CourtListener 10382952•People v. Langi CA1/4
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Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Langi CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A168754
v. (San Mateo County
REMUS SAM LANGI, Super. Ct. No. SC054893C)
Defendant and
Appellant.
Remus Sam Langi was convicted of second degree murder
in 2007. (People v. Langi (Apr. 28, 2009, A119095 [nonpub. opn.])
(Langi I).) In 2019, Langi filed a petition under what is now
Penal Code1 section 1172.6, seeking resentencing based on
changes to the law of murder after his conviction. The trial court
summarily denied the petition, but we reversed with instructions
to hold an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Langi (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 972, 984 (Langi II).) The trial court held the
required hearing and denied the petition on the merits. Langi
again appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of a juvenile offense he committed and that substantial
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
evidence does not support the trial court’s findings. We find no
error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Evidence of the offense
In late December 2002, Miguel Martinez, Jose Martinez,
Francisco Molina, Domingo Huerta, and Danny Jesus went out to
celebrate Jesus’s birthday.2 After going to a party for a few
hours, the group went to a dead-end street in East Palo Alto
sometime after midnight. All five had something to drink at the
party, although Miguel was taking it slow, and they continued
drinking in East Palo Alto while standing in a circle. Sione
Fakalata, Langi, Joe Ngaloafe, and a fourth individual
approached. The first three appeared to be of Tongan descent,
and the fourth man said he was Puerto Rican or Costa Rican.
Fakalata was wearing black pants, a black hooded sweatshirt,
and a black leather jacket. Langi was wearing black shorts and a
black hooded sweatshirt, and Ngalaofe had on a red sweatshirt.
Langi was 19 years old, 6 feet tall, and weighed 195 pounds at
the time. The newcomers appeared to have been drinking, and
Langi was slurring his words and saying he was drunk and high.
The newcomers dispersed into the circle.
The discussion was friendly at first, with Miguel and his
friends offering drinks to the newcomers and chatting. Langi
bragged about his old days when he used to fight a lot and beat
up on other guys. At one point, Miguel and Fakalata were face to
2 Jose Martinez and Miguel Martinez were not related. To
avoid ambiguity, we refer to them by their first names.
face, staring into each other’s eyes confrontationally for a few
seconds. Miguel eventually broke it off, said “It’s cool,” and
offered Fakalata a drink. A little later on, Jose was talking to
Fakalata and asked whether he knew Jose’s friends who were
Tongan and Samoan. This seemed to make Fakalata mad. He
told Jose angrily, “I will knock you out, fool.” Fakalata punched
Jose hard in the face twice, and Jose fell to the ground. On the
ground, Jose was hit in the head by fists or feet and felt
something moving in his pocket where his keys were. When the
beating and the feeling in his pocket stopped, Jose ran home.
When he got there, he discovered his keys were missing.
Miguel was standing next to Jose and turned towards him
when Fakalata hit him. Jesus testified at Langi’s trial that
Langi ran across and punched Miguel in the face. Miguel fell
down. A police officer who interviewed Jesus in the hospital
immediately after the incident and again a few weeks later wrote
in his reports that Jesus said that it was Fakalata who hit and
knocked down Miguel. But Jesus denied saying this, and the
officer later testified that in his report he had confused Jesus’s
descriptions of Jose and Miguel because they had the same last
name. The officer did not realize his error, so he repeated it in
another report of a second interview a few weeks later. At
Fakalata’s trial, which took place a few months before Langi’s,
Jesus at first could not recall who hit Miguel, but then after a
lunch break testified that Langi hit Miguel.
Huerta testified at Langi’s trial that he saw Langi run
towards Miguel and Jose, then Huerta looked away. When
Huerta looked back, Miguel was on the ground and not moving.
His legs were on the sidewalk and his body was in the street.
Langi was punching and kicking Miguel in the face and body. At
the preliminary hearing, Huerta testified that before he turned
away he saw Langi hit Miguel in the head. When Huerta looked
back, Miguel was on the ground and someone was stomping on
his face and body.
Molina testified at Langi’s trial that he saw Fakalata swing
at Miguel, but Molina did not know if Fakalata connected.
Molina looked away because Langi was running towards Jose
and Miguel. Molina saw Miguel still standing, and Molina looked
away again. When Molina looked back again, Miguel was on the
ground. Fakalata and Langi were hitting Jose, and then Langi
was on top of Miguel hitting him hard with both fists.
At the hospital immediately after the incident, Molina told
a police officer that the person wearing a red shirt had hit
Miguel. Molina admitted at trial that he had told this to the
police, but he said it was not correct. At the preliminary hearing,
Molina first testified, as he did at Langi’s trial, that he did not
remember seeing why Miguel was on the ground. Later in the
hearing, Molina testified that he saw Langi hit Miguel, Miguel on
the ground, and Langi continuing to hit him. When confronted at
the trial with a transcript of the latter portion of his preliminary
hearing testimony, Molina remembered saying it. But at the trial
he did not remember seeing Langi hit Miguel before Miguel was
on the ground. Molina only remembered turning around and
seeing Miguel on the floor and Langi hitting him.
Huerta and Jesus were also hit, knocked to the ground,
stomped on the head, and they both felt hands in their pockets.
Jesus lost his keys and wallet, but Huerta did not lose any
property.
While Fakalata and Miguel were beating his friends,
Molina was backing away from the scene and calling the police.
Fakalata, Langi, and Ngalaofe walked towards Molina, so he hid.
When the group passed Molina, he heard Langi saying that he
wanted to go back to the scene. At the preliminary hearing,
Molina testified that Langi said this loudly and angrily.
The police arrested Fakalata, Langi, and Ngalaofe shortly
afterwards. (Langi I, supra, A119095.) In Langi’s pockets were
keys belonging to Jose and Miguel. (Ibid.) Jesus’s wallet and
keys were found near the scene. (Ibid.)
Dr. Peter Benson, a forensic pathologist, testified for the
prosecution that Miguel died of brain swelling with herniation
and brain death due to blunt head trauma. Miguel had
discoloration on the outside of his right forearm that could have
been a defensive injury and another injury on the inside of his
left forearm. He had a bruise and a skull fracture on the back of
his head. That area of the skull is fairly thick, indicating that the
injury must have been caused by a lot of force. Miguel had a
subdural hematoma, meaning a mass of blood between the brain
and the lining of the skull. More force would have to be applied
to a young person to cause a subdural hematoma than an older
person. Miguel also had a contra coup injury to his brain,
meaning damage to the front of his skull associated with the
injury to the back of his head.
Miguel also had injuries to his left cheek, right forehead,
and right side of his lips. There were five other reticulated
injuries on the sides of Miguel’s head, which would have required
a moderate amount of force. Dr. Benson opined that if Miguel
had been knocked out when he hit his head on the ground, his
muscles would have been floppy and not tense. Additional
strikes to his head would have then caused additional movement
to his brain and could have caused additional brain injury. The
injury to the back of Miguel’s head could have caused his death
by itself. But according to Dr. Benson, the other injuries to his
head probably did contribute by speeding up the dying process.
Langi presented testimony from another forensic
pathologist, Dr. Paul Herrmann. Dr. Herrmann opined that
Miguel’s head and brain injuries from striking the ground caused
his death. Dr. Herrmann did not believe Miguel would have
survived his contra coup injuries. Dr. Herrmann agreed with Dr.
Benson that the additional blows to Miguel’s head could have
caused more damage to his brain and somewhat contributed to
his death. But Dr. Herrmann did not find that contribution to be
terribly significant and could not state with certainty that they
did contribute. Dr. Herrmann admitted that if Miguel had been
stunned or knocked unconscious by a punch to his face, then his
fall to the ground would have been worse because he would have
been unable to protect himself.
Trials
In 2005, “Ngaloafe pled guilty to several felony offenses,
including robbery, battery with serious bodily injury, and assault
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, in
exchange for a stipulated term of 10 years in state prison.”
(Langi I, supra, A119095.) In October 2006, Fakalata was
convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder and other
offenses and sentenced to 29 years, 8 months in prison. (Ibid.;
People v. Fakalata (Aug. 11, 2008, A116627) [nonpub. opn.].)
This court affirmed his conviction. (People v. Fakalata, supra,
A116627.) In March 2007, a jury found Langi guilty of second
degree murder, three counts of robbery, and battery with serious
bodily injury. (Langi I, supra, A119095.) The trial court found
true an allegation that Langi had a prior juvenile conviction for
robbery and sentenced him to 38 years to life in prison. (Ibid.)
Langi appealed, and this court affirmed. (Ibid.)
Resentencing
In 2019, Langi filed a petition for resentencing under what
is now section 1172.6. He alleged that he had been convicted of
murder based on the felony murder rule or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and could not now be convicted of
murder because of changes the Legislature made to the statutes
governing murder. The trial court summarily denied Langi’s
petition, relying on a statement in Langi I that he had punched
Miguel and caused Miguel to fall and hit his head on the
sidewalk or curb. (Langi II, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.)
The trial court concluded from this that the jury had found Langi
guilty as the actual killer, which made him ineligible for
resentencing. (Ibid.)
Langi appealed and this court reversed. (Langi II, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) We noted that the Legislature had
amended what is now section 1172.6 to allow anyone convicted of
second degree murder to petition for resentencing if the person
was convicted based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine “or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Langi II, at p. 978.) We then held, based
on intervening guidance from the California Supreme Court, that
the trial court erred by treating Langi I’s statement that Langi
delivered the punch that caused Miguel to fall and hit his head as
conclusive evidence that Langi was the actual killer and not
eligible for resentencing. (Langi II, at pp. 979–980; see People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971–972.)
Langi II explained that while evidence in the record
supported the statement in Langi I, “the record as a whole” from
Langi’s trial “leaves room to question” whether Langi threw the
punch that led to Miguel’s death. (Langi II, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) The jury could have convicted Langi
based on an aiding and abetting theory even if someone else
threw the fatal punch. (Ibid.) The jury instructions for the
aiding and abetting theory allowed the jury to impute malice to
Langi based on his participation in a crime, without finding that
he personally acted with malice. (Id. at pp. 981–983.) Langi II,
at page 984, concluded, “Because the record of conviction does not
conclusively negate the possibility that the jury found appellant
guilty of second degree murder by imputing to him the implied
malice of the actual killer, without finding that he personally
acted ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), an evidentiary
hearing is required. At that hearing, the court may find that
appellant was the actual killer or that he was an aider and
abettor who facilitated the killing with personal disregard for
human life, in which case his petition will be denied. If the
prosecution fails to prove that he was either, he will be entitled to
relief.”
On remand, the trial court held the required hearing. The
evidence at the hearing included transcripts of testimony at
Langi’s original trial, transcripts of testimony by Molina and
Huerta at the preliminary hearing, and transcripts of Molina’s
911 call and statement to the police in the hospital after the
incident.
The prosecution and Langi also supplied additional
evidence. The prosecution offered testimony about a 2000
incident. Someone bumped Ansel M. and punched his arm in the
hallway one day at school when he was 15 years old. The person
was confronting him, so Ansel M. said something like “chill out”
and walked away. The next thing he remembered was someone
pulling him off the ground and helping him to the nurse’s office.
He had an injury to his face and memory loss that day. Based on
witness statements, a police officer at the time identified Langi
as the person who punched Angel M. The trial court admitted
into evidence certain pages of a juvenile petition relating to Langi
and this incident.
Langi presented testimony from Dr. Gangaw Zaw, a
forensic psychologist. Dr. Zaw explained that adolescents’ brain
development is incomplete so they are much more impulsive and
their ability to foresee the consequences of their actions is
limited. Their problem-solving abilities are also limited by their
lack of analytical ability and life experiences. They are more
likely to take risks when in the presence of their peers. In
response to a hypothetical question based on the facts of this
case, Dr. Zaw testified that the incomplete brain development of
an adolescent could impair the adolescent’s ability to think about
the consequences of the action of punching someone or striking
someone who was already on the ground and not responding.
However, Dr. Zaw never clinically evaluated Langi or examined
the record of his case. Dr. Zaw agreed that there is spectrum of
individual development and that if an adolescent committed a
similar offense in the past, it would provide reason to believe the
adolescent would understand the consequences of doing it again.
The trial court denied Langi’s petition. It concluded beyond
a reasonable doubt that Langi was the actual killer and acted
with implied malice. It noted that Langi punched Miguel,
causing him to lose consciousness, fall, and suffer a serious and
likely fatal injury. The court also found that Langi continued to
strike Miguel while he was unconscious and defenseless on the
ground. In the alternative, the trial court found that Langi was a
direct aider and abettor of Miguel’s killer, knew his conduct
endangered Miguel’s life and acted with conscious disregard for
Miguel’s life. The trial court found this was evident from the
joint nature of the assault on Miguel after Langi knocked Miguel
unconscious. The trial court’s finding on implied malice was
based on Langi’s initial punch, continued beating of Miguel once
he was unconscious, failure to render aid, immobilization of
Miguel’s friends by beating them, and angry expression of desire
afterwards to return to the scene, apparently to continue the
assault.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal background
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
limited the scope of the felony murder rule. [Citations.] The bill
amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, outside of
felony murder, ‘to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) [¶] Among other things, Senate Bill No. 775
[(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 55, § 2)] expanded
Senate Bill No. 1437’s mandate by eliminating any ‘other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime’ as a means of finding a
defendant guilty of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)” (People v. Love
(2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 328 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 870.)
“However, ‘Senate Bill 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant
was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or “was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.” ’ ” (People v. Love, supra,
328 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 870.)
“ ‘[S]ection 1172.6 is the statutory mechanism for
determining whether to retroactively vacate a final murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction that does not
comply with the new, narrower definitions.’ [Citation.] After a
defendant files a petition alleging entitlement to relief, and
makes a prima facie showing of such entitlement (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a) & (b)(1)(A)), ‘then the court must in most cases convene
an evidentiary hearing where the People bear the burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of the pertinent crime under the new, narrower definitions.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).)’ [Citation.] At that evidentiary
hearing, the court may consider admissible evidence admitted at
any prior hearing or trial and ‘new or additional evidence.’
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the People do not meet their burden of
proof, the conviction must be vacated, and the defendant
resentenced.” (People v. Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373.)
“Second degree implied malice murder remains valid
notwithstanding the recent changes” wrought by Senate Bill Nos.
1437 and 775. (People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848,
859.) Implied malice has physical and mental components.
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508 (Cravens).) The
physical component is met if “ ‘the killing is proximately caused
by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988; see Cravens,
at p. 508.) The mental component is satisfied if the defendant
“ ‘ “ ‘knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and . . . acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “To
be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the
defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing
to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical.” ’ ”
(Reyes, at p. 988; accord, Cravens, at p. 508.)3
II. Admissibility of evidence of Langi’s juvenile offense
Langi challenges the trial court’s decision to admit evidence
regarding his assault as a juvenile on a fellow student. He
argues that this evidence does not meet any of the Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (b) exceptions to the bar on admission of
evidence of a defendant’s other acts. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)
[“The admission of evidence in the [resentencing evidentiary]
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed”].)
3 Because, as we explain post, we affirm the trial court’s
finding that Langi was the actual killer who acted with implied
malice, we need not discuss his liability for murder under current
law based on an aiding and abetting theory. (See People v. Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991 [setting out the elements of a
direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder].)
“As a general rule, evidence of uncharged crimes is
inadmissible to prove the defendant had the propensity or
disposition to commit the charged crime. ([Evid. Code,] § 1101,
subd. (a); [citations].) ‘The reason for this rule is not that such
evidence is never relevant; to the contrary, the evidence is
excluded because it has too much probative value.’ [Citations.]
‘ “The natural and inevitable tendency” ’ is to give excessive
weight to the prior conduct and either allow it to bear too
strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as
justifying a conviction irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
[Citations.] [¶] Evidence of other crimes is admissible, however,
when relevant for a non-character purpose — that is, when it is
relevant to prove some fact other than the defendant’s criminal
disposition, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake of fact or accident.”
([Evid. Code,] § 1101, subd. (b); [citations].)
“Although a prior criminal act may be relevant for a non-
character purpose to prove some fact other than the defendant’s
criminal disposition, the probative value of that evidence may
nevertheless be counterbalanced by a section 352 concern.
Evidence may be excluded under section 352 if its probative value
is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
[would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’
“Thus, ‘the admissibility of uncharged crimes depends upon
three factors: (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved;
(2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove or disprove the
material fact [i.e., probative value]; and (3) the existence of any
rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence [i.e.,
prejudicial effect or other section 352 concern].’ [Citations.] [¶]
Courts subject other crimes evidence to ‘ “extremely careful
analysis” ’ [citation] and review the admission of such evidence
for abuse of discretion [citation].” (People v. Hendrix (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 216, 238.)
“Whether similarity is required to prove knowledge and the
degree of similarity required depends on the specific knowledge
at issue and whether the prior experience tends to prove the
knowledge defendant is said to have had in mind at the time of
the crime. For example, knowledge of the dangers of driving
while under the influence can be obtained through the general
experience of having suffered a driving under the influence
conviction [citation], from the knowledge obtained in driving
under the influence classes [citations] or from the admonition
required by Vehicle Code section 23593 upon a DUI-related
conviction. While prior similar driving conduct and other similar
circumstances would enhance the probative value, other crimes
evidence may be admissible even though similar only in a general
way, i.e., the prior events involve prior DUI offenses. This is so
because in any of these examples, the evidence supports an
inference that the defendant was aware of the dangers of driving
while under the influence at later times when he or she drove.”
(People v. Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 241, fn. omitted.)
This awareness is relevant because it tends to establish a
“defendant’s knowledge — gained in the course of the prior
misconduct — of the natural consequences, dangerous to life, of
the reckless operation of a motor vehicle, and of his persistence in
that behavior, thus evidencing a conscious disregard for the lives
of others on the road. These mental features, of course, comprise
the mens rea of implied malice, thereby supporting an accusation
of second degree murder.” (People v. Ortiz (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111–112, italics omitted.)
Evidence of Langi’s juvenile offense was relevant here in
precisely the same fashion as evidence of a prior driving under
the influence conviction in a murder trial. The prosecution’s
theory of implied malice at the resentencing hearing, consistent
with several precedents we discuss post, was that the natural
consequences of knocking Miguel unconscious while he was
standing on concrete or asphalt were that Miguel would fall and
suffer a serious head injury, and that Langi knew and consciously
disregarded the risk of such consequences. Evidence that Langi
had previously punched Ansel M. hard enough to knock him
unconscious and cause him to fall down, and was found
responsible by a juvenile court for doing so, was relevant to
proving this theory. If Langi could punch someone hard enough
to knock him to the ground senseless before, he could do it again.
In light of Langi’s own personal experience, Langi’s decision to
punch Miguel on the sidewalk or asphalt of a cul-de-sac in East
Palo Alto could therefore demonstrate his conscious disregard for
the risks that Miguel would fall to the ground.
Langi resists this conclusion by pointing out that Ansel M.
did not suffer a head injury like Miguel and arguing that this
makes Langi’s punch of Ansel M. probative only of a risk of great
bodily injury, not of a risk dangerous to human life. Langi’s
juvenile offense was certainly not definitive proof of malice in the
same way as, for example, evidence that he had previously killed
someone by knocking him out on a hard surface. But that does
not entirely vitiate the evidence’s probative value. It still
provided one of the links in the chain, which was sufficient to
make it admissible. The prosecution could prove that Langi
disregarded a risk that Miguel would fall to the ground and then
then rely on common sense (and, as discussed post, judicial
precedent) to establish the risk to human life from such a fall on
a concrete or asphalt surface.
Cases dealing with the admission of prior DUI or reckless
driving evidence in a later implied malice murder prosecution
bear this out. (See People v. Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 112–115 [discussing cases].) Evidence of a prior DUI
conviction or reckless driving, even when the defendant did not
previously injure or kill anyone, is admissible because the
experience demonstrates the risk and, in the case of a conviction,
the legal consequences underscore the significance of the danger.
(Ibid.) In the same way, Langi did not need to have killed Ansel
M. with his punch to learn from the experience and his juvenile
court disposition that he could, with a punch, knock someone
unconscious and cause him to fall down in a dangerous way.
Similarly, Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 509, stated
that evidence of a defendant’s prior sucker punches that did not
cause death was admissible as evidence of a common plan or
scheme in a prosecution for murder based on sucker punching
and causing someone to fall and hit his head. We discuss
Cravens in more detail post, but this aspect of the decision
supports our conclusion here that evidence of Langi’s juvenile
offense was likewise admissible, even though the prior punch did
not result in death.
Langi also argues briefly that the evidence of his juvenile
offense was inherently prejudicial, which we interpret as an
argument that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence
Code section 352 because its probative value was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People v. Hendrix, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 238.) Given that the evidence was
probative of implied malice, one of the key issues in the
resentencing hearing, we are not convinced that the evidence was
made inadmissible by the small possibility that the trial court
would improperly rely on it as propensity evidence to find Langi
was Miguel’s actual killer.
III. Substantial evidence of implied malice
Because the question at the evidentiary hearing on a
resentencing petition under section 1172.6 is factual, we review a
trial court’s findings at such a hearing for substantial evidence.
(People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 328 Cal.Rptr.3d 198,
205.) “This means ‘[w]e “ ‘examine the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial
judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must
review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at pp. 205–206.)
Our Supreme Court recently remarked, in a case applying
the substantial evidence standard in a direct appeal, “ ‘ “Evidence
which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is
not sufficient to support a conviction. Suspicion is not evidence,
it merely raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for
an inference of fact.” [Citation.] The substantial evidence rule
mandates consideration of the weight of the evidence before
deferring to the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the trier
of fact. “[I]n determining whether the record is sufficient . . . the
appellate court can give credit only to ‘substantial[’] evidence, i.e.,
evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is ‘of solid
value.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307.)
However, the court did not state that it was changing the
substantial evidence standard, and it has elsewhere stated,
“ ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support” ’ the [fact finder]’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357; see People v. Davis, supra, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d at
p. 206 [applying Zamudio to review of ruling on § 1172.6
petition].)
A. Actual killer
Langi first attacks the trial court’s finding that he was the
actual killer of Miguel by pointing to discrepancies between
witnesses’ testimony at Langi’s original trial and prior testimony
or statements to the police. Langi points out that Molina and
Huerta testified at Langi’s trial that they saw Langi move or run
towards Miguel but looked away, and when they looked back
Miguel was on the ground and Langi was beating him. But in the
preliminary hearing, they both said they saw Langi hit Miguel in
the face and Molina saw Langi knock Miguel to the ground.
Langi admits that Jesus testified clearly at the trial that he saw
Langi hit Miguel and Miguel fall down. But he points out that a
police officer wrote in a report that at the hospital immediately
after the incident and in an interview a few weeks later that
Jesus had identified Fakalata as the person who knocked Miguel
down.
The evidentiary conflicts that Langi highlights do not
convince us that the record as a whole lacks sufficiently solid or
credible evidence that Langi hit Miguel and caused him to fall.
Under substantial evidence review, it was for the trial judge to
assess credibility and resolve any conflicts in the evidence.
(People v. Davis, supra, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 206.) Only if the
discrepancies in the evidence were so severe that the witnesses’
testimony could not reasonably inspire confidence (People v.
Collins, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 307) or under no hypothesis would
support the verdict (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 357) could we reverse the trial court’s finding. The
inconsistencies Langi highlights do not rise to this level.
Beginning with Jesus, his trial testimony was clear that
Langi hit Miguel. Jesus was an eyewitness to the incident and in
a good position to identify the perpetrator, so his testimony
carries significant weight. Jesus denied telling the police officer
that Fakalata knocked down Miguel, and the trial court could
reasonably choose to believe Jesus’s trial testimony rather than
the police officer’s reports of his prior statements. This was
especially reasonable here, since the police officer who wrote the
reports testified and explained that he misunderstood Jesus’s
account.
If the trial court wanted corroboration of Jesus’ account, it
could justifiably rely on Molina’s and Huerta’s preliminary
hearing testimony that Langi hit Miguel and knocked him down
over their testimony at trial that they did not remember. The
preliminary hearing took place in October 2003, less than a year
after Miguel’s death. Langi’s trial, by contrast, took place over
four years after the incident, in March 2007. It is reasonable to
think that their memories faded in between the preliminary
hearing and the trial. Their preliminary hearing testimony
accorded with Jesus’s trial testimony, identifying Langi as the
person who punched Miguel and knocked him down.
Additionally, while Molina initially did not remember mentioning
Langi’s punch to the police, after refreshing his recollection by
reading a police report, Molina recalled previously telling the
police that Langi hit Miguel. In any event, even if the trial court
relied solely on Molina’s and Huerta’s trial testimony and
disregarded their preliminary hearing testimony, there was no
actual inconsistency between Jesus and Molina or Huerta.
Molina and Huerta merely said at trial that they did not see an
actual punch land; neither testified that anyone else hit Miguel
or knocked him down.
Langi notes that Fakalata was the aggressor who got in the
staring contest with Miguel earlier and started the fighting by
punching Jose, but this makes no difference. There was
sufficient evidence that Langi delivered the specific punch that
knocked Miguel unconscious and to the ground, which supports
the trial court’s finding.
Langi also argues that the medical evidence complicates
the picture, but it does not seriously call into question the
eyewitnesses’ testimony. Dr. Benson testified that the other
injuries to Miguel’s head and face probably contributed by
hastening his death. But Dr. Benson was clear that Miguel’s
head injury could have caused death all by itself, so the punch
that knocked Miguel down proximately caused his death,
regardless of whether Miguel’s other injuries sped up the process.
(People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988 [proximate cause
means a substantial factor, rather than an insignificant or
theoretical one].) Langi’s own expert testified at trial that the
additional injuries did not significantly contribute to Miguel’s
death. Langi also suggests that the apparent defensive injury to
Miguel’s forearm shows Miguel was not knocked immediately
unconscious by the punch. But there is no clear indication of
when Miguel injured his forearm, while the record as a whole is
clear that Miguel suffered significant head and brain injuries
when he struck his head upon falling down after being punched.
Langi’s punch caused the fall, which caused the head and brain
injuries, which caused Miguel’s death. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that Langi was Miguel’s actual
killer.
B. Implied malice
Separate from his argument about the evidence that he
delivered the fatal punch to Miguel, Langi challenges the
evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that he acted with
implied malice. As noted ante, implied malice has physical and
mental components, and Langi contends the evidence here is
insufficient to prove either.
This is not the first murder case in which a defendant
knocked a victim unconscious and the victim fell and struck his
head on a hard surface. Langi recognizes that in three prior
cases courts have affirmed second degree murder convictions in
scenarios that resemble the facts here, but he argues the cases
are factually distinguishable. We therefore begin by describing
the three relevant precedents.
a. Efstathiou
In People v. Efstathiou (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 441, 442, the
defendant, who was a cook, followed his employer out of a
restaurant onto the street and got into a fight in which he
punched the employer and knocked him down. The defendant
crossed the street, then came back and kicked the employer on
the ground. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that the jury
reasonably convicted Efstathiou of second degree murder even if
it found the employer died because he struck his head on the
sidewalk rather than from Efstathiou’s punches. (Id. at p. 443.)
Efstathiou explained, “The consequences which would follow a
fall upon a concrete walk must have been known to” the
defendant. (Ibid.)
b. Cravens
In Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th 500, 503, the victim got into a
disagreement with Cravens and his friends at a bar. The victim
was five feet 10 inches tall and weighed about 180 pounds, while
Cravens was 6 feet tall and 240 pounds. (Id. at p. 506.) Cravens
and his friends followed the victim home, and a fight ensued
between the victim and one or more of Cravens’ friends. (Id. at
p. 504.) Eventually the fight ended, and the victim was standing
in the street, not behaving aggressively (according to the
prosecution’s witnesses), when Cravens “coldcocked” the victim
unexpectedly from the curb. (Id. at p. 505.) The punch was
described as “extremely hard.” (Ibid.) Witnesses thought the
victim was unconscious before he hit the ground. (Ibid.) The
victim’s skull made a loud noise when it hit the ground, and blood
started to stream from the back of his head. (Ibid.) Cravens
later bragged and laughed about knocking out the victim with
one punch with his non-dominant hand and said he was willing
to go back at the victim again. (Id. at p. 506.) The victim had a
blood alcohol level of .17 percent and died a few days later. (Id.
at p. 505.)
The Court of Appeal reduced Cravens’ second degree
murder conviction to manslaughter, but the Supreme Court, with
one justice dissenting, reversed that ruling. (Cravens, supra,
53 Cal.4th at pp. 506, 512; see id. at pp. 514–518 (dis. opn. of
Kennard, J.).) It cited People v. Munn (1884) 65 Cal. 211, 212–
213, which observed that an assault with a fist can make a killing
murder but that the law generally distinguishes between
assaults with deadly weapons and simple assault and battery.
(Cravens, at p. 508.) The Cravens court then concluded on the
facts before it that “the manner of the assault and the
circumstances under which it was made rendered the natural
consequences of defendant’s conduct dangerous to life.” (Ibid.)
The court first noted that Cravens “targeted a smaller and
shorter victim who was intoxicated, exhausted, and vulnerable”
from the previous drunken brawl. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 508.) Second, Cravens described the defendant’s punch as very
hard, hard enough to knock the victim unconscious, and cited the
fact that he hit his head on the ground with an audible cracking
sound. (Id. at p. 509.) Third, Cravens said the defendant gained
extra inches of height for his punch by standing on the curb while
the victim was at street level, guaranteeing the victim would fall
on a hard surface, and cited Efstathiou’s remark about the
predictability of consequences of falling on a concrete walk.
(Ibid.) Fourth, “[p]erhaps worst of all” to the court, Cravens
faulted the Court of Appeal for ignoring the facts that Cravens’
punch was a sucker punch and that he had a history of using
sucker punches to his advantage, established through evidence of
prior incidents admissible to demonstrate a common plan or
scheme. (Id. at pp. 509–510.) Cravens concluded that the
defendant’s punch was not at all ordinary, but rather “was an
extremely powerful blow to the head calculated to catch the
impaired victim off guard, without any opportunity for the victim
to protect his head, and thereby deliver the victim directly and
rapidly at his most vulnerable to a most unforgiving surface.”
(Id. at p. 511.)
Finally, Cravens found the record supported the jury’s
finding of the mental component of implied malice. “[T]he jury
was entitled to infer defendant’s subjective awareness that his
conduct endangered [the victim’s] life from the circumstances of
the attack alone, the natural consequences of which were
dangerous to human life.” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511.)
Cravens also observed that Cravens had egged on his friends to
fight the victim beforehand, took no steps to check on the victim’s
condition or secure emergency assistance after knocking him
unconscious and splitting his head open on the sidewalk,
expressed a willingness to fight the victim more, and bragged and
laughed about his prowess afterwards. (Ibid.)
One justice in Cravens stated in a concurrence that the
facts of the case fell “just within the outer bounds of conduct
sufficiently dangerous to satisfy” the test of implied malice that
looks at whether an act’s natural consequences are dangerous to
life. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 514 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)
The dissenting justice, by contrast, was not convinced that
Cravens’ extra height on the curb or history of sucker punches
made the victim’s death a natural consequence of the single blow.
(Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 516–517 (dis. opn. of Kennard,
J.).) Nor was she convinced that Cravens’ conduct beforehand in
egging on his friends to fight the victim or afterwards in not
seeking help for the victim and trivializing the incident indicated
anything about Cravens’ subjective awareness of the risk of his
punch. (Id. at p. 517.) The dissenting justice also noted that
Cravens hit the victim with his non-dominant hand and had
previously sucker punched other victims without inflicting any
life-threatening injury. (Ibid.)
c. Palomar
The victim in People v. Palomar (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 969,
971–972 (Palomar), drank 10 beers in a bar and made a
derogatory remark about Mexicans. Palomar, who was a “ ‘pretty
big guy,’ ” told others he intended to “ ‘fuck homeboy up,’ ” and
someone warned the victim that he would be “ ‘jumped’ ” when he
left the bar. (Id. at p. 972.) The victim, who was five feet 10
inches tall and a solid, well-built 225 pounds, did not take the
warning seriously. (Ibid.) While the victim and a friend were
walking away from the bar, they heard a noise and turned
around. (Ibid.) Palomar punched the victim in the face with an
“ ‘incredibly powerful’ ” punch. (Ibid.) The victim stayed
standing for a moment, his eyes closed, and then he fell slowly
backwards towards the curb. (Id. at p. 973.) The victim’s head
hit the edge of the curb and sounded like a watermelon being
dropped off a building. (Ibid.) He began bleeding from his ears,
mouth, and back of his head. (Ibid.) Palomar walked away.
(Ibid.)
The Palomar court compared the facts to Cravens and, over
a dissent, affirmed the defendant’s second degree murder
conviction. (Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975–980.) For
the physical component of malice, Palomar first noted that the
victim was obviously intoxicated and therefore vulnerable, while
Palomar was not intoxicated. (Id. at p. 976.) Second, Palomar
inferred that the punch was very hard because it knocked the
victim unconscious despite his stature. (Id. at pp. 976–977.)
Third, Palomar’s conduct guaranteed the victim would fall on a
hard surface, whose consequences must have been known to the
defendant (citing Efstathiou). (Id. at p. 977.) Fourth, Palomar
surreptitiously approached the victim and used a sucker punch.
(Ibid.)
For the mental component of malice, Palomar, like
Cravens, held the jury could infer Palomar’s subjective awareness
of the risk of his conduct from the circumstances of the attack,
whose natural consequences were dangerous to human life.
(Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.) Palomar also noted
that Palomar must have planned the attack, since someone
warned the victim he would be jumped. (Ibid.) Palomar finally
observed that the defendant simply walked away even though he
must have known the victim was severely injured, given the
sound his head made when it hit the edge of the curb. (Ibid.)
A dissenting justice distinguished Cravens because the
victim there was vulnerable from a prior beating by the
defendant’s friends and in the street while Cravens was on the
curb, whereas the victim was roughly the same size as Palomar,
was on the same level, and had dismissed a warning about being
jumped. (Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 981–982 (dis.
opn. of Perren, J.).) The majority was not swayed by these
distinctions. (Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 978–980.)
The keys to Cravens, according to the Palomar majority, were
“the victim’s extreme vulnerability and the powerful sucker
punch to the head delivered while the victim was standing on a
concrete surface.” (Id. at p. 979.) The majority also found the
facts of that case were more egregious than Cravens because
Palomar made a deadly stealth attack and the jury could have
inferred he was motivated by racial animus, given the victim’s
derogatory comment about Mexicans. (Id. at pp. 979–980.)
d. Analysis
Langi questions whether the facts of this case resemble
those of Cravens, Efstathiou, and Palomar closely enough to
support the trial court’s finding that he acted with implied malice
and therefore could be convicted of second degree murder as
Miguel’s actual killer. While there are some factual differences,
we conclude the facts support the trial court’s findings on both
components of implied malice.
On the physical component of malice, Langi points out that
there is no evidence Miguel was intoxicated or was smaller than
Langi. This is correct. Jose testified at the trial that Miguel was
“taking it slow” and would drive, so the trial court could infer
that he was not drunk. Langi, by contrast, described himself as
drunk and high and was slurring his words. While the Attorney
General describes Miguel as smaller, he offers no record citation
to support the assertion. The record indicates that Langi was six
feet tall and 195 pounds, but we are aware of no evidence of
Miguel’s size or stature. However, Palomar was apparently
comparable in size to his victim. (See Palomar, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 972 [Palomar was “ ‘a pretty big guy’ ”]; id.
at p. 982 (dis. opn. of Perren, J.) [Palomar and victim were
roughly the same size].) Miguel was also vulnerable because he
was not expecting Langi’s punch, as discussed post. Although
Miguel’s relative size and sobriety may weigh against a finding of
malice, they are not dispositive.
Langi is incorrect when he also asserts that there was no
evidence of the force of the punch that knocked Miguel down or of
the force with which his head hit the sidewalk. While no
witnesses described the force of Langi’s punch to Miguel, it could
be inferred that the punch was extremely hard from its
consequences alone, given that it knocked Miguel senseless and
caused him to fall immediately to the ground. (See Cravens,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 509 [punch was hard enough to knock the
victim unconscious, despite his youth and fitness, before he hit
the ground]; Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 976–977
[could infer strength of punch from fact that it knocked out
victim].) The force of Miguel’s fall can also be inferred to have
been as severe as those in the prior cases. It cracked Miguel’s
skull in a fairly thick area, which Dr. Benson testified would have
required a lot of force.
Langi also asserts that Miguel was not taken by surprise,
unlike the victims in Cravens or Palomar. The trial court,
however, could reasonably infer that Miguel was taken
unawares. An altercation had already begun when Fakalata
punched Jose, as Langi notes. But Molina, Jesus, and Huerta all
testified that Langi “ran” across the circle towards Miguel, while
Miguel had turned towards Fakalata and Jose. It is reasonable
to conclude from this that Langi punched Miguel unexpectedly
while Miguel’s attention was focused on Jose and Fakalata. The
fact that Langi got a running start could also be inferred to have
added force to his punch, analogous to the advantage Cravens
had by standing on a curb while his victim was in the street.
(Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 509.) Langi argues that the
defensive bruise on Miguel’s forearm means either that Miguel
defended himself before he was punched or that he was not
unconscious when he hit the ground. As noted ante, there is no
direct evidence of when Miguel suffered this injury, so it is
difficult to place much weight on it. Miguel could have suffered it
when Fakalata first swung at him, which Molina recalled, before
Langi unexpectedly knocked Miguel senseless.
As in Cravens and as discussed ante, the evidence of
Langi’s juvenile offense indicates that he had prior experience
and knowledge of the consequences of his powerful punches.
Langi questions how the violent incident with Ansel M. could
support a finding of implied malice because the prior encounter
was not fatal. The dissent in Cravens made the same point
(Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 516 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)),
but the Cravens majority nonetheless relied on that defendant’s
history of sucker punches to affirm the jury’s finding that the
defendant’s sucker punch on the victim was “predictably
dangerous to human life” (id. at p. 510). Langi’s prior assault
also provides sufficient reason for the trial court to discount the
significance of Dr. Zaw’s testimony about adolescent brain
development. (See People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400,
417 [youth is relevant circumstance bearing on whether
defendant had implied malice].) Dr. Zaw admitted that an
adolescent’s prior experience with an action would provide reason
to believe the adolescent could foresee the consequences of
repeating it.
On the mental component of implied malice, we may infer
Langi’s subjective awareness from the factual circumstances
supporting the physical component of implied malice. (Cravens,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Additionally, Langi was repeatedly
bragging about his ability to beat people up when he first joined
the circle of friends at the end of Garden Street, which could
indicate that he already had violent intentions and was trying to
intimidate his victims. The evidence of Langi’s conduct after
beating Miguel also resembles that of the defendants in Cravens
and Palomar, in that Langi did not check on Miguel’s condition or
seek emergency assistance for him. (Ibid.; Palomar, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.) Additionally, like in Cravens, at page
511, after the assault Langi loudly and angrily said he wanted to
return to the scene and, presumably, resume beating on Miguel
and the other victims.
Langi protests that there is no evidence he was aware of
the severity of Miguel’s injuries, since there was no indication
that Miguel was bleeding as much as the victims in Cravens or
Palomar. But Miguel was motionless on the ground after falling,
which suggests he had suffered a significant injury. But even if
the facts here differed from Cravens or Palomar in this respect,
and despite the absence of evidence of planning like in Palomar,
there are two other differences that make this case just as serious
and that cement the question of Langi’s mental component of
implied malice.
First, where the defendants in Cravens or Palomar walked
away from the victims after knocking them unconscious with a
single blow, Langi actually continued the assault, like the
defendant in Efstathiou. (See People v. Efstathiou, supra,
47 Cal.App.2d at p. 442 [defendant came back to kick victim after
hitting him and knocking him down].) Once Miguel was on the
ground and not moving, Langi continued to kick him and hit him
hard with both fists. Langi delivered blows to Miguel’s body as
well as his face, thereby delivering force to his head, where he
had already been severely injured. Second, Langi also beat
Miguel’s friends, which prevented them from defending him.
These facts, which the trial court cited, elevate this case above an
unintentional homicide following a battery and support the trial
court’s finding of implied malice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Langi (A168754)
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