Gilman v. Hawthorne CA1/5

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Filed 4/23/25 Gilman v. Hawthorne CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ROBERT GILMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A167783
v.
HEIDI HAWTHORNE, (Solano County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. FCS056345)

Heidi Hawthorne appeals from a judgment entered after a bench trial
finding that she committed fraud and conversion, in connection with the joint
purchase of a house with Robert Gilman, and distributing the net proceeds
from the sale of the property between the parties. Hawthorne does not
contest the accounting following the partition by sale. We agree with
Hawthorne that judgment on the fraud and conversion claims should be
reversed.
BACKGROUND
I. Complaint
On April 14, 2021, Gilman filed a complaint against Hawthorne for
partition by sale, conversion, and fraud.1 The complaint alleged the

1 The complaint also named Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc. The trial court dismissed this entity with prejudice because no

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following: Gilman and Hawthorne each owned 50 percent of a residential
home in Vallejo, which they purchased together in late 2014. The purchase
price was $650,000, and the parties agreed that each would pay 50 percent.
Hawthorne applied for a loan of $225,000 and intended to pay the remaining
balance of $100,000 in cash. However, just before closing, Hawthorne was
unable to obtain the loan without a cosigner due to her credit history.
Further, she did not have the ability to contribute the $100,000 in cash.
Gilman agreed to be a coborrower with Hawthorne on the $225,000 loan and
to pay her balance of $100,000 in cash, in addition to his $325,000 cash
contribution, to complete the purchase of the home. Hawthorne represented
that when her credit rating improved she would refinance the loan into her
own name. She also agreed to repay Gilman the additional $100,000 he
contributed to the purchase price. The property was refinanced in August
2016 and again in June 2018; however, Gilman received no money from
either refinance.
The first cause of action alleged partition by sale. The second cause of
action, for conversion, alleged that Hawthorne received approximately
$90,000 from the two refinance loans and converted these proceeds to her
own use without repaying Gilman the additional $100,000 he contributed to
the purchase of the property. The third cause of action, for fraud, alleged
that Hawthorne defrauded Gilman when she told him she would contribute
50 percent of the purchase price of the property and then, when escrow was
about to close, informed him that she did not qualify for a loan without a
cosigner and that she could not pay any cash toward the purchase price.
Gilman withdrew the additional $100,000 cash from his savings account and

evidence was presented relating to it and no evidence was presented that it
was served with the summons and complaint.

2
cosigned for the $225,000 loan to complete the purchase of the property. The
third cause of action further alleged that Gilman agreed to the 2016 and 2018
refinances because he believed that Hawthorne would perform on her
obligation to repay him the additional $100,000 cash which he contributed to
the purchase price.
II. Trial and Judgment
The following evidence was produced at the bench trial. In 2014,
Gilman and Hawthorne were platonic friends from church. They agreed to
purchase a house together in Vallejo for $650,000. Gilman was going through
a divorce at the time, and Hawthorne’s home, which was in foreclosure,
ultimately sold in a short sale. They initially agreed to split the purchase
price equally, with Gilman contributing $325,000 in cash and Hawthorne
contributing $100,000 in cash and obtaining a loan for her remaining
$225,000. However, a week before escrow closed, Hawthorne told Gilman
that she could not come up with the $100,000 cash payment and that she
could not qualify for the loan without Gilman as a cosigner. Gilman agreed
to contribute the additional $100,000 with the understanding that
Hawthorne would pay him back shortly after closing. Hawthorne’s version of
the parties’ verbal agreement was that she would pay back $25,000 and work
off the remaining $75,000 in labor on the house, or “ ‘sweat equity.’ ” She
testified that she made three payments to Gilman in late 2014 and early 2015
in the amounts of $5,100, $9,950, and $9,950; however, she did not have
documentation of any of the payments. Gilman cosigned on the $225,000
loan Hawthorne obtained. Escrow closed on January 26, 2015. At that time,
Gilman asked Hawthorne to repay the $100,000 loan.2 Hawthorne made the

2 Gilman’s testimony does not explain how Hawthorne responded to his

request at the time of closing.

3
mortgage payments on the loan Gilman cosigned, and she never asked him to
contribute to the mortgage payments.
In August 2016, Hawthorne refinanced the $225,000 mortgage for a
larger loan of $284,900 that was in her name only. Gilman agreed to the
refinance. Hawthorne received $63,855.96 from the 2016 refinance. Gilman
expected that Hawthorne would use the cash to pay him back a portion of the
$100,000 she owed him. However, he did not specifically condition his
agreement to the refinance on Hawthorne’s paying him back. Gilman neither
asked her to pay him from the loan proceeds nor received any of the
$63,855.96 from the first refinance in August 2016.
In June 2018, Hawthorne again refinanced the property with a new
loan of $305,000. Gilman agreed to the second refinance. Hawthorne
received $18,803.89 from the 2018 refinance. Again, neither did she pay any
of it to Gilman nor did Gilman ask to be paid any of the loan proceeds.
In January 2021, Hawthorne attempted to refinance the property a
third time for a loan of $530,000. This time, Gilman did not agree to the
refinance. He testified that he refused to agree to the third refinance because
“from the second and the third loan where money was taken out, I was then
aware that I wasn’t going to get any back of my money.” (Sic.)
The parties agreed to sell the property in August 2021 for $975,000.
After payment of the mortgage, the net proceeds of the sale were $651,691.
Following the trial, the parties submitted proposed statements of
decision. On January 6, 2023, the trial court issued a tentative proposed
statement of decision in favor of Gilman on all claims. Hawthorne filed an
objection to the proposed statement of decision and requested a hearing. The
trial court did not hold a hearing on Hawthorne’s objection. On March 6,
2023, the trial court issued its final statement of decision, which was largely

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the same as the tentative proposed statement of decision. It found that
Hawthorne perpetrated fraud on Gilman by misrepresenting that she would
repay the additional $100,000 he contributed to purchase the property. It
found Gilman’s testimony credible that Hawthorne agreed to contribute
$100,000 in cash to purchase the property and found Hawthorne’s testimony
that the parties agreed she would pay a portion of the $100,000 in cash and
the remainder in “ ‘sweat equity’ ” to lack credibility, in part because there
was no documentary evidence Hawthorne made any cash payments to
Gilman. The trial court further found that Gilman “ ‘discovered’ ” Hawthorne
had no intent to repay him after the second refinance in June 2018 and
therefore his complaint was timely filed on April 14, 2021. It found that
Hawthorne breached her fiduciary duty to Gilman by failing to repay the
$100,000. It further found the conversion claim timely because “it was
reasonable for [Gilman] to expect that [Hawthorne] would repay the money
she borrowed from him out of the refinance funds, and that [Gilman]
‘discovered’ [Hawthorne’s] deception after the second refinance in June 2018
when she did not repay the $100,000.00 she borrowed from him then.”
The judgment entered was as follows: “1. Hawthorne committed fraud
when she induced Gilman to believe she had sufficient funds available to
close escrow on an equal co-owner basis, on which Gilman reasonably relied
and in reliance, withdrew an additional $100,000.00 from his retirement
funds to loan Hawthorne for her portion of the down payment. This use on
behalf of Hawthorne of the additional $100,000.00 deprived Gilman of his
own use of the funds for a period of several years, causing harm to him;
[¶] 2. Hawthorne committed fraud when she promised to repay $100,000.00
to Gilman knowing that she was either unable to repay him or had no
intention of doing so; [¶] 3. Hawthorne committed conversion when she

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refinanced the original loan twice and removed cash equity belonging equally
to the parties. The amount of equity she converted from the first withdrawal
of $63,855.96 and the second withdrawal of $18,803.89 totals $82,659.94.
[¶] 4. Hawthorne committed conversion when she failed to deposit $13,000.00
of the sale proceeds received from her first attorney into either her attorney’s
trust account or [Gilman’s] attorney’s trust account. [¶] 5. Gilman shall
receive $437,000.00 of the net proceeds after sale in repayment of his
contribution of $325,000.00 on his own behalf, $100,000.00 on Hawthorne’s
behalf, and $12,000.00 closing costs. [¶] 6. The remainder of the net proceeds
after sale of $201,141.78 ($638,141.67 - $437,000.00) shall be evenly divided
between Gilman and Hawthorne as follows: $100,570.89 to each party.
[¶] 7. Gilman shall receive interest pursuant to Civil Code §3336[3] at the
rate of 7% for the period of time from the first refinance through trial on the
first withdrawal of equity according to proof, and interest at the same rate for
the period of time from the second refinance through trial according to proof.
[¶] 8. Hawthorne shall pay Gilman, the prevailing party, $15,244.80 in fees
and costs.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
In summary, the judgment awarded Gilman $549,570.89, plus interest
to be determined based on the loan proceeds Hawthorne retained from the
two refinances, plus attorney fees.

3 Civil Code section 3336 states, in relevant part:“The detriment
caused by wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be:
[¶] First—The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the
interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party
injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of
the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his
part would not have averted.”

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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hawthorne seeks reversal of the judgment on the fraud and
conversion causes of action. Specifically, she challenges paragraphs 1–
4 and 7 of the judgment. She does not challenge paragraph 5, 6, or 8 of the
judgment.
I. Fraud—Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment
Hawthorne argues that the trial court erred in finding Gilman’s fraud
claim, filed over six years after he contributed the additional $100,000 to
close escrow, was timely. Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d)
provides that the statute of limitations for fraud or mistake is three years
and that “[t]he cause of action . . . is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.” Hawthorne claims there is no substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s finding of delayed discovery. She also argues there is no
substantial evidence that Gilman suffered any damages based on fraud.
Since we agree with Hawthorne’s second argument, we do not need to reach
the question of whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding of delayed discovery.
“To recover for fraud, a plaintiff must prove loss proximately caused by
the defendant’s conduct. [Citations.] ‘Deception without resulting loss is not
actionable fraud.’ ” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 42, 65.) Gilman alleged that Hawthorne defrauded him by
agreeing to contribute 50 percent of the purchase price of the property and
then, when escrow was about to close, informing him that she could not
qualify for a loan without a cosigner and that she could not pay any cash
toward the purchase price. Gilman then withdrew the additional $100,000
from his savings account and cosigned for the $225,000 loan to complete the

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purchase of the property. The trial court found that Gilman’s fraud damages
were his inability to use the $100,000 in retirement funds he paid for the
house on behalf of Hawthorne. However, it is undisputed that the house sold
for a profit in 2021. Gilman acknowledged this and, when asked at trial what
damages he sustained, he stated, “As of today, I can’t think of any damages.”
During closing argument, Gilman’s counsel acknowledged the lack of
damages for the fraud cause of action. He stated, “I think there is a cause of
action for fraud. I don’t know what the damages are or what the penalties
would be against her, but I believe that she was leading him along into doing
this so she could have a nice place to live, and she stayed there for six years.”
Gilman argues that the trial court’s statement of decision awards
$100,000 to Gilman as both damages for fraud and reimbursement to him
based on the accounting after the partition by sale. We disagree. The
judgment expressly states that Gilman’s fraud damages were based on his
loss of use of the $100,000 (which we discuss post). However, the $100,000
was awarded to him as part of the accounting distribution after the trial
court credited Gilman’s testimony regarding the terms of his agreement to
contribute $100,000 cash on behalf of Hawthorne. Gilman did not argue or
present evidence that he was damaged based on Hawthorne’s representation
that she would contribute $100,000 in cash to the purchase price. The
property resold for a profit in 2021, resulting in net proceeds of $651,691.
The parties stipulated that Gilman paid the $100,000 on Hawthorne’s behalf
to close escrow. Hawthorne did not dispute that Gilman was entitled to
repayment of the $100,000, only whether the parties agreed Hawthorne
would repay a portion of the $100,000 by working on the property and if so
whether she did so. The trial court found against Hawthorne on these issues,
and Hawthorne does not contest these findings or the accounting after

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partition of sale, which awards Gilman “437,000.00 of the net proceeds after
sale in repayment of his contribution of $325,000.00 on his own behalf,
$100,000.00 on Hawthorne’s behalf, and $12,000.00 in closing costs,” in
addition to 50 percent of the remaining net proceeds after sale, for a total of
$549,570.89.
Gilman further argues that the trial court awarded Gilman damages
based on the lost value of the use of the $100,000. He refers to the portion of
the judgment that states: “This use on behalf of Hawthorne of the additional
$100,000.00 deprived Gilman of his own use of the funds for a period of
several years, causing harm to him.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Notably,
the judgment does not award Gilman any amount attributable to his loss of
use of the $100,000 he paid on behalf of Hawthorne. Nor does the record
reveal any evidence of such damages. Gilman claims, without supporting
authority, that his testimony that he “can’t think of any damages” was
merely a legal conclusion and not evidence. We reject Gilman’s argument.
There is no substantial evidence to support a finding that Gilman was
harmed by the loss of use of the $100,000, which he effectively invested by
jointly purchasing the property, which appreciated in value by 2021.
Specifically, there is no evidence as to what interest Gilman would have
earned if the $100,000 had remained in his retirement account; whether he
would have used it for other investments; or whether any forgone
investments would have yielded a greater profit than Gilman realized from
the appreciation of the property. He was awarded in the partition accounting
the entire amount he contributed to the purchase price, plus a 50-percent
share of the property’s appreciation. Nothing in the record supports damages
based on Hawthorne’s misrepresentation that she would contribute $100,000
in cash toward the purchase on the property. “Misrepresentation, even

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maliciously committed, does not support a [fraud] cause of action unless the
plaintiff suffered consequential damages.” (Conrad v. Bank of America
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 133, 159, rejected on another ground in Lovejoy v.
AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 94–95.)
II. Conversion—Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Judgment
Hawthorne argues the trial court erred in finding that she committed
conversion when she refinanced the original loan twice and removed cash
equity belonging equally to the parties. The trial court found that
Hawthorne converted $63,855.96 from the first refinance in August 2016 and
converted $18,803.89 from the second refinance in June 2018. It awarded
Gilman interest on these amounts under Civil Code section 3336 at 7 percent
for the period of time from each refinance to trial. Hawthorne contends
Gilman’s conversion claim based on the 2016 refinance is barred by the three-
year statute of limitations. She also contends that Gilman failed to state a
claim for conversion and that substantial evidence does not support
conversion.
We agree that conversion based on the 2016 refinance is time-barred.
The elements of conversion are (1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession
of the property; (2) defendant’s wrongful act toward or disposition of the
property, interfering with plaintiff’s possession; and (3) damages. (PCO, Inc.
v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 384, 395 (PCO, Inc.).) The statute of limitations for conversion is
three years (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (c)(1)), and the limitations period
begins to run upon the act of wrongfully taking property. (Bono v. Clark
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1433 (Bono).) Hawthorne allegedly converted
the $63,855.96 from the 2016 refinance when she received the funds in
August 2016 and did not give them to Gilman. Even assuming that such

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conduct constitutes conversion, the three-year limitations period began to run
in August 2016, by which time Gilman knew Hawthorne had obtained the
loan proceeds and not given them to him. Thus, his complaint filed in April
2021 is untimely.
The trial court applied the delayed discovery rule and found that
Gilman “ ‘discovered’ ” Hawthorne’s “deception after the second refinance in
June 2018 when she did not repay the $100,000.00 she borrowed from him
then.” Courts have recognized an exception to the three-year statute of
limitations for conversion when “ ‘a fiduciary has concealed material facts
giving rise to the cause of action.’ ” (Bono, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.)
The trial court’s statement of decision cites to Fox v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 (Fox) for the position that to rely on
the delayed discovery rule, the plaintiff “ ‘must specifically plead facts to
show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made
earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ ” (Id. at p. 808, italics
omitted.) However, the court then fails to apply these standards to Gilman
and simply finds that he “ ‘discovered’ ” the “deception” in 2018 after the
second refinance. Substantial evidence does not support this finding.
There is no evidence that Hawthorne ever concealed the fact that she
obtained funds from the August 2016 refinance and did not repay Gilman.
Gilman testified that he refused to agree to the proposed third refinance in
2021 because “from the second and the third loan where money was taken
out, I was then aware that I wasn’t going to get any back of my money.”
(Sic.) However, there is no evidence that Gilman was unaware in 2016 that
Hawthorne did not pay him from the refinance proceeds. Instead, the record
establishes that Gilman agreed to the 2016 refinance and was aware in
August 2016 that Hawthorne received funds from the first refinance that

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went “[i]nto one of Heidi Hawthorne’s accounts” and that she did not pay him
any of the proceeds. Nor did he ever ask her to do so. It was Gilman’s
burden to prove that he first discovered the conversion claim based on the
2016 refinance within three years of the filing of the April 2021 complaint.
(Fox¸ supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808.) He failed to do so. Gilman’s conversion
claim based on the August 2016 refinance is time-barred.4
The June 2018 refinance, which yielded Hawthorne $18,803.89,
occurred less than three years before Gilman filed his complaint in April
2021. Although Gilman’s conversion claim based on the June 2018 refinance
is within the three-year limitations period, we find that substantial evidence
does not support a finding of conversion.
“ ‘Money cannot be the subject of a cause of action for conversion unless
there is a specific, identifiable sum involved, such as where an agent accepts
a sum of money to be paid to another and fails to make the payment.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.] A ‘generalized claim for money [is] not actionable as
conversion.’ [Citations.]” (PCO, Inc., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)

4 The statement of decision also found that Hawthorne breached a

fiduciary duty to Gilman, including by failing to repay him the $100,000. In
certain circumstances, the existence of a fiduciary duty reduces a plaintiff’s
burden of discovery of the accrual of a cause of action. (WA Southwest 2, LLC
v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 148, 157 [“ ‘ “when a
potential plaintiff is in a fiduciary relationship with another individual, that
plaintiff’s burden of discovery is reduced and he is entitled to rely on the
statements and advice provided by the fiduciary” ’ ”].) However, “even
assuming . . . that [Hawthorne] had a fiduciary duty to [Gilman], this does
not mean that [Gilman] had no duty of inquiry if [he was] put on notice of a
breach of such duty.” (Ibid.) There is no evidence that Hawthorne concealed
the fact that she obtained the loan proceeds and did not give them to Gilman
in August 2016. Thus, even if her actions in failing to repay Gilman are
considered a breach of fiduciary duty, they do not support delayed discovery
of Gilman’s claim for conversion based on the August 2016 refinance. (Ibid.)

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Conversion is derived from the common law action of trover, and the
gravamen of the tort is “the defendant’s hostile act of dominion or control
over a specific chattel to which the plaintiff has the right of immediate
possession.” (Ibid.) As explained in PCO, Inc., “California cases permitting
an action for conversion of money typically involve those who have
misappropriated, commingled, or misapplied specific funds held for the
benefit of others. (See, e.g., Haigler v. Donnelly [1941] 18 Cal.2d [674,] 681
[real estate broker]; Fischer v. Machado [1996] 50 Cal.App.4th [1069,] 1072–
1074 [sales agent for consigned farm products]; Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51
Cal.App.3d 590, 599 [citation] [attorney’s claim for $6,750 fee from proceeds
of settlement subject to lien]; Watson v. Stockton Morris Plan Co. (1939) 34
Cal.App.2d 393, 403 [citation] [savings and loan issued duplicate passbook
and delivered funds to third party].)” (PCO, Inc., at p. 396.) “ ‘[A] cause of
action for conversion of money can be stated only where a defendant
interferes with the plaintiff’s possessory interest in a specific, identifiable
sum’; ‘the simple failure to pay money owed does not constitute conversion.’
[Citation.] Were it otherwise, the tort of conversion would swallow the
significant category of contract claims that are based on the failure to satisfy
‘ “mere contractual right[s] of payment.” ’ ” (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7
Cal.5th 1141, 1151–1152, 1st bracketed insertion added (Voris).)
The evidence here does not support a finding of conversion based upon
Hawthorne’s refinance of the property with Gilman’s knowledge and consent
and her retention of the refinanced loan proceeds. It is undisputed that
Gilman never asked Hawthorne to repay him with the proceeds of the
refinanced loans, either before or after she received the funds. Gilman
expressly agreed to the two refinances in advance and never conditioned his
agreement on Hawthorne’s using the proceeds of the refinanced loans to

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repay him a portion of the $100,000 she owed him. His expectation that she
would do so is not sufficient evidence to support a claim for conversion. We
reverse the judgment in favor of Gilman on his conversion claims based on
the refinances and also reverse the award of interest in paragraph 7 of the
judgment.5 (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1151–1152.)
III. Trial Court Erred by Sua Sponte Finding Hawthorne Converted
$13,000—Paragraph 4
The judgment found that Hawthorne committed conversion when she
failed to deposit $13,000 of the sale proceeds received from her first attorney
into either her attorney’s trust account or Gilman’s attorney’s trust account.
Gilman’s conversion cause of action was based on the refinances only and did
not include allegations regarding $13,000 missing from the sale proceeds. We
agree with Hawthorne that the trial court erred in finding she converted
$13,000, in the absence of any motion to amend the complaint to add the
alleged facts surrounding the $13,000. (McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 893, 908–910 (McMillin).)
A. Additional Facts
Gilman’s pleading contains no allegations regarding conversion
following the sale of the property in 2021. The issue arose somewhat
obliquely during trial when Gilman’s counsel examined Hawthorne. Much of
the factual background regarding this issue was presented to the trial court

5 Hawthorne, for the first time in the conclusion section of her reply

brief, asks that in addition to ordering that the trial court strike the portion
of the judgment ordering Hawthorne to pay interest on the proceeds of the
refinances (paragraph 7), we should also order the trial court to enter a
judgment “ordering the interest repaid.” She does not include any record
citations to support the implication that Hawthorne paid Gilman interest
pursuant to the judgment. Without an adequate record, we are unable to
consider the requested relief. However, the parties may address the issue on
remand.

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through statements from counsel for the parties, rather than directly from
Hawthorne’s trial testimony. Gilman’s counsel sought to question
Hawthorne about her receipt of a $13,000 check from her prior attorney.
Gilman’s counsel explained to the trial court that the net proceeds after sale
of the property were approximately $651,000, which Hawthorne’s prior
counsel held in a trust account, and that the prior counsel later retained
$13,000 from the trust account as payment for counsel’s fees. The remaining
approximately $638,000 in net proceeds was transferred to Gilman’s counsel’s
trust account. Hawthorne’s counsel objected based on attorney–client
privilege. After further discussion by counsel, the trial court allowed
Gilman’s counsel to question Hawthorne about whether the $13,000 was part
of the proceeds of the sale of the property, which should be added to the
amounts in Gilman’s counsel’s trust account, but not about conversations or
communications between Hawthorne and her prior counsel.
Gilman’s counsel showed Hawthorne a copy of a check from her prior
counsel that included a “ ‘description’ ” “ ‘Heidi Hawthorne refund fees.’ ”
Although Hawthorne was not asked to identify the amount of the check and
the exhibit is not included in the appellate record, the parties agree the
amount was $13,000. Hawthorne acknowledged that she signed the check
and that she did not return the funds to Gilman’s counsel to be deposited in
his client trust account with the remainder of the net sale proceeds.
Hawthorne was not asked about, and did not testify as to, when she endorsed
the check, but given that the property was sold in August 2021, it must have
been after the complaint was filed in April 2021. At no point during the
parties’ discussion before the court did Gilman’s counsel state that he was
alleging Hawthorne converted the $13,000. Nor did he move to amend his
complaint to include allegations regarding the $13,000.

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During closing argument, Gilman’s counsel argued that Gilman
established conversion based upon the refinances, as alleged in his complaint.
He mentioned the $13,000 in passing while discussing the division of
proceeds of sale, stating, “The other one that’s interesting is the $13,000
proceed of sale. And I almost forgot about that. That is in—Ms. Hawthorne
already has that. That should never have been sent away outside of the net
proceeds that should have been reported.” Hawthorne’s counsel did not
mention the $13,000 in her closing argument. She argued that the refinances
did not constitute conversion. Gilman’s counsel did not refer to the $13,000
in his rebuttal closing.
Nor did Gilman’s proposed statement of decision assert that
Hawthorne’s retention of the $13,000 constituted conversion. Instead, his
proposed statement of decision found that Gilman proved conversion based
on the refinances. He mentioned the $13,000 only in the proposed judgment
as follows: “Ms. Hawthorne return the $13,000 that she received from her
prior attorney which funds were from the net proceeds after sale of the
property to the law office of [Gilman’s counsel].”
Hawthorne’s proposed statement of decision did not discuss the $13,000
in the context of conversion. It addressed the conversion claim based on the
allegations regarding the refinances only. It mentioned the $13,000 in a
footnote in the context of the accounting and final distribution and
acknowledged that it should be deducted from the proposed distribution to
Hawthorne.
The first time the $13,000 is asserted as the basis for Gilman’s
conversion claim is in the trial court’s tentative proposed statement of
decision filed on January 6, 2023. The tentative proposed statement of
decision concludes that “Hawthorne committed conversion when she failed to

16
deposit $13,000.00 of the sales proceeds from her first attorney into either
her attorney’s trust account or Plaintiff’s attorney’s trust account. This
amount shall be divided equally.”
On January 26, 2023, Hawthorne filed objections to the trial court’s
tentative proposed statement of decision and requested a hearing. She did
not object to the trial court’s considering the $13,000 as part of the partition
accounting, but she objected to it being the basis for a conversion judgment.
She argued that the issue was not raised in Gilman’s complaint and that
Gilman never filed a supplemental complaint to allege facts material to the
case occurring after the original complaint was filed. She claimed it was
fundamentally unfair to find her liable for conversion of the $13,000 when it
was not pleaded by Gilman and not brought to Hawthorne’s attention.
Hawthorne’s objection states, in part, “Because it was outside the scope of the
complaint, Hawthorne’s current counsel did not know or understand that this
$13,000 was from the Hawthorne–Gilman sales proceeds, and believed the
refund was based upon an attorney–client dispute. At no time did [Gilman’s
counsel] contact Hawthorne’s counsel to explain the issue and ask for the
money. Had he done so, Hawthorne would have realized the situation and
immediately tendered the money.”
The trial court did not hold a hearing on Hawthorne’s objections. On
March 6, 2023, the trial court issued its statement of decision and judgment.
The paragraph of the judgment finding that Hawthorne committed
conversion based on the $13,000 is unchanged from the tentative proposed
statement of decision except that the final decision deletes the statement,
“This amount shall be divided equally.”

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B. Analysis
We agree with Hawthorne that the trial court abused its discretion by
sua sponte adjudicating an unpleaded supplemental claim for conversion
based upon Hawthorne’s retention of the $13,000 that her prior attorney
returned to her. (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 913 [“A court that
rules on a material issue ‘without even mentioning to the parties at the time
that it was considering the question’ violates due process”].) Although
Gilman’s counsel questioned Hawthorne regarding her receipt of the $13,000,
he never sought to amend his complaint to allege Hawthorne’s actions
regarding the $13,000 constituted conversion; nor did he even suggest as
much in either his closing argument or his proposed statement of decision.
Gilman argues that Hawthorne had opportunity for cross-examination
and was not misled or prejudiced by his failure to amend his complaint to
include allegations that her receipt of the $13,000 was a basis for his
conversion claim. We disagree. Hawthorne had no notice of this new claim
until the trial court’s tentative proposed statement of decision concluded that
Hawthorne converted the $13,000. During Hawthorne’s examination on the
issue, the trial court stated that the relevant question was whether the
$13,000 should be part of the net sales proceeds.6 Neither the court nor
Gilman’s counsel ever suggested the $13,000 was the basis for his conversion

6 Despite the trial court’s comment about determining whether the

$13,000 was part of the sale proceeds, the judgment neither awards Gilman
the $13,000 as damages nor includes it as part of the net sales proceeds. In
the facts section of the statement of decision, the trial court states that the
net proceeds from the 2021 property sale are $651,691, but paragraph 6 of
the judgment states the lesser amount of $638,141.67 as the net proceeds.
Neither party addresses this discrepancy, and Hawthorne explains in her
reply brief that the $13,000 was addressed by the parties in the distribution
of the proceeds, with each party receiving $6,500.

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cause of action. We find that the trial court erred in sua sponte amending
Gilman’s pleading to adjudicate an unpleaded claim in its tentative proposed
statement of decision and that Hawthorne is prejudiced by a finding that she
committed conversion based on facts that were never alleged or argued to
constitute conversion. (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th, at p. 913; Castaic
Clay Manufacturing Co. v. Dedes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 444, 449 [in the
absence of an actual amendment to conform to proof, the trial court may not
grant relief not alleged in the pleadings].) We reverse the portion of the
judgment finding that Hawthorne converted $13,000.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part. The judgment against Hawthorne on
the fraud cause of action and the conversion cause of action is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue a new
judgment striking paragraphs 1–4 and 7 of the judgment. Hawthorne is
entitled to her costs on appeal.

7 Hawthorne also argues that the trial court erred in finding that

Gilman and Hawthorne created a partnership and were fiduciaries because
Gilman’s complaint did not include allegations of partnership or breach of
fiduciary duty and that there is no substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s findings. The trial court made these findings in its statement of
decision in connection with consideration of the conversion claim and the
impact of the statute of limitations. The judgment itself, however, does not
include any findings regarding partnership or breach of fiduciary duty. For
the reasons discussed ante, we reverse the judgment for conversion and need
not further consider the propriety of the trial court’s consideration of the
issue of partnership and breach of fiduciary duty or whether there was
substantial evidence of a partnership or breach of fiduciary duty.

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Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Chou, J.

A167783/Gilman v. Hawthorne

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