S.S. v. L.S. CA5

CourtListener 10380745CalctappApr 17, 2025

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Filed 4/17/25 S.S. v. L.S. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

S.S.,
F088078
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. Nos. FC-21-000249
v. & FL-23-000316)

L.S., ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant and Respondent. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

It is ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed herein on April 14, 2025, be
modified as follows:

1. The caption should list the superior court case Nos. as FC-21-000249 and
FL-23-000316.

There is no change in the judgment.

This court will deem appellant’s “PETITION FOR REHEARING,” “REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF APPELLATE COURT’S DECISION,” “FORMAL
REBUTTAL TO APPELLATE COURT OPINION,” “LETTER TO THE COURT
REGARDING UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF PARENTAL CONTACT,” which were all
filed on April 15, 2025, his “SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING” and “SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO APPELLATE COURT
OPINION DATED APRIL 14, 2025,” which were both filed on April 16, 2025, and his
“SUPPLEMENTAL CLARIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING,” “SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING,” and “SUPPLEMENTAL
NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING,” which were filed on
April 17, 2025, as a combined petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing is denied.

No further documents will be accepted for filing on this matter.

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

2.
Filed 4/14/25 S.S. v. L.S. CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

S.S.,
F088078
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. Nos. FC-21-000249
v. & FC-23-000316)

L.S.,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Joseph R.
Distaso, Judge.
S.S., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
S.S. (father) appeals a final order awarding sole physical and legal custody of his
now 14-year-old daughter, J.S. (daughter), to daughter’s mother, L.S. (mother), and
suspending his visits until he receives a minimum of six months of therapy from a
licensed therapist. Father contends his constitutional rights were violated during the
proceedings, the family court judge was biased against him, and daughter’s right to
testify as provided in Family Code section 3042 was violated. Mother did not file a
respondent’s brief.1 Finding no merit in any of father’s numerous contentions, we affirm
the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother, who never married, met in approximately 2006 while mother
was living in the Philippines, and they were together in the United States from about
2007 to 2021. Mother, who worked as a nurse and purchased the home the family lived
in, was the sole breadwinner while father stayed home with daughter, who was born in
2010, until he began working about 10 years into his relationship with mother. Father
and mother separated sometime in 2021, when mother relocated to San Diego, leaving
daughter and father in Stanislaus County.
In February and May 2023, father and mother, respectively, filed requests for
domestic violence restraining orders against each other. In May 2023, the family court
ordered that the parties should have joint legal custody of daughter with father having
sole physical custody. The court ordered mother and daughter to attend counseling with
Yvette Allivato, a licensed marriage and family therapist, with a focus on reunification
assessment and counseling. The matter was continued to September 25, 2023, for an in-
court child custody counseling review.
The Grant of Temporary Custody to Mother
At the September 25, 2023 hearing, the family court issued custody and visitation
orders based on the child custody counselor’s recommendation, which father objected to.
The family court ordered that daughter be turned over to mother’s care that day with
mother having sole legal and physical custody, and that daughter’s contact with father be

1 The failure to file a respondent’s brief does not constitute a default, i.e., the
appealed order is not automatically reversed. (In re Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 232;
In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078, fn. 1 [“we do not treat the
failure to file a respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission of error)”].) Instead,
we consider the appellant’s brief, independently examine the record on appeal, and
reverse only if prejudicial error is found. (In re Bryce C., at pp. 232‒233.)

2.
supervised. Mother and daughter were ordered to attend counseling with Allivato with a
focus on family counseling. The family court noted that daughter was present during the
mediation hearing and father was told to have her leave the room. Daughter also was
present during a brief hearing before the family court. The matter was continued to
December 5, 2023, for an in-court child custody counseling review.
On November 16, 2023, mother filed a request to stop father’s visits with daughter
pending further recommendation of daughter’s treating counselor and sought temporary
emergency orders pausing father’s visits. In support of her request, mother explained that
daughter had been doing well in her care since the court granted her sole custody, but
after father’s first supervised visit with daughter on October 26, 2023, daughter’s
behavior changed drastically to the extent the counselor believed further contact with
father would be detrimental to daughter. There was a fear of self-harm and digression if
future visits took place. The treating counselor filed a treatment summary confidentially.
Mother claimed father was continuing to communicate with daughter through daughter’s
cell phone and sharing court documents. Mother asserted it would be in daughter’s best
interest for her to have no contact with father pending further therapy and court order.
The family court issued temporary emergency orders denying father contact with
daughter pending further court order.
The Family Court Services Evaluation
At a December 5, 2023 hearing on mother’s request, the family court issued
custody and visitation orders based on the child custody counselor’s recommendation.
The family court referred the matter to a focused “Family Court Services Evaluation,”
granted mother sole legal and physical custody of daughter, prohibited father’s contact
with daughter, and granted mother the ability to monitor daughter’s access to electronics.
The matter was continued to February 22, 2024, for a hearing on the Family Court
Services evaluator’s report.

3.
On January 16, 2024,2 mother filed an order to show cause and affidavit for
contempt seeking to hold father in contempt for violating the family court’s orders.
Mother asserted father violated court orders by (1) allowing daughter to be present for the
mediation and court hearing, and (2) continuing to communicate with daughter on her
cell phone and instructing her not to cooperate with mother, to lie to the mediator, and to
hide her contact with him.
On January 31, the family court, on its own motion, reviewed father’s request for a
copy of the therapy notes and supervised visitation log from the court’s file.3 The family
court set a hearing date on this request for February 22.
Jennifer Tercero, a licensed marriage family therapist, filed her Family Court
Services evaluator’s report (the evaluator’s report) on February 22. Tercero
recommended, among other things, that: (1) mother have sole legal and physical custody
of daughter; (2) daughter’s contact with father be prohibited; (3) mother monitor
daughter’s access to electronics; (4) daughter attend individual counseling with a licensed
provider; and (5) father be referred to a psychologist for a psychological evaluation.
That same day, the family court temporarily adopted the evaluator’s report and
recommendations pending the trial set for March 20 and 21, on the issue of child custody,
which also would address father’s objection to the evaluator’s report. The court stated it
also would review and consider each party’s requests for domestic violence restraining
orders. With respect to father’s request for records, the minute order noted that portion
was dropped that day. The family court set the hearing on mother’s order to show cause
for contempt for March 14. The minute order further noted that bailiffs had to escort
father out of the courtroom after he repeatedly interrupted the court and raised his voice,
despite being admonished not to act out. Father refused to wait after the hearing for the

2 Subsequent references to dates are to the year 2024, unless otherwise stated.
3 Father’s request is not in the appellate record.

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minute order to be provided to him and swore at the court, stating that the judge was the
most “corrupt judge” and family court was “corrupt.”
The Contested Custody Hearing
At the March 14 hearing on mother’s request to hold father in contempt, mother’s
counsel accepted father’s response, which was filed that day. The hearing was continued
to March 20. Mother’s attorney filed a trial brief and witness list, while father filed a trial
brief.
The contested hearing was held on March 20 and 21, which was not reported.
The minute order of the March 20 hearing shows that at the outset the family court
addressed father and found that father recorded a proceeding on September 25, 2023,
without the court’s permission in direct violation of California Rules of Court,
rule 1.150,4 and the local rules. The court noted that in father’s trial brief, father stated
the recording on daughter’s phone should be investigated by the Commission of Judicial
Performance. The family court also found father recorded a mediation session on
daughter’s cell phone without permission.
The family court admitted into evidence on father’s behalf a two-page letter signed
by daughter dated August 11, 2021, marked as exhibit 1, and on mother’s behalf seven
pages of photographs, marked as exhibit 2, and a thumb drive, marked as exhibit 3.
Mother’s counsel played various videos before the court. The evaluator, Tercero, was
deemed an expert in child custody and visitation matters. Tercero testified and her report
was moved into evidence as exhibit 4. Mother’s counsel questioned Tercero and entered
two pages of drawings into evidence as exhibit 5. Father cross-examined Tercero.
Mother’s counsel moved two pages of text messages and various letters into evidence as
exhibits 6 and 7. Mother’s counsel continued with direct examination, presumably of
mother, and played videos on the thumb drive. The family court denied both parties’
requests for restraining orders. The hearing was continued to March 21.

4 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

5.
The March 21 minute order shows that father called mother to testify. Father
questioned mother, as did the family court, and mother’s counsel cross-examined mother.
Father also testified. Mother’s counsel moved into evidence daughter’s drawings, the
supervised visit log, Allivato’s letters and treatment summary, labeled exhibits 8 through
12, while father moved a report from child protective services (CPS) into evidence,
labeled exhibit 13. Both parties made statements to the court. The family court set a
chambers interview with daughter for April 2, with daughter to appear via Zoom.
Counsel would not be admitted into the Zoom interview with daughter. The family court
asked the parties if they had other evidence, testimony, or information they wished to
provide to the court. Both parties replied, “No,” and they rested. The family court stated
it would take the case under submission after the April 2 chambers interview of daughter.
The family court interviewed daughter under oath via Zoom on April 2. The
family court requested a transcript and ordered it sealed.
The Family Court’s Order and Statement of Decision
On April 19, the family court issued the following child custody and visitation
orders: (1) mother would have sole legal and physical custody of daughter; (2) father
would not have visitation and was prohibited from filing for modification of visitation
until he received at least six months of therapy from a licensed therapist which would
focus on proper emotional boundaries with daughter; and (3) any future visits between
father and daughter would be in conjunction with the recommendations of daughter’s
therapist.
In conjunction with this order, the family court issued a tentative statement of
decision.5 The family court explained this was an initial custody order which required it

5 The family court explained it denied the parties’ requests for domestic violence
restraining orders because neither party provided sufficient evidence to prove that
domestic violence was committed by the other party.

6.
to apply the best interest of the child standard. The family court summarized the parties’
testimony, as well as Tercero’s testimony.
The family court summarized its video conference interview of daughter. The
court noted that daughter was bright and engaging during the interview. She stated she
lived in San Diego with mother and mother’s boyfriend, where she attended Catholic
school. Daughter had a difficult time with the other kids in her eighth-grade class and
said, “they think I’m different and they erase me from the picture.” Daughter said she got
along with children from the sixth grade and was friends with them, but she “doesn’t fit
in” with the kids in her own grade.
Daughter last saw father in November 2023, and while she received a text from
him, she did not respond. Daughter wanted to follow the court rules regarding contact
with father. She liked living with mother and was less scared than when she lived with
father. Daughter said she was “getting better at [mother] being kind to me,” and it “feels
more free to have my own room and own bed.” Daughter had an electric keyboard and
enjoyed taking piano lessons, and she continued to practice art.6
In its discussion section, the family court noted the parties agreed the problems in
their relationship resulted in the complete breakdown of their long-term relationship.
While mother testified there were relationship problems before the COVID pandemic, it
was clear to the court that the relationship significantly worsened during COVID.
The family court noted that the videos and letters, marked exhibits 3 and 7, clearly
showed daughter was extremely emotionally attached to father to the complete exclusion
of mother. The videos showed that daughter referred to “Daddy” as her best friend and
that she loved him, wanted him to come back, and she didn’t “blame my dad.” Allivato
opined daughter was isolated, as father’s homeschooling of daughter left her alone for

6 The family court noted that at the end of the interview, it asked daughter if she had
any questions. When daughter asked why she was speaking with the court, the court told
her it had to decide on the contact she would have with father, and she should not worry
about that decision as that was something for the adults to decide.

7.
most of the day. Allivato opined daughter was being emotionally and psychologically
harmed and she would only believe what father told her. The court found the letter
daughter wrote to mother (exhibit 7), which blamed her for wrecking the family’s home,
supported Allivato’s analysis, as it was clear daughter received the information in the
letter from father and blamed mother for the financial difficulties the parties faced.
The family court found that father wrongfully included daughter in mother’s and
father’s relationship problems. One video played for the court showed that father called
daughter to witness an argument between he and mother after mother called the police to
report that father was harassing her. Father asked daughter if he harmed “mommy.”
Daughter responded, “no.” In another video from 2021, daughter listed the problems she
and father had with mother. Daughter stated she did not want to be with mother after
mother called 911 on father and tried to get him arrested, and she only wanted to live
with father. She was happy to have such a good dad because he did so much for her,
father was her number one best friend, and he loved to take care of them. Daughter did
not think mother loved her or daddy anymore, and she wished daddy would stay home
with her. In an August 11, 2021 letter (exhibit 1), daughter wrote that she wanted to live
with father and mother hurt her by leaving her and daddy for many days and coming
home at 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., thinking everything was fine when it was not, and by calling
the cops on father twice while daughter was scared. Daughter wanted “to know why she
has done this, as we have been waiting for an explanation for nine months?”
The family court found it clear that daughter got her ideas from father, who had
the primary role in caring for her, and his close association with her resulted in father
placing his and mother’s relationship problems directly on daughter. Daughter, however,
was not emotionally prepared to handle these issues and compensated for that by solely
aligning with father. Father presented daughter’s journal from 2019 (exhibit 7) where he
told daughter not to be mean to mommy and mother loved daughter so much. The court,

8.
however, noted this was clearly before the problems between the parties became so
pervasive during the COVID pandemic.
The family court found that father had not complied with many of the court’s
orders. He continued to secretly contact daughter even after the court ordered him not to
do so, and he had daughter present during at least one of the child custody mediation
sessions, where father secretly recorded the session on daughter’s phone without court
permission. In addition, father took daughter to court with him when mother and father
litigated father’s eviction from the family home. These incidents showed father’s lack of
insight into the emotional harm he caused daughter by involving her in these issues.
The family court noted it ordered supervised visits between father and daughter
with a professional supervisor, but after one supervised visit daughter significantly
emotionally regressed. She cried throughout the visit and stated she wanted to return to
father. Daughter threw items around her room, made a mess of the back car seat, and
refused to shower.
Before mother obtained sole custody, father and daughter clearly were emotionally
bonded to the exclusion of mother, and father relied on daughter for his own emotional
support, which caused her to engage in survival behavior. Father supported daughter’s
emotional attachment to him and her estrangement from mother. Father appeared to lack
insight into the negative effect he had on daughter’s emotional development and had not
acknowledged the emotional toll his actions caused daughter and still contended mother
was responsible for daughter’s emotional distress.
This contrasted with the family court’s observation of daughter’s progress while in
mother’s primary care. Daughter appeared completely different—she felt less fearful in
her life circumstances, was attending school and was able to socially engage with other
children. The court’s interview of daughter showed that she was progressing in her
development much more appropriately while in mother’s sole care compared to when she
was primarily with father.

9.
The family court found that after reviewing all the evidence and considering its
discussion, it was in daughter’s best interest for the current custody order to remain in
place.
On April 25, father filed a 36-page objection to the family court’s tentative
statement of decision attached to a Judicial Council form declaration. Among other
things, father asserted the family court was biased against him, and he was unjustly
evicted from the family’s home. Father claimed the family court violated his due process
rights by sealing the transcript of daughter’s court interview and withholding confidential
treatment summaries, which were not given to him until the March 20 hearing. Father
complained the family court improperly struck evidence of mother’s immigration fraud
which prevented him from proving why he was unable to claim community property
rights and allowed her to evict him from their home in August 2023. Father stated he
would not comply with the family court’s decision to seek therapy, and he objected to
both he and daughter being forced into coercive therapy. Father asserted the family court
ignored daughter’s voice, letters, and right to custodial preference.
On May 7, mother’s attorney served notice of entry of the April 19 statement of
decision on father. Father filed a notice of appeal from the April 19 order on May 13.
On May 17, the family court issued a minute order addressing father’s April 25
objection. The court stated it was not informed of the objection until May 13 because it
was filed as a declaration. The family court stated it considered father’s objections and
denied them in their entirety, which meant the statement of decision filed on April 19 was
the final statement of decision. The family court noted that father continued to violate
court orders, as he did throughout the pendency of the case, as he stated he would not
comply with the court’s current order and admitted he had contact with daughter through
a text communication where daughter told father that his prior homeschooling of her was
superior to her current school placement.

10.
Post-Order Proceedings
On May 23, father filed an “EXHIBIT LIST IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL,” to
which was attached eight documents that were not entered into evidence at the contested
custody hearing.
On June 20, mother’s counsel filed a respondent’s notice designating the record on
appeal. On June 25, father filed a second amended appellant’s notice designating the
record on appeal. Father elected to proceed with a settled statement, and he filed a
proposed settled statement on August 8.
On August 12, a hearing was held on father’s motion to unseal the April 2 Zoom
interview of daughter, at which mother and father testified. The family court ordered the
transcript unsealed and available only to father, mother, and mother’s attorney, and that
the transcript can be shared only with the parties. The family court further ordered that
the parties shall not contact or discuss the contents of the transcript with daughter.
The Family Court’s Settled Statement on Appeal
On August 19, the family court issued its proposed settled statement on appeal,
which it amended the following day. The family court did not accept father’s proposed
settled statement on appeal filed on August 8, as it did not accurately summarize the
witness testimony and physical evidence introduced, and did not accurately contain a
narrative of the proceedings as required by rule 8.137(d)(2). The family court accepted
father’s proposed settled statement only to specify father’s grounds of appeal pursuant to
rule 8.137(f)(5). The court set out a detailed statement which it proposed to certify as the
settled statement on appeal pursuant to rules 8.137(g)(1) and 8.137(f)(4)(A). The court
set a hearing on either party’s objection to the court’s proposed settled statement for
September 4 pursuant to rule 8.137(f)(4).
The family court summarized the witness testimony and exhibits from its
statement of decision, as well as the undisputed facts which showed father was daughter’s
primary custodial parent during the parties’ relationship.

11.
Father testified that he strongly desired the return of his custody rights—while he
wanted sole custody, he was willing to share custody with mother. Father did not believe
he did anything to justify the court stopping his contact with daughter. During his
testimony, father was very upset that Allivato reported suspected child abuse to CPS as a
mandated reporter. Father testified the report was made because he and daughter slept
together in the same bed. Daughter reported to Allivato that they slept in the same bed so
they were not alone and could be close. Father testified co-sleeping with children was
common in his Asian culture, and he accused Allivato of misconduct by making a report
to CPS. The family court, however, found Allivato did not commit misconduct; rather,
she simply made a mandated report that was required by her position as daughter’s
therapist.
The family court noted that father presented most of his case through video
evidence, which he claimed showed daughter’s love and affection for him. Father
testified he homeschooled daughter the entire time she was in his primary custody. They
completed many activities together, including starting a YouTube channel where daughter
discussed financial issues. Father stated daughter had friends from her on-line gaming
community, and she was very intelligent and a good artist.
During the hearing, the family court found that father did not commit sexual abuse
against daughter, as daughter never reported father sexually abused her, mother stated she
did not believe daughter was sexually abused, CPS did not find any evidence father
committed sexual abuse, and there was not any other evidence submitted of sexual abuse.
The family court noted that both parties repeatedly exhibited over-emotionality
during the pendency of the case. During the February 22 hearing, father cursed at the
court and had to be escorted out of the courtroom by law enforcement. Father cried and
audibly sobbed when certain family videos were played during the trial on child custody.
Mother also cried and became overly emotional during her trial testimony. The family

12.
court had to frequently intervene to lower the tension and calm down the parties to allow
each side to present their evidence.
The family court summarized mother’s testimony. Mother stated it had been
difficult for daughter to be in her care, as daughter was not socialized with her peer group
and had difficulty making friends. Mother thought this was because father homeschooled
daughter and isolated her from other children. Mother believed father “brainwashed”
daughter against her. Daughter’s therapist stated daughter had the emotional maturity of
a nine- or 10-year-old child. When mother first gained sole custody of daughter, daughter
frequently lashed out by telling mother she was stupid, which father frequently told
mother during their relationship. Daughter did not know how to groom herself or
conduct routine hygiene tasks. Daughter, however, was doing better emotionally. She
was seen by a psychologist and psychiatrist. She had been accepted into the ninth grade
and had some friends at school. Mother shared pictures from exhibit 2, which showed
daughter appropriately dressed and socializing with her friends in school.
The family court also summarized the testimony of Tercero, the appointed Family
Court Services evaluator who the court accepted as an expert child custody
recommending counselor. Tercero spoke to both parents and to daughter. She met with
daughter for about two hours, reviewed filings by each parent, and reviewed Allivato’s
letter to the court. Tercero opined daughter was unable to form emotional bonds with
children her own age; at times daughter presented as a child her own age and at other
times presented as more child-like. Daughter cried throughout Tercero’s interview and
emotionally withdrew into herself. Daughter told Tercero she cut herself because “she
couldn’t help the father’s situation,” and she cut herself while in father’s care but not
while in mother’s care.
Daughter told Tercero that father was her best friend, and she stayed home until he
returned from work. Tercero stated daughter knew everything about father’s financial
accounts and court proceedings. Daughter described mother as an evil person for taking

13.
father away from her. Daughter stated father took her to the CPS office so he could clear
his name, and she blamed mother for the abuse allegations. Daughter told Tercero she
used to sleep in the same bed with father but that stopped after the CPS worker came to
the hotel where she and father were staying.
Tercero testified there was a negative emotional impact to father’s relationship
with daughter because it impacted her ability to navigate the world successfully on her
own. Tercero explained that by father sharing adult matters with daughter, daughter
assumed a negative narrative toward mother because daughter did not have the emotional
capacity to process the information. Tercero further explained that children in these
situations go into a survival mode where they align with the parent they believe is the
strongest, which manifested here by daughter being unable to stop yelling at mother.
Daughter also identified a personality split between herself and another personality
named Violet, who came out when she was computer gaming, was depressed, or wanted
to self-harm. Daughter stated Violet would tell her not to do it.7
Tercero recommended that daughter stay in mother’s sole custody and father
obtain a psychological evaluation to help him develop better emotional regulation and
boundaries before he could have contact with daughter. Tercero identified several areas
of concern: (1) father took daughter to CPS to clear his name and to court when the
parties participated in an unlawful detainer action and involved her twice in child custody
mediation even after being told she could not be present; and (2) father did not follow
court orders as he continued to contact daughter even after being ordered not to do so.
Tercero stated that any contact between father and daughter should occur in a
professional setting.
The family court stated the entire court interview with daughter was recorded by a
court reporter and certified the reporter’s transcript was the settled statement of her

7 Father disputed Tercero’s testimony that daughter had a split personality named
Violet and claimed Violet was daughter’s gaming avatar.

14.
statement to the court. The family court noted it informed the parties that it would speak
to daughter and consider her input when deciding the child custody issue as required by
Family Code section 3042, subdivision (e), and rule 5.250, and no party objected to the
court speaking with daughter.
Finally, the family court noted that its April 19 statement of decision detailed the
exhibits received and the court’s analysis of those exhibits. In addition, the court exhibit
list filed March 21, and its minute orders dated March 20 and 21, detailed all the exhibits
that were admitted and whether an objection was made to them. The family court
certified these documents as the settled statement on appeal for the exhibits and physical
evidence.
On August 27, father filed objections to the family court’s amended proposed
settled statement. At the September 4 hearing, the family court noted that while mother
did not object to its proposed settled statement, father filed numerous objections. The
family court stated it considered all of father’s objections and denied them. Accordingly,
the family court certified its August 20 proposed settled statement on appeal as the settled
statement pursuant to rule 8.137(h). The family court noted that during the hearing, after
father confirmed the court received his objections, he started arguing with the court and
stating the court “violated his rights” and he wanted to “cross-examine” his daughter.
The family court then concluded the hearing.
On September 6, the family court judge issued a minute order recusing himself
from hearing all proceedings in the matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3. The clerk reassigned the case to another superior court judge for all future
hearings.
DISCUSSION
Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the family
court’s custody order. Instead, he contends his constitutional rights were violated, raises
various evidentiary errors, and argues the family court was biased against him.

15.
Before reaching father’s claims we note that an order challenged on appeal is
presumed to be correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is
father’s burden as the appellant to “demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608‒609.) To affirmatively show
that error occurred, an “appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by
citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685 [“appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error
through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal
authority”].) “[C]onclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C., at p. 408.)
Furthermore, the failure to provide an adequate record for meaningful review of an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant. (Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416; Hernandez v. California Hospital
Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)
I. Father’s Due Process Rights
Father contends his due process rights were violated because the family court:
(1) refused to provide him with an unredacted CPS report; (2) sealed the reporter’s
transcript of daughter’s testimony for four months; and (3) denied a motion he filed on
September 9 to provide him with an unredacted CPS report and to recover his daughter’s
phone, on which was recorded the September 2023 mediation and court session. Father
asserts these rulings amounted to the withholding of evidence which deprived him of the
opportunity to present his case.
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” That
amendment guarantees the right to a fair process in court proceedings. Certain “basic
procedural protections” must be provided before a state deprives a person of property.

16.
(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 651.) “Due process requires ‘notice,
an opportunity to respond, and a hearing.’ ” (Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 619, 631.) The fundamental requirement is an opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S.
319, 333; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 [“the central meaning of procedural
due process” requires “ ‘[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard’ ” and to enjoy that right “ ‘they must first be notified’ ”; the right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard “ ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner’ ”].)
With respect to the CPS report, the record shows father entered the report into
evidence at the contested hearing, in which the following identifying information was
redacted: (1) the reporting party’s name; (2) mother’s, father’s and daughter’s social
security numbers and dates of birth; and (3) mother’s name and phone number. Even if
father were entitled to an unredacted report, father has not shown prejudice from the
family court’s failure to provide one. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [reversal is warranted
only if the appellant establishes a miscarriage of justice].) In its statement of decision,
the family court assumed that Allivato was the reporting party, and it made a finding
during the hearing that it did not find father sexually abused daughter, in part because
CPS did not find any evidence of sexual abuse. Father does not identify any redacted
information in the report that would have helped his case or explain how obtaining an
unredacted report would have changed the outcome of the family court’s custody
decision.
With respect to the transcript of daughter’s testimony, the family court questioned
daughter via Zoom outside the presence of the parties and mother’s attorney. Although
the court ordered the transcript sealed, it summarized daughter’s testimony in its
statement of decision. It is proper for a judge to question a child with the knowledge and
consent of the parties or their attorneys. (Tarling v. Tarling (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 8, 11;

17.
Fam. Code, § 3042, subd. (f)(1) [“the court shall not permit a child addressing the court
regarding custody or visitation to do so in the presence of the parties”].) The parties and
mother’s attorney knew about the interview and there is nothing in the record to indicate
that they did not consent to it.
Father contends the trial court’s sealing of the transcript constituted a form of
evidence suppression in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s suppression of evidence
favorable to a criminal defendant violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment. (Id. at p. 87.) This case, however, applies only to criminal
prosecutions and father does not cite any authority that it applies to child custody
proceedings.
Moreover, father has not shown a reasonable probability the transcript would have
produced a different result had he received it earlier. After father filed his notice of
appeal, the family court granted father’s motion to unseal the transcript, and the transcript
is part of the appellate record. Although father now has access to the transcript, he does
not use it to challenge the family court’s custody findings.
The only argument father raises with respect to the family court’s interview of
daughter is that the court refused to allow daughter to express her custodial preference.
Contrary to father’s assertion, the family court was not required to ask daughter who she
preferred to live with. Family Code section 3042, subdivision (a), provides, “If a child is
of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to
custody or visitation, the court shall consider, and give due weight to, the wishes of the
child in making an order granting or modifying custody or visitation.” A child 14 years
of age or older who wishes to address the court regarding custody or visitation must be
permitted to do so unless the court determines it is not in the child’s best interest. (Id.,

18.
§ 3042, subd. (c).)8 But where, as here, the child is under 14 years of age, the court has
discretion to allow the child’s testimony on custody or visitation “if the court determines
that is appropriate pursuant to the child’s best interest.” (Id., subd. (d).) The statute
“does not require the child to express to the court a preference or to provide other input
regarding custody or visitation.” (Id., subd. (i).) “In many cases it may be quite unwise
to inquire as to the child’s preference; doing so may destroy what little good will is left
between the [parties] or between one of the [parties] and the child.” (Stack v. Stack
(1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 357, 364–365.)
This appears to be such a case. The evidence showed, as the family court found,
that father and daughter were emotionally bonded together to the exclusion of mother,
and father relied on daughter for his emotional support. Father placed his relationship
problems with mother directly on daughter, who was not emotionally prepared to handle
those issues and compensated for that by aligning with father. Daughter had previously
expressed her desire to live with father, but as the family court discovered when
interviewing daughter, daughter’s development progressed more appropriately while in
mother’s care when compared to father’s. Although the family court did not directly ask
daughter with whom she wanted to live, daughter told the court she did not want to talk to
or have contact with father, she felt more free living with mother and felt better living
with her, and she was less scared than when she lived with father. Nothing in the record
indicates the family court refused or failed to consider daughter’s preferences in making
its custody determination. Accordingly, father has not established that the family court
erred in not directly asking daughter about her preferences.

8 Family Code section 3042, subdivision (c) requires the court, if it determines it is
not in the best interest of a child 14 years of age or older to address the court regarding
custody or visitation, to state its reasons for that finding on the record. Father contends
the family court here erred in not stating on the record why it did not allow daughter to
testify about her preferences. This subdivision, however, does not apply here, where
daughter was 13 years old when she testified. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that daughter wished to tell the family court her preference.

19.
More importantly, “the court is not bound to decide according to [a child’s]
preference and may award custody consistent with its finding of the best interest of the
child[].” (In re Marriage of Hopson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 884, 907; accord Tarling v.
Tarling, supra, 186 Cal.App.2d at pp. 9–11, 12 [court did not abuse its discretion in
denying change of custody, even though child preferred to live with his father rather than
his mother].) Even if daughter expressed a preference to live with father, the family court
reasonably could find that it was not in her best interest to live with him, as father lacked
insight into the negative effect he had on daughter’s emotional development and failed to
acknowledge the emotional toll his actions took on her.
Father asserts daughter was of sufficient age and maturity to express her
preferences and if she had been allowed to testify, she would have provided insight into
her well-being and emotional connection to father. Daughter, however, did testify and
provide insight into her well-being and connection to father. The cases father cites do not
require the family court to ask a child under 14 years of age about the child’s preferences.
(See In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 964, fn. 11 [while a trial
court may consider and give due weight to a child’s wishes if the child is of sufficient age
and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to custody, it need not call a child as a
witness where the child’s best interest dictates, and instead may provide alternative
means of obtaining information regarding the child’s preferences]; In re Marriage of
Rosson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1094, 1102‒1103 [a court must give a child’s preference
“serious consideration” where the issue is whether children will be moved from the
community where they lived most of their lives, an excellent parent who remains in the
community wishes the children to reside with him or her, and the children have expressed
a preference to remain in the community].) Moreover, there is nothing to suggest the
family court did not give serious consideration to daughter’s preferences.
Father contends the family court erred in denying his motion to remove the
redactions in the CPS report and to recover daughter’s phone, which was filed after he

20.
filed the notice of appeal. Father asserts that without access to the recording of the
September 2023 mediation and court hearing and the unredacted CPS report, he was
denied the opportunity to present crucial facts in his defense.
The motion, however, is not in the appellate record. A party challenging a ruling
by the trial court has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.
(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) An appellant’s failure to do so results in a
finding that he or she has defaulted and that the trial court’s decision must be affirmed.
(Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608‒609.) Therefore, since father’s motion is
not in the record, we cannot review whether the family court erred in denying it.
Father also asserts he was unlawfully deprived of his home when mother evicted
him from it despite his financial contributions toward its purchase and maintenance. He
asserts he was deprived of his property rights because the court failed to provide him with
a fair opportunity to contest the unlawful detainer action. This action and appeal,
however, concern only child custody—it is not the unlawful detainer action, which would
have been filed under a different case number. The family court did not make any
decision about the family home, as that issue was not before it. Accordingly, any issue
about father’s eviction from the home or his contributions toward it are not before us.
In sum, father has not shown that his due process rights were violated.
II. First Amendment Rights and the Right Against Self-Incrimination
Father contends his First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances
was violated when the family court: (1) withheld crucial evidence, namely, the
unredacted CPS report and the transcript of daughter’s testimony; (2) denied his
September 9 motion to recover daughter’s phone and remove the redactions on the CPS
report; and (3) refused to allow daughter to testify about her custodial preferences.
“The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is protected by
both the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 3.)” (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1342.) The right has been

21.
construed to encompass the right to petition the judicial branch for resolution of legal
disputes. (Ibid., citing California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972)
404 U.S. 508, 510; Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) 564 U.S. 379, 387
(Guarnieri); cf., id. at p. 402 (conc. & dis. opn. of Scalia, J.) [“The Court has never
actually held that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected ‘Petition’ ”].)
Father, however, does not cite any authority that the right to petition extends to
evidentiary rulings made during litigation. The right to petition the government has never
been considered absolute. (Vargas v. City of Salinas, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342;
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 743 (Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants) [“baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to
petition”].) The right does not compel the government to listen or grant relief. (See
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315 (1979) 441 U.S. 463, 465 (per
curiam ) [“the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the
government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and
bargain with it”]; We the People Foundation, Inc. v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2007)
485 F.3d 140, 143‒144 [no right to receive response to or official consideration of a
petition]; Canfora v. Olds (6th Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 363, 364 [no constitutional guarantee
that petitions for the redress of grievances will succeed].)
The cases father relies on, Guarnieri and Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, do not state
the right to petition extends to evidentiary procedures. Guarnieri addressed “the extent
of the protection, if any, that the Petition Clause grants public employees in routine
disputes with government employers.” (Guarnieri, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 382.) The
United States Supreme Court described the right of petition as “the right of individuals to
appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal
disputes.” (Id. at p. 387.) This general statement does not establish whether evidentiary
rulings made during litigation implicates the petition clause. (See Guarnieri, at pp. 388‒

22.
389 [a petition conveys the author’s special concerns to the government and requests
government action to address those concerns].)
In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the National Labor Relations Board may issue a cease-and-desist order to halt an
employer’s prosecution of a state court civil suit brought to retaliate against employees
for exercising federally protected labor rights without a finding the suit lacked a
reasonable basis in fact or law. (Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 733.)
The court decided such an order may not be issued unless the suit lacks a reasonable
basis, noting that such suits are not within the scope of First Amendment protection
because the First Amendment does not immunize “baseless litigation.” (Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants, at pp. 743, 748‒749.)
Father also contends his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was
violated because the family court refused to provide him with the unredacted CPS report,
sealed daughter’s transcript, and refused to allow daughter to testify. Father’s argument
is meritless, as the evidence he cites did not require him to give testimony that might
incriminate him. “As a matter of constitutional protection, criminal defendants cannot be
compelled to testify against themselves. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 15.) Furthermore, witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings have the right to
refuse to answer any question that might tend to incriminate them. (Evid. Code, § 940.)”
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1097‒1098, fns. omitted.) Father
does not cite to any question he either was compelled to answer or refused to answer that
he believed would tend to incriminate him.9

9 In a section of his brief labeled “Statement of Appealability,” father asserts in
passing that he seeks appellate review of other issues, namely, that Allivato fabricated her
reports, the court denied him access to Allivato’s reports, and his First Amendment right
to free association was violated when the family court restricted his contact with
daughter. In the same section, father asserts the Commission on Judicial Performance,
Board of Behavioral Sciences, and the Complaint Review Unit of the State Bar of
California enabled ongoing misconduct in the family court through their inaction as they

23.
In sum, father has not shown any violation of his First Amendment right to access
the courts or his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
III. Judicial Bias and Recusal
Father contends the family court judge assigned to his case was biased against him
as evidenced by: (1) the exclusion and withholding of key evidence, such as sealing
daughter’s transcript and not including the CPS report as an exhibit; (2) rulings that
consistently favored mother, such as striking evidence of mother’s immigration fraud;
(3) refusing to admit exculpatory evidence, such as the unredacted CPS report; and
(4) the judge’s recusal at the conclusion of the case.
Case law has recognized that California has a substantial statutory system
available to address alleged judicial bias, which “requires those concerned about judicial
bias to file in the trial court and, if dissatisfied, to petition for writ of mandate, which is
the exclusive means of review.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
588; Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subds. (c) & (d).)10 The failure to raise a challenge of bias

failed to act on father’s complaints against the family court judge, Allivato, and mother’s
attorney, and the family court was biased against fathers in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause.
Father failed to articulate an intelligible argument on these issues supported by
appropriate authority and citations to the record in the argument section of his brief. We
therefore need not consider these issues. (See Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“asserted grounds for appeal that are unsupported by any
citation to authority and that merely complain of error without presenting a coherent legal
argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of discussion”]; 300 DeHaro Street
Investors v. Department of Housing & Community Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
1240, 1257 [appellant forfeited argument “by failing to brief it properly under a separate
heading … and … failing to provide adequate legal analysis”]; rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each
brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the
point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].)
10 Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c) sets out the procedure when
a party seeks to disqualify a judge for cause, and requires a party to seek disqualification
“ ‘at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the
ground for disqualification.’ ” (Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008)

24.
in the trial court will result in a waiver of this issue on appeal. (Tri Counties Bank v.
Superior Court, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337‒1338.)
Here, while father raised the issue of judicial bias when designating the record on
appeal and in his proposed settled statement, he did not raise the issue with respect to the
family court’s evidentiary rulings during the contested custody hearing or before the
family court issued its decision. Therefore, at a minimum, father’s claim of bias with
respect to the family court’s conduct of the contested hearing is waived.
Even if not waived, the claim fails. A trial court’s repeated rulings against a party
are not grounds for finding bias. (Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
p. 589; Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795–796.)
Father’s arguments appear to attack evidentiary rulings within the family court’s
discretion, and therefore do not demonstrate bias. (See, e.g., Evid. Code, § 352 [court has
discretion to exclude evidence if probative value is substantially outweighed by undue
consumption of time or substantial danger of undue prejudice or confusion].)11
Father also asserts the judge’s post-decision recusal along with the unexplained
withdrawal of mother’s attorney at the conclusion of the custody matter suggest potential
misconduct or bias that was concealed from the parties and shows that the judge should
have recused himself earlier in the case. The family court judge recused himself pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, without stating the basis for his recusal. That

167 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337.) A failure to comply with the promptness requirement
“constitutes forfeiture or an implied waiver of the disqualification.” (Ibid.)
11 The Honorable Joseph R. Distaso was the judge throughout most of the
proceedings. In his appellate brief, father mentions another judge, the Honorable Alan
Cassidy, in his statement of appealability and statement of facts, asserting Judge Cassidy
displayed bias in his rulings, which he claims were based on “Title IV-D financial
incentives.” The record shows that Judge Cassidy presided over one hearing on June 27,
2023. The minute order of that hearing states the parties met and conferred and discussed
the issues, but were unable to reach an agreement, and the court set a two-day trial for
March 20 and 21 on the parties requests for domestic violence restraining orders and
economic issues. There is nothing to suggest bias during this hearing.

25.
the judge did so at the conclusion of the custody matter does not indicate that he was
biased against father during the proceedings. Father claims the judge’s evidentiary
rulings show bias, but he does not directly challenge those rulings on appeal, which is his
recourse if he believed the rulings were erroneous. Mother’s attorney’s withdrawal also
does not infer bias or collusion—the attorney likely decided not to represent mother on
appeal.12
DISPOSITION

The family court’s April 19, 2024 order is affirmed.

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

12 Father also asserts that he filed a complaint against Judge Distaso with the
Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission), which the Commission closed
in March 2024. Noting that Commission rules mandate the confidentiality of the
Commission’s investigation, father argues such a rule raises concerns about the integrity
of the trial proceedings and suggests that judicial misconduct may have been concealed.
Father does not cite any authority to support this proposition, and we fail to see how
confidentiality of Commission proceedings, particularly where the Commission declines
to act on the complaint, indicates judicial misconduct occurred.

26.

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