother, or the maternal great-grandmother
whether the maternal great-grandfather had any Indian ancestry
or was also believed to have Yaqui heritage. This information
would be potentially important in a calculation of the blood
quantum of the children. But even assuming the maternal great-
grandmother was the only relative who was believed to be a
member of the tribe, the overall incompleteness of the ICWA-030
form potentially undermined the tribe’s determination, which
was based at least in part on “the family information provided.”
In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636 (Breanna S.),
disapproved of on other grounds in In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 637, footnote 6, is instructive. In that case, the issue
on appeal was the adequacy of notice to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe.
Under the version of the statute in effect at the time, the mother
and maternal grandmother’s statements that the family possibly
had Indian ancestry in the Yaqui Tribe through the maternal
great-grandmother was sufficient to trigger a duty to provide
notice to the tribe. (Breanna S., at pp. 644, 649–650.) DCFS sent
ICWA notices that were missing required information, including

15
the maternal grandparents’ current and former addresses, the
maternal grandmother’s place of birth, and the maternal great-
grandparents’ places of birth and death. (Id. at p. 651.) DCFS
conceded some of the information was known to the agency but
argued its omission was harmless. The agency additionally
argued the record did not indicate that other omitted information
was known or ascertainable. (Ibid.)
The court rejected the latter contention, relying on the
agency’s “ ‘ “affirmative and continuing duty” ’ to make the
inquiries necessary to determine whether a dependent child is or
may be an Indian child.” (Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at
p. 652.) DCFS had interviewed the mother and maternal
grandmother about the family’s Indian ancestry, but the record
did not demonstrate that the agency asked either of them about
the maternal grandfather, made any effort to locate and
interview the maternal grandfather, or attempted to learn the
birthplace of the maternal great-grandfather. (Ibid.) The court
found this investigation inadequate. (Id. at pp. 652, 655.)
The court also rejected the argument that the omissions
were harmless. The court noted the tribe’s assessment that the
children were not members of or eligible for membership in the
tribe was based on the family information provided. The court
reasoned that some of the information missing from the ICWA
notices concerned the maternal great-grandmother, “the ancestor
who [the mother and maternal grandmother] had affirmatively
identified as a Yaqui Indian.” (Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th
at p. 654.) As a result, the court could not “say with any degree of
confidence that additional information concerning that relative,
her husband and her daughter would not have altered the tribe’s
evaluation.” (Ibid.)

16
In this case, we are concerned with the adequacy of DCFS’s
further inquiry, not mandatory notice to the tribe. However, the
Breanna S. court’s reasoning remains relevant. DCFS contends
no further inquiry of mother’s family members was necessary
because it contacted the tribe and the tribe found the children
were not members or eligible for membership. But as the
Breanna S. court explained, the tribe’s determination was based
on the family information DCFS provided. If that information
was significantly incomplete, the trial court could not conclude
DCFS’s inquiry of the tribe was, standing alone, sufficient to
show adequate and diligent inquiry under section 224.2.
Section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2) requires that in conducting
a further inquiry, the child welfare agency gather the very
information DCFS failed to collect here. DCFS presented no
evidence demonstrating it made any efforts to interview available
family members who might have been able to provide that
missing information. Under these circumstances, we can only
conclude that the court’s implied finding that DCFS’s inquiry was
“ ‘proper, adequate, and duly diligent . . . is unsupported by
substantial evidence and the court’s conclusion to the contrary
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.’ [Citations.]” (Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1102.)
However, the children remain under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction and the matter is continuing. “So long as proceedings
are ongoing and all parties recognize the continuing duty of
ICWA inquiry, both the Agency and the juvenile court have an
adequate opportunity to fulfill those statutory duties.” (In re S.H.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 179.) We therefore do not
conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s June 17, 2024
disposition orders. We instead vacate only the juvenile court’s

17
June 17, 2024 finding that ICWA did not apply with respect to
K.W., D.W., and R.W., and direct the juvenile court to conduct
further proceedings consistent with section 224.2 and the court
and DCFS’s continuing ICWA inquiry duty.
DISPOSITION
The appeal as to H.J. (B337665) is dismissed. In the
appeal as to K.W., D.W., and R.W. (B338805), the juvenile court’s
June 17, 2024 ICWA finding is vacated and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In all other respects, the juvenile court orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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