In re M.M. CA2/5

CourtListener 10381237CalctappApr 18, 2025

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Filed 4/18/25 In re M.M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

In re M.M. et al., Persons B340613
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 20CCJP03117D)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Father appeals from the October 9, 2023 order terminating
parental rights to his child, R.M.G. (minor) under section 366.26.1
We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) did not comply with their obligations
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.).
According to father, the Department failed to comply with its
duty to interview minor’s maternal great-grandmother, maternal

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2
great-grandfather, or maternal step-great-grandfather about
possible Indian ancestry.
State law imposes on the Department a first-step inquiry
duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and
others who had an interest in the child.” (In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal
regulations explain that the term “[e]xtended family member is
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the
absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached
age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).)
The duty of initial inquiry includes making a meaningful effort to
interview available relatives. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
542, 552–553.)
Minor is the only child at issue in the current appeal.
However, minor has three older half-siblings who share the same
mother (M.M.), but have different fathers. When parental rights
to those three half-siblings were terminated in October 2023,
M.M. appealed, arguing the Department had failed to comply
with its ICWA inquiry obligations. The Department conceded
error, “acknowledging that it did not fulfill its duty of inquiry
under ICWA because it did not ask the maternal grandfather’s
family members, maternal uncles E.M. and R.M., maternal aunt
R.M., maternal great-grandmother, maternal great-grandfather
and maternal step-great-grandfather about possible Indian
ancestry[.]” (In re L.R. (Mar. 29, 2024, B332255) [nonpub. opn.],
p. 3.) This court’s opinion conditionally affirmed the termination
of parental rights and remanded for the juvenile court to order
inquiry of all available extended family members, as well as

3
“other reasonably available maternal relatives, such as maternal
grandfather.” (Id., at pp. 4–5.) However, focusing on the
obligation to interview great-grandparents, we also stated that
“absent some information about the possibility of Indian
ancestry, we disagree that the Department had an obligation to
locate and interview maternal great-grandmother or maternal
step-great-grandfather, as they fall outside the definition of
extended family members and the record does not contain any
information that they have an interest in the children.” (Id. at
p. 4.)
In the current appeal, father argues that the Department
fell short of its initial inquiry obligations because it did not
interview minor’s maternal great-grandmother, maternal great-
grandfather, or maternal step-great-grandfather regarding
ICWA, despite evidence the Department was aware of those
relatives. The Department contends that it satisfied its initial
inquiry obligation by asking mother, father, maternal
grandmother, maternal grandfather, several maternal uncles and
a maternal aunt, all of whom denied Indian ancestry.
Father relies on three references to great-grandparents in
the clerk’s transcript, none of which support an inference that
anyone from the Department spoke to or interviewed any of the
relatives father now claims should have been asked about Indian
ancestry. First, in the six-month review report, M.M. expressed
to the social worker “that she counts [on] the support of maternal
grandfather and paternal great grandfather whom she is
currently residing with.” Second, a single entry in a log of social
worker activity indicated that maternal great-grandparents were
present during a visit in February 2024 that included minor, her
three half-siblings, mother, maternal grandmother, and maternal

4
great-grandparents. The notes stated “[t]he family overall were
observed to have a bond.” Third, in the permanency planning
report, minor’s maternal grandmother and caregiver, who was
already in the process of adopting minor’s three half-siblings,
identified her “numerous support systems that help her overall
well-being that allows her to be present” for minor as including
“maternal great grandparents, her adult children who[] live in
the home, and her coworkers.”
Father argues that unlike In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
303, 323, which held ICWA did not require the agency to cast
about for investigative leads, here the individuals in question
were “known to the Department, present at visits, and clearly
had an interest in” minor. We disagree with father’s argument
that the isolated record references to maternal great-
grandparents were sufficient to create a duty under ICWA to
locate and interview those individuals and ask them about
possible Indian ancestry, in light of our earlier holding that
ICWA did not impose such an obligation absent any indication of
possible Indian ancestry, since the family members in question
fall outside of ICWA’s definition of extended relatives. (In re
L.R., supra, at p. 4.) In addition to the fact that no relative has
raised any indication of Indian ancestry, we disagree with
father’s characterization of the evidence as demonstrating that
the great-grandparents had an interest in minor sufficient to
raise any inquiry duty under ICWA. (Compare In re A.C. (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 130, 131–132 [initial inquiry included the duty to
ask a nonrelative extended family member who was the child’s
caregiver and prospective adoptive parent].)
Finally, in his reply brief, father argues that the
Department’s reliance on interviewing only maternal

5
grandparents, aunts, and uncles downplays the importance of
interviewing older generations. We reject father’s effort to create
an obligation where none already exists. The facts of this case do
not involve a situation where members of a younger generation
claim ignorance about possible Indian ancestry but identify
members of an older generation that might have missing
information. (Compare In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 293
[mother claimed Cherokee ancestry on maternal side and claimed
an aunt might have information about possible ancestry on
mother’s paternal side].)
As the California Supreme Court noted in Dezi C., ICWA
does not empower parties to bring numerous appeals on an open-
ended basis, and the opinion “does not require reversal in all
cases in which every possible extended family member has not
been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry.” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140.) In the absence of any evidence
that anyone raised the possibility of Indian ancestry, or that
anyone at the Department in fact spoke to the individuals
identified in father’s appeal, we decline to hold that it had any
obligation to locate and interview them about possible Indian
ancestry.

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s August 28, 2024 order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

7
In re M.M.
B340613

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

Although I do not join all aspects of the majority’s
discussion of the issue presented, I agree the juvenile court’s
order should be unconditionally affirmed.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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