CourtListener 10382469•People v. Shepard CA3
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Filed 4/22/25 P. v. Shepard CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101542
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 05F04789)
v.
MALCOLM SHEPARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Malcom Shepard appeals the trial court’s denial of his second petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Specifically, he disagrees with the
1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to become
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. Although defendant filed his petitions under former section 1170.95, we cite to
the current section number throughout this opinion.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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trial court’s determination that issue preclusion prevented him from challenging the
court’s previous determination that he was ineligible for relief as the actual killer.
Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to review the record pursuant
to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Defendant has filed a supplemental brief arguing for an
exception to issue preclusion and that the record of conviction does not establish his
ineligibility for relief. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Conviction by Jury
On June 19, 2007, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and found true the allegations that the murder was committed during the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), that
defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)), and that a principal in the crime was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd.
(a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of life without the
possibility of parole plus 25 years to life. We affirmed his conviction on appeal. (People
v. Shepard (Sept. 10, 2009, C057177) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Defendant’s First Section 1172.6 Petition
On March 3, 2021, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 (hereinafter defendant’s first petition). The People opposed defendant’s first
petition arguing in pertinent part that he was ineligible for relief as the actual killer.
Neither defendant’s first petition, nor his reply brief in support thereof averred that he
was not the actual killer. Rather, defendant’s reply brief acknowledged he did “not
necessarily fall within the scope” of section 1172.6 and asked the court to treat
defendant’s first petition “as a petition for any and all possible relief under any and all
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possible interpretations and/or applications of the present law” in light of defendant’s
“very positive and rehabilitative conduct.”
The trial court denied defendant’s first petition at the prima facie stage, finding the
jury’s determination that defendant “intentionally and personally discharged a firearm
causing the victim’s death[] (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)[])” established that defendant was the
actual killer. Defendant did not appeal this decision.
C. Defendant’s Second Section 1172.6 Petition
On September 1, 2022, defendant filed another petition for resentencing
(hereinafter defendant’s second petition), and the trial court appointed counsel and
ordered briefing.
The People opposed defendant’s second petition, arguing the petition was
successive and barred by issue preclusion. The People alternatively argued the jury’s
instructions and findings established defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because he was the actual killer.
Defendant’s reply brief argued for the application of an exception to issue
preclusion based upon the evolving caselaw and his claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel received during his first petition. On the merits, defendant contended the jury
instructions did not conclusively establish that he was the actual killer or had the requisite
mental state for direct aiding and abetting malice murder.
The trial court issued a tentative decision finding defendant’s second petition was
barred by issue preclusion as set forth in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong).
The court explained, issue preclusion prohibits relitigation of issues argued and decided
in prior proceedings if the issue sought to be precluded is identical to the one decided in a
former proceeding; the issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the former
proceeding; the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits; and the party
against whom preclusion is sought is the same as or in privity with the party to the former
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proceeding. (Id. at p. 716.) Issue preclusion would not apply if there was a significant
change in the law that justified a reexamination of the issue. (Id. at p. 717.)
Applying this law to defendant’s case, both of defendant’s petitions sought the
same relief on the same basis. In defendant’s first petition, the trial court determined that
the record of conviction conclusively established defendant was the actual killer and
denied the petition on that basis. Defendant did not appeal this decision, which was final.
Moreover, while case law concerning section 1172.6 was evolving, defendant had not
provided, nor was the court aware of authority granting section 1172.6 relief to actual
killers.
Finally, the trial court alternatively found the record of conviction—specifically
the jury instruction and finding related to defendant’s personal and intentional discharge
of a firearm causing death enhancement—conclusively established that defendant was the
actual killer and ineligible for relief on that basis.
At the prima facie hearing on June 14, 2024, the trial court adopted its tentative
decision and denied defendant’s second petition. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Because defendant appeals from a postconviction ruling, the procedures set forth
in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 do not apply. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226,
231.) Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has directed that, when a defendant files a
supplemental brief in a postconviction appeal where appointed counsel finds no arguable
issues, we must “evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,” but need not
conduct an independent review of the entire record. (Id. at p. 232.)
Defendant raises two issues for this court’s consideration in his supplemental
brief. First, he asserts defendant’s second petition is not precluded “due to changes in
law [and] amendments made to [sections] 188 [and]189.” We understand this argument
to assert that an exception to issue preclusion should apply because the law has changed
since the trial court’s first decision.
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Second, defendant argues the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement did
not conclusively establish that he was the actual killer or acted with the requisite mental
state for murder. He posits the jury instructions required the jury to determine: (1) that
he personally and intentionally shot a firearm, and (2) his act was the cause of the
victim’s death. Thus, defendant reasons the instructions did not require the jury to
determine that his shot caused the victim’s death. Rather, the jury could have used his
being a major participant or planner of the robbery as the pertinent act. As such,
defendant concludes the jury’s finding for this enhancement did not establish he was the
actual killer and/or acted with “malice aforethought.”
Regarding defendant’s first argument, it is well-settled that an exception to the
application of issue preclusion exists if “there has been a significant change in the law
since the factual findings were rendered” and that change “warrants reexamination of the
issue.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.) “This exception ensures basic fairness by
allowing for relitigation where ‘the change in the law [is] such that preclusion would
result in manifestly inequitable administration of the laws.’ ” (Id. at p. 717.) However,
this exception only applies to a significant change in the law impacting the determination
of a relevant issue. (Id. at pp. 717-718.)
Here, the relevant issue was whether defendant was ineligible for relief as the
actual killer. The unavailability of section 1172.6 relief to actual killers is well
established and has not changed. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233; see also
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563-564 [preliminary hearing transcript may be
used to refute conclusory allegations of defendant’s entitlement to relief by establishing
that Patton was prosecuted as the actual attempted killer].) Accordingly, defendant has
not established a change in law that would warrant nonapplication of issue preclusion to
his status as an actual killer.
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In light of this conclusion, we do not reach defendant’s second argument
challenging whether the jury instructions and verdict established on the merits that he
was the actual killer and/or acted with malice.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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