CourtListener 10386215•People v. Moore CA5
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Filed 4/28/25 P. v. Moore CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088058
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF172121D)
v.
DAVID LEE MOORE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina
Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant David Lee Moore entered an illegal gaming business with three other
gang members and robbed the business at gunpoint. While fleeing, the four robbers shot
at a security guard and wounded him in the leg. A jury convicted defendant of attempted
murder, second degree robbery, assault with a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery and
assault with a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and found true
multiple firearm and gang enhancements.
After defendant’s trial, the Legislature substantially amended the statutes
applicable to gang enhancements and sentencing. On appeal, we reversed the true
findings on the Penal Code1 former section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) gang
enhancements, the section 12022.53, subdivision (e) gang-related firearm enhancements,
and the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement (due to an erroneous jury
instruction). (People v. Moore (July 13, 2023, F082544) [nonpub. opn.].) After remand,
the prosecutor declined to retry the enhancements, and the trial court resentenced
defendant after declining to strike the remaining enhancements.
Defendant argues that we must remand for resentencing because the trial court was
unaware of its discretion to either strike the enhancements and/or impose lesser
enhancements. We conclude that the trial court was aware of its sentencing discretion
and affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On September 25, 2020, a jury convicted defendant of attempted murder (§§ 187,
664; count 1), second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c); count 2), assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), conspiracy to commit robbery and assault with a firearm
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defendant’s appeal raises issues related to errors in his resentencing. Therefore, we
dispense with a recitation of the facts in this case.
2.
(§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 212.5, subd. (c), 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5), and unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The jury also found
true allegations that defendant committed the crimes to benefit a criminal street gang
(former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) as to all counts; personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)), personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) causing great bodily
injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), was vicariously liable for another principal participant’s
use and discharge of a firearm during a gang-related crime (§ 12022.53, subds. (e), (b),
(c), (d)) as to counts 1 and 2; and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) as to counts 3 and 5.3
After defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial court found true that
defendant had a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)).
At the time of defendant’s trial, former section 186.22 provided for enhanced
punishment when a defendant is convicted of an enumerated felony committed “for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.” (Former
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 561, § 178, p. 4369.) Effective
January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 186.22
to require proof of additional elements to establish gang offenses and enhancements.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3.) On appeal, we reversed defendant’s true findings on the gang
3 The information charged codefendants Frankie Duque Ramos and Eric Frank Grijalva
with the same crimes as well as participation in a criminal street gang (former § 186.22,
subd. (a); count 4). Anesia Lucia Ribeiro was charged in counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and also with
accessory to a crime (§ 32; count 7). Adolfo Rivera was charged by separate information for his
involvement in the robbery. The jury convicted Ramos of the same charges and found true the
same enhancements but failed to reach a verdict as to count 4, which charged Ramos with
participating in a criminal street gang. The trial court granted Ribeiro’s motion for judgment of
acquittal as to attempted murder (count 1), and the jury acquitted her of one charge but failed to
reach a verdict as to the remaining three charges against her. The jury also failed to reach a
verdict as to any of the charges against Grijalva.
3.
enhancements (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) as to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 and gang-
related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)) as to counts 1 and 2. Additionally,
we reversed the true finding for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7) due to
an erroneous jury instruction and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the prosecutor declined to retry the enhancements, and the trial court
resentenced defendant on April 24, 2024. The trial court resentenced defendant to a total
prison term of 14 years, plus two years, plus 25 years to life as follows: the middle term
of 14 years for attempted murder (§§ 187, 664, 667, subd. (e)), plus 25 years to life
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), plus stayed terms of 10 and 20 years (§§ 654, 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c)); and a consecutive two-year term for robbery (§§ 212.5, subd. (c), 667,
subd. (e)), plus 25 years to life (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), plus stayed terms of 10 and 20
years (§§ 654, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)).4
As to the remaining charges, the trial court imposed and stayed (§ 654) the
following sentences: the low term of four years for assault with a firearm (§§ 245,
subd. (a)(2), 667, subd. (e)), plus three years (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); the low term of
32 months for conspiracy to commit robbery (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (e)), plus
three years (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and the low term of 32 months for possession of a
firearm by a felon (§§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (e)).5
4 The Judicial Council has separate forms to record defendant’s determinate and
indeterminate sentences: the Determinate Felony Abstract of Judgment (form CR-290) and the
Indeterminate Felony Abstract of Judgment (form CR-292). The trial court erroneously recorded
both the determinate and indeterminate sentences on only the Determinate Felony Abstract of
Judgment (form CR-290). We shall direct the trial court to prepare amended abstracts of
judgment, recording the determinate sentences on the Determinate Felony Abstract of Judgment
(form CR-290) and the indeterminate sentences pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d) on
the Indeterminate Felony Abstract of Judgment (form CR-292) as was done after defendant’s
original sentencing.
5 The trial court previously dismissed enhancements pursuant to sections 12022.5 and
12022.7 as to count 6 because the jury did not make any finding on them. During defendant’s
original sentencing, the court struck the enhancement for a serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)).
4.
The court also ordered defendant to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) as
to counts 1 and 2, a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended $300 parole
revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), $150 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov.
Code, § 70373), and $200 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8).
Defendant timely appealed on May 15, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the record demonstrates that the court was unaware of its
discretion to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements and/or impose
lesser firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) because the
court failed to acknowledge that it had such discretion. We disagree.
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike or dismiss the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements or impose lesser firearm
enhancements.
Defendant contends this case must be remanded for the trial court to consider
whether it would strike the firearm enhancements attached to his sentence pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620). The People argue forfeiture and contend the existing
record fails to show the resentencing court was unaware of its discretionary authority to
strike the challenged enhancement. We agree that defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the trial court was unaware of its resentencing discretion to dismiss or strike the
firearm enhancement pursuant to section 1385.
A. Background
At defendant’s resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued the trial court should
resentence defendant to middle or upper term as to counts 1 and 2 and order that the
sentence on count 2 be served consecutively. Defense counsel argued that the middle
term for attempted murder was “more appropriate” and stated, “I don’t have much more
to add than [what] was laid out in the moving papers as to our argument that the assault
5.
on the security guard was not a different intent or motive but was part of [defendant]
attempting to reach safety from the robbery and, therefore, should be run concurrent.”
Prior to resentencing defendant, the court stated: “I’ve considered everything
that’s been provided to me by both counsel, arguments today, the opinion of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal, to the extent it’s appropriate to consider for resentencing. I’m
exercising all discretion I currently have and discretion I would have in the future, should
I have some additional discretion and law change.”6 The court also indicated that
“[f]actors in aggravation and mitigation have been considered as already indicated based
on my review of everything, including Probation’s new recommendation.”
Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill 620 amended section 12022.53,
subdivision (h) to remove the prohibition on striking a section 12022.53 enhancement
and allow the trial court to dismiss or strike it in the interest of justice pursuant to
section 1385. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2.) Defendant was resentenced on April 24, 2024,
approximately six years after Senate Bill 620 took effect.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“We review the trial court’s exercise of discretion at sentencing for abuse.”
(People v. Shenouda (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 358, 368; see People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) Defendant is entitled to the court’s informed discretion on any
sentencing decision. (See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) A court
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers “ ‘can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose [decision] is or may have been based on misinformation
regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ ” (Ibid.) Under these
circumstances, the proper remedy is to remand “unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that
6 When originally sentenced on March 3, 2021, the court stated: “You fired a weapon, and
given the facts of this case, given everything, given all the factors in aggravation and in
mitigation, I am declining to strike any enhancements other than the [section] 667[, subdivision]
(A) or dismiss any enhancements. I don’t believe it’s warranted.”
6.
the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it
had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Absent evidence to the contrary, [appellate courts] presume that the trial court
knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; see
People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; People v. Martinez (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 686, 728.) Moreover, appellate courts “presume that a judgment or order
of the trial court is correct,” and “ ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666; see Martinez, at p. 728.)
“Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing
court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order.”
(Stowell, at p. 1114; see In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
C. Analysis
(1) Remand is not warranted under Senate Bill 620
a) Forfeiture
“ ‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the
party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which
the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor,
misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number
of valid reasons ....” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) Only “a narrow
class of sentencing issues … are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection,” such as
when a court fails to exercise its discretion. (People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th
1003, 1023.) Therefore, defendant has not forfeited his argument that the trial court was
unaware of its discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancements.
7.
b) Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court
was unaware of the scope of its discretion to dismiss or
strike the firearm enhancements.
A trial court cannot exercise its discretion if it is “unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers.” (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.)
However, we never presume error, so defendant must “affirmatively demonstrate that the
trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.” (People v. Davis (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 168, 172.) Here, defendant did not object at sentencing to imposition of
the firearm enhancements and attempts to avoid forfeiture by framing his argument as the
trial court being unaware of its discretion. We disagree.
Defendant was originally sentenced on March 3, 2021, and resentenced on
April 24, 2024, approximately three and six years, respectively, after Senate Bill 620’s
amendments to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) went into effect on January 1, 2018.
Section 1385 contains no express requirement that a trial court articulate any findings or
rulings unless it strikes or dismisses an enhancement. (See § 1385, subd. (a); In re Large
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [noting the express findings requirement of § 1385, subd. (a)
only applies when a strike is dismissed].) Therefore, in the face of a silent record like this
one, and in the absence of an affirmative duty to make express findings, we presume that
the court knew about section 12022.53, subdivision (h). (People v. Ramirez, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 1042; In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498–499; People v.
Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 666; People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114;
Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; People v. Martinez, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.)
At the time of defendant’s sentencing and resentencing, Senate Bill 620 had
already amended section 12022.53 to permit the trial court to exercise its sentencing
discretion to strike or dismiss defendant’s firearm enhancements. We will not presume
that the trial court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss or strike the firearm
enhancements simply because no party raised the issue and the court never specifically
8.
discussed it. We note, however, that the court stated before resentencing that it intended
to exercise its current sentencing discretion and any future discretion imparted by a
change in the law, although it did not mention any specific sentencing decision to which
the discretion applied. However, during defendant’s original sentencing hearing, the
court specifically stated that it declined to dismiss or strike any enhancements except for
the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, indicating that the court was aware of
its discretion to strike enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (h). As
the information alleged enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c),
(d), and (e), and the jury found all of those allegations true, section 12022.53,
subdivision (h) provided the court discretion to either strike or dismiss all the firearm
enhancements or strike and dismiss section 12022.53, subdivision (d)’s term of 25 years
to life and impose lesser terms of 10 or 20 years pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) or (c).
In support of his position, defendant relies upon People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado), which was decided after defendant’s original sentencing but
before his resentencing. Tirado held that a court may strike a section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement and impose a lesser uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement. (Tirado, at
p. 692). However, we presume the court was aware of its sentencing discretion to impose
less severe firearm enhancements because, unlike in Tirado, those lesser enhancements
were charged in the information as to each individual count, the jury found each of them
to be true, and the court expressly stayed the lesser enhancements in favor of imposing
the most severe enhancement for each count. The issue in Tirado, not present here, was
whether a court may strike a firearm enhancement and instead impose a lesser uncharged
firearm enhancement. (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 696.)
Defendant has failed to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court was unaware
of or misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion. Therefore, defendant is not
entitled to resentencing on this basis.
9.
(2) Remand is not warranted based on the Supreme Court’s decision
in People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015 (McDavid)
However, five days after defendant’s resentencing, our Supreme Court issued its
recent decision in McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1015. After Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688,
our Supreme Court addressed a split of authority that had developed as to whether a trial
court could strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement and impose a lesser
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c). (McDavid, at
p. 1030.) Our Supreme Court held that a court is not limited to permitting imposition of a
lesser uncharged enhancement within section 12022.53 and may impose a lesser
included, uncharged enhancement under another statute if supported by facts that were
alleged and found true. (McDavid, at p. 1030.)
While the information in this case charged a firearm enhancement pursuant to
section 12022.5, the enhancement was not charged as to counts 1 and 2. Nonetheless,
after McDavid, the trial court had discretion to strike the section 12022.53 enhancements
and impose lesser included enhancements pursuant to section 12022.5. We conclude that,
whether or not the trial court was aware of this discretion at the time of resentencing, it
undoubtedly would not have exercised it. Therefore, another resentencing hearing is
unnecessary.
The question as to whether a trial court could impose a lesser included firearm
enhancement outside of section 12022.53 was pending before the Supreme Court at the
time of defendant’s resentencing (see People v. McDavid (July 14, 2022, D078919)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275940, revd. & remanded sub nom.
McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1031) and the subject of three decisions published in
2022 (see People v. Fuller (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394, 397 [permitting imposition of
lesser included, uncharged firearm enhancement outside of § 12022.53], review granted
Nov. 22, 2022, review dism. June 26, 2024, S276762; People v. Johnson (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1080 [same], review granted Dec. 14, 2022, review dism. June 26,
10.
2024, S277196; People v. Lewis (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 34, 39–42 [may not impose a
lesser firearm enhancement from outside of section 12053.22], disapproved in McDavid,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030). However, we need not determine whether the trial court
knew the full extent of its discretion as clarified in McDavid because the record here
clearly indicates the trial court would not have imposed lesser included firearm
enhancements from section 12022.5. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 1391; People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.)
As discussed above, the court previously indicated it was aware of its discretion to
strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements and impose lesser section 12022.53 firearm
enhancements that had also been found true by the jury. During defendant’s initial
sentencing, the trial court specifically stated that, after considering all the factors in
aggravation and in mitigation, it would decline to strike or dismiss any other
enhancements apart from section 667, subdivision (a). At resentencing, the trial court
similarly stated: “I’m exercising all discretion I currently have and discretion I would
have in the future, should I have some additional discretion and law change.” Since
2018, the trial court had discretion to strike or dismiss some or all of the section 12022.53
enhancements. The other sentences possible under section 12022.53 include the lesser
sentences of 20 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and 10 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Nonetheless, the trial court did not dismiss or strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancements, although it could have and reduced the prison term for the firearm
enhancements to 20 or even 10 years. The court’s rejection of these alternatives makes
clear it would not have imposed an alternative sentence of three, four, or 10 years under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), which authorizes imposition of sentences that are for
less or the same number of years as found in section 12022.53.
Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “when the applicable law governing the
defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it
11.
had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.” (People v.
Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425.) However, here, there is no speculation involved. If
the court declined a reduction of 10 or 20 years, we conclude that the trial court would
not have exercised its discretion to impose an even lesser firearm enhancement pursuant
to section 12022.5. The record in this particular case meets the higher standard mandated
by Salazar.
We conclude that remand for resentencing is not required.
II. The trial court did not impose any sentence as to the prior prison term enhancements.
Defendant argues that the trial court imposed and stayed sentence on at least one
former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement and, therefore, he is
entitled to a full resentencing. We disagree.
A. Background
Defendant’s information (filed in 2018) originally alleged prior prison term
enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) as to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. However,
effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit prior prison term enhancements to prior prison
terms that were served for a sexually violent offense. (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by
Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, pp. 1–4.) Defendant’s prior prison term was served for a
violation of section 212.5 and not a sexually violent offense and, therefore, could not
provide a basis for the enhancement.
Defendant fails to acknowledge that, in response to the prosecutor’s motion, the
trial court dismissed the prior prison term allegations as to all defendants on June 11,
2020. After the jury verdict, the trial court made true findings as to all prior conviction
allegations in the information, and mistakenly, the dismissed former section 667.5,
subdivision (b) allegations, although the court acknowledged that they could not be used
for sentencing. The headings of all subsequent minute orders reflect the court’s true
finding as to the prior prison term enhancements and, after the original sentencing, also
12.
indicate that the trial court stayed the enhancements. However, the minute orders from
the original sentencing and resentencing hearings do not indicate that the former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements were discussed during the hearings or that
the court pronounced any sentence as to them. They were not included on the original or
amended abstract of judgment. Most importantly for our purposes, the reporter’s
transcripts of defendant’s sentencing and resentencing hearings establish that the court
and parties did not discuss the former section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements and
the court did not orally pronounce any sentence as to those enhancements.
B. Analysis
The trial court’s oral pronouncement constitutes the court’s judgment. (People v.
Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) Conflicts between the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts
are generally presumed to be clerical in nature and are resolved in favor of the reporter’s
transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise. (People v. Smith (1983)
33 Cal.3d 596, 599; Mesa, at p. 471.) Because the trial court had dismissed the prior
prison term allegations before trial and no mention was made of them during either
sentencing hearing, we conclude the minute orders are incorrect and shall order the
resentencing minute order be corrected to reflect that the prior prison term enhancements
were dismissed, consistent with the June 11, 2020 minute order and the reporter’s
transcript.
DISPOSTION
The clerk of the superior court shall (1) prepare amended abstracts of judgment
that record the determinate sentences on Judicial Council form CR-290 and the
indeterminate sentences on Judicial Council form CR-292, (2) transmit certified copies of
the amended abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
and (3) amend the April 24, 2024 resentencing minute order to reflect that the former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements were dismissed (as reflected in the June 11,
2020 minute order) and not stayed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
13.
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