CourtListener 10382521•People v. Chukwu CA2/4
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Filed 4/22/25 P. v. Chukwu CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B338085
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA516273
v.
OBINNA CHUKWU,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2024, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
Obinna Chukwu of assault with a deadly weapon and found true
the allegation that he caused great bodily injury in the
commission of the assault. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
12022.7, subd. (a).) The jury acquitted Chukwu of making
criminal threats and mayhem. (§§ 422, subd. (a); 203.) The trial
court struck Chukwu’s prior strike under People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and denied a defense
motion for Veteran’s Diversion. The trial court sentenced
Chukwu to five years in state prison, consisting of a low term of
two years on the assault, enhanced by three years under section
12022.7 for inflicting great bodily harm. Chukwu timely
appealed. We appointed counsel to represent him.
On December 24, 2024, Chukwu’s counsel filed a brief
raising no issues on appeal and asking us to review the record
independently. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).)
That same day, we sent Chukwu a letter informing him of his
right to file within 30 days a supplemental brief raising any
appellate issues he wished us to consider. On January 24, 2025,
Chukwu filed a supplemental brief raising numerous arguments.
As discussed in greater detail below, we reject those arguments.
In addition, we have independently reviewed the record, and we
discern no arguable issues. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
We therefore affirm the judgment.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We briefly provide the following description of the evidence
adduced at trial. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 851 [unpublished opinion does not warrant extensive factual
statement].) We construe the evidence, as we must on the
substantial evidence review that forms the basis of several of
Chukwu’s arguments, in favor of the judgment. (People v. Staten
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460 (Staten).)
Two eyewitnesses testified that Chukwu committed the
assault – the assault victim, Moses Katakanya, and Erika
Brumfield, a woman who was with Chukwu and Katakanya when
the assault occurred.
Katakanya testified that he and Chukwu were at a Reggae
concert together, then ended up at a banquet hall “after party”
around 4:00 a.m. on October 12, 2022. Katakanya gave Chukwu
money to buy drinks for their group, which included Brumfield.
Chukwu bought the drinks, but did not give Katakanya his
change, so Katakanya confronted him. Chukwu seemed agitated.
The group stepped outside.
Five to fifteen minutes later, Chukwu approached
Katakanya and again seemed agitated. Chukwu began cursing
at Brumfield and another woman in the group. Katakanya told
Chukwu to stop, and Chukwu attacked Katakanya. Chukwu
punched Katakanya in the head, and Katakanya started bleeding
from his eye. Katakanya fell to the floor, and Chukwu kicked
him in the chest. When Katakanya tried to get up, Chukwu
grabbed a glass bottle and hit Katakanya in the wrist with it.
When Chukwu hit Katakanya with the bottle, Katakanya started
bleeding very badly, then Chukwu left. The bottle cut Katakanya
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very deep, through his muscle. Katakanya did not provoke the
attack with any verbal or physical threats.
The cut was so severe that Katakanya had to have two
surgeries. At the time of trial, Katakanya still had a scar on his
face, as well as a scar on his arm. Katakanya was a software
engineer, so his job required lots of typing, and due to the injuries
he sustained during the assault, he has been unable to type
because it causes him pain and swelling. At the time of the
assault, Katakanya was in his 50’s, Chukwu was decades
younger, and Chukwu was much larger than Katakanya.
Brumfield witnessed the assault and corroborated
Katakanya’s account of what happened – that Chukwu, without
being provoked, assaulted and badly hurt Katakanya. Brumfield
added that the glass bottle Chukwu hit Katakanya with was a
champagne bottle.
DISCUSSION
Chukwu raises 18 arguments in his supplemental brief,
many of them undeveloped. We will address these arguments in
turn.
I. Applicable Legal Principles
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) “‘This means
that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to
the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test
his claim. The appellant must present an adequate argument
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including citations to supporting authorities and to relevant
portions of the record. [Citations.]’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 616, 619-620 (Kilrain).) “Accordingly, the California
Rules of Court expressly require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each
point . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority’ and to ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter
in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the
record where the matter appears.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)” (Kilrain, supra, at p. 620.)
“‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.’” (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
“Consequently, ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].
[Citation.]’” (Ibid.) “These rules apply both to parties represented
by counsel and self-represented parties.” (Ibid.)
II. Chukwu Has Failed To Show Reversible Error
A. Chukwu has not demonstrated that any fair
hearing or Fourteenth Amendment violations
occurred
In his first argument, Chukwu asserts, in general terms,
that the trial court failed to give him a fair hearing, violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and imposed an illegal sentence.
He also contends his trial included fabricated testimony,
inconsistent statements, and prosecutorial misconduct. We have
thoroughly reviewed the record. We discern none of the legal
violations Chukwu alleges. His trial was exceedingly fair, and
5
indeed, many legal rulings went in his favor.2 He was sentenced
lawfully, and perhaps leniently, as the trial court exercised its
discretion to strike his prior strike conviction. The record
contains no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.
As for Chukwu’s allegation of fabricated testimony, nothing
in the record indicates that victim Katakanya and eyewitness
Brumfield did anything other than testify in good faith, to the
best of their abilities. It was within the jury’s province to credit
Katakanya and Brumfield’s testimony as accurate. This court
may not, on appeal, make witness credibility determinations that
run contrary to the jury’s findings. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1199, 1206 (Ochoa) [in conducting substantial evidence
review, we do not substitute our own evaluation of witness
credibility for that of the fact finder]; see People v. Vasco (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 137, 161 [“Because we must draw all inferences
in support of the judgment, [a] defendant ‘bears an enormous
burden’ when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence”].) We
therefore reject Chukwu’s arguments.
B. The conviction was supported by substantial
evidence
Although this court is having difficulty understanding
Chukwu’s second argument, he appears to suggest that his
conviction is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
In reviewing a judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, a
court must review the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine if there is substantial evidence from
which any rational trier of fact could find each element of the
2 We commend the trial court’s management of Chukwu’s
trial.
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443
U.S. 307, 318-319; Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 460.)
As discussed above, it was not unreasonable for the jury to
believe the testimony of Katakanya and Brumfield, and thus
conclude Chukwu was guilty of assaulting Katakanya. (See
Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206 [appellate courts must defer to
jury’s credibility determinations when conducting substantial
evidence review].) It likewise was not unreasonable for the jury
to conclude the champagne bottle Chukwu assaulted Katakanya
with was a deadly weapon. (People v. Parks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 955,
959, fn. 1 [“‘[a]ny object, instrument or weapon, when used in a
manner capable of producing and likely to produce death or great
bodily injury, is then a deadly weapon’”]; People v. Cordero (1949)
92 Cal.App.2d 196, 199 [“a beer bottle, which used as a club or a
missile, constitutes a deadly weapon”].) Nor was it unreasonable
for the jury to conclude that Katakanya’s injuries, which were
extensive, led to significant bleeding, two surgeries, and created
long lasting pain which hampered his ability to perform his
occupation, constituted great bodily injury within the meaning of
section 12022.7. (Id., subd. (f)(1) [“As used in this section, ‘great
bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial physical injury”];
People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64 [“determining whether a
victim has suffered physical harm amounting to great bodily
injury is not a question of law for the court but a factual inquiry
to be resolved by the jury”]; id. at p. 66 [“Proof that a victim’s
bodily injury is ‘great’—that is, significant or substantial within
the meaning of section 12022.7—is commonly established by
evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the
resulting pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the
injury”]; People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047
7
[“[S]ome physical pain or damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or
abrasions is sufficient . . . .”].) In other words, the judgment is
supported by substantial evidence.
C. Chukwu has shown no evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct
In his third argument, Chukwu again contends the
prosecution engaged in unlawful misconduct. We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and discern no indication of
prosecutorial misconduct.
D. Chukwu has not demonstrated a violation of his
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
amendment rights
In his fourth argument, Chukwu contends his Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated. We reject these contentions because they are not
adequately supported by citation to legal authority or the
appellate record. (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
Moreover, we have thoroughly reviewed the record, and we
discern no constitutional violations or any other legal errors.
Indeed, Chukwu’s trial was conducted in an exceedingly fair
manner.
E. Chukwu’s general reference to PTSD is not
supported by legal argument
In his fifth argument, Chukwu asserts that he was
diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) before
committing the assault. He raises no legal argument
surrounding his assertion. Because he raises no argument
adequately supported by law or fact, we deem his fifth contention
forfeited. (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
8
F. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the enhancement for great bodily injury
In his sixth argument, Chukwu contends his great bodily
injury enhancement should be stricken because he has PTSD
from his military service. It was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to impose the enhancement. As discussed above,
the severity of Katakanya’s injury reasonably supported the
jury’s finding that Chukwu inflicted great bodily injury. It was
not arbitrary or irrational for the trial court to impose the
enhancement given the severity of Katakanya’s injuries. (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 [trial court’s
sentencing decisions are reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion, and will not be overturned unless the defendant
clearly shows the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary].) We therefore conclude the sentence imposed was not
an abuse of discretion.
G. Chukwu has not shown that his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective due to a failure to request
pretrial mental health diversion
Chukwu next asserts his counsel was prejudicially
ineffective in not requesting pretrial diversion based on his
PTSD. There is no indication in the record that Chukwu would
have agreed prior to trial to comply with treatment as a condition
of diversion. (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(3).) On this record,
Chukwu cannot, therefore, satisfy his burden of establishing that
trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by not requesting
pretrial diversion. It is entirely possible that defense counsel had
some tactical reason for not requesting pretrial diversion; that
9
defense counsel did not request diversion because Chukwu made
clear he would not comply with treatment; or that counsel
believed requesting pretrial diversion was futile for some other
practical reason. In other words, Chukwu cannot meet his
burden of establishing his trial counsel’s performance was
prejudicially deficient. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687 [to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
performance].)
H. Chukwu has not shown that his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective due to a failure to request
pretrial veterans’ diversion
In his eighth argument, Chukwu suggests his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective by not requesting pretrial diversion on
the basis that Chukwu was a military veteran with PTSD. (See
§ 1001.80.) We reiterate the above analysis relating to Chukwu’s
argument concerning non-military mental health diversion. On
this record, it is unclear whether defense counsel had a tactical
reason for not requesting veteran’s pretrial diversion.
Accordingly, Chukwu cannot meet his burden of demonstrating
ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. The trial court did not err in denying Chukwu’s
motion to dismiss
In his ninth argument, Chukwu argues the trial court erred
in denying his motion to dismiss the charges based on
insufficiency of the evidence. He contends Katakanya was not
credible in his testimony. As explained above, however, in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not
reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. (Ochoa, supra, 6
10
Cal.4th at p. 1206.) We therefore reject his argument that the
jury verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence.
J. The letter from the victim does not require
reversal
As a tenth argument, Chukwu notes that the victim wrote
a letter to the court indicating he did not wish Chukwu to serve
additional prison time for the assault. Katakanya’s letter does
not change the fact that the sentence the trial court imposed was
a rational exercise of its sentencing discretion given the
circumstances of the case. In other words, despite Katakanya’s
letter, we conclude the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
K. Chukwu has not shown that his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective due to a failure to raise a
voluntary intoxication defense
Chukwu argues in his eleventh argument that his counsel
was prejudicially ineffective because voluntary intoxication can
be a defense to assault with a deadly weapon. We reject this
contention on the basis that voluntary intoxication is no defense
to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. (People v. Finney
(1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 712.)
L. Chukwu’s other arguments regarding his mental
health condition fail
Chukwu’s twelfth argument is that his trial counsel was
ineffective by not allowing him to present a link between his
mental health issues and the assault. To the extent this
argument relates to mental health diversion, for the reasons
discussed above, we reject it. To the extent the argument relates
to other aspects of trial, we deem it forfeited as it has not been
11
raised in a manner adequately supported by law or citation to the
record. (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
M. Chukwu has not shown that his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective due to a failure to raise
an insanity defense
In his thirteenth argument, Chukwu claims his counsel
was ineffective by not preparing an insanity defense. Again, as
with several of Chukwu’s other arguments, this argument is
forfeited because it is not adequately supported by citation to
legal authority or the appellate record. (Kilrain, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) Nor does the record demonstrate that
Chukwu can meet his burden of demonstrating prejudicial error.
N. Chukwu has not demonstrated that the trial court
failed to take mitigating circumstances into
account in sentencing
Chukwu’s fourteenth argument is that the trial court failed
to consider his status as a military veteran with PTSD as a
mitigating sentencing circumstance. The record shows, however,
that the court was well aware Chukwu was a military veteran
with PTSD. We therefore reject the contention that the court did
not consider those aspects of this case in pronouncing judgment.
O. Chukwu has not shown that the trial court erred
at sentencing
Chukwu, in his fifteenth argument, contends the trial court
erred at sentencing because there was a lack of evidence that he
posed a danger to society. As discussed previously in this
opinion, the sentence the trial court imposed was not arbitrary or
irrational given the circumstances of the case.
12
P. Chukwu has not shown any error in the jury
instructions
Contrary to Chukwu’s assertion in his sixteenth argument,
the jury instructions given were adequate. Additionally, Chukwu
has forfeited his argument by not supporting it with citation to
legal authority or the appellate record. (Kilrain, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
Q. The GBI enhancement was supported by
substantial evidence
Chukwu’s contends in his seventeenth argument that the
trial court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement for great
bodily injury was not supported by substantial evidence. We
disagree. As discussed above, the great bodily injury
enhancement is supported by substantial evidence. Notably,
Katakanya’s injury was severe, required two surgeries, and led to
him being unable to type, disrupting his career as a software
engineer.
R. Chukwu’s eighteenth argument is not discernible
We deem Chukwu’s final argument forfeited as we are
unable to discern its meaning. (See Kilrain, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
III. We Do Not Discern Reversible Error Based On An
Independent Review
As noted above, in addition to rejecting Chukwu’s
arguments, we have independently reviewed the record and we
have found no arguable issues. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p.
443.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.*
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P.J.
MORI, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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