People v. Patrick CA2/3

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Filed 4/17/25 P. v. Patrick CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B334444

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA175893)
v.

ALONZO JUNE PATRICK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2000, a jury convicted Alonzo June Patrick of first
degree murder based on a drive-by shooting in which Patrick was
the driver and his passenger was the shooter. In 2022, Patrick
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.1
He appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing after an
evidentiary hearing. Patrick argues the trial court applied the
wrong standard of proof and failed to act as an independent
factfinder in determining he acted as a direct aider and abettor
with intent to kill. We affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On the afternoon of November 19, 1991, Patrick was
driving near Crenshaw High School in Los Angeles. He and his
passenger were members of a gang. Rival gang members fired
shots at Patrick’s car. He immediately made a U-turn and drove
back to the area where the shots had been fired. While Patrick
slowed the car, his passenger shot six times into a crowd. One
shot struck and killed a bystander, Larry Christon.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the statute as section 1172.6 for
the remainder of this opinion.
2 We previously granted Patrick’s Request for Judicial Notice
of the record from his direct appeal, which includes transcripts
from his trial. The resentencing court relied on the trial
transcripts in denying Patrick’s resentencing petition. We take
the facts from the evidence admitted at Patrick’s trial and at the
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.

2
Prior Proceedings
In September 2000, Patrick was tried by jury for Christon’s
murder. The evidence at trial established the following:
Alfonzo Lezine testified that Patrick, his fellow gang
member, told him about the drive-by shooting. Patrick said that
after he and a passenger were shot at, Patrick turned the car
around and his passenger fired shots. Patrick initially bragged to
Lezine about his role in the shooting. At trial, Lezine testified
that Patrick also said he “didn’t mean [for it] to happen like that.”
However, Lezine admitted that his initial written statement
provided to an FBI agent did not mention this comment.
FBI Special Agent Ronald Twersky testified that on June
30, 2000, he interviewed Lezine. Lezine provided a handwritten
statement recounting what Patrick told him. The statement was
admitted into evidence at trial. According to the written
statement, Patrick told Lezine “ ‘the whole story,’ ” “ ‘bragged
about it,’ ” and said that after he and his passenger were shot at,
“ ‘they drove around and came back and [Patrick’s passenger]
shot [the victim].’ ”
Bystander Danny Owens testified that he was at a gas
station when he observed someone fire two or three shots towards
Patrick’s car.3 Owens saw the car disappear from view and
return within approximately 20 seconds to the location of the
shooting. He saw a passenger sitting on the window ledge of the
door of the car. The passenger shot at a group of people and the
car then drove away.
Another eyewitness, Compton Charles, heard two gunshots.
Approximately 15 seconds later, Charles saw Patrick’s car

3 Patrick later admitted it was his car in a written
declaration attached to his resentencing petition.

3
approach and slow down, even though it had the right of way and
there was no stop sign or traffic in front of it. The car slowed
from about 20 miles per hour to 15 miles per hour. Charles saw a
passenger emerge from the window and shoot multiple shots at a
crowd of people, then the car continued driving.
California Highway Patrol Officer Jeff Loftin testified that
after Patrick was arrested for using false identification, he
confessed that he had done so because he was involved in a
murder. Patrick told Loftin that he was driving a car with a
passenger when he drove by a group of individuals who fired
shots at them. He turned the car around and his passenger shot
at the group, and he saw his passenger had shot someone in the
head. When Loftin asked Patrick why he turned the car around,
he replied, “ ‘So my passenger could,’ ” but he did not finish his
sentence.
In a statement read into evidence at trial, Patrick’s friend,
Danielle Harris, told an FBI agent that Patrick had attempted to
persuade her to testify falsely that she was at the scene of the
murder and Patrick’s passenger had not “shot back.”4
At trial, the prosecution proceeded on a theory that Patrick
was the driver and that he aided and abetted his passenger’s
shooting of Christon. The trial court instructed the jury on direct
aiding and abetting as well as a theory of murder as a natural
and probable consequence of the commission of assault with a
firearm. The jury was also instructed on first degree drive-by
murder under section 189 and the special circumstance of
intentional discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle under
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21).

4 At trial, Harris’s written statement was admitted not for its
truth, but as evidence of Patrick’s consciousness of guilt.

4
The jury found Patrick guilty of the first degree murder of
Christon, found true the special circumstance that “the murder
was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person and
persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death,” and
found true the allegation that a principal in the offense was
armed with a firearm (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(21),
12022, subd. (a)(1); count 1).
For the murder of Christon, the court sentenced Patrick to
life without the possibility of parole, plus one year on the
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) allegation, to run consecutive to
determinate sentences on other counts.5
In February 2002, on direct appeal, this Court affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Patrick (Feb. 25, 2002, B147837) [nonpub.
opn.].)
Petition for Resentencing
In September 2019, Patrick filed a habeas petition. In
relevant part, he asserted he was eligible for resentencing of his
first degree murder conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) because he was not the actual shooter. The
court appointed counsel.

5 In addition to the murder of Christon (count 1), the
operative third amended information charged Patrick with
attempted murder, attempted robbery, and carjacking (counts 2–
4), stemming from an incident in June 1998 that was unrelated
to Christon’s murder. The People originally charged these counts
in a separate information. In July 1999, the trial court granted
the prosecution’s motion to consolidate the four charges for all
proceedings, including trial. Counts 2 through 4 are not at issue
in this appeal.

5
In December 2019, the People filed an opposition,
construing part of the habeas petition as a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 and arguing that it should be
denied because (1) the jury found the special circumstance true
that the drive-by murder was committed by shooting
intentionally with the intent to inflict death, and (2) Patrick was
a major participant in a felony drive-by shooting who acted with
reckless indifference to human life by aiding and abetting an
accomplice to shoot at people outside the car.
In February 2022, Patrick’s appointed counsel filed a new
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The petition
asserted that Patrick was convicted on a now-invalid natural and
probable consequences theory and the special circumstance of
discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle did not require a
finding that Patrick intended to kill. Attached to the petition
were excerpts from the trial transcript, the relevant information,
jury instructions, and the abstracts of judgment. In addition,
Patrick re-submitted a declaration he had originally attached to
the habeas petition. The declaration stated in relevant part:

“2. On November 19, 1991, I was involved in a
drive by shooting where I was the driver. We were
near Crenshaw High School. The incident caused the
unfortunate death of a young man.
“3. Without trying to minimize the severity of the
crime; I was near Crenshaw High School when 2 gun
shots were fired at my car by rival gang members. I
then made a U-turn, returned to the area of the
parking lot where the shots had been fired and the
passenger Hadise Mobley returned fire.
“4. The passenger fired the shots over the top of
my car. One of the shots unfortunately killed a
young man . . . .

6
“5. I believe the court should consider the
circumstances of this crime and come to the
conclusion that I never instructed the passenger to
kill someone, nor did I provide him with the weapon
that he used to commit the crime. . . .”

In October 2022, Patrick filed a supplemental request for
resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing he had stated a prima
facie case for relief based on his conviction for murder and the
natural and probable consequences jury instruction, and
requesting that the court set an evidentiary hearing. The trial
court granted the request.
On July 14, 2023, the parties appeared for an evidentiary
hearing. Patrick’s counsel argued there was insufficient evidence
of intent to kill based on the jury instructions. The People argued
that the jury instructions were irrelevant because, regardless of
Patrick’s intent to kill, he could still be prosecuted under a felony
murder theory because he acted as a major participant with
reckless indifference to human life. The court responded, “the
question in a[ ] [section] 1172 hearing is is there sufficient
evidence remaining if you take out anything, such as foreseeable
consequences, is there enough to retry him. [¶] So even if there
was a mistake— [¶] This is not an overall habeas corpus as to
the bad jury instruction. So that’s the only question the court has
to answer.” Patrick’s counsel then submitted on the “state of the
record.” The People did not submit any new evidence at the
hearing.
On July 26, the court informed the parties that it wanted to
review the complete trial transcripts before it ruled. The People
submitted the complete transcripts, and, on August 11, the court
denied Patrick’s petition.

7
The court’s written ruling observed that Patrick was
convicted of first degree murder and he admitted his
participation in the crime in the declaration attached to his
petition. The court also recited the evidence showing that
Patrick had told Lezine of his involvement. The court referenced
the eyewitnesses’ testimony and Harris’s statement. Finally, the
court noted ballistics evidence establishing that two shots were
fired at Patrick’s car and his passenger fired six shots.
The court determined that Patrick “can still be prosecuted
under the current state of the law, under two possible theories[:]
[¶] (1.) As a person who was not the actual killer, but with the
intent to kill, aided and abetted . . . or assisted in [sic] the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree (Penal Code
section 189[(e)](2); or [¶] (2.) The person was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life . . . [.] As previously set forth petitioner drove back to
the scene of the shooting in a manner that allowed his co-
defendant to shoot into a group of people. His actions (which he
admitted) are the very definition of assisting and abetting. [¶]
Further, he was clearly a major participant in the underlying
felony (see People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal[.]4th 788[,] and People
v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal[.]4th 522).”
The court also reasoned: “Petitioner admitted his return to
the scene of the shooting was done in such a manner as to enable
his co-defendant to shoot into a group of people. His actions
facilitated the shooting, and nothing to prevent it [sic] and his
own actions intentionally allowed the shooter to kill. He then
assisted the shooter in getting away.”
The court denied the petition, concluding, “The People have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner could be

8
prosecuted under the current state of the law for first degree,
willful and premedi[t]ated murder.”
Patrick filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 significantly narrowed accomplice
liability for murder by eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and by limiting the scope of the felony murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile), superseded by statute on other
grounds by Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.); (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551).)
The bill amended section 188 by adding the requirement
that, except as stated in section 189, “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) It amended the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which
provides that a participant in the perpetration of certain
enumerated felonies in which a death occurs is liable for felony
murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was not the
actual killer but, with the intent to kill, “ ‘aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree,’ ” or (3) the person was a “ ‘major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life,’ ” as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842; § 189, subd. (e).)

9
“[A] principal in a murder, including an aider or abettor,
may still be criminally liable if that individual personally
possesses malice aforethought, whether express or implied.”
(People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631; People v. Silva
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640; People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 [Sen. Bill No. 1437 did not “alter the
law regarding the criminal liability of direct aiders and abettors
of murder because such persons necessarily ‘know and share the
murderous intent of the actual perpetrator’ ”].)
Section 1172.6 sets forth a procedure that allows a person
convicted of a qualifying offense under the former law to petition
for resentencing if the person could no longer be convicted of the
offense under amended sections 188 or 189. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847; see also
Sen. Bill No. 775, § 2 [further amending statutory procedures in
§ 1172.6].) If the court determines the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Within 60 days, “ ‘the court must hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving,
“beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder” under state law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . .’ ” (People v. Njoku (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 27, 41; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (3).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court determines
whether “the petitioner committed [the underlying crime] under
a still-valid theory. . . .” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 294 (Clements).) The trial court serves as “a
fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard . . . .” (Id. at pp. 294–295.) It “ ‘must

10
impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received throughout the entire trial’ and determine whether that
‘proof . . . leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is
true.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 295.) Under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence
to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Clements, at pp. 294–297.)
II. Patrick Has Not Established That the Trial Court
Erred by Denying his Petition Based on Its Finding
That Patrick Was a Direct Aider and Abettor
Patrick contends the trial court applied the wrong standard
of proof and failed to act as a factfinder when it found him
ineligible for resentencing.6 He asserts that instead of

6 The trial court found that Patrick was liable under current
law as a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill and as a
major participant in an underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Here, we only consider the
former theory because Patrick argues, and the People concede,
that the trial court erred in finding the evidence established
Patrick’s liability on a felony murder theory. Felony murder
requires evidence that the murder was committed in the
perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies. There was no
such evidence in this case. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); cf. People v.
Burgess (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 592, 606.) The People
acknowledge that assault with a firearm is not a predicate felony
for first degree felony murder. (See also People v. Chavez (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 379, 385–387 [drive-by-shooting is not an
enumerated felony for purposes of felony murder rule].) To the
extent the trial court was suggesting Patrick is guilty of second
degree felony murder, we note that, assuming the theory
continues to be viable after Senate Bill No. 1437 (see, e.g., §§ 188,

11
independently determining whether the People established
Patrick’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under a valid legal
theory, the trial court merely reviewed the record to evaluate
whether there was substantial evidence for a trier of fact to find
him guilty. Whether the court applied the correct legal standard
is an issue we review de novo. (See, e.g., Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly
Hills Gateway, L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12, 33.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution is required to
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court is the factfinder and
must determine whether the People have met the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 294.)
Patrick contends the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard based on three statements the court made during the
proceedings. First, he cites the court’s statement during the July
2023 evidentiary hearing that “the question in [a section] 1172
hearing is is there sufficient evidence remaining if you take out
anything, such as foreseeable consequences, is there enough to
retry him.” Second, Patrick points to a portion of the trial court’s
written ruling in which it discussed the convictions for attempted

subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); In re White (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 933,
937, fn. 2; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1142,
fn. 3), the parties agree that even under prior law, neither
assault with a firearm nor felony drive-by shooting would qualify
as a predicate for felony murder. (People v. Chun (2009) 45
Cal.4th 1172, 1200 [felonies that are assaultive in nature merge
with homicide and cannot be predicate for second degree felony
murder].)

12
murder, attempted robbery, and carjacking, none of which were
at issue in the section 1172.6 petition. The court noted that
Patrick conceded: “ ‘There was sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction,’ ” as to those counts, quoting from Patrick’s habeas
petition. The ruling stated this concession was “consistent with
defendant’s decision not to contest the sufficiency of evidence or
otherwise make any substantive challenges in his direct appeal of
his convictions.” Third, Patrick relies on the trial court’s
statement of its ultimate conclusion: “The People have proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner could be prosecuted
under the current state of the law for first degree, willful and
premeditated murder.” We find no error.
It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that an
appealed judgment or order is presumed correct, and error must
be affirmatively shown. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
“ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all
presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by
the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.) A corollary to this
rule is that “ ‘ “a trial court is presumed to have been aware of
and followed the applicable law.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Julian R.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 (Julian R.).)
Moreover, “ ‘ “[n]o rule of decision is better or more firmly
established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of
reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct
in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a
wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to
the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations
which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.)

13
In the context of bench trials, “[a]s a broad general
proposition, cases have stated that a trial court’s remarks in a
bench trial cannot be used to show that the trial court misapplied
the law or erred in its reasoning. (People v. Grana (1934) 1
Cal.2d 565, 571; [citations].) These statements are founded on
the principle that, in a criminal bench trial, the trial court is not
required to provide a statement of decision and that any
explanation of his or her decision a trial judge provides is not
part of the record on appeal. [Citation.] [¶] This broad
proposition has been subjected to an important limitation.
Without discussing whether a trial judge’s statements are part of
the record on appeal, cases decided after People v. Grana have
held that we may nonetheless consider a judge’s statement when,
taken as a whole, the judge’s statement discloses an incorrect
rather than a correct concept of the relevant law, ‘embodied not
merely in “secondary remarks” but in [the judge’s] basic ruling.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Tessman (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293,
1302 (Tessman).) While an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6 is not a bench trial, we find this general
proposition applicable.
Applying these principles, we disagree that the three
statements Patrick has identified demonstrate that the trial
court applied an incorrect legal standard when ruling on his
petition. As an initial matter, we must presume that the trial
court was aware of the law and its role as an independent
factfinder at the evidentiary hearing. Effective January 1, 2022,
amendments to section 1172.6 clarified that the prosecution at a
resentencing hearing has the burden of proof to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder, a
substantial evidence finding is insufficient to prove beyond a

14
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing,
and the trial court must act as the factfinder. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (c); People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123; Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at pp. 294, 297; People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745 (Garrison).)
Thus, while there was initially a split of authority
regarding whether the trial court applied a substantial evidence
test or acted as an independent factfinder (see, e.g., Garrison,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 745 [describing split]), the
Legislature resolved any uncertainty over a year and a half
before the trial court ruled on Patrick’s petition. Courts had
similarly addressed the issue in published opinions. (See, e.g.,
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3 [December
2022]; Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 294, 297 [February
2022]; Garrison, at p. 745 [December 2021].) Indeed, Patrick’s
October 2022 supplemental request for resentencing cited the
amendments to section 1172.6 from Senate Bill No. 775, and
specifically recited the relevant portions of section 1172.6 which
set forth the prosecutor’s burden and the insufficiency of a
substantial evidence finding. The trial court expressly indicated
it “read all the papers filed by both sides.” We presume that the
court followed that law. (Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 499.)
The trial court’s statement at the evidentiary hearing about
“sufficient evidence” does not indicate the trial court misapplied
the law. The court responded to counsel’s argument that “there
may not have been sufficient evidence for an intent to kill based
on the [jury] instructions.” The court noted that at the
evidentiary hearing stage, the jury instructions were not
relevant. The court referred to the need to evaluate the evidence

15
that remained after evidence supporting a natural and probable
consequences theory was eliminated. The court’s oral statement
was neither inherently incorrect, nor an indication that in its
subsequent written ruling the court applied an improper
substantial evidence review. Further, even if the trial court’s
comment could be construed as an incorrect summary of the law,
the statement was a “ ‘secondary remark[ ],’ ” rather than an
element in the trial court’s ultimate ruling. (Tessman, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.)
The second statement at issue referenced the attempted
murder, attempted robbery, and carjacking convictions, and was
entirely unrelated to the murder count for which Patrick sought
resentencing. Patrick provides no basis for us to conclude that
the statement, apparently made as background information
about the prior proceedings, demonstrated error in the court’s
determination of Patrick’s eligibility for resentencing on the
murder count.
Finally, as to the third statement, Patrick correctly states
that the proper standard is not whether he “ ‘could be
prosecuted’ ”—the words the trial court used—but rather whether
the prosecution proved that he “ ‘is guilty’ ” under current law.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) However, we conclude that, taken as a
whole, the statement did not disclose an incorrect concept of the
law. (Tessman, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.)
The trial court provided a detailed recitation of the
evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing, including evidence
that post-dated the original trial. The court unequivocally
concluded that Patrick’s actions were “the very definition of
assisting and abetting.” Although the court erred in concluding a
felony murder theory was viable, its statement that Patrick “was

16
clearly a major participant in the underlying felony,” illustrates
that the court was acting in its role as an independent factfinder,
not merely determining this was a conclusion that could be
drawn from the evidence. The court further explained its ruling:
“In the instant case petitioner admitted his return to the scene of
the shooting was done in such a manner as to enable his co-
defendant to shoot into a group of people. His actions facilitated
the shooting, and [did] nothing to prevent it and his own actions
intentionally allowed the shooter to kill. He then assisted the
shooter in getting away.” These were factual findings, not merely
statements of what a jury or other finder of fact could have found.
These findings, along with the trial court’s references to the
People’s burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard,
indicate the trial court applied the correct legal standard and
independently found the People met their burden to show Patrick
was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of murder on a direct
aiding and abetting theory.
Garrison does not compel a different result. In Garrison,
the trial court ruled on the defendant’s petition for resentencing
before the 2022 amendments to section 1172.6, during a period
when the role of the trial court and the standard of proof were
unsettled legal issues. In ruling on the petition, the trial court
used the language: “ ‘I also find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Garrison could have been convicted as the actual shooter and
actual killer in this felony murder case.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) On appeal, the People conceded the trial
court had applied an incorrect substantial evidence standard.
(Id. at p. 745, fn. 6.) The reviewing court, however, did not
expressly accept the concession, instead concluding that
“[a]ssuming Garrison is correct that the trial court applied the

17
wrong standard of proof at the section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3)
hearing, Garrison cannot demonstrate any prejudicial error.” (Id.
at p. 745, italics added.) The Garrison court did not decide
whether the trial court’s language indicated it applied the wrong
standard of proof, and, even if it had, this case presents different
circumstances since the trial court’s ruling occurred after the
Legislature and caselaw clearly established the proper standard
of proof and the trial court’s role in the process.
Despite the trial court’s imprecise language here, we
assume it was aware of and followed the applicable law. (People
v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) Patrick has failed to
meet his burden of establishing affirmative error. We therefore
reject his claim that the trial court applied the wrong standard of
proof and failed to act as a factfinder when it denied his
resentencing petition.

18
DISPOSITION
The order denying Patrick’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

19

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