People v. Rivas CA2/7

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Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Rivas CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B330923

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA014016)
v.

DAVID IGNACIO RIVAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Roberto Longoria, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J.
Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

David Ignacio Rivas appeals from the superior court’s
denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 The superior court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and determined the People proved beyond a reasonable
doubt he was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 1993, Anthony Noriega was killed by a
single shotgun blast to the head in Diana Esperon’s living room.
Noriega was driven to Esperon’s home by Elisio Reynoso. At the
time of the shooting, Esperon was home with her daughter, her
roommate John Gonzalez, and her friend Kathleen Kong. Adrian
Garibay, Jason Montoya, and Rivas were charged with Noriega’s
murder, robbery, attempted murder of Reynoso, and attempted
robbery.

A. Trial Proceedings
In 1995, Garibay, Montoya, and Rivas were tried together.
The People’s theory at trial was that Esperon asked the three
defendants to help her rob Noriega in a false drug deal. Esperon
did not testify at trial or at the preliminary hearing.

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.

2
1. Reynoso’s Testimony
Reynoso testified Noriega asked him for a ride on
January 11, 1993. They met at a restaurant, and Reynoso drove
Noriega to Esperon’s home in Monterey Park. When they
arrived, Noriega told Reynoso to park several houses away.
Noriega went into the house and returned a few minutes later.
Reynoso then drove him to a convenience store, where Noriega
played video games for 30 to 45 minutes. They also stopped at a
McDonald’s so Noriega could use the restroom. When they
returned to Esperon’s home, Reynoso again parked a few houses
away. While they waited in the car for Esperon’s call, they
observed a black jeep drive by and return, at which point a
woman got out of the car. Noriega entered the home shortly
thereafter. He left his cell phone in the car. Reynoso saw a man,
whom he later identified as Garibay, walk out of the house and
approach the black jeep. Garibay then walked back into the
house with a man. Reynoso described Garibay and the man as
gang members. Reynoso called Noriega about the two men
heading to the house but Noriega assured him, “Oh, it is okay, I
know them.”
A few minutes later, Garibay approached Reynoso in his
car and insisted Noriega wanted to speak with Reynoso inside.
Reynoso was reluctant but complied when Noriega did not
answer his calls. As they entered, Garibay put a
.45 semiautomatic gun to Reynoso’s head and demanded to know
where the money was. When they walked through the house,
Reynoso saw Noriega lying face down on the ground with a man
standing over him holding a shotgun to his head. At trial,
Reynoso identified Rivas as the man standing over Noriega.

3
When Garibay again demanded to know where the money
was, Reynoso told him, “It is in the trash.” Rivas instructed
Garibay to take Reynoso outside to retrieve the money. Noriega
warned Reynoso, “Don’t do anything stupid.” Rivas said, “Don’t
do anything stupid or I will kill your friend.”
Once outside, Garibay demanded Reynoso’s car keys and
said, “Don’t do anything stupid or I will shoot you on the street.”
Garibay put the gun in his waistband. Reynoso pretended to look
in the trash but when he saw that Garibay was not holding the
gun, he ran and hid in bushes around the corner. Garibay fired
four or five shots after him.
Because his car was found at the scene of the shooting,
Monterey Park police officers visited Reynoso at his home to
interview him. Reynoso initially told the officers he lent Noriega
his car and knew nothing about the shooting. When the officers
suggested he may have somehow been involved in the shooting
and what they suspected was a drug deal, Reynoso relayed to
them the events he testified to at trial.
On January 12, 1993, the day after the shooting, Reynoso
identified Garibay, by photograph, as the man who took him
outside. Although he was also shown a photograph of Montoya,
Reynoso did not recognize him and stated the man who held the
shotgun was “much thinner.”

2. Gonzalez’s Testimony
John Gonzalez rented a room in Esperon’s house and
witnessed the events that night. Gonzalez’s preliminary hearing
testimony was read into the record at trial because he asserted
his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and was found to be
unavailable. At the preliminary hearing, Gonzalez testified he

4
observed Noriega, Esperon, and the three defendants watching
television together on January 11. That evening, he went into his
bedroom, loaded his shotgun, and put it under his mattress
before going to take a shower. He testified he did this every night
for protection. When he returned to his room, Gonzalez heard
Montoya and Garibay demanding money from Noriega. When
Gonzalez looked out of the partially closed bedroom door, he saw
Garibay holding a shotgun. He also saw Montoya but no one else.
Gonzalez checked for his own shotgun and realized it was gone.2
When Gonzalez looked out of his bedroom door again, he
saw Montoya holding the shotgun. Montoya and Garibay
continued to demand money from Noriega. Gonzalez then heard
Reynoso knocking on the side door or front door. When Reynoso
came in, Noriega asked him to “please give these people the
money.” Gonzalez heard Reynoso exit the house with Garibay.
Gonzalez testified it was Montoya, not Rivas, who stood over
Noriega with the shotgun.
Gonzalez then heard four rounds fired outside of the house,
consistent with Reynoso’s account. Soon thereafter, he heard a
shotgun blast inside the house. Gonzalez saw Garibay, Montoya,
and Rivas run toward his bedroom and ask Esperon to drive
them away. Montoya dropped the shotgun as they left the house.
Gonzalez called 911. He confirmed it was his shotgun that was
used against Noriega, and forensics confirmed Gonzalez did not
have gunshot residue on his hands. Monterey Park police arrived
at approximately 10:00 p.m.

2 During the trial, Gonzalez informed the lead detective he
lied about his shotgun being taken without his knowledge. He
told the detective Garibay took it from him at gunpoint.

5
Gonzalez initially told the police he was asleep at the time
of the shooting and did not identify any of the defendants. He
later changed his account to what he relayed in his preliminary
hearing testimony.

3. Rivas’s Defense
Rivas did not testify at trial. He argued in his defense
there was reasonable doubt about his culpability because
Reynoso’s statements to the police were inconsistent with his
trial testimony and because Gonzalez testified he saw Montoya,
and not Rivas, holding the shotgun that killed Noriega. Rivas
argued he was not present at the incident in Esperon’s home
because he was at his aunt’s birthday party at the time of the
shooting. His aunt, Virginia Cervantes, and her granddaughter
testified at trial that Rivas was at the party.

4. The Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Rivas guilty of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) as charged in count 1; the lesser included offense of
attempted first degree residential robbery (§§ 211, 664) to the
charge of first degree residential robbery in count 2; and the
lesser included offense of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)) to the charge of attempted murder in count 3. The
jury also found true that a principal was armed with a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), as to
counts 1 and 3; and that Rivas personally used a shotgun within
the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), as to count 2.
The trial court sentenced Rivas to state prison for 30 years
to life. Rivas appealed from the judgment and this Court
affirmed.

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B. Resentencing Proceedings
On March 1, 2019, Rivas filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95, current section 1172.6. After
appointing counsel and considering the parties’ briefs, the
superior court issued an order to show cause. Codefendants
Montoya and Garibay also filed section 1172.6 petitions and the
petitions were heard together. On September 13, 2022, the court
conducted a joint evidentiary hearing on Rivas’s and Montoya’s
petitions.3 The People submitted the record of the previous trial
and appeal.

1. Additional Evidence
Rivas did not testify or present any evidence at the joint
evidentiary hearing.
Montoya testified at the hearing and presented additional
evidence pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Montoya
testified that Esperon contacted him for help in conducting a
drug deal. She did not trust the buyer Noriega and wanted
Montoya there to ask Noriega to leave in the event something
happened. Esperon picked him up from his apartment and drove
him to her home in Monterey Park. Garibay, Gonzalez, and
Esperon’s daughter were there when Montoya arrived. Rivas
arrived approximately 45 minutes later and was told about the
plan after he indicated he would stay. Montoya and Garibay
were gang members at the time. Montoya denied Rivas was a
member of their gang.

3 Garibay died during the section 1172.6 proceedings. The
superior court dismissed his petition.

7
Montoya testified Gonzalez also knew about Esperon’s
plan. According to Montoya, Noriega arrived but he and Esperon
were unable to reach an agreement; Noriega asked Esperon to
show him the drugs and she asked to be shown the money.
Montoya and Rivas hid in the bedroom while Noriega and
Esperon negotiated. Gonzalez joined them and showed them his
shotgun. Montoya testified, “He was acting weird, messing
around with it, pointing it towards the bedroom window just
showing off.” Noriega left about 15 minutes after he arrived but
was expected to return. After waiting one and a half hours,
Montoya left to attend Virginia Cervantes’s birthday party.4
Montoya testified that he refused to help when Esperon asked
again later that evening, and he did not return to Esperon’s home
that night. He asserted he stayed at Cervantes’s party until
approximately midnight, and he saw Rivas at the party during
that time.
Lorinza Anda, Cervantes’s daughter, corroborated
Montoya’s testimony and confirmed she saw and spoke to
Montoya at the party from approximately 8:00 p.m. to midnight.
She admitted she did not testify or alert authorities to his
potential alibi during the original trial even though her daughter
and Cervantes testified in support of Rivas’s defense.
Montoya submitted a transcript of Esperon’s interview with
police in which she admitted to trying to arrange a drug deal
between Noriega (the buyer) and George Medina (the seller). She
and Noriega negotiated the deal in her bedroom, and she called
Medina to bring the drugs. Noriega left before Medina arrived.

4 As stated, Cervantes provided testimony supporting Rivas’s
alibi defense at the 1995 trial.

8
Esperon confirmed to the detective that Montoya, Rivas, and
Garibay were all at her house that day but she was unsure
whether they were all there at the same time that evening.
Esperon confirmed Gonzalez knew about the drug deal, and she
was in a back room with Gonzalez when she heard voices in her
living room and a shot. She then heard someone trying to enter
or exit through her kitchen door. She went to the living room and
saw someone on the floor. She got in her jeep and drove off with
Garibay and Montoya but did not recall whether Rivas was in the
jeep with them. She told the detective she believed Montoya
killed Noriega. She believed she knew Garibay well and even
though he “can be heartless,” he would not kill someone in her
house. On the other hand, she described Rivas as a kid who
“really doesn’t know what is going on.”

2. Superior Court Orders
The superior court denied Rivas’s section 1172.6 petition
but granted Montoya’s petition. As to Rivas, the court stated:
“The Court then finds that the People’s witness, Mr.
[Reynoso] who accompanied the victim Mr. Anthony Noriega in
this case positively identified Mr. Rivas as not only being present
at the time of the killing, but as the person who held the shotgun,
pointed at the victim’s head as he was on the ground.
“There is very substantial evidence[5] that further supports
the fact that the trial testimony of witness Reynoso indicated

5 The deputy district attorney clarified with the court during
its ruling that the standard of proof was beyond a reasonable
doubt and not substantial evidence.

9
that it was David Rivas who said, ‘Don’t do anything stupid or I
will kill your friend.’
“It goes without saying that in addition to intending to
commit a robbery with a loaded weapon, the act of pointing a
shotgun close to the victim’s head and threatening to kill the
victim to the victim’s friend [if he] does not comply with the
demands[,] he is clearly acting with reckless indifference to
human life and supports the findings that Petitioner David Rivas
was the participant of the underlying felony by virtue of his
continued participation and presence at the scene.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“In this court’s view [this evidence] clearly demonstrates a
reckless indifference to human life and supports a finding that he
was a major participant in the underlying felony by virtue, again,
of his continued participation and armed presence at the time.
“The court also notes that at trial Petitioner Rivas called
alibi witnesses at trial claiming that he could not have been
present at the crime location because he was at a family party.
The jury, therefore, considered and found those witnesses either
not trustworthy, unreliable, or unbelievable as reflected in their
guilty verdict and charges against him.
“Therefore, for all the aforementioned reasons the court is
going to deny the petitioner’s request for resentencing and find
he’s ineligible for relief as to Mr. Rivas.”
As to Montoya, the court noted the contradictory testimony
provided by Reynoso (who testified Rivas held the shotgun over
Noriega), and Gonzales (who testified he saw Montoya hold the
shotgun just before he heard the blast). The court determined
Reynoso was more credible than Gonzalez, since Reynoso
consistently told officers at the photo show up, in the live lineup,

10
and at trial that Montoya was not the person holding the
shotgun. By contrast, Gonzalez’s “testimony regarding what
happened was not only inconsistent depending on who
interviewed him, his actions and motives were certainly highly
suspect.” The court expressed that it “would abandon its
responsibilities of making an independent evaluation[] of the
evidence” if it simply accepted the People’s argument Gonzalez’s
testimony was trustworthy or reliable.
Rivas timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Rivas first asserts the superior court improperly considered
itself bound by the jury’s findings thus abdicating its role as an
independent fact finder. Rivas next argues the evidence was
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because
Reynoso’s eyewitness identification was “deeply flawed.” Lastly,
Rivas contends the trial court improperly failed to consider
Rivas’s youth—he had just turned 18 at the time of the
shooting—when it determined he acted with reckless indifference
to human life.

A. Section 1172.6 and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony murder rule by
amending sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

11
(Lewis).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). Section 189 now requires the People to prove the
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and
abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2));
or a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448 (Curiel); People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also provided a procedure in
section 1172.6 for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the individual could not
have been convicted of murder under the changes to sections 188
and 189. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
Where, as here, the petitioner makes the requisite prima
facie showing he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the
superior court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (See § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189

12
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“Of course, in a section [1172.6] petition, the trial judge [is
not] charged with holding a whole new trial on all the elements of
murder. Instead, the parties will focus on evidence made
relevant by the amendments to the substantive definition of
murder.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298
(Clements); accord, People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943,
952 (Vargas); see People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 678
(Daniel) [rejecting argument that section 1172.6 “authorizes a
defendant to present new evidence to undermine a jury’s finding
of guilt under a particular theory of murder, effectively retrying
the case”].)
We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence, provided
the court understood the elements of the offense and applied the
proper standard and burden of proof. (See Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988; Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)

B. The Superior Court Made Independent Factual Findings
Rivas first contends the court failed to act as an
independent fact finder because it erroneously believed it was
bound by the jury’s personal use true finding and by its rejection
of Rivas’s alibi defense. According to Rivas, the jury’s findings

13
did not have preclusive effect under collateral estoppel principles
because new evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing.
The new evidence consisted of Montoya’s testimony that he saw
Rivas at the birthday party, and the newly admitted transcript of
Esperon’s statement to the police that she did not recall Rivas
being in the car when she drove Montoya and Garibay away after
the shooting.
The superior court acts as an independent fact finder at a
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. (See Gomez v. Superior Court
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 778, 787.) Its factual determinations are
limited to “issues made relevant by the changes to the law
effected by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Ibid.; accord, People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458.) As stated, “in a
section [1172.6] petition, the trial judge [is not] charged with
holding a whole new trial on all the elements of murder. Instead,
the parties will focus on evidence made relevant by the
amendments to the substantive definition of murder.” (Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 470 [section 1172.6 does not permit “‘litigat[ing] anew’ any
trial issues or allowing ‘a petitioner to challenge any aspect of the
factfinding from the original trial that [they] wish[] to revisit.’”];
People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 661 [same].)
Here, the record shows the superior court independently
considered the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and
applied the proper standard of proof.6 Gonzalez and Reynoso
provided contradictory testimony about who held the shotgun

6 As stated, although the court misspoke by stating there
was “very substantial evidence” supporting its findings, the
deputy district attorney immediately interjected to ensure the
court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.

14
aimed at Noriega. In its ruling, the superior court addressed
Gonzalez’s and Reynoso’s testimony at length, citing to the record
by page and line number and noting any inconsistencies. It
found Reynoso was the more credible witness. The court credited
Reynoso’s testimony that Rivas held the shotgun to Noriega’s
head and threatened to kill Noriega. It discounted Gonzalez’s
testimony that he observed Montoya holding the shotgun just
before he heard the shot.
The superior court’s detailed examination of the evidence
demonstrates it did not simply “defer” to the jury’s true finding as
to (1) the personal use enhancement and (2) the jury’s implicit
rejection of the alibi defense. First, its differing orders on
Montoya’s and Rivas’s petitions demonstrate the court did not
consider itself bound by the jury’s personal use finding in light of
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the
jury found true the same section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
personal use enhancement as to both Montoya and Rivas in
connection with the attempted robbery conviction. If the court
believed it was bound by the jury’s personal use findings, it would
not have granted Montoya’s petition and denied that of Rivas.
Second, the record before us demonstrates the superior court did
take into account the jury’s rejection of Rivas’s alibi defense when
the court noted the alibi witness testimony in its ruling, but it did
not treat the jury’s finding as conclusive and made its own
conclusion.
The California Supreme Court has “rejected the argument
that section 1172.6 categorically prohibited the consideration of
factual findings made by a jury in the defendant’s underlying
trial.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451, discussing Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) As Strong explained, section 1172.6

15
“strongly suggests” the Legislature intended superior courts to
examine “many, and perhaps most” prior jury findings on
resentencing, whether adverse or favorable to a defendant.
(Strong, at p. 715.) The Legislature did not intend “to permit
wholesale relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions”
in resentencing proceedings. (Ibid.; People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [“a section [1172.6] petition is not a
means by which a [petitioner] can relitigate issues already
decided”].) As a result, “general principles of issue preclusion
informed [the high court’s] consideration of the effect of prior jury
findings in a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.6.”
(Curiel, at p. 451.)
Rivas contends issue preclusion does not apply to the jury’s
rejection of his alibi defense in this case because additional
evidence was admitted at the evidentiary hearing. Rivas cites
cases suggesting a superior court may make a factual finding at
odds with those of the jury when the parties present new
evidence concerning that issue at the evidentiary hearing. (See,
e.g., People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376; People v. Henley
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003; People v. Cooper (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 393.)
We need not decide whether the jury’s rejection of Rivas’s
alibi defense has preclusive effect here. Although the superior
court noted the jury’s guilty verdict necessarily meant the jury
rejected the testimony of the alibi witnesses, the court did not
state it was bound by the jury’s implicit finding. It made its own
credibility determination: it believed Reynoso’s testimony placing
Rivas at the scene of the crime. And, as stated, the Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that a superior court is
categorically prohibited from considering a jury’s prior factual

16
findings. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451, discussing
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) Further, the alibi finding
was not relevant to the issues at Rivas’s resentencing hearing,
because the purpose of that hearing was not to relitigate whether
Rivas was involved in the crime but rather to consider the extent
of his involvement. (See Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 678
[section 1172.6 does not allow defendant to present new evidence
to undermine jury’s finding of guilt, effectively retrying the case]);
accord, Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.)

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding Rivas Was a Major Participant and Acted with
Reckless Indifference to Human Life
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under amended section 189, subdivision (e)(3), a person
who participates in one of the felonies listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), may be liable for murder if the People prove he or
she “‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life,’” within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 448; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) “substantially clarified the law
surrounding major participant findings,” and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) “substantially clarified the relevant
considerations for determining whether a defendant has acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” (Strong, supra,
13Cal.5th at p. 721.)
Banks specified that courts should consider: “What role did
the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led
to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in

17
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in
the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
In Clark, the high court analyzed the subjective and
objective elements to determine whether a defendant acts with
reckless indifference to human life, including: was the defendant
aware that weapons would be used; did the defendant himself or
herself use the weapon; did the defendant have an opportunity to
reduce the overall risk of violence during the felony or to aid the
victim; and did the defendant know his cohorts were likely to use
lethal force. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622.) The
high court observed these elements largely overlap with the
“major participant” analysis. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 676-677.) “‘Although we state these two requirements
separately, they often overlap,’” “‘for the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, at p. 615.)
“While the superior court acts as an independent fact finder
in determining whether the People have met their burden, on
appeal, the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence
standard to the superior court’s findings.” (Vargas, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 951; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 590-591 (Mitchell).)
“In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence, we apply well-settled principles. ‘We “‘examine the

18
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that
would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the necessary
fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” [Citation.] Our job on review
is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition.
While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as
to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is
to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480 (Oliver).)

2. Analysis
As stated, after examining the evidence before it, the
superior court credited Reynoso’s identification of Rivas as the
individual standing over Noriega with the shotgun and
threatening to kill Noriega if Reynoso did “anything stupid.”
Under Clark and Banks, this conduct was sufficient to satisfy the
major participant and reckless indifference to human life
components of the current felony-murder law: Rivas was present
at the scene of the robbery; he was armed with a shotgun; he held
the shotgun pointed at Noriega; he threatened Noriega’s life; he
fled after the shooting; and he did not aid Noriega or Reynoso,
the victims. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 615, 618-622.) This is substantial
evidence supporting the superior court’s finding that Rivas was a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.

19
Rivas argues Reynoso’s identification of him was “deeply
flawed” because, in his view, Reynoso could not have seen Rivas
clearly from his vantage point, the house was dark, and Reynoso
was in the house for “mere seconds.” Additionally, Rivas
contends the photo show up procedure was “highly suggestive,”
and Reynoso’s story lacked credibility due to inconsistencies and
Reynoso’s previous falsehoods to detectives. Rivas asserts his
alibi witnesses were more credible than Reynoso. Rivas argues,
“[a]t a minimum, the conflicting accounts given by Gonzalez and
Reynoso, plus Rivas’s alibi evidence, meant that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Rivas’s insufficiency of the evidence arguments address the
reliability and credibility of Reynoso’s testimony vis-à-vis
Gonzalez’s and the alibi witnesses’ testimony. The superior court
found Reynoso’s testimony was reliable and credible. On appeal,
we may not substitute our own credibility determinations for
those of the superior court. (See People v. Nelson (2011)
51 Cal.4th 198, 210 [“‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a
witness’s credibility’”]; Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
Further, to the extent Rivas argues that under
section 1172.6 his actual innocence can be relitigated, the law
does not support the argument. “A defendant cannot use a
section 1172.6 resentencing hearing to relitigate facts already
determined, whether by plea, admission, or verdict.” (People v.
Hill (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 274, 288; accord, People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“‘The purpose of section [1172.6]
is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189
with respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a
do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’”];

20
see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 470.)

D. Youth as a Factor in Rivas’s Mental State
Rivas further contends the superior court failed to consider
his youth as a factor relevant to whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Rivas asserts he had just turned 18 at
the time of the offense. Rivas did not raise this argument in the
superior court and it is forfeited. (See People v. Pittman (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416.) Further, Rivas does not cite anything
in the record before us that would support his contention. (See
People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282-283 [failure
to cite record forfeits issue on appeal].) Rivas fails to provide any
facts and record citations that would support his argument that
his youth affected whether he harbored the requisite mental state
for felony murder.7 (See Pittman, at p. 418 [“The cases discussing
the role of youth in relation to criminal culpability ‘stress two
areas’: youthful offenders’ ‘relative impulsivity’ and ‘their
vulnerability to peer pressure.’”]; ibid. [concluding the
“‘“hallmark features of youth”’ may have been at play” given
specific circumstances of the crime]; but see Mitchell, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595 [“Youth can distort risk calculations.
Yet every 18 year old understands bullet wounds require
attention. The fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other
factors.”].) “[O]ur review is limited to those issues that have been
adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s brief” and “it

7 Rivas asserts that any forfeiture is a result of the
ineffective assistance of counsel he received during the trial
proceedings. Rivas states he intends to file a petition for habeas
corpus addressing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

21
is not the appellate court’s role to construct theories or
arguments” for an appellant. (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
705, 721; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate brief
must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation
of authority”], and rule 8.360(a) [briefs in criminal appeals must
comply with rule 8.204].)

DISPOSITION

The order denying Rivas’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.

22

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