CourtListener 10382018•People v. Aguilar CA1/4
Full text
Filed 4/21/25 P. v. Aguilar CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172263
v. (San Bernardino County
ROBERT MARK AGUILAR, Super. Ct. No. FWV23001318)
Defendant and Appellant.
We consider this appeal upon its transfer from the Fourth Appellate
District. Defendant Robert Mark Aguilar appeals from a judgment convicting
him of multiple offenses against his former spouse, Jane Doe, for which he
was sentenced to eight years in state prison. Aguilar contends the trial court
prejudicially erred by consolidating for trial two criminal cases brought
against him and by admitting into evidence at trial proof of certain
uncharged prior bad acts. We conclude his arguments lack merit and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges Against Aguilar
All of the charges against Aguilar involved his conduct towards Jane
Doe. In April 2023, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office
filed a complaint against him in case number FWV23001316 regarding an
incident that occurred on October 21, 2022 (October 2022 case). As later
1
amended after a preliminary hearing, Aguilar was charged with
misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury upon a former spouse (Pen. Code,1
§§ 273.5, subd. (a), 17, subd. (b)) and misdemeanor interference with a
wireless communication device (§ 591.5). Ten aggravating sentencing factors
were alleged regarding both counts (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)).
In May 2023, the San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office filed a first
amended information against Aguilar in another case, number
FWV23001318, alleging one count regarding an April 3, 2023 incident and
four counts regarding an April 10, 2023 incident (April 2023 case). Regarding
the April 3 incident, Aguilar was charged with misdemeanor violation of a
domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). Regarding the April 10
incident, he was charged with felony assault with intent to commit a felony
(which the jury was instructed was oral copulation) (§ 220, subd. (a)(1));
felony criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)); misdemeanor battery on a former
spouse (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)); and misdemeanor violation of a domestic
relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). Eighteen aggravating sentencing
factors were alleged regarding all five counts. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
B. Jane Doe’s Trial Testimony
At trial, the prosecution’s principal evidence regarding all the incidents
was Jane Doe’s testimony. She testified that she and Aguilar were involved
romantically off and on for 24 years and married for 19 years until their
divorce was finalized on March 15, 2023. They raised three children
together, who were young adults at the time of trial.
In the ten years before their divorce, the relationship between Jane Doe
and Aguilar was “really rocky.” In October 2022, Doe began efforts to obtain
a restraining order against him but stopped before obtaining one. In
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
February 2023, she obtained a temporary restraining order that barred him
from contacting or abusing her, and from coming within 100 yards of her or
her home, vehicle, and workplace. On March 13, 2023, the court issued a
permanent restraining order that prohibited Aguilar from these same actions
until March 13, 2026. The order was personally served on Aguilar that same
day.
1. The October 21, 2022 Incident
On the evening of October 21, 2022, Doe left work and stopped at a
convenience store. When she came out of the store, Aguilar “pop[ped] out of
nowhere.” She unlocked her car and got in; Aguilar got in the backseat at the
same time. She told him to get out or she would drive to a grocery store
across the street with him in the car. When he did not leave, she drove to the
store and went inside, as did Aguilar.
Doe saw Aguilar again as she walked back to her car. When she
unlocked her car to get in, he got in the back seat behind the driver’s seat.
Doe got into the driver’s seat anyway, thinking Aguilar would leave when she
told him her mother was waiting for her. But when she told him, he just
said, “ ‘You always say your mom’s waiting for you.’ ”
Aguilar argued with Doe about something she had posted on social
media that his mother had told him about. Doe told him, “ ‘Fuck your mom.’ ”
Aguilar grabbed her right arm, pulled it up, and put his other arm around
her neck. She could not breathe and told him that; he responded by “cussing”
and being “upset” with her. After no more than a minute, he let go, kind of
hugged her, and said he was sorry and that he did not mean to do those
things.
Doe told Aguilar she hated him and was going to call the police. She
started to call on her cell phone but Aguilar tried to grab it, so she put it out
of his reach and tried calling from her car’s screen. Aguilar reached over and
3
stopped the call on the screen. Doe said she wished her boyfriend would kill
him, and Aguilar responded by pressing his fist to the right side of her jaw
and applying pressure for about 30 to 40 seconds, causing her a lot of pain
and to cry. He punched her in the back of her head, twice she believed,
causing her more pain. He then got out of the car, took money from her
purse, threw water on her, said she would never see him again, and walked
away. Doe reported the incident to the police.
As a result of the incident, Doe had a large bump on her face, a “little
busted lip,” and scratches on her hand. Photographs of her injuries were
introduced into evidence.
2. The April 3, 2023 Incident
On the morning of April 3, 2023 (after Doe’s divorce of Aguilar became
final), Doe drove to work by a different route than usual. She saw Aguilar
following her in his car, then “lost him.” When she exited her car at her
workplace, he was in front of her. He asked her why she took a different
route to work that day and told her he would “mess up” her car if she did not
see him for lunch. She told him to stop acting crazy, went into her workplace,
and called the police.
3. The April 10, 2023 Incident
On April 10, 2023, Doe was napping during her lunch hour in the
driver’s seat of her car, parked in her workplace’s outdoor parking lot. At
around 12:45 to 12:50 p.m., Aguilar parked his car directly behind and
perpendicular to hers, got out, woke her up by knocking on a window, and
told her to open the door. She did not but after a few moments of back and
forth between them, she opened the driver-side door to return to work.
Aguilar pulled the door open and entered the car, squeezing himself into the
left and partially on top of Doe by putting his right leg over her left one, and
shut the car door.
4
Doe said she had to go back to work. Aguilar “stopped” her, said he was
really hot, and told her to touch his stomach. She declined but when he said,
“ ‘Just touch it,’ ”she did; she noticed he was “really sweaty.” He then
lowered his very loose shorts, exposed his penis, which was flaccid, and said,
“ ‘Suck my dick.’ ” Doe recounted at trial that Aguilar said this; she also
characterized it as his “asking” her to perform oral sex on him, although she
did not think he said, “ ‘Can you.’ ” He “asked” her three times to touch his
penis, back-to-back. In the past, it had not been unusual for them to have
oral sex together. When they had, his penis was always hard.
Doe said no to having oral sex with Aguilar in her car that day and
turned her head toward the passenger-side window to show her
unwillingness. Aguilar grabbed her head and turned it towards him with his
right hand, Doe at trial indicating his action by placing her hand on the side
of her head over her ear.
The two wrestled for three to five minutes, Aguilar moving Doe’s head
toward him and Doe moving it away. Doe testified that he moved her head
towards his face, but “wasn’t pushing it down,” although she acknowledged
telling the police he pushed her head towards his penis. She testified that
she pulled her head away except for one time when she looked at his penis.
She told a police officer responding to the incident that the force Aguilar used
in moving her head was maybe as much force as is used to close a door.
After refreshing her memory by looking at a transcript of her statement
to police on the day of the incident, Doe testified that after Aguilar tried to
force her head towards her, he put his hand on her lap and lifted up his
waist, pushing his groin towards her. She kept telling him she had to go and
was going to be late.
5
Aguilar pulled his pants back up. Referring to her stepfather, he said,
“ ‘You can suck Rick’s dick, but you can’t suck mine?’ ” Also, during the
incident he told her “that if he did go to jail for this he was going to kill [her].”
She was afraid he would hurt her. She later told police she did not think he
would kill her, but that, “because he was on heavy drugs,” she thought he
would hurt her.
Doe continued to tell Aguilar she had to go and he exited her car. Doe
then exited herself. She opened her trunk to give him some towels he
wanted. Aguilar then said he would “fuck [her] up” if she left right away
because he wanted to give her a letter that an ex-boyfriend had written to
her. She stayed, afraid he was going to hurt her. He gave her the letter and
she walked away as he was saying something and went into her workplace.
She reported the incident to the police.
Doe did not believe she spoke to Aguilar that day about the restraining
order that prohibited him from coming to her workplace. She told him about
it on other occasions when he came to her workplace and he denied the order
prohibited him from being there. She also told him video cameras were used
in the area.
Before trial, Doe spoke by phone with the district attorney’s office to
ask that it drop the “sexual charges” in the case. She did this for Aguilar’s
safety because he was the father of her children and she would always love
him. Also, her children were receiving phone calls that he was being beaten
up in jail. In the call to the district attorney’s office, Doe said she believed
Aguilar only wanted her to look at his penis and was not forcing her to
perform oral sex, and that he was wearing baggy pants without a belt that
were coming down, so she obviously was able to see his penis.
6
C. The Surveillance Camera Recording
A surveillance camera’s video recording of the outside of Doe’s car
during the April 10, 2023 incident was played at trial as Doe testified about
the incident. It shows Aguilar parking his car behind and perpendicular to
Doe’s car, exiting his car wearing loose shorts that he appears to hold up with
his hands, going to Doe’s driver’s side and passenger side windows, and
knocking on them. Then, he returns to the drivers-side door, it opens, and he
gets in the car and, with a little difficulty, closes the door. There is no
movement of the car evident until about four minutes later when Doe’s car’s
trunk opens. About a minute and a half later, Aguilar and then Doe exit the
car. They go to the trunk of her car, where they are partially blocked from
the camera’s view by Aguilar’s car. After some conversation, as Doe stands
by, Aguilar goes into his car and then to his open car trunk, and hands her
what appears to be a letter, which she reviews. She then walks away
towards a building with the letter, leaving Aguilar behind. He eventually
drives away.
D. Evidence of Aguilar’s Prior Uncharged Bad Acts
After conducting a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to
consider evidence proffered by the People, the court permitted them to
introduce evidence of four prior uncharged bad acts by Aguilar, all of which
were introduced via Doe’s testimony.
First, on March 13, 2023, Doe was asleep at her home at about 2:30 to
3:00 in the morning when her daughter woke her up and said she had heard
rocks being thrown at a window. Doe looked outside. She saw mud on the
window and Aguilar walking away from the area. She reported the incident
to the police.
Second, on March 18, 2023, Doe was sleeping on a couch in the living
room of her home when Aguilar called her and told her to open the door
7
because he wanted to have sex with her. She refused. He ended up knocking
on a window and the dogs started barking; he called Doe and told her to shut
the dogs up and that he would be back in five minutes, but he did not return.
After he left, she found that the back patio’s ring camera was missing and a
wire was hanging down where the camera had been. Doe’s mother reported
the incident to the police.2
Third, on the evening of April 3, 2023, Doe left work in her car and soon
noticed Aguilar was following her. He drove up on the side of Doe’s car and
told her to pull over but she refused. As she called the police to report that he
was following her, Aguilar bumped her car with his, though not at a
moderate or significant speed, and then stopped his car in front of hers. She
stopped and Aguilar exited his car and tried unsuccessfully to open Doe’s car
door. Doe, talking to a police dispatcher, drove around Aguilar and parked in
front of her house. Aguilar, in his car about 10 to 20 feet away, “flipped [her]
off.” She told police about this incident as well.
Fourth, on April 8, 2023, Doe and her stepfather, Rick, went to a
storage unit she shared with Aguilar to retrieve her belongings after he
decided to stop paying for the unit. Aguilar appeared, questioned Doe about
who she brought with her and, when Rick carried some boxes into the unit,
exchanged words with Rick and started arguing and wrestling with him. Doe
told Rick to go to her car and, after Rick left, Aguilar pushed Doe and said,
“ ‘Why do you want to be a little whore?’ ” After leaving, Doe reported the
incident to the police.
2 At the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Doe testified that she did
not know the date when this ring camera incident occurred but that it was
about three weeks before March 18, 2023. At trial, the prosecutor referred to
the “ring camera” incident as occurring on March 18, 2023, and Doe did not
disagree.
8
E. Verdict, Sentence and Appeal
The jury found Aguilar guilty of all seven counts. After the trial court
granted the People’s motion to dismiss some aggravating factors, it found
most of those still alleged to be true. The court subsequently sentenced
Aguilar to a total prison term of eight years, followed by a period of parole of
three to four years, imposed certain fines and fees, and awarded Aguilar 280
days of custody and conduct credits.
Aguilar filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Consolidating the Cases
Aguilar argues the trial court erred in consolidating the two cases
because doing so caused him undue prejudice under state law and because
the resulting joint trial was fundamentally unfair to him and violated his
federal constitutional rights.
1. The Relevant Proceedings Below
Prior to trial, the People filed a written motion under section 954 to
consolidate the October 2022 and April 2023 cases. Their proffer regarding
the October 21, 2022 and April 3, 2023 incidents was much the same as Jane
Doe’s trial testimony, except that the People contended Doe told Aguilar on
October 21, 2022 that “he was not supposed to be there because of a
temporary restraining order.”
Regarding the April 10, 2023 incident, the People proffered that Jane
Doe, napping in her car in her workplace’s parking lot during her lunch hour,
“was woken up by [Aguilar] pounding on her driver’s side window.” After
some back and forth, Aguilar, on the driver’s side of Doe’s car, “forced himself
on top of her, into her car. He managed to use his body to press hers against
the seat and close the door. Inside the car, [Aguilar] and Jane Doe argued.
[Aguilar], who was wearing extremely baggy pants that he was holding
9
together by the waistband, pulled his pants down to expose his flaccid penis.
He told Jane Doe to orally copulate him, and she refused. [Aguilar] lifted his
hips to bring his groin closer to Jane Doe’s face as he used his hand to push
downward on Jane Doe’s head, moving her towards his penis. After about
five minutes, [Aguilar] eventually stopped. Jane Doe mentioned the
restraining orders that listed [Aguilar] as a restrained party, and [Aguilar]
told her that if he was ever arrested on any violation of restraining order
case, he would kill her. The two exited the car, and the two began an
exchange of property. During this exchange, [Aguilar] told Jane Doe that if
she went back to her office, he would hurt her, so she stayed until the
exchange was complete.”
The People argued in support of consolidation that the two cases
involved charges of the same class that were connected together in their
commission because they involved violent confrontations with the same
victim, Jane Doe, in her car, during which she told Aguilar a restraining
order prohibited him from being near her. Also, the cases involved
similarities in time and location, the evidence supporting them would be
cross-admissible if the two cases were tried separately, and consolidation
would not unduly prejudice Aguilar because the type and strength of the
evidence were similar and, therefore, the jury would not be inflamed by the
admission of all the evidence being admitted in either case.
The court considered the People’s consolidation motion at a subsequent
motion in limine hearing. Aguilar’s counsel objected to the motion at the
hearing, arguing there was not necessarily any “crossover” between the cases,
that the October 2022 case was significantly weaker than the April 2023 case,
and that the April 2023 case involved coercion rather than physical violence.
10
The trial court granted the consolidation motion. It explained, “I don’t
believe there’s any undue prejudice likely by consolidating the two for judicial
economy, and also for the alleged victim so that she doesn’t need to testify
twice in two different proceedings. I will consolidate the two cases over
Defense objection. Especially since there was a restraining order in place in
the misdemeanor [October 2022] case, as there is a restraining order in place
in the felony [April 2023] case. And it, of course, involves the same
defendant, same alleged victim.”
2. Legal Standards
A trial court considers a consolidation motion such as the People’s
under section 954. In relevant part, section 954 allows the joinder of two
accusatory pleadings filed in the same court that contain “different offenses
connected together in their commission” or contain charges “of the same class
of crimes or offenses,” and further provides that “the court . . . , in the
interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that
the different offenses or counts . . . be tried separately . . . .”
“[W]ithin the meaning of section 954, offenses are ‘of the same class’ if
they possess common characteristics or attributes.” (Aydelott v. Superior
Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 718, 722.) For example, “robbery and murder . . .
are . . . deemed to be of the ‘same class,’ insofar as both offenses share
common characteristics as assaultive crimes against the person.” (People v.
Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 276; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188
[same]; see also Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1219–1220
(Alcala).)
“Joinder is ordinarily favored because it avoids the increased
expenditures of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate
trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122.) “Joinder, therefore, ‘is the
course of action preferred by the law.’ ” (Ibid.) Consistent with this
11
preference, “[w]here joinder is proper under section 954, ‘[t]he burden is on
the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial
danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.’ ” (People
v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 438 (Hin).)
“In determining whether a court abused its discretion in declining to
sever properly joined charges, we first ‘consider the cross-admissibility of the
evidence in hypothetical separate trials.’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 438.)
“[C]omplete (or so-called two-way) cross-admissibility is not required. In
other words, it may be sufficient, for example, if evidence underlying charge
‘B’ is admissible in the trial of charge ‘A’—even though evidence underlying
charge ‘A’ may not be similarly admissible in the trial of charge ‘B.’ ” (Alcala,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221.)
The cross-admissibility of evidence “ ‘is normally sufficient to dispel any
suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly
joined charges.’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439; Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th
at pp. 1220–1221.) When cross-admissibility is not sufficient to dispel any
suggestion of prejudice, a court also considers “ ‘(1) whether some of the
charges are particularly likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (2)
whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case
so that the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or all of
the charges; or (3) whether one of the charges (but not another) is a capital
offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.’ ”
(Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439.) A court also weighs these factors against
the benefits of joinder. (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 783 (Soper).)
In short, “[i]n the context of properly joined offenses, we assess
potential prejudice not under Evidence Code section 352, but instead in the
context of the traditional four factors” (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1222,
12
fn. 11), meaning the cross-admissibility of charges; the tendency of the
charges to inflame the jury (the so-called “ ‘spill-over’ effect” (Soper, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 775)); the bolstering of a weak case; and the conversion of
noncapital charges into a capital case. (Alcala, at p. 1222, fn. 11.) Of course,
to the extent Evidence Code section 352 is implicated in an analysis of cross-
admissibility, it is to be considered, but we also bear in mind that our
Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . found a trial court’s denial of a motion to
sever charged offenses to be a proper exercise of discretion even when the
evidence underlying the charges would not have been cross-admissible in
separate trials.” (Acala, at p. 1221, original italics.)
We also keep in mind that, “ ‘[e]ven if a defendant fails to demonstrate
the trial court’s joinder ruling was an abuse of discretion when it was made,
reversal may nonetheless be required if the defendant can demonstrate that
“the joint trial resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due
process violation.” ’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439.)
We review a trial court’s consolidation motion ruling for abuse of
discretion (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 774), keeping in mind that “ ‘[t]he state’s interest in joinder gives the court
broader discretion in ruling on a motion for severance than it has in ruling on
admissibility of evidence.’ ” (Alcala, at p. 1221.) “ ‘The burden of
demonstrating that consolidation or denial of severance was a prejudicial
abuse of discretion is upon [the party] who asserts it; prejudice must be
proved, and “[a] bald assertion of prejudice is not enough.” ’ ” (People v. Ruiz
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 605.)
3. Analysis
Aguilar does not dispute that the October 2022 and April 2023 cases
involved offenses that are “connected together in their commission” and “of
the same class.” (See § 954.) The court did not abuse its discretion in
13
concluding that they did, especially because both involved allegations that
Aguilar committed assaultive crimes against Doe. (People v. Lucky, supra,
45 Cal.3d at p. 276; People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 188; Alcala,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1219–1220.)
a. Aguilar’s Undue Prejudice Argument Lacks Merit
Aguilar begins his undue prejudice argument by contending, based on
the People’s proffer in their consolidation motion, that the evidence in the two
cases was not cross-admissible. As we have discussed, one-way cross-
admissibility only is required. (Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221.)
Accordingly, we first focus on whether the evidence of the October 2022 case
would be admissible in a separate trial of the April 2023 case.
Aguilar argues the October 2022 evidence was not admissible in the
April 2023 case under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352. Section 1109
provides in relevant part that in a domestic violence case, “evidence of the
defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible
by Section 1101 [prohibiting the admission of propensity evidence subject to
certain exceptions] if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section
352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Section 352 provides, “The court in
its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
In determining whether Evidence Code section 1109 propensity
evidence of another offense is admissible, a court engages in “a careful
weighing process under section 352” by “consider[ing] such factors as its
nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its
commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the
jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely
14
prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending
against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial
alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of
the defendant’s other . . . offenses, or excluding irrelevant though
inflammatory details surrounding the offense.” (People v. Falsetta (1999)
21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [regarding Evidence Code section 1108 propensity
evidence of other sex offenses] (Falsetta); People v. Brown (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333–1334 [concluding the reasoning underlying the
Falsetta opinion also applies to Evidence Code section 1109 evidence].)
“The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code
section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense
that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. . . . ‘The
“prejudice” referred to . . . applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke
an emotional bias against defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues.’ ” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638; see
also People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075–1076 (Wang).) “ ‘In
other words, evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of
such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use
the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant,
but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction.’ ”
(People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 286.)
We review a trial court’s rulings under Evidence Code section 352 for
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405; People v.
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 75.)
Aguilar concedes there is “some relevance” between the October 2022
and April 2023 allegations because they both involved claims that he
committed domestic violence against the same person, Jane Doe, and further
15
concedes there are “some similarities” between the two cases, as both
involved allegations that he attacked Doe in her car.
Nonetheless, Aguilar contends under Falsetta and other cases that the
consolidation of the two cases was “severely prejudicial” to his chances in the
April 2023 case and, therefore, improper. He emphasizes that there were no
sources of information regarding the October 2022 incident independent of
Jane Doe, the complaining witness in both cases (see People v. Lewis (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287 [independent sources of the subject evidence increased
its probative value]). Further, the October 2022 incident involved allegations
that Aguilar engaged in “extremely inflammatory and violent” acts, and,
therefore, admission of that evidence would be “much more inflammatory” to
the jury than the evidence of the April 2023 incidents. These allegations
include “that after [Aguilar] got into Doe’s car on October 21, 2022, he . . .
tried to take her phone to keep her from calling police; grabbed her right arm,
held it up toward the ceiling; used his left arm to put Doe in a chokehold from
behind for about one minute, causing her to have difficulty breathing; after
letting her go . . . used his right fist to apply pressure to her jaw, causing
swelling; . . . punched her in the back of the head twice; [and] . . . caused two
cuts to Doe’s lip and two cuts to her left hand.”
On the other hand, Aguilar contends, the prosecution alleged Aguilar
made verbal threats in both April 2023 incidents and, regarding the April 10,
2023 incident, did not allege that Aguilar’s penis ever touched Doe, that she
ever touched it, or that Aguilar physically harmed Doe or injured her
physically. Also, contrary to People’s contention and the trial court’s finding,
the October 2022 incident did not involve Aguilar’s violation of a restraining
order, as none were in place at the time, unlike when the two April 2023
incidents allegedly occurred.
16
Aguilar further asserts it was reasonably probable a jury would convict
him of the April 2023 case charges based on the October 2022 incident. He
argues the evidence that on April 10, 2023 he “intended to commit oral
copulation against Doe’s will and . . . use enough physical force to overcome
Doe’s will to accomplish the act, was very weak at best . . . .” The prosecutor
did not allege he forced Doe to touch his penis, that his penis touched her or
came close to her mouth, or that his penis was erect; the two had a history of
engaging in oral copulation; and the prosecutor’s proffer included that
Aguilar stopped seeking Doe’s oral copulation of him after about five minutes,
at which time they both exited the car.
Also, Aguilar argues, the October 2022 evidence was not sufficiently
probative of his intent on April 10, 2023 (see Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)
[propensity evidence admissible to prove intent, among other things]) because
the incidents were insufficiently similar and the intent required to prove the
April 10, 2023 incident was different than that required for the October 2022
incident.
We disagree with Aguilar’s contentions. The trial court’s explanation of
its reasons for granting the consolidation motion indicate it concluded
consolidation would yield substantial benefits, that the evidence of the two
cases was cross-admissible because none of it was unduly prejudicial, and
that the evidence of each case was probative of the other because both cases
involved Aguilar’s alleged violation of a restraining order, the same
defendant, and the same victim. Although the court erred in thinking the
October 2022 incident involved Aguilar’s violation of a restraining order—
none had been issued against him as of October 2022—we conclude the
remainder of its conclusions were reasonable.
17
Aguilar gives short shrift to the case-specific and systemic economies
that the court could reasonably conclude would result from consolidation. By
trying the cases together, the court, the parties and Doe, the complaining
witness in both cases, would have to participate only once in proceedings
regarding her testimony (including the Evidence Code section 402 hearing
conducted in the consolidated case). Further, as our Supreme Court
explained at length in Soper, “as a general matter, a single trial of properly
joined charges promotes important systemic economies. Whenever properly
joined charges are severed, the burden on the public court system of
processing the charges is substantially increased. . . . For example, each of
the numerous procedural steps attendant to any criminal proceeding—such
as . . . pretrial motions, as well as trial sessions themselves—would proceed
on discrete tracks. Additionally, when two previously joined matters advance
to separate trials, approximately twice as many prospective jurors would
need to be summoned and subjected to the selection process.
“Further amplifying these and related trial-level inefficiencies resulting
from separate trials is the appeal of right afforded to all convicted criminal
defendants. Separate appellate records would be compiled by the clerk’s
offices of the respective trial courts. . . . Furthermore, the Court of Appeal,
through its own clerk’s office, would be required to manage and process
discrete appeals, and provide an opportunity for separate oral arguments.
Individual written decisions would be drafted, considered, and filed.
Subsequently, separate petitions for rehearing could be filed in the Court of
Appeal, followed by individual petitions for review in this court.” (Soper,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 782.)
In light of these substantial benefits from consolidation, Aguilar was
required to “make a clear showing of prejudice to demonstrate that the trial
18
court abused its discretion.” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 746.) He did not for multiple reasons.
To begin with, Aguilar, while conceding similarities between the cases,
dismisses the probative value of the October 2022 evidence, which was
significant, especially because of the parties’ debate over Aguilar’s intent
during the April 10, 2023 incident. The prosecution contended, among other
things, that on April 10, 2023, Aguilar appeared suddenly at Doe’s car and
forced his way into it and on top of her; exposed his penis and insisted that
she orally copulate him; when she refused, grabbed her head and attempted
to force it towards his penis and pushed his groin area up and in her
direction; and threatened to kill her if he were arrested for violating the
restraining order. These actions are consistent with his actions on October
21, 2022, including his sudden appearance, his unpermitted entry into Doe’s
car, his refusal to abide by her wishes that he leave, and his use of force
against her. Therefore, the October 21, 2022 incident was probative of
Aguilar’s intent on April 10, 2023.
Nor is the evidence of the October 21, 2022 incident necessarily more
inflammatory than the April 10, 2023 incident, or the evidence of Aguilar’s
intent on April 10, 2023 particularly weak. Both incidents involved Aguilar’s
surprise assault on Doe in her car. While on October 21, 2022 alone Aguilar
violently attacked Doe, causing her physical injury, on April 10, 2023—after
Doe had obtained a restraining order against him—Aguilar exposed himself,
insisted Doe orally copulate him in the middle of the day in her car at her
workplace parking lot, grabbed and wrestled with her head as he insisted
that she perform this sex act, and threatened to kill her. These acts are
shocking in their own right; indeed, a reasonable jurist could conclude they
are even more shocking than the alleged events of October 21, 2022.
19
Further, the evidence proffered by the People regarding Aguilar’s
intent on April 10, 2023 was not particularly weaker than the evidence
proffered of the October 21, 2022 incident. “[I]t always is possible to point to
individual aspects of one case and argue that one is stronger than the other.
A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a risk of
prejudicial ‘spillover effect,’ militating against the benefits of joinder and
warranting severance of properly joined charges.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 781.) Here, the cases were of similar strength overall (perhaps
explaining why Aguilar objected to consolidation below in part on the ground
that the April 2023 case, not the October 2022 case, was the stronger of the
two). The People relied on Doe’s testimony of Aguilar’s assault of her for both
incidents. Both incidents were in parts corroborated—the October 21, 2022
incident by photographs of Doe’s injuries and the April 10, 2023 incident by a
surveillance video showing Aguilar’s blocking of Doe’s car with his own in her
workplace’s parking lot and his entry into Doe’s car for a span of over five
minutes.
More to the point, the People’s proffer of the evidence they would
present at trial of Aguilar’s actions on April 10, 2023 left little if any doubt
that he intended to force Doe to orally copulate him. Again, the People
contended he forced his way into her car and on top of her when she was
napping in her workplace parking lot, exposed his penis, insisted she orally
copulate him and, when she refused, tried to force her head in the direction of
his penis as he raised it in her direction. If that were not enough, he
threatened to kill her. This can hardly be characterized as a clumsy act of
seduction, as Aguilar’s contentions suggest.
Aguilar further argues that if the two cases had been tried separately,
“there would have been no chance that [Aguilar] would have been convicted of
20
the alleged October incident at the time of the trial on the April incidents.”
Therefore, he contends, citing cases such as Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
pp. 772–773, this rendered the admissibility of the “uncharged acts” even
more prejudicial because the jury could have wanted to punish him for these
uncharged acts. Aguilar confuses charging with conviction—obviously, the
People had already charged him with committing offenses on October 21,
2022 at the time it moved to consolidate the two cases. Therefore, this
argument also lacks merit.
In short, we have no quarrel with the trial court’s conclusion that the
evidence of the October 21, 2022 incident would be admissible in a separate
trial of the April 2023 case.3 We also think this conclusion is sufficient to
dispel the suggestion of prejudice by the consolidation of the cases. But even
if it were not, we have already indicated by our discussion our view that the
other factors considered in determining prejudice—the tendency of the
charges to inflame the jury, the bolstering of a weak case with a strong case,
and the conversion of noncapital charges into a capital case (Alcala, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 1222, fn. 11)—all break in favor of concluding the trial court
did not abuse its discretion under section 954 by consolidating the two cases.
b. The Consolidation of the Two Cases Did Not Render the Joint
Trial Fundamentally Unfair to Aguilar
As we have discussed, our review of the trial court’s consolidation of the
two cases also requires that we consider if Aguilar has demonstrated that
“ ‘ “the joint trial resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due
process violation.” ’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439.)
3 Accordingly, we have no need to decide if the April 2023 incidents
evidence would be admissible in a separate trial of the October 2022 case.
21
Aguilar contends the joint trial was fundamentally unfair for much the
same reasons as he asserts regarding the court’s granting of the People’s
consolidation motion.
Aguilar also relies on the differences in Doe’s trial testimony from the
People’s proffer in support of their consolidation motion to argue the trial
evidence of his intent to force Doe to orally copulate him on April 10, 2023
was weak. He contends, among other things, that this evidence shows he did
not hold Doe down, that Doe testified that she did not believe she used the
word “demand” when talking to police or the district attorney’s office about
Aguilar’s insistence of sex on April 10 and testified that he “asked her” to
orally copulate him, that she at one point told police, “I shouldn’t say he was
trying to force me” and that he did not use a lot of force, that she testified
that he moved her head towards him but not that he pushed it down or that
he moved his hips at that point, that his penis never touched Doe and she did
not touch it, that in the past it had not been unusual for the two to have oral
sex, and that his penis was flaccid rather than hard as it had been during
those previous sexual encounters.
We disagree with Aguilar’s view of Doe’s testimony. Her account of
Aguilar’s actions on April 10, 2023 is very compelling. She was precise and
detailed in her descriptions of what he said and did—such as that he exposed
his penis and said, “ ‘Suck my dick,’ ” insisted three times in a row that she
touch his penis, grabbed her head and attempted to push it towards him as
she resisted for three to five minutes, pushed his groin area up and towards
her, accused her of “ ‘suck[ing] Rick’s dick,’ ” threatened to kill her, and, after
they exited her car, threatened to “fuck [her] up” if she left before he gave her
a letter from an ex-boyfriend.
22
Further, Aguilar’s contentions are not particularly relevant to the
inquiry of whether Aguilar intended to force Doe, including by duress,
menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, to orally copulate
him.4 Of that, Doe’s trial testimony leaves little doubt. She indicated that
Aguilar, appearing out of nowhere, forced his way against her wishes into the
driver’s side of her car and sat partially on top of her, putting a leg over one
of hers. Regardless of whether he asked or demanded oral sex from Doe or
what she told police about his use of force, she testified that when she refused
him, he attempted for three to five minutes to force her head towards him as
she attempted to turn it away, a significant period of time, and then raised
his groin area towards her. And he threatened to kill her. Doe further
testified that she feared he would hurt her. This testimony is damning. It
establishes that Aguilar intended to force Doe, physically, by duress, or by
threat of harm, to orally copulate him.
Further, regardless of what sex the two might have had in the past as a
couple, prior to April 10, 2023, Doe had obtained a restraining order against
Aguilar, repeatedly called the police when he came near her, and finalized
her divorce of him. These facts, combined with Doe’s account of Aguilar’s
sudden appearance, exposure of his penis, and insistence that she orally
copulate him in the middle of the day in her car at her workplace despite her
repeated refusal, makes Aguilar’s contention that a reasonable juror could
well have found he was merely seeking Doe’s voluntary participation in a sex
act to be utterly unpersuasive.
4 The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant was guilty of
unlawful oral copulation if, among other things, the subject did not consent to
the act and “[t]he defendant accomplished the act by force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to someone.”
Aguilar does not contest the propriety of these instructions.
23
In short, Aguilar fails to show the joint trial of the two cases was
fundamentally unfair to him. His due process claim is without merit.
B. The Trial Court’s Admission of the Evidence of the Ring Camera
Incident Is Not a Basis for Reversal
Aguilar next argues the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting the
evidence of one of the four prior uncharged acts heard by the jury, that being
the evidence that in March 2023 Aguilar called Doe on the phone and
knocked on her back door, stating that he wanted to have sex with her, and,
upon being rebuffed by her, ripped out her back patio ring camera (the ring
camera incident). Aguilar argues this evidence was unduly prejudicial under
Evidence Code section 352 and its admission violated his constitutional due
process rights. We conclude that, assuming solely for the sake of argument
that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, such an error was
undoubtedly harmless. Therefore, we reject Aguilar’s claim without
addressing its merits or the People’s argument that Aguilar forfeited a part of
his merits argument.
1. The Relevant Proceedings Below
As we have discussed, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence
that Aguilar had engaged in four prior uncharged bad acts. Aguilar objected
to the admission of the evidence under Evidence Code 352. At an Evidence
Code section 402 hearing, the trial court heard the proffered evidence,
including of the ring camera incident, all of which consisted of Jane Doe’s
testimony. Her testimony was much the same as her trial testimony, which
we have already summarized, except she testified the incident occurred about
three weeks before March 18, rather than on March 18 itself as the
prosecution indicated at trial.
The trial court concluded the evidence of the ring camera incident was
admissible as a violation of the temporary restraining order “in that it
24
involved destruction of property and would qualify as disturbing the peace
and so forth,” but that it was not admissible as a domestic violence incident
to show propensity or common plan evidence under Evidence Code section
1109.
2. Legal Standards
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits
evidence of character to prove conduct. However, evidence of a prior
uncharged act may be admissible to prove a disputed material fact—other
than criminal disposition—such as “identity, motive, intent, knowledge, or
the absence of mistake or accident.” (§ 1101, subd. (b); Wang, supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)
Before admitting such evidence, a trial court must determine whether
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or
will create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury. (§ 352; Wang, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)
We review the trial court’s Evidence Code section 352 ruling for abuse
of discretion. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405; People v.
Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 75.) Aguilar contends state law
error is evaluated for prejudicial effect by determining if it is reasonably
probable he would have received a better result but for the error, citing
College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.
As we have discussed, “ ‘[t]he admission of relevant evidence will not
offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Jablonski (2006)
37 Cal.4th 774, 805, quoting Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 913.) Aguilar
contends the federal standard for evaluating the prejudice for such an error is
whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
25
3. Analysis
We conclude that, whether we apply the state law or federal standard
for error asserted by Aguilar, any error by the trial court in admitting the
evidence of the ring camera incident (assuming arguendo there was error)
was undoubtedly harmless.
Aguilar once more focuses a prejudice argument on his contention that
the evidence of his intent to force Doe to orally copulate him on April 10, 2023
was particularly weak. Therefore, he contends, the admission of the evidence
of the ring camera incident fatally prejudiced his chances of obtaining a
better result at trial because the ring camera incident likewise involved his
insistence on sex, and in the middle of the night at Doe’s residence,
circumstances that made the evidence particularly inflammatory, more so
than the evidence of the three other uncharged prior acts and the April 10,
2023 incident.
We disagree for four reasons. First, the jury’s verdict suggests it found
Jane Doe’s testimony regarding all of the incidents she described, charged
and uncharged, to be credible. It had good reason to do so, as Doe’s testimony
included considerable detail and the defense did little if anything to
effectively challenge her accounts. Doe testified that on five other occasions
other than the ring camera and April 10, 2023 incidents, Aguilar forced
himself upon her and/or threatened her, including three times in violation of
a restraining order prohibiting him from having any contact with her. On
October 21, 2022, Doe testified, he entered her car without her permission,
refused to leave, and choked, punched, and hurt her. On March 13, 2023—
despite having by this time been served with a permanent restraining order
that prohibited him from contacting Doe or being in her vicinity—he
disturbed her at home in the middle of the night by throwing things at a
window. On the morning of April 3, 2023, by which time Doe had formally
26
divorced him, he followed her to work and threatened to “mess up” her car if
she did not see him for lunch. Later that same day, he followed her home
from work, demanded she stop her car and, when she did not, bumped her car
with his and attempted to block her car with his own. And on April 8, 2023,
he confronted her at a storage unit, fought with her stepfather, and pushed
Doe as he called her a “whore.”
The evidence of these incidents provided ample support for Doe’s
testimony that on April 10, 2023, Aguilar forced his way into her car and
partially on top of her, insisted that she orally copulate him and, when she
refused, grabbed her head and attempted to force it towards him, then
pushed his groin area up and in her direction, and threatened to kill her.
These actions are consistent with his sudden appearance and unpermitted
entry of her car on October 21, 2022; with his refusal to abide by her wishes
that he leave her alone on that same date; with the force he employed against
her on October 21, 2022, when he repeatedly attacked her, on April 3, 2023
when he bumped her car with his own, and on April 8, 2023 when he fought
with Rick and pushed Doe; with the threat he made on April 3, 2023 that he
would damage her car if she did not do as he wished; with his tracking her
down in her car on October 21, 2022 and twice on April 3, 2023; and with his
disregard of the restraining order in both April 3, 2023 incidents and at the
storage unit on April 8, 2023. In other words, there was ample evidence
presented at trial, none of which Aguilar contends was inadmissible, that he
repeatedly disregarded Doe’s wishes, acted with force against her,
endangered her physical well-being, and threatened her, including despite
knowing a restraining order barred him from approaching her at all.
27
Second, as we have discussed, Doe’s detailed testimony about Aguilar’s
actions on April 10, 2023 is very compelling. Over and over again, she was
precise and detailed in her descriptions of what Aguilar said and did.
Third, there was nothing particularly inflammatory about Doe’s
testimony of what Aguilar said and did during the ring camera incident. She
testified that he called and then appeared in the middle of the night at her
house for a few minutes and told her to open the door because he wanted to
have sex with her. When she refused to let him in, he left after apparently
ripping out the back patio ring camera. In comparison to some of the other
incidents, this was a relatively mild episode—he neither attacked nor
threatened Doe, stayed only a few minutes, and left without attempting to
force his way into the house. We fail to see any significant prejudice that
could have been caused by Doe’s recounting of this incident, particularly in
light of her testimony about more serious bad acts by Aguilar in other
incidents.
As for Aguilar’s argument that the evidence of his intent to assault Doe
with the intent to commit a felony on April 10, 2023 “was extremely weak,”
we have already discussed why we find it unpersuasive.
Aguilar’s contention that the ring camera incident was particularly
prejudicial because it was the only other time Doe testified that he insisted
on having sex with her is also underwhelming. As our discussion has just
suggested, his actions on April 10, 2023 were hardly those of a seducer;
rather, his ugly, aggressive, sudden insistence that Doe orally copulate him
after she had divorced him and obtained a court order barring him from
approaching her indicate he was using force and threat in order to humiliate
and harm her. As such, it was more similar to his conduct on October 21,
2022 when, upon her angering him, he physically attacked and hurt her in
28
her car, or on April 3, 2023 when he told her to pull over and, when she did
not, bumped her car with his and forced her to stop.
Finally, the evidence of the ring camera incident was a small part of
the trial. Doe’s description of the incident amounted to only about four of
nearly 100 pages of testimony. Further, the prosecutor did not highlight the
incident in closing argument, referring to it once in the course of discussing
Aguilar’s restraining order violations without mentioning Aguilar’s wanting
to have sex.
In short, we have no doubt the jury would have found Aguilar guilty of
all charges even if it had not considered the evidence of the ring camera
incident. Therefore, any error by the trial court—error which we assume
arguendo and do not find here—was harmless.5
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
SIGGINS, J.*
5 In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not commit multiple
errors, we also reject Aguilar’s argument that we must reverse the judgment
because of the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
29
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.