People v. Ramirez CA4/3

CourtListener 10403255CalctappApr 29, 2025

Full text

Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Ramirez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063907

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2100695)

ROBERTO ANDRES RAMIREZ, OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a prejudgment order of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, Jeffrey M. Zimel, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Michael A. Hestrin, Riverside County District Attorney, Janinda
Gunawardene, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
After Respondent Roberto Andres Ramirez was charged with
robbery, he filed a written motion pursuant to Penal Code section 13811,
which allows a defendant who is currently imprisoned to request a speedy
trial on a newly charged offense within 90 days of providing notice to the
prosecution. After filing the section 1381 motion, Ramirez was absent from
court on two separate occasions. Ramirez subsequently moved to dismiss the
robbery charge on the ground the prosecution did not comply with its duty
under section 1381 to transport him to trial within 90 days. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss.
Appellant Riverside County District Attorney seeks reversal,
arguing Ramirez is not entitled to have the charges dismissed because any
delay was due to his purposeful refusal to be transported for trial. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirm the
prejudgment order granting Ramirez’s motion to dismiss.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2021, Ramirez was charged with one count of robbery
(§ 211). The complaint also alleged Ramirez had suffered a prior strike
(§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12 (c)(1)).
On May 30, 2023, while incarcerated in state prison on other
charges, Ramirez filed a demand for trial on the robbery charge pursuant to
section 1381. On June 14, the District Attorney requested a court order
directing the superintendent of Pleasant Valley State Prison to deliver
Ramirez to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office for transport to Riverside
County Superior Court for trial.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
On July 18, a prosecutor and public defender (appearing as a
friend of the court), reported Ramirez had not been transported to court for
trial. The trial court read into the record an email it had received from the
District Attorney’s Office, which stated, “‘Per Deputy Lopez, [Robert Presley
Detention Center] Transportation Unit, they went to pick [up] the inmate
yesterday and he refused to leave his cell. He will not be transported for
today’s hearing.’” The court declined to accept the email as evidence or find a
waiver of Ramirez’s right to speedy trial. The matter was continued to
August 7.
On August 7, Ramirez was not present in court. The prosecution
alleged Ramirez had again refused to come out of his cell to be transported to
court. Defense counsel objected on the ground there was no evidence aside
from the prosecution’s hearsay allegation to establish Ramirez refused to
leave his cell. The trial court continued the hearing.
On December 8, Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss the robbery
charge on the ground the prosecution had failed to transport him to court for
hearing on the charges within 90 days, pursuant to section 1381.
On December 22, during the section 1381 hearing, the
prosecution argued it should be denied because Ramirez had waived his
rights under section 1381 by refusing to come out of his cell. The prosecutor
argued that, because Ramirez had allegedly refused to be transported, he was
“no longer demanding a trial.” Defense counsel objected that the prosecution
had only offered inadmissible hearsay regarding Ramirez’s alleged refusal to
come to court. Defense counsel argued Ramirez was entitled to cross-examine
the deputy charged with transporting Ramirez.
The trial court granted Ramirez’s section 1381 motion as follows:
“[A]fter the [district attorney] received the [section] 1381 demand on May

3
30th, under [section] 1381 they had 90 days to bring the defendant here to
court, and that would have been the end of August. And whether or not the
defendant refused on August 9th, I have no information of any other efforts
made to bring him here. [¶] . . . I don’t really believe that I have enough
information to find that as a valid basis to deny the [section] 1381 [motion].
So that is going to be granted. The case is dismissed, [pursuant to section]
1381.”
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE ACTION
A. Legal Standard
Section 1381 requires a trial or a grant of continuance within 90
days of the district attorney’s receipt of a defendant’s demand for trial where
the defendant is already incarcerated on a previous charge. If the 90 day
period is exceeded without either the commencement of trial or a
continuance, the court in which the case is pending is required to dismiss the
charges, on motion of either party, or on its own motion. (Ibid.; see People v.
Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039, 1051, fn. 6.) The “statutory speedy trial
provisions,” which include section 1381, are “‘supplementary to and a
construction of’ the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee.” (People v.
Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766.)
A dismissal under section 1381 does not bar another prosecution
for a felony offense, nor does it act as res judicata of the issues or constitute
prior jeopardy. (Id., subd. (a); see People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614,
622–623.)

4
An appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination of a
statutory speedy trial case for abuse of discretion. (People v. Shane (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 196, 203.)
B. Analysis
Under section 1381, the court “shall . . . dismiss the action” if the
prosecution fails to “bring the defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90
days” after receipt of the defendant’s motion. Thus, the trial court was
required to grant Ramirez’s motion to dismiss the charges unless the
prosecution could prove good cause for the delay. (See People v. Manina
(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 896, 900 (Manina).) Good cause may be established
where the defendant’s own actions cause the delay. (Ibid.) Section 1381’s
provision that the defendant “‘desire[s] to be brought to trial’” requires him to
“reasonably cooperate with, and not obstruct, the prosecutor’s efforts to bring
on the trial within the statutory period.” (Manina at p. 900.) In Manina, the
court concluded the prosecution had established good cause because the delay
in bringing the defendant to trial was “reasonably attributable” to his “real,
or feigned, suicide attempt in the county jail.” (Id. at pp. 900–901.)
Here, the trial court’s determination that the prosecution failed
to meet its burden to establish good cause for the delay was supported by
substantial evidence. The court correctly determined the prosecution failed to
offer any evidence to establish Ramirez actually refused to be transported to
court other than inadmissible hearsay. The prosecution could have sought to
have Deputy Lopez or someone else with direct knowledge testify in court
that Ramirez refused to come out of his cell. Because the prosecution did not
do so, it failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate good cause for the
delay.

5
We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting Ramirez’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1381.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s prejudgment order granting Ramirez’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to section 1381 is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P.J.

SCOTT, J.

6

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.