CourtListener 10384386•People v. Martinez CA4/1
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Filed 4/24/25 P. v. Martinez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080828
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD278102)
LUIS JAVIER MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for
resentencing.
Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Luis Javier Martinez appeals from a judgment entered after a jury
convicted him of second degree murder, attempted murder, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm in connection
with two separate 2018 shootings. The jury also found true a number of
sentence enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced Martinez to
prison for a term of eight years, plus a term of 15 years to life.
On appeal, Martinez makes six claims of error. He first sets out four
claims of evidentiary error, and then separately argues that even if these
evidentiary errors are individually harmless, their cumulative effect is
prejudicial and requires reversal. Sixth, Martinez contends the trial court
erred in failing to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing certain
fines and fees. The People have also appealed, arguing that the court
committed three sentencing errors that require us to vacate the sentence and
remand for resentencing.
We conclude the trial court erred in excluding one of Martinez’s out-of-
court denials of involvement in the murder despite it being offered as
impeachment, but the error was harmless. We further conclude that even
assuming Martinez has identified evidentiary error in another of his
claims—i.e., that the prosecutor should not have been permitted to elicit from
the gang expert testimony that he had never known a gang member to falsely
take credit for a murder—such presumed error was also harmless. Further,
even when considered jointly, these two errors—actual or presumed—do not
require reversal of Martinez’s convictions.
We agree with the People that the trial court failed to recognize the full
extent of the discretion it possessed when sentencing Martinez in connection
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with a Penal Code1 section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm enhancement
found true by the jury. Because the record does not clearly demonstrate the
court would have made the same sentencing decisions had it understood the
full breadth of its sentencing discretion, we vacate Martinez’s sentence and
remand for resentencing. For that reason, we need not consider the People’s
other two claims of sentencing error. Finally, we accept the People’s
concession that Martinez was entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing, and
instruct the trial court to conduct such a hearing on remand. We affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Trial Evidence
A. Martinez’s Tagging Crew and AR-15 Rifle
Martinez belonged to a tagging crew2 called CMA and went by the
moniker “Malo.” At some point he founded and led a new tagging crew,
South Francis (SF), which was named for the street where Martinez lived.
SF was affiliated with another tagging crew that called itself 5D.
Rival tagging crews perpetuated their rivalries by crossing out each
other’s graffiti and engaging in fights with each other. Two of SF’s main
rivals were called Earn Their Respect or Easy to Right (ETR) and Nightlight
Crew (NL).
As early as May 2017, Martinez obtained an AR-15 rifle. In April 2018,
Martinez watched several YouTube videos about or involving AR-15s after
1 Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2 A “tagging crew” was described at trial as a group of individuals who
paint “graffiti” on “almost anything, except houses” throughout a
neighborhood.
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searching for the terms “AR-15,” “[m]aking AR-15,” “[b]uild or buy an AR-15,”
and “Ape With AK-47,” among others.
B. April 23, 2018 Shooting
On April 23, 2018, four members of ETR were in a black Toyota Camry
parked in front of Brandon T.’s house, waiting for him to come out and join
them. Brandon knew Martinez. Martinez had tagged Brandon’s house twice,
and they had been in physical fights with each other. Of the SF members,
Brandon considered Martinez to be “the main aggressor” toward him.
As the ETR group was waiting for Brandon, a white Honda Accord,
heading the same direction the Toyota was facing, slowly passed them. As
the Honda passed by, its occupants were “mad dogging”3 the ETR members.
Martinez was identified as one of the Honda’s occupants. After passing, the
Honda executed a U-turn and, going the opposite direction the Toyota was
facing, came to a stop next to the Toyota so that the driver windows were
facing each other.
The driver of the Honda asked the driver of the Toyota, Edgar C., if he
was from ETR. Edgar nodded his head, and the driver of the Honda replied,
“fuck you from ETR.” The driver also said, “This is 5D.”
At that point, the four occupants of the Honda got out, including the
driver, and started punching and kicking the Toyota. One of the occupants of
the Honda was holding a “big gun,” that looked “[l]ike an AR.” A witness
estimated the gun was approximately two and a half feet long. Edgar hit the
accelerator and drove off in the Toyota. Seconds later, Brandon, still inside
his house, and the occupants of the Toyota heard a single shot ring out. To
3 A witness gestured to demonstrate “mad dogging,” and an attorney
indicated that the witness was “[l]ooking around.”
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Brandon, who had experienced the sounds of different types of guns being
fired during visits to a shooting range, “it sounded like a big gun.”
Fernando R., who was sitting in the backseat of the Toyota, grabbed his
chest and said, “I got hit.” A bullet had traveled through the Toyota’s trunk
and a backseat, entering Fernando’s back and shattering inside his body,
sending a bullet fragment through his chest. Fernando later died. A deputy
medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that the cause of
Fernando’s death was a gunshot wound to the torso. Police officers did not
find the bullet’s cartridge casing.
C. Martinez’s Conduct After April 23 and through May 2018
From the day after the April 23 shooting through early May 2018,
Martinez searched for and viewed several news articles about Fernando’s
killing.
Four days after the shooting, Martinez informed someone through
Facebook Messenger that he was on the run. He sent the person a video of
the “little room” where he was staying. An object resembling an assault rifle
could be seen as the camera panned around the room.
Martinez also engaged in multiple online conversations in which he
alluded to having committed and/or participated in the April 23 shooting.
For example, in one set of messages over Facebook Messenger, Martinez
complained to Brandon about Brandon’s “snitching ass big homie Dritz,”
called ETR members “lame,” and asserted that he, Martinez, “didn’t need no
one when [he] ran up on [Brandon’s] homies in front of [Brandon’s] pad.” In
multiple other messages to various individuals, Martinez took credit for
shooting Fernando and threatened others with a similar fate.
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D. The June 5, 2018 Shooting
Another shooting involving SF members took place on June 5, 2018.
On that day, neighbors MC Perez (Rico) and Luiz M. were hanging out at the
apartment complex where Luiz’s parents lived. Rico tended to hang out with
members of NL. Miguel, a friend of Rico’s and an NL member, suspected that
Martinez had vandalized his mother’s house. Miguel asked Rico to come with
him to Martinez’s house to “squash the beef.” Rico agreed, and Luiz and
three others joined.
When the group of teens arrived at Martinez’s home, Martinez’s mother
was outside. Rico explained to Martinez’s mother that his “friend was
bothered over [tagging that] had happened to his mom’s house,” and he was
there because he knew both parties who were potentially involved. At that
point, a group of two or three young men came out of Martinez’s house and
“looked mad.” Martinez’s mother called Martinez on the phone while one of
Rico’s friends grabbed bats from a neighbor’s yard.
Martinez’s mother was frustrated with the situation and put Miguel on
the phone to talk to Martinez. Miguel told Martinez, “You want to keep doing
your shit, let’s squash it all,” and at another point said, “Even your mom
knows that I’m going to kick your ass.” After the phone call ended, Rico and
his friends apologized to Martinez’s mother for coming with such a large
group, and she offered Miguel some money to help him paint over the graffiti
on his mother’s house.
Later that evening, Martinez arrived at Rico’s home in a white Honda
Accord, which was accompanied by another car. Martinez got out of the front
passenger seat of the Honda wearing a red jacket or hoodie and holding a gun
that was “big” and larger than a handgun. Martinez said, “What’s up fools?
You all went to my pad,” as he pointed the gun toward Rico and Luiz. Rico
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ducked behind a car, while Luiz ran away. Martinez fired one shot in their
general direction.
E. The Post-June 5, 2018 Investigation
On June 6, 2018, a detective obtained a tracking warrant for Martinez’s
cell phone and officers were able to locate him hiding in a shed near a multi-
unit building located in a residential neighborhood. After a standoff, an
emergency negotiations team was able to get Martinez to leave the shed
without further incident. Inside the approximately 10 foot by 12 foot room,
officers found a smashed cellphone in a toilet and a disassembled AR-15
wrapped in a red jacket or sweater. A spent cartridge case for a .223-caliber
round officers found at the scene of the June 5, 2018 shooting was determined
to have been fired from the AR-15 found in the shed.
DNA from five individuals was found off of the lower receiver and butt
stock of the AR-15. DNA from the first contributor made up 65 percent of the
sample, while the second contributor made up 25 percent of the sample.
DNA from three other contributors made up the final 10 percent. Martinez
matched the second contributor’s DNA with a likelihood of 1 in 3,830. DNA
obtained from two other parts of the firearm that were tested demonstrated
limited likelihood of being Martinez’s.
F. Martinez’s Defense
Martinez called a defense investigator, a gang expert, and a
psychologist to testify. The gang expert testified that young people in
southeast San Diego, where Martinez lived, are known to take credit for
crimes they did not commit in order to portray themselves as being more
tough than they may be. The defense psychologist testified similarly, and
also identified six mental conditions he had diagnosed in Martinez—
intermittent explosive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
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unspecified trauma or stressor related disorder, borderline intellectual
functioning, cannabis use disorder, and a conduct disorder of unspecified
onset type.
II.
Verdicts and Sentencing
The People charged Martinez with the April 23, 2018 murder of
Fernando (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) with the allegations he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused a nonaccomplice’s
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personally used a firearm during the
murder (§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)(A)).4
In connection with the June 5, 2018 shooting, Martinez was charged
with attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd.
(a), 664, subd. (a); count 2); two counts of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3, 4); and one count of unlawful possession of
a firearm by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 29815; count 5).
As to count 2, it was also alleged that Martinez personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and as to counts 2, 3, and 4, that
he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).5 The People further
alleged Martinez committed counts 1 through 4 for the benefit of, at the
4 The information also alternatively alleged in connection with count 1
that Martinez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)) and/or personally and intentionally used a firearm (id., subd. (b)) in
committing the murder. These allegations were ultimately not given to the
jury.
5 The information alternatively alleged in connection with count 2 that
Martinez personally and intentionally used a firearm in committing the
attempted murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). This allegation was ultimately not
given to the jury.
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direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subds.
(b)(1), (b)(5)).6
A jury convicted Martinez of Fernando’s murder in the second degree
and convicted him as charged on the other four counts. The jury also found
true all of the firearm enhancement allegations. On August 12, 2022, the
trial court sentenced Martinez to eight years in prison, followed by 15 years
to life plus a term of life with the possibility of parole, all to run
consecutively. Both Martinez and the People appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Martinez’s Appeal
A. No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting Opinion Testimony As to the
Possible Caliber of the Bullet That Struck Fernando
Martinez contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a
district attorney investigator (DAI) to testify about the possible caliber of the
bullet involved in Fernando’s death. He argues Evidence Code sections 352,
801, and 802 required the court to act as a “gatekeeper” to exclude the DAI’s
expert opinion because it was speculative, unsupported by the material on
which it was based, and lacking in foundation. We disagree.
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude any testimony that the
firearm used in the April 23, 2018 shooting was the same firearm used in the
June 5, 2018 shooting. Alternatively, defense counsel requested a hearing
6 The gang enhancements were bifurcated for purposes of trial, and after
the jury reached its verdicts on the charged counts and non-gang
enhancements, the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss all gang
enhancement allegations.
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pursuant to Evidence Code sections 402,7 801, and 802 and People v. Kelly
(1076) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly) and Frye v. United States (DC Cir. 1923) 293 F.
1013 (Frye). The prosecution moved to admit the DAI’s testimony. The trial
court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section
402, at which the DAI testified.
The DAI described his background, explaining he was employed as a
supervising district attorney investigator, and in his current assignment he
was a range master and training sergeant. His training with firearms began
in 1986, when he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps. He spent six
years as a Marine rifle and pistol instructor, and he shot competitively as
part of the Marine rifle and pistol team.
In 1993, the DAI joined law enforcement, attending a police academy
for seven months where he received basic firearms training. He served as a
police officer for 14 years, after which he worked for five years with the
California Department of Justice (CDOJ), working on narcotics and firearms
trafficking cases. While there, he received specialized training from CDOJ
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms on the identification,
manufacturing, and trafficking of firearms.
In his current supervising position, the DAI organized firearms
training for his office, as well as district attorney offices throughout the state.
He is responsible for all Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)
certifications for his office’s investigators, as well as all the firearms training
and defensive tactics training required annually by POST. He described his
familiarity and training with the assault rifle platform (i.e., the M16, AR-15,
7 Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), provides: “The court may
hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the
presence or hearing of the jury.”
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and M4, all of which fire a .223 caliber round) and “[a]ll manner of pistols
from .22 up to .45 caliber.” He described being a current SIG Sauer armorer
and a POST-certified rifle and pistol instructor.
In addition, the DAI testified about his training on and experience
with the effects of different bullets when fired into a variety of objects. When
the district attorney’s office hires new deputies, the DAI takes the new hires
to a shooting range to demonstrate the effects of different caliber bullets on
these targets. During these trainings, the DAI and trainees have shot
“everything from .38 caliber handguns up to .223, 12-gauge.” They fired
those different types of ammunition into a wide range of items, including car
doors, cinderblocks, drywall, wood framing, and ballistic vest panels, and
then compared the results.
The DAI had been given photographs of a bullet hole in a trunk, a
bullet hole in a backseat, a trajectory rod going through both bullet holes, and
Fernando’s body, with a ruler next to each item in the photographs. Based on
the photograph of the bullet hole next to the ruler, he opined the bullet hole
in the trunk had a diameter of “just about .6 centimeters, which translates
roughly to about .22, .23 inches.” Over defense counsel’s foundational
objection, he testified the bullet hole in the trunk was consistent with bullet
holes he had investigated in the past, and he opined that the trunk bullet
hole was consistent with the firing of a .22- or .223-caliber bullet.
The DAI also described having been trained on the velocity of different
types of bullets. Over defense objections based on lack of foundation and
speculation, he opined that based on the velocity at which a .223-caliber
round travels, the trajectory demonstrated in the photographs was consistent
with a .223-caliber bullet. He explained that a .22-caliber round contains less
powder, and therefore achieves a slower velocity than a .223-caliber round, so
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while a .22-caliber round “would probably penetrate the trunk lid,” “would go
through the trunk,” “[m]aybe into the backseat,” and “[m]aybe into the body,”
it is “[n]ot likely that it would exit the other side of the body.”
On cross-examination, the DAI acknowledged certain weaknesses in
his opinions, including (a) he did not have a scientific degree or background
in forensic ballistics; (b) he was familiar with only one of the professional
organizations defense counsel asked about, and as to that organization, he
was unfamiliar with their guidelines concerning forensic testimony; (c) he did
not examine the vehicle or know whether it had a steel or aluminum trunk;
(d) he did not use a precision caliper or micrometer to measure the bullet
hole; (e) his opinion was limited to describing what caliber the bullet could
have been, not identifying its actual caliber; (g) he could not determine
whether the bullet hole had been caused by any specific type of .22- or .223
caliber bullet, such as a .22 Hornet, .22 Nosler, .220 Swift, .22-250
Remington, .22-250 Ackley Improved, .221 Fireball, .222 Remington, .223
Remington, .223 WSSM, or .224 Valkyrie; and (h) .22- or .223-caliber
ammunition can be fired from a number of firearms, which meant he could
not determine precisely what type of firearm had been used..
The trial court heard argument from both sides on the admissibility of
the DAI’s proffered testimony, engaged in a discussion with the prosecutor
and defense counsel, and took the matter under submission. At a later
pretrial hearing, the court ruled the DAI’s opinion testimony to be
admissible. The court explained:
“So I’ve read the—I read some of the—I read the cases that
were cited by—by [the prosecutor]—and thank you [court
reporter] for giving me all that information. I appreciate it.
And so now—so I guess I’m looking at it in this way. This
is not really—this is not really a Kelly-Frye issue, this is
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not a new technology like DNA was back when that was—
we went through the Kelly-Frye process.
“This is more of a person who has unique experience that
most likely people do not have because of his—his
involvement in military and his involvement with guns and
the range master, et cetera. And so—and the fact that he’s
actually shot .223s and .22s into the metal and is familiar
with what the holes look like. It’s not . . . scientific. I
would call it more like a learned opinion.
“And so—but, certainly, all of the things that he cross-
examined him on or things that are—that you can take him
on about. But I think that—I think that his, that—and you
can certainly challenge that. But I think his opinions are
relevant. I think his opinions are helpful to the jury. I
think that the fact that—well, again, I think it’s sort of like
a police officer saying, you know, I estimated the speed to
be X, and it’s not precise, but that’s kind of what this is.”
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, defense counsel requested the
evidentiary hearing on the DAI’s expert testimony be reopened. Counsel
argued the DAI, in emails with another investigator, admitted he is not a
ballistics expert and there could be confirmation bias because he had been
asked if the bullet holes were created by a .223-caliber round. The trial court
denied the request, stating: “I still stand by my earlier ruling and think that,
again, this is a learned opinion. [¶] . . . [¶] He’s not a ballistic expert, I agree,
but is it absolutely necessary that he be a ballistic expert to offer that
opinion? And I don’t think he needs to be. I think based upon his training
and experience, he can offer an opinion and you certainly have a lot of
ammunition, no pun intended, to dispute it.”
At trial, a criminalist testified the bullet fragments extracted from
Fernando’s body were too damaged to support any conclusions about the type
of bullet that hit him. The following colloquy transpired between the
prosecutor and the criminalist:
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“Q: Now, this type of round that fires from a 5.56 or
.223, do they—do they fragment in this way?
“A: They definitely can fragment. Part of their design
is to break apart when hitting a body. So they can
fragment.
“Q: Okay. Do you see in the course of your experience
a .223 round or a 5.56 type round fragment in this manner?
“A: I have seen them fragment like that.
“Q: So would you say this is unusual?
“A: No.”
Defense counsel asked in cross-examination:
“Q: Now, I want to ask you just a couple of questions
about caliber determination. AFTE [i.e., the Association of
Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners,] doesn’t scientifically
support examining a photograph or a bullet hole to
determine caliber . . . ; is that fair to say?
“A: That’s not something I’ve ever seen . . . done
through AFTE.
“Q: OSAC [i.e., the Organization of Scientific Area
Committees,] also doesn’t support that . . . , correct?
“A: I will say that there are plenty of articles
published that I have never read, but that’s not anything
that I’ve seen through any of them.
“Q: The best practice for caliber determination is
through the process that you took in the crime lab using
the equipment that you had available, correct?
“A: For us, for forensic scientists, when I talk about
caliber determination, I’m talking about getting the actual
bullet itself and doing measurements, doing—weighing and
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measuring how—the diameter base looking at the
structure. That’s what we consider a bullet caliber
determination.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Q: On direct examination a moment ago, [the
prosecutor] asked you about calibers and fragments and
.223, and 5.56 ammunition fragmenting. Other bullets also
fragment upon impact, correct?
“A: Yes.”
On redirect, the criminalist explained she remained comfortable
testifying that she has observed .223-caliber rounds fragment similar to the
round that killed Fernando, despite defense counsel’s questions about the
forensic science organizations:
“There’s kind of two parts to—let me make sure I say this
carefully. There’s kind of two parts to a forensic analysis.
If you’re asking me based on my generalized—and AFTE,
part of their bylaws just address this and part of their code
of ethics. [¶] If you’re just saying to me, in your experience
you’ve seen hundreds if not thousands of these, is this
something that you’ve seen? Yes, I can say that without
doing scientific testing because it is my—I can say that in
my experience, this is something that I’ve seen.
“But if you’re asking me for a scientific conclusion, like, has
this bullet been fired from this gun, now you’re asking for a
very specific thing and I need to go through all of that
testing and conclusions. I need to make sure I’m following
an approved scientific method, because I am giving you a
forensic answer as opposed to what is my experience as
someone who has looked at a lot of these things. So—I am
answering it from a different perspective if that makes
sense.”
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During the prosecutor’s direct examination of the DAI, he
acknowledged that, unlike the criminalist who testified, he is not a ballistics
criminalist analyst, scientist, member of any sort of ballistics organization, or
member of any organization that deals with the scientific aspects of firearms.
Consistent with his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the DAI testified
an AR-15 is a semiautomatic rifle that fires a .223- or 5.56-caliber cartridge.
He explained a “.223 would fit through [the bullet hole in the trunk], a .22
would fit through it, and anything smaller than those would fit through it,”
but a .308-, .38-, .40-, or .45-caliber bullet would not fit through. The court
overruled defense counsel’s foundation objection to the DAI’s opinions about
what caliber round would fit through the hole. Over the same objections, the
DAI opined, based on his training and experience and their difference in
velocity, that a .223-caliber round could travel through the trunk, the rear
seat, and Fernando’s body, but it was his belief a .22-caliber round could not.
As he did during the evidentiary hearing, on cross-examination at trial
the DAI conceded many points about the limitations of his opinions. And, on
redirect, the prosecutor asked, “Are you making an opinion today that you
can definitely conclude that a .223 round caused that hole?” He responded,
“No, sir.”
Relevant to the DAI’s testimony, the trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
“Both the People and the defense must disclose their
evidence to the other side before trial, within the time
limits set by law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the
other side the chance to produce all relevant evidence, to
counter opposing evidence, or to receive a fair trial.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
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“In evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence,
you may consider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“The prosecution failed to disclose the following items
within the legal time period:
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(4) The report, statement, and opinion of [the DAI].”
The court further instructed jurors as follows:
“Witnesses were allowed to testify as experts and to give
opinions. You must consider the opinions, but you are not
required to accept them as true or correct. The meaning
and importance of any opinion are for you to decide. In
evaluating the believability of an expert witness, follow the
instructions about the believability of witnesses generally.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“In addition, consider the expert’s knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education, the reasons the expert
gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which
the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide
whether information on which the expert relied was true
and accurate.
“You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable,
unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.
“An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question.
A hypothetical question asks the witness to assume certain
facts are true and to give an opinion based on the assumed
facts. It is up to you to decide whether an assumed fact has
been proved. If you conclude that an assumed fact is not
true, consider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact
in evaluating the expert’s opinion.
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“If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another, you
should weigh each opinion against the others. You should
examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or
other matters on which each witness relied. You may also
compare the experts’ qualifications.”
In closing argument, defense counsel urged the jury to not credit the
DAI’s testimony:
“[One witness] is a ballistics expert, a criminalist for over
ten years. She was a supervisor at the SDPD Crime Lab.
She’s someone who is a member of [AFTE], an organization
that has a code of ethics that requires the scientific method
be followed and requires that you only follow approved
methods of forensic evidence. And that’s what she’s done
her whole career. And that’s what she did in this case. She
reviewed the evidence. She reviewed the bullet fragment
from April 23rd, 2018, and she could not make a caliber
determination, meaning she couldn’t say it was a .223,
which is so crucial to the prosecution’s case.
“She could not say it was a .223 caliber bullet because it is
not supported by the evidence. She couldn’t say that bullet
was fired from the AR-15 because it is not supported by the
evidence. She couldn’t say that the gun recovered on June
6th 2018 was the same gun used on April 23rd, 2018
because it is not supported by the evidence, by the science.
“And enter [the DAI], who, yes, has experience as a
firearm’s expert but who himself testified, I am not a
ballistics expert and in this case, what did he do? It wasn’t
a reconstruction. He admitted that much. Because to truly
help determine the caliber of a bullet, there are certain
factors that you would need potentially just by looking at
the bullet. The angle, the distance, biomechanical issues.
The type of surface it hit, what that surface was made up
of. None of that was available nor was it attempted to be
recreated.
“So what we have here is someone who comes in after being
asked by the prosecution team can you look at this bullet
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hole and tell me if this is a .223 caliber bullet that caused
it. That’s problematic because confirmation bias,
contextual bias, cognitive bias will lead you to the answer
that you’re suggested in the question. But what we know is
that [AFTE] themselves have conducted studies on this.
“And I asked [the DAI] if he was aware of those things,
specifically a study where a .25 caliber bullet which is
bigger than a .22 created a smaller hole than the .22 when
fired into an object because that’s what cases like this
demand. Honesty in evidence. Scientific method.
Forensics that are backed up by actual procedure and
practice and repetition.
“This was the first and only time in his 30 year career that
[the DAI] was asked to provide an opinion about this and
never did provide an opinion about this because during his
30 years law enforcement career, whenever there was a
firearm investigation, a shooting, a homicide, it was
submitted to the crime lab for caliber determination and
ballistics because the crime lab is the department that
makes those findings based on science and not speculation
of a photograph taken four years ago.”
The prosecutor acknowledged in rebuttal the following:
“There was a lot mentioned . . . regarding [the DAI’s]
investigation. [The DAI] is not a ballistics expert. He
never represented to be one. He’s not a scientist. He’s not
a part of organizations that ballistics individuals like [the
criminalist] would be a part of. But what he did was
provide you a learned opinion based on his experience as a
man that shoots a whole lot of guns, including AR-15s. The
man trains people to shoot AR-15s.
“He has measured the holes left by AR-15s, and he’s not
coming before you making an ultimate conclusion that [it]
was a[n] AR-15 [round]. We know that that round split
into several small pieces. [The criminalist] was unable to
make a determination. We understand that. [The DAI] is
simply telling you that a .223 round would fit through that
hole consistent with a .223 round. And more so it is
19
consistent with the velocity to travel through that trunk,
through the chair, into the body of the deceased and out the
front. That is the testimony that [the DAI] provided to
you.”
“[U]nder Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the trial
court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1)
based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2)
based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or
(3) speculative.” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771–772 (Sargon).) However, “courts must
also be cautious in excluding expert testimony.” (Id. at p. 772.)
“The trial court’s preliminary determination whether the expert
opinion is founded on sound logic is not a decision on its persuasiveness. The
court must not weigh an opinion’s probative value or substitute its own
opinion for the expert’s opinion. Rather, the court must simply determine
whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or
whether that opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Sargon,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) Such an opinion may be based on “professional
studies or personal experience.” (Ibid.)
“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or
exclude expert testimony, and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426 [cleaned up].)
“To establish an abuse of discretion, defendants must demonstrate that the
trial court’s decision was so erroneous that it ‘falls outside the bounds of
reason. A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.’
” (People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605 (Johnson) [cleaned up].)
20
Here, the trial court reasonably decided to allow the DAI’s testimony,
despite the fact he is not a ballistics expert. The DAI possessed many years
of extensive training and experience with firearms, including the effects of
different caliber ammunition on a variety of objects, through his time as a
Marine, a competitive shooter, a peace officer, a range master, an armorer,
and a firearms instructor. In training new deputy district attorneys on the
effects of various firearms, the DAI shot a variety of firearms, ranging from
.38-caliber handguns to .223-caliber rifles, into different materials, such as
car doors, car fenders, steel plates, Kevlar vests, cinderblocks, wood framing,
and drywall. He and his trainees would measure the bullet holes different
ammunition created, as well as observe whether the ammunition was able to
penetrate the target material. The DAI based his opinions on his wide-
ranging training and experience with firearms and ammunition, and the trial
court reasonably concluded that this experience and training formed the
basis of expertise that could assist the jury in considering the evidence in this
case.
The Supreme Court discussed similar expert testimony in People v.
Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 280 (Ayala), where an investigator taped two
bullets of known caliber to a victim’s body. The victim was X-rayed to
compare the sample bullets with the bullet inside of the victim to try to
determine its caliber. (Ibid.) Over defense counsel’s objection, a diagnostic
radiologist who was certified as an expert testified, “ ‘[T]he deformed
projectile within the patient most likely represents . . . the same caliber
as . . . the [taped] projectile . . . just to the left . . . of the projectile within the
patient.’ ” (Ibid.)
The defendant in Ayala challenged the admission of this expert opinion
testimony, arguing it “amounted to expert testimony in ballistics, a topic in
21
which [the radiologist] was not an expert.” (Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 281.) The Supreme Court rejected this contention, explaining: “[The
radiologist] acknowledged that he was not a ballistics expert, and declined to
testify about the bullets’ caliber. He did testify that both bullets appeared to
be the same ‘caliber,’ by which he could have meant the same size—defendant
did not object or ask the radiologist to clarify his meaning in further
examination. As a radiologist, [he] could testify that the bullets were located
so that their relative size would not be distorted in the X-ray photographs.”
(Ibid.) The Court also rejected the idea that the radiologist had “conducted a
scientific experiment that did not satisfy foundational relevance
requirements.” (Id. at p. 282.) The Court reasoned: “The X-ray procedure
was not an experiment performed in order to duplicate the conditions of the
crime—as stated, it was not an experiment of any kind. Rather, it was
simply a procedure that gave the radiologist an opportunity to describe a
physical effect of the shooting that the jury could not discern without expert
help.” (Ibid.)
Like the radiologist in Ayala, the DAI possessed expertise that could
help the jury. Again, the DAI based his opinions on his particular expertise,
which was well-documented. And, like the radiologist in Ayala who “declined
to testify about the bullets’ caliber” (Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 281), the
DAI specifically testified he was not concluding “that a .223 round caused
[the] hole” in the trunk. Instead, he testified, based on his years of
experience of shooting different caliber bullets into various materials, that it
was his opinion that a .223-caliber round or “anything smaller” would fit
through the hole and that the degree of penetration was consistent with the
bullet having been a .223-caliber round, not a .22-caliber round.
22
Much of Martinez’s argument regarding the admission of the DAI’s
testimony goes to the possible weight to which it was entitled, not to its
admissibility. For example, Martinez takes issue with certain failings in the
DAI’s examination of the evidence, arguing among other things that he “did
not examine the trajectory rod’s diameter” and the “the millimeter lines [on
the photographed ruler used for measurements] did not align with the edges
of the hole.” Such challenges do not undermine the DAI’s specialized
knowledge, training, and experience, nor do they demonstrate his opinions
were speculative or based on improper material. Instead, these are issues
that were potential subjects for cross-examination and go to the
persuasiveness of the DAI’s testimony; they do not form a basis for rejecting
the testimony as inadmissible. (See People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76,
97 [when a witness has established having sufficient knowledge of a subject
to entitle his option to be presented to the jury, the degree of his knowledge is
a question of weight more than admissibility]; People v. Cook (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1334, 1346 [“defendant’s observations that [a criminalist] did not
document all his work, took some inaccurate notes, did not conduct ‘blind’
testing, deviated from the lab protocol in some respects, and failed to respond
to a coworker’s doubts about the accuracy of a test of blood on a carpet are all
matters going to weight, not admissibility”]; People v. Morganti (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 643, 664, fn. 12 [“the quality of the testing performed in a
particular case is an issue relevant to weight not admissibility”].) We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the DAI’s
expert testimony at issue.
Given our conclusion the trial court properly exercised its discretion to
admit the DAI’s expert opinion under Evidence Code sections 801 and 802,
Martinez’s claim the ruling violated his federal constitutional right to due
23
process necessarily fails. “[T]he routine application of provisions of the state
Evidence Code law does not implicate a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 957; accord People v. Abilez
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503.)
B. Excluding One of Martinez’s Hearsay Statements in Which He Denied
Having Shot Fernando Was Harmless Error
Martinez argues the trial court erred by excluding evidence of his out-
of-court statement in which he denied having shot Fernando that he offered
for impeachment purposes. Although we agree the court erred, we conclude
the error was not prejudicial.
At trial, defense counsel sought to admit evidence of a Facebook
conversation between an individual named Jonathan F. and Martinez in
which Martinez denied having shot Fernando. In the written conversation,
Jonathan and Martinez traded insults, and then Jonathan asked Martinez if
he was “the one who shot my lil cousin nano . . . .??” Martinez replied, “Nah
why.” Jonathan pressed Martinez at least two more times about his claims,
and those of his tagging crew, regarding Fernando’s death, and Martinez
denied his crew was involved, saying “Nah not us . . . ,” and he repeated his
denial that he was the one who shot Fernando.
The prosecutor objected to the admission of this conversation as
inadmissible hearsay, arguing its admission would violate Evidence Code
section 1220—which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for admissions
of a party opponent—noting that “[i]t is a statement of the defendant not
being offered by a party opponent.” Defense counsel argued the conversation
was nevertheless admissible under the business record exception, or it was
admissible not for its truth, but to impeach Martinez’s other out-of-court
statements of guilt before the jury. The court excluded evidence of the
24
Facebook conversation, concluding the statements were inadmissible
hearsay, for any purpose.
On appeal, the People concede the Facebook conversation was
admissible for impeachment, but argue the trial court’s error was harmless
because the court had admitted at least one other of Martinez’s denials, as
well as other impeachment evidence. We accept the People concession as
proper.
Evidence Code section 1202 provides in pertinent part: “Evidence of a
statement or other conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a
statement by such declarant received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not
inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant
though he is not given and has not had an opportunity to explain or to deny
such inconsistent statement or other conduct. Any other evidence offered to
attack or support the credibility of the declarant is admissible if it would
have been admissible had the declarant been a witness at the hearing.”
Thus, “when a hearsay statement by a declarant who is not a witness is
admitted into evidence by the prosecution, an inconsistent hearsay statement
by the same person offered by the defense is admissible to attack the
declarant’s credibility.” (People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 470.)
“The purpose of section 1202 is to assure fairness to the party against whom
hearsay evidence is admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination.”
(Ibid.)
The rule set out in Evidence Code section 1202 applies to criminal
defendants. (See People v. Baldwin (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 991(Baldwin).)
When the People introduce a defendant’s hearsay statement admitting guilt,
a defendant’s hearsay statement denying guilt is admissible as impeachment
evidence for the purpose of calling into question the admission of guilt. (Id.
25
at pp. 1002–1007.) Here the trial court failed to appreciate that Evidence
Code section 1202 expressly allows a defendant to offer his hearsay
statements denying guilt for the limited purpose of impeaching his out-of-
court statements conceding guilt.
The error, however, was harmless. Here, the parties disagree as to the
applicable standard on prejudice. Martinez, contending that this error
violated his constitutional rights to present evidence and due process, argues
the trial court’s error must be analyzed for prejudice under Chapman v. State
of California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). The People assert prejudice
should be determined under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson). We agree with the People.
Where the trial court rejects only some evidence concerning the
defense, the proper standard to review for prejudice is that set forth in
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, not the stricter standard reserved for
errors of constitutional dimension as set out in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18.
(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 428; People v. McNeal (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203 [“Because the trial court merely rejected some evidence
concerning a defense, and did not preclude defendant from presenting a
defense, any error is one of state law and is properly reviewed under People v.
Watson.”].) Here, the court did not reject all evidence related to Martinez’s
attempt to undermine his out-of-court statements inculpating him in
Fernando’s shooting. Rather, the court permitted Martinez to challenge
those statements as being mere puffery through a variety of other evidence,
including at least one other out-of-court statement in which he denied
involvement in the shooting, as well as through the testimony of an
investigator who conceded Martinez had also denied committing the homicide
in other conversations.
26
Applying the Watson prejudice standard, we conclude it is not
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to
Martinez if his Facebook out-of-court denial had been admitted for
impeachment purposes. First, as previously mentioned, the court allowed the
defense to question witnesses about and even admit in evidence other
statements by Martinez in which he denied having participated in Fernando’s
killing. For example, defense counsel succeeded in getting a prosecution
investigator to testify that Martinez denied committing the homicide to an
individual named Angel, who referred to Fernando as “my brother.” And
because the prosecutor never objected to testimony of Martinez’s out-of-court
statements to Angel, this evidence was admitted for all purposes, including
as evidence of the truth of Martinez’s denial. Unlike this evidence, however,
the out-of-court denial Martinez complains should have been admitted would
have only been admissible for impeachment purposes.
Beyond this, the trial court permitted defense counsel to make use of a
variety of other evidence to undermine Martinez’s out-of-court admissions.
Defense counsel pointed out multiple instances from Martinez’s Facebook
messages in which he made false claims and engaged in puffery in an
attempt to make himself look more “tough.” For example, defense counsel
highlighted that although Martinez claimed to be “clicked up with Logan” (a
criminal street gang), there was no evidence to support this claim. Similarly,
Martinez made claims elsewhere about “beefing it with Logan” and Sherman,
another criminal street gang, and asserted police had “raided” his home. But
there was no evidence to support these claims either. The defense gang
expert, who was a former gang member, testified it is common for young
people in Martinez’s neighborhood to exaggerate and even make false claims
in order to portray themselves as tough. To demonstrate, the expert
27
recounted how a different gang member had taken credit for a murder the
expert had actually committed. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from
a psychologist to the effect that it is common for youth, especially those who
have suffered trauma, to present themselves as tougher than they really are.
The psychologist also explained that young people sometimes claim credit for
crimes they did not commit to further this perception. The defense presented
and elicited plenty of evidence calling into question the veracity of Martinez’s
out-of-court admissions of guilt, such that additional possible impeachment
evidence would have been cumulative.
Most important to our analysis, however, is that this cumulative
impeachment evidence was minimal compared to the strong evidence
demonstrating Martinez’s guilt in Fernando’s killing. (See Baldwin, supra,
189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 [error under Evid. Code, § 1202 was harmless in
light of overwhelming evidence of guilt].) Martinez was at the crime scene
and had acted violently toward the victim and his friends. In recorded
messages, Martinez repeatedly implicated himself in the shooting through
credible admissions. He acknowledged “smok[ing]” Fernando, told others
that he was on the run for murder, and he made additional threats to
“smoke” others. Even accounting for the instances of Martinez’s puffery,
Martinez’s repeated admissions of guilt, which were corroborated by other
evidence, were overwhelming. The jury heard Martinez had obtained an AR-
15 approximately a year before Fernando’s killing, and that he watched
videos on how to use that firearm in the days before the shooting. There was
evidence, including eyewitness testimony, that Fernando had been shot by a
“big gun,” approximately two and a half feet long, like an AR-15. Martinez’s
postshooting conduct further demonstrated consciousness of guilt. He
searched for and viewed news articles about the shooting, and went into
28
hiding because someone “snitched [him] out.” He used an AR-15 to commit
another shooting on June 5, 2018, merely a month and a half later. Later,
Martinez hid the rifle, resisted arrest, and destroyed a cell phone that he had
in the room where he was hiding.
In sum, the totality of the evidence persuades us it is not reasonably
probable the jury would have reached a more favorable result had the trial
court permitted the defense to offer an additional hearsay denial by Martinez
for the purpose of impeaching his repeated admissions of guilt.
C. No Abuse of Discretion in Exclusion of Martinez’s Statement That His
Father Was So Angry That “His Vein Popped”
Similar to the previous argument, Martinez contends the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding a March 27, 2017 Facebook conversation
between him and another individual in which Martinez seemed to falsely
claim he had been the cause of his own father’s death. Defense counsel
sought to admit these statements for the nonhearsay purpose of showing
Martinez had engaged in “puffery,” in order to impeach other incriminating
statements as also being puffery. The Facebook conversation went as follows:
“[J.M.:] I was scared of you lowkey[ ]
“[Martinez:] Why
“[J.M.:] Cuz you told me that your dad died because of you?
That his vein popped because he was so mad at you and he
screamed then his vein popped
“[Martinez:] I forgot I told u that
“[J.M.:] Yeaah lmfao
“[Martinez:] What’s funny
“[J.M.:] Wait that’s not true right
29
“[Martinez:] It is
“[J.M.:] Damn I’m sorry”8
The trial court was not persuaded, stating, “[W]e’re spending way too
much time on all this anyway and . . . I think that there’s plenty of examples
in what is coming in of puffery.” The court noted there would have to be
evidence presented to demonstrate Martinez’s claims in the statement were,
in fact, puffery, as no one knew whether his father had died, and, if so, how
he died. When defense counsel responded that Martinez did not even know
his father, the court noted even this foundational fact would have to be
proven, demonstrating that “we’re going to go off on some tangent to try to
show that he was puffing.” The court ruled the particular conversation was
cumulative and required an undue consumption of time in comparison to its
probative value and excluded the proffered evidence pursuant to Evidence
Code section 352. We see no error.
A trial court has discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will necessitate an undue consumption of time or create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Under Evidence Code section 352,
“ ‘a trial court has broad discretion to exclude evidence it deems irrelevant,
cumulative, or unduly prejudicial or time-consuming.’ ” (Johnson, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 605 [cleaned up].) We review the admission and exclusion of
8 In the exhibit in which these messages were documented, the messages
appear in reverse order, so that the last message appears at the top of the
page, while the first message appears on a second page. For ease of
comprehension, we reflect the messages here in the order in which they were
sent, rather than the order in which they appear in the exhibit.
30
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004 [under abuse of discretion standard,
“ ‘trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not
required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice’ ”].)
Here, the trial court reasonably found that the particular statement
was merely cumulative of other evidence of Martinez’s exaggeration of, if not
full fabrication of, his involvement in various other conduct. The court also
found the defense would need extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the falsity of
Martinez’s claims regarding his father’s death to establish it was puffery.
(See Evid. Code, § 403.) A “trial court has discretion to exclude impeachment
evidence . . . if it is collateral, cumulative, confusing, or misleading.” (People
v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 412.) We cannot say the trial court’s exclusion
of this evidence was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. We conclude
the court was well within its broad discretion to determine the probative
value of the proffered evidence was substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission would require an undue consumption of time.
D. Assuming Error in the Trial Court’s Admission of A Gang Expert’s
Testimony He Had Never Known A Gang Member to Falsely Take
Credit for Committing a Murder, Martinez Has Failed to Demonstrate
Prejudice
Martinez next contends the trial court erred in allowing testimony from
the prosecution’s gang expert that he had never known a gang member to
falsely take credit for committing a murder. After the prosecutor questioned
the gang expert about how Martinez’s Facebook messages included
disrespectful and mocking language, the following testimony was elicited:
31
“Q. In your experience do people take claim for a
murder they didn’t commit?
“A. No.
“Q. Why?
“[Defense counsel]: Objection. Lacks foundation
“The Court: Okay. Lay the foundation.
“Q. In your experience in investigating gang related
crimes, looking at social media and discussing gang related
events with gang members, have you experienced anyone
that admits to a murder they didn’t commit?
“A. No, I have not.
“Q. Why is that?
“[Defense counsel]: Objection. Lacks foundation
“The Court: Overruled.
“A. There would be consequences, basically, twofold.
Consequences legally. You’re admitting to a crime that you
didn’t commit but that admission could be used against you
criminally. But then there is the bigger thing, which would
be against you on the street.
“If you’re —everything about - - everything we talked about
with respect and earning their respect through violent acts
or through committing crimes or doing whatever you’re
doing to earn your respect, well, killing somebody is the
ultimate violent crime. So that’s the biggest way to earn
fear among your associates and your rivals.
“So if you’re taking credit for it, you’re trying to put
yourself up there, but the person who did the murder, if
you didn’t do it, they know you’re lying. That[ ] you’re full
of it They know that you didn’t do that. So then you’re
32
obviously someone who lies. You’re going to be
disrespected. They’re not going to respect you because
you’re claiming thing you didn’t do.
“Nobody - - they respect - - well, part of respect is telling
the truth, but they’re going to - - the person who did it - -
they’re the ones who earned that respect from doing that.
So they’re going to know. Their companions are going to
know, and you’re going to face the repercussions of trying to
take credit for what they didn’t [sic] do.
“Kind of like when we talked about taking Southeast out of
your name because you didn’t earn it. It’s along the same
lines. So you would expect that the person who claimed to
do something they didn’t do would get disciplined by the
people who actually did it for trying to take their credit.”
Martinez makes two related claims in connection with this evidence.
First, he asserts this testimony would have only been relevant if the
prosecution had proved certain preliminary facts—namely that Martinez was
a gang member, rather than a tagging crew member, or that being a gang
member was so similar to a tagging crew member that this testimony would
have a tendency in reason to prove a tagging crew member also would not lie
about committing a murder. Because neither of these preliminary facts had
been demonstrated, Martinez argues, the gang expert’s testimony was not
relevant to demonstrating Martinez’s admissions should be believed and
should have been excluded on relevance grounds.
We conclude Martinez has forfeited his contention this testimony
should have been excluded on relevance grounds. As the record
demonstrates, defense counsel did not object to the testimony as lacking
relevance. The lack of a specific objection challenging the evidence on
relevance grounds results in forfeiture of argument on appeal. (See, e.g.,
People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756 (Dykes) [“numerous decisions by
33
this court have established the general rule that trial counsel’s failure to
object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground asserted on appeal
results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal”].)
Second, Martinez argues the gang expert’s testimony as to the “reasons
why a gang member would not lie about committing a murder” should have
been excluded because the testimony was “speculative.” We also conclude the
lack of a specific objection challenging the evidence as speculative results in
forfeiture of the argument on appeal. (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 756.)
But even if we were to overlook the forfeiture of these arguments, we
conclude any error was harmless. Like the erroneous exclusion of evidence,
the erroneous admission of evidence is generally reviewed for prejudice under
the standard set out in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, which, again, requires
reversal only if it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error. (People
v. Roberts (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 565, 576.) Martinez argues, however, that
the admission of this evidence not only constituted state law error but
violated his federal constitutional right to due process. The admission of
evidence in violation of state law will only be found to also violate due process
if the error rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. (People v.
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 70.) Here we cannot conclude a presumed
error of admitting the gang expert’s opinion about the lack of false
confessions of murder amongst gang members rendered Martinez’s trial
fundamentally unfair.
As a result, we apply the Watson prejudice standard and conclude it is
not reasonably probable a result more favorable to Martinez would have been
reached even if the court had excluded the gang expert’s testimony regarding
his view as to why he had not encountered a situation in which a gang
34
member falsely took responsibility for a murder he did not commit. First,
this evidence did not go uncontradicted. In fact, the defense presented its
own gang expert—a former gang member—who testified it is common for
youth in Martinez’s neighborhood to make any variety of false claims to
portray themselves as “tough.” He then provided a specific instance where
his fellow gang member took credit for a murder that the expert had
committed when he was 17 years old. Martinez’s attorney also elicited
similar testimony from a psychologist, who described how it is common for
kids, especially those who have suffered trauma, to present themselves as
tougher than they really are. Sometimes these kids take credit for crimes
they did not commit to further the goal of appearing tougher.
Beyond this, there was plenty of evidence demonstrating Martinez had,
in fact, engaged in puffery repeatedly. Yet, the jury was disinclined to believe
that Martinez’s multiple claims of responsibility for Fernando’s death were
also instances of puffery, likely because Martinez’s admissions were
corroborated by the other evidence presented at trial. Such evidence included
Martinez’s possession of a large firearm, his viewing of videos on how to use
it just before the shooting, and his post-shooting conduct—including
searching for and viewing articles on Fernando’s death and telling someone
he had gone into hiding and sharing video evidence of the interior of his
hideout. In addition, when he was ultimately found hiding in a shed after the
June 5, 2018 shooting, Martinez had destroyed his cell phone and officers
found a semiautomatic firearm in the shed. In light of all the evidence and
the many times Martinez admitted his role in Fernando’s shooting, there is
no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion about his guilt in the absence of the prosecution’s gang expert’s
opinion about why gang members are unlikely to lie about being responsible
35
for murders they did not commit. That testimony was simply “unimportant
in relation to everything else the jury considered.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31
Cal.4th 63, 86.)
E. No Cumulative Error
Martinez contends the cumulative effect of the errors he has identified
necessitates reversal of his convictions. Under the cumulative error doctrine,
“[a] series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some
circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial
error.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.) As we have
concluded, none of the errors about which Martinez complains—whether real
or presumed—supports reversal when considered individually. We conclude
the same is true even when the asserted errors are considered in the
aggregate.
The two evidentiary errors Martinez has identified, one of which is an
error we have presumed for the sake of argument, do not warrant reversal
when considered in the context of the entire trial. The effect of the exclusion
of evidence that was merely cumulative of abundant evidence going to
Martinez’s credibility was negligible. And the admission of the gang expert’s
opinion as to why he had not witnessed a gang member falsely claim
responsibility for murder also went to the veracity of Martinez’s claims of
responsibility, a topic on which much evidence was presented by both sides.
Indeed, the gang expert’s testimony was countered by other expert testimony
as well as abundant evidence of Martinez’s puffery. In sum, the cumulative
impact of these evidentiary rulings did not deprive Martinez of a fair trial or
due process of law. (See People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 489.)
36
E. On Remand, the Trial Court Must Conduct An Ability-to-Pay Hearing
Before Imposition of Fines and Assessments
At sentencing, the trial court stated its intention to impose a $10,000
restitution fine, a $200 court security fee (§ 1465.8), and a $150 criminal
conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), among other fines and fees.
Martinez requested a hearing on his ability to pay the various assessments
and fines the court intended to impose, but the court declined to do so.
Relying on People v Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, Martinez asserts the
court’s imposition of these court facilities and court operations assessments
and the $10,000 restitution fine without conducting an ability-to-pay hearing
violated his rights under both the state and federal constitutions.
The question whether it is constitutionally permissible to impose the
challenged assessments and restitution fine without first determining a
defendant’s ability to pay is currently pending before the California Supreme
Court in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 94, review granted
November 13, 2019, S257844 (Kopp). The People nevertheless concede that
Martinez, who was 16 years old at the time he committed the offenses, was
“entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing” and that such a hearing should have
taken place. As we explain next, because we are remanding for full
resentencing on the basis of one of the People’s asserted sentencing errors, on
remand the trial court must conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before
imposing any fines and assessments.
II.
The People’s Appeal
The People assert the trial court committed three sentencing errors
that require us to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing: (1) the
trial court failed to appreciate the full scope of its discretion under section
37
1385, subdivision (c), to impose an enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), as to the murder conviction in count 1; (2) it failed to either
pronounce sentence on or strike the jury’s true finding on the section
12022.53, subdivision (c), enhancement pursuant to section 1385 as to count
2; and (3) it erroneously stayed punishment for counts 3 and 4 under section
654, rather than imposing and staying execution of sentences on these
counts. We agree with the People as to their first claim of sentencing error
and because we are vacating Martinez’s sentence and remanding for full
resentencing, we do not need to address the People’s second and third claims.
The People contend the trial court erroneously struck a 25-years-to-life
enhancement based on the jury’s finding that Martinez personally discharged
a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). They argue that the court
mistakenly believed it was mandated to dismiss the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), enhancement under recent amendments to section 1385
enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721,
§ 1). Martinez argues the court understood the scope of its discretion and
exercised that discretion when it dismissed the enhancement. We agree with
the People and conclude the court’s error requires vacatur of the sentence.
At the August 12, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court considered
the newly enacted provisions of section 1385, subdivision (c). The trial court
and the prosecutor engaged in the following discussion on the topic:
“[The Court:] So the statute that we're all talking about is
— I mean, to me, I think the way I read the statute is that I
don’t have a choice. When I'm talking about the gun
allegation, I don't have a choice but to reduce it.
“And so I'm going to impose a sentence of 15 years to life,
because that is the statutory sentence on second degree
murder. And since my reading of the statute—I
understand that there is a letter that said something a
38
little different, but until that statute changes, I think I'm
bound by what the statute says to me and how I interpret
it.
“And so I'm going to strike the punishment of the [section
12022].53 and—but impose 3 years consecutive to the 15
years to life on Count 1, because I think that the statute
gives me the authority to still impose a punishment, but
not the full [section 12022].53 punishment. Because then it
makes the—that enhancement—it makes the sentence
longer than 20 years.
“And so on Count 1, it will be 15 years to life plus 3, which
is the low term on [the section 12022].5.
“[The prosecutor]: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt you. I
do believe the Court has the authority, if this is the avenue
the Court is taking, to impose—or to consider imposing not
only the [section 12022].5, but also the [section 12022].53(b)
and the [section 12022].53(c) as the lesser enhancements.
“So the People would ask this Court to consider imposing
the [section 12022].53(c), which is a 20-year enhancement.
“The Court: But it still makes the sentence longer than 20
years. The total sentence is longer than 20 years because
of the enhancement. That is the issue.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[The prosecutor]: I think the ambiguity of the statute in
whole is up for debate.
“The Court: We're going to find out about that. We're
going to find out about it in this case, I'm sure.
“[The prosecutor]: My record is that the Court has the
obligation to impose the [section 12022].53(d). I made my
record on that. But I'm also supplementing that saying I
believe, too, even in the spirit of [section] 1385(c) and the
language that was enacted this year, that it also gives the
39
Court the ability to impose the (c), (b), and [section
12022].5(a) because it would fit within the 20 years.
“The Court: Okay. And my reading of the statute is that
total term with the crime and the enhancement is more
than 20 years, then I can't—it adds up to more than 20
years, then I can’t.”
“ ‘For all criminal sentencings after January 1, 2022, our Legislature in
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) has provided direction on how trial
courts are to exercise their discretion in deciding whether to dismiss
sentencing enhancements.’ ” (People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 45,
quoting People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391, affd. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1024.) “Specifically, section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) now provides
that ‘the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so,’ and subdivision (c)(2) states that ‘[i]n exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence’ of nine listed ‘mitigating circumstances,’ any ‘one or more’ of which
‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v.
Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 443–444 (Mazur).)
The nine listed “mitigating circumstances” include factors like mental
illness, prior victimization, childhood trauma, and the use of a prior
conviction over five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I).) Two of the
mitigating circumstances include “shall be dismissed” language: section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), not implicated here, applies where “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case,” and subdivision (c)(2)(C), which
the trial court appears to have relied on, refers to situations in which “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.”
40
Both subdivisions provide that if the relevant circumstance is present, an
enhancement “shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) & (C).)
Since Martinez’s sentencing, reviewing courts have rejected the
argument the “shall be dismissed” language of subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and
(c)(2)(C) of section 1385 requires dismissal anytime the relevant circumstance
is present, concluding instead that dismissal is not mandatory under these
provisions. (See Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 446; People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290, 297 (Mendoza); People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87
Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21 (Lipscomb).) “[T]he statutory phrase ‘shall be
dismissed’ in section 1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C) cannot be read
in isolation.” (Mazur, at p. 445.) Rather, when read in context, section 1385
expressly permits imposition of enhancements that would lead a total
sentence of over 20 years or where multiple enhancements are alleged when a
trial court “finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics added). (See, e.g., Mazur, at p. 445;
Mendoza, at pp. 290–293; Lipscomb, at pp. 15–21.)
But the statute also permits the imposition of multiple enhancements
or an enhancement that would result in a sentence of more than 20 years,
even where there is no finding that dismissal would endanger the public.
When “[c]onstrued as a whole, the statute makes clear that all the mitigating
circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2) merely guide the court's discretion
in determining whether a dismissal is in furtherance of justice.” (Mazur,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.) This is conveyed through the way in which
related provisions in the statute work in tandem: “Subdivision (c)(1) first
sets forth the controlling ‘furtherance of justice’ standard for dismissal,” and
“[s]ubdivision (c)(2) then states that the court must give great weight to the
presence of any one or more of the nine listed mitigating circumstances ‘[i]n
41
exercising its discretion’ whether to dismiss.” (Ibid.) Finally, “[s]ubdivision
(c)(3) confirms the discretionary nature of [the] dismissal] decision by stating
that the court ‘may exercise its discretion at sentencing’ but is not prevented
‘from exercising its discretion’ earlier in the proceedings.” (Ibid.) Thus, the
“shall be dismissed” language of the mitigating circumstances in subdivisions
(c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C)—read in context—only requires the court to dismiss the
relevant enhancement if it first finds the dismissal would not endanger the
public and that doing so would be “in the furtherance of justice” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1)). (See Mazur, at pp. 444–445.)
Apparently recognizing the rising tide of authority rejecting the idea
that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), requires dismissal of any
enhancement that would result in a sentence of more than 20 years, Martinez
does not argue the statute should be read as mandating dismissal of the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. Instead, he contends the
People’s argument misconstrues what the trial court actually did at his
sentencing. According to Martinez, the record can be read as demonstrating
the trial court understood it had discretion under section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(C) to impose the enhancement, but decided it would exercise its
discretion to dismiss the enhancement. Martinez highlights that at an
earlier point in the hearing, the court made a reference to section 1385’s
consideration of a defendant’s danger to the public as a reason to “ ‘not
consider giving the person a lesser sentence.’ ” Martinez argues this
demonstrates the court understood that a finding that a defendant would be
a danger to the public would mean that no dismissal of an enhancement was
warranted.
Martinez further contends other portions of the trial court’s remarks
can “fairly be read to show that it understood the scope of its discretion under
42
section 1385, subdivision (c),” and it chose to dismiss the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement “in the interest of justice.” To demonstrate this,
Martinez relies on the fact the trial court discussed that Martinez had proved
the existence of two of the mitigating factors set out in section 1385,
subdivision (c): (1) imposition of an enhancement would result in a sentence
longer than 20 years (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), and (2) Martinez was a juvenile
when he committed the offenses (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(G)). He then contends
the court also “implicitly” found the existence of two additional mitigating
factors—childhood trauma and mental illness. In Martinez’s view, “the trial
court’s discussion of the mitigating factors of defendant’s childhood trauma,
mental illness, and status as a juvenile when he committed the crimes”
indicates that the court relied on these factors, gave them great weight, and
then made a “judgment that dismissing the enhancement would further the
interest of justice.”
We disagree with Martinez’s reading of the record. Martinez’s
assertions about the trial court’s statements fail to acknowledge the court
had multiple firearm enhancements to consider, many of which did not
involve sentences that would have led to a term of more than 20 years. The
most reasonable reading of the court’s references to the public safety
consideration, as well as the other potentially mitigating factors set out in
section 1385, subdivision (c), is that the court was considering these factors to
decide whether to impose or dismiss the other firearm enhancements found
true by the jury, not the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. But
when the court discussed the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement,
specifically, it expressed its belief that it could not impose a sentence greater
than 20 years on any particular count. The court said: “I mean, to me, I
think the way I read the statute is that I don't have a choice. When I'm
43
talking about the gun allegation [of section 12022.53, subdivision (d)], I don't
have a choice but to reduce it. [¶] . . . And my reading of the statute is that [if
the] total term with the crime and the enhancement is more than 20 years,
then I can’t—it adds up to more than 20 years, then I can’t [impose it].”
(Italics added.) There is no room for interpretation. The record demonstrates
the trial court believed it did not possess the discretion to do anything other
than dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court is not aware of the
scope of its sentencing discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
378.) Because of this, a court “necessarily abuses its discretion when it fails
to exercise its discretion.” (People v. Choi (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 753, 766.)
Here, because the trial court was unaware it retained discretion to impose
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, its dismissal of that
enhancement under the misapprehension it had no discretion to do otherwise
constituted an abuse of discretion.
Further, the error requires reversal of the sentence and remand for the
trial court to exercise its discretion in connection with the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement. “[T]here is a practical difference in assessing
the effect of an error when the court has not articulated whether a
discretionary decision was made in the first place, as compared to when there
were errors in a decision the court actually rendered.” (In re F.M. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 701, 716.) This is because where a sentencing court was not
aware of the scope of its discretionary powers at sentencing, it is almost
always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court
would have done if it had known the true scope of its discretionary powers at
the time of sentencing. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.)
Therefore, where a court does not undertake to exercise its discretion, “ ‘the
44
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly
indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
Here, the court offered no hint it would have imposed the same
sentence if, under an alternative view of the meaning of section 1385, it
possessed discretionary power to impose the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement. And we cannot glean such an indication from other aspects of
the sentencing hearing. For example, the trial court did not dismiss the
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancements, despite the presence of other
mitigating circumstances, suggesting the court either determined public
safety or the interests of justice warranted their imposition. Under these
circumstances, we would have to engage in speculation to conclude that the
court would have exercised its discretion by dismissing the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement if it had known it had authority to impose the
enhancement despite the “shall be dismissed” language. We therefore
conclude the trial court's erroneous misapprehension of section 1385,
subdivision (c) as requiring dismissal of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement necessitates that Martinez’s sentence be vacated and the
matter remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall exercise
its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) in connection with the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. We express no view on how
the trial court should exercise this discretion on remand.
DISPOSITION
Martinez’s sentence is vacated. The judgment is affirmed in all other
respects. The matter is remanded for the trial court to hold a new sentencing
hearing. On remand, the court shall also determine whether Martinez has an
ability to pay the fines and fees challenged on appeal before reimposing them.
45
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
46
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