People v. Barry CA2/7

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Filed 4/16/25 P. v. Barry CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337178

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA105062)
v.

EDWARD JOSEPH BARRY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan I. Rubin, Commissioner, and Hector M.
Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
The Noriega Law Firm and Lauren A. Noriega for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Edward Barry appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered after he pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a).) Barry contends the preliminary hearing magistrate
erred in denying his motion pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1538.5 to suppress evidence obtained from the
warrantless entry and search of his home, and the trial court
erred in denying his renewed motion to suppress made in the
trial court and motion under section 995 to set aside the
information. Barry argues the law enforcement officers’ use of
night vision binoculars to surveil his garage, entry onto his
driveway to detain him, and forced entry into his home to conduct
a protective sweep violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Evidence at the Suppression Hearing
The preliminary hearing and a concurrent hearing on
Barry’s motion to suppress were held on June 9, 2022 before a
magistrate.2 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD)
Detectives Roberto Reyes, Goro Yoshida, and Mario Magdaleno
testified. Each detective was a member of the LASD Narcotics
Bureau and the California Multijurisdictional Methamphetamine
Enforcement Team (Cal-MMET). The magistrate admitted
photographic evidence of items seized from Barry’s property.
Barry did not testify or present any evidence.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Alan I. Rubin, Commissioner.

2
On October 22, 2020 Detective Reyes was part of a Cal-
MMET task force conducting surveillance of a white sedan
parked in a shopping center parking lot in Redondo Beach.
Detective Reyes testified that after about an hour on the scene,
he observed Barry3 walking alone through the parking lot looking
at the cars. Barry was not the target of the investigation, and
Detective Reyes did not know who Barry was. Barry walked past
the white sedan, looked at the vehicle’s rear license plate, and
then entered the vehicle without using a key. Barry’s behavior
was consistent with a “vehicle swap,” a narcotics operation
Detective Reyes was familiar with from previous investigations,
which involves a vehicle “loaded with narcotics” that is driven to
a commercial parking lot and left unlocked. “[S]oon
after . . . another person will approach, enter that vehicle and
take the vehicle away for the purposes of unloading narcotics.”
Detective Reyes followed the sedan as Barry drove out of the
parking lot directly to a single-family residence on Firmona
Avenue (the Firmona home), which was less than a mile away
(also in Redondo Beach).
After Barry arrived in the sedan at the Firmona home,
Detective Yoshida was called out to the home to conduct
surveillance. Detective Yoshida testified that he reached the
location around 7:00 p.m. It was already dark, and the
streetlights were on. He wore plain clothes and parked his
vehicle in a parking lot across the street from the Firmona home
with a direct line of sight down the home’s driveway. Detective
Yoshida used “pretty large” binoculars with night vision.

3 Detectives Reyes, Yoshida, and Magdaleno each identified
Barry in the courtroom.

3
Throughout his surveillance he remained in radio contact with
other members of the task force and provided them with real-
time updates.
From his vantage point, Detective Yoshida observed the
white sedan was parked at an angle partially inside a two-car
garage at the far end of the driveway. Detective Yoshida had a
direct view of the driver’s side of the vehicle.4 He estimated the
driveway was about 40 feet long, and the sedan was about 60 feet
from his vantage point across the street. There was a door in the
back of the garage that Detective Yoshida believed led into the
main house; he later learned the door instead led into a fenced
backyard with access to the house.
Detective Yoshida could see movement underneath the
sedan. He observed a male, later identified as Barry, crouched by
the front bumper. At first Detective Yoshida could not tell what
Barry was doing, but as Detective Yoshida watched, he was able
to see that Barry was dismantling the bumper. Barry then began
to remove brick-sized packages from the bumper area and place
them in a grocery bag. From his training and experience,
Detective Yoshida believed the brick-sized packages were likely
to contain narcotics. As Barry was unloading and bagging the
packages, a female, later identified as Barry’s girlfriend,
Gabriela, went back and forth between Barry’s location and the
direction of the house, where she would disappear from view for

4 In his opening brief Barry asserts the garage door was
“partially closed.” However, the preliminary hearing transcript
does not include testimony the garage door was partly closed.
Detective Yoshida testified he had an unobstructed view into the
garage and could see many items inside, including laundry
appliances and shelving.

4
several minutes before returning.5 Barry finished loading the
grocery bags and carried them in the direction of the house.
Detective Yoshida admitted during cross-examination that he
could not see if Barry, Gabriela, or the narcotics ever went inside
the house, but he believed the narcotics had been carried inside
based on his impression of the property layout.
Less than 10 minutes later, Barry returned to the garage
when a second male, later identified as Julio Sanchez, arrived in
another vehicle and parked in the driveway. Barry got into the
white sedan, and Sanchez got back into the second vehicle, and
they both prepared to reverse their vehicles out of the driveway.
Detective Yoshida relayed this information to the rest of the task
force, and the team decided “to stop the vehicles at the driveway.”
Officers wearing vests labeled “Sheriff’s Department” with the
LASD emblem, tactical gear, and gun belts swarmed onto the
driveway, blocking Barry and Sanchez from leaving. The officers
loudly announced they were from the LASD. Several windows of
the house faced the location where the officers stopped Barry and
Sanchez.
Detective Mario Magdaleno was in charge of the
investigation and was one of the six officers who surrounded the
two vehicles.6 Detective Magdaleno testified the vehicles were

5 During cross-examination, Detective Yoshida admitted he
earlier stated in an email to a deputy district attorney that he
saw Gabriela inside the garage only one time, several minutes
before Barry began handling the narcotics packages. However,
Detective Yoshida confirmed that he observed Gabriela enter the
garage multiple times while Barry was handling the packages.
6 In addition to the six officers who detained Barry and
Sanchez, four other officers were stationed in “the outer area.”

5
stopped in a position that was “directly in line” with and “no more
than 10 feet” from the house. As Barry was being removed from
the sedan—before he was asked any questions—he spontaneously
stated, “‘the stuff’s inside’” and “my girlfriend’s inside.’”7
Detective Magdaleno testified he was concerned about the
statements, explaining that in any narcotics operation,
particularly a large-scale operation, “we’re fearful of individuals
inside locations who could be arming themselves, or people that
we have . . . not been able to detain at that point. And being that
we’re looking at narcotics we want[] to ensure that there’s an
officer safety element that we must adhere to, protective sweeps,
entering locations, clearing locations just to ensure the safety of
the officers as well as the people.” Moreover, Detective
Magdaleno testified, in his experience with large-scale narcotics
operations, once police officers expose themselves to anyone
involved in the operation, it is urgent to “freeze [the] location” to
ensure that evidence is not destroyed. He testified, “There’s an
exigency for us to make an attempt to enter the location as
readily and as quickly as possible to . . . preserve that evidence.”
After Barry and Sanchez were taken out of their respective
vehicles, officers checked the vehicles to confirm there were no

Altogether, approximately 10 officers and six or seven police
vehicles were part of the operation.
7 Barry made the statement “‘the stuff’s inside’” to the officer
who removed Barry him from the sedan, and that officer
contemporaneously relayed Barry’s statement to Detective
Magdaleno. Detective Magdaleno personally heard Barry say,
“‘My girlfriend’s inside.’” Detective Magdaleno was designated as
the investigating officer for the purpose of the preliminary
hearing.

6
other passengers inside.8 Officers then walked through the
garage area toward the rear door of the garage because it was
“the last known area that we had seen the girlfriend walk
through.” After the garage area was cleared, officers went
through the garage door, which led into the fenced backyard with
a cement path leading to the rear entrance to the house.
Detective Magdaleno banged loudly on the wrought-iron door of
the house and repeatedly announced, “‘Sheriff’s Department.
Come to the door please’” in English and Spanish. In between
the announcements and banging, he could hear footsteps and
shuffling inside, but no one answered the door or responded to his
announcement. Detective Magdaleno feared someone inside the
house was “possibly . . . arming themselves” and “possibly
destroying evidence.”
After about a minute of banging on the door, Detective
Magdaleno directed the other officers to open the outer wrought
iron door with a “pick and lock ram.” As officers breached the
perimeter of the outer door frame, they heard the voice of a
female (Gabriela), who then opened the door for them. Officers
led Gabriela outside and performed a protective sweep inside the
house “to ensure nobody else was in there and there was no
harm.” During the sweep, officers identified two large grocery
bags containing narcotics packages sitting on the floor of the
central hallway in “plain view.”
After the protective sweep, Detective Magdaleno stationed
officers at the house to make sure that no one could enter, but the
officers were instructed not to conduct any additional searches.

8 Barry and Sanchez were handcuffed and escorted to the
front of the house and placed in a police car.

7
While Barry was detained in a police car on the street, Detective
Magdaleno obtained a search warrant, which took a “couple of
hours.” Once the warrant was authorized, officers searched the
house and recovered 12 “kilo-type” packages presumed to contain
narcotics, a sandwich bag filled with pills, numerous large-
capacity magazines in various calibers, part of an AK-47 assault
rifle, two shotguns, a small pistol in a metal case, and an assault
pistol. During a subsequent search of the sedan, two additional
“kilo”-type packages were recovered from a compartment in the
front bumper area. Officers found graffiti associated with the
Westside Culver City gang, a criminal street gang, including
gang monikers, on a table inside the garage.
During cross-examination, Detective Magdaleno admitted
it was fair to say his team “created [the] exigency” to enter the
Firmona home “by making [themselves] known to the people at
the residence” as a result of detaining Barry and Sanchez in the
middle of the driveway. But Detective Magdaleno’s experience
with similar vehicle-swap operations, combined with Barry’s
movements as relayed by Detective Yoshida, led him to believe
the sedan likely contained narcotics even after Barry finished
unloading the packages, because Barry was likely taking the car
somewhere to be picked up again. Moreover, it was not feasible
based on the number of officers and vehicles available to the team
to follow and try to arrest Barry after he left the Firmona home,
while also securing the scene until the officers could obtain
search warrants. Magdaleno explained that attempting to follow
Barry with insufficient officers posed a risk: “Often we don’t
know where these people are going and if they start driving too
far and we don’t have enough people to follow, the undercover

8
officer could be made out. . . . We need to have enough and
sufficient people to ensure the safety of the team.”
After the presentation of evidence, the parties stipulated
that the materials recovered from the Firmona home and the
white sedan were tested by a laboratory and included more than
6 kilograms of cocaine and 29 grams of methamphetamine
tablets. The parties also stipulated the assault pistol was an
operable .223-caliber semi-automatic assault weapon.

B. Barry’s Motions To Suppress and Set Aside the Information
Barry filed his motion to suppress in advance of the
preliminary hearing and noticed it to be heard concurrently. He
argued there was no probable cause for his warrantless detention
and de facto arrest, and no probable cause or exigent
circumstances justifying law enforcement’s entry and search of
his home and curtilage. Further, Barry asserted that all
statements he made to the police officers, even if they were
spontaneous, must be suppressed because the officers were not
lawfully present on his property. He also argued all evidence
subsequently found at the property must be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule as the fruit of the unlawful entry. The
People did not file a written opposition.
At the June 9, 2022 preliminary hearing, after the
presentation of the evidence, Barry’s attorney argued that law
enforcement may not create the exigent circumstance it relies on
to justify a warrantless search; there were no specific, articulable
facts from the investigation showing it was reasonable for the
officers to believe exigent circumstances existed; and despite the
presence of around 10 law enforcement personnel, no one tried to
obtain a warrant before entering Barry’s property. The

9
prosecutor argued that in the broader context of the drug-
trafficking investigation that began in the parking lot and based
on surveillance of the activities and people coming and going
from the garage, exigent circumstances existed to detain Barry
on his driveway. A protective sweep of the home was justified by
information that at least one other person was inside the house
with the drugs, with a clear view of the location where the
officers detained Barry and Sanchez.
The magistrate denied the suppression motion. The
magistrate found Barry’s spontaneous statements to the officers
were admissible as statements against interest, regardless of
whether he was under arrest. All of the drugs and weapons
discovered after the search warrant had been issued were “clearly
admissible because there was a warrant.” The only “real issue”
was whether there were exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless entry into Barry’s home.9 The magistrate found
exigent circumstances for officer safety were “clearly apparent”
because the officers knew at least one person was present in the
house, no one answered the door despite movement inside, there
was a large amount of drugs to be protected, and there was a
reasonable basis for officers to believe there could be weapons.
The magistrate concluded, “The officers in my view had every
right to go in there to perform at least a protective sweep of the
house, and they did that.” Further, photographic evidence
confirmed the grocery bags full of drugs were clearly visible in
plain sight. However, the magistrate found the People did not
show the need to preserve evidence created an exigent

9 The prosecutor did not dispute that the Firmona home was
Barry’s home despite the absence of any evidence on the issue.

10
circumstance given the sheer size and number of the narcotics
involved, stating, “This evidence [is] not going down the
toilet. . . .”
The People filed an information on June 22, 2022, and
Barry filed a motion in the trial court to set aside the information
pursuant to section 995.10 Barry asserted substantially the same
arguments he raised at the suppression hearing before the
magistrate to argue the magistrate’s holding order was based on
inadmissible evidence. On September 2 Barry filed a renewed
motion to suppress under section 1538.5 in the trial court. Barry
stated in his motion that the court had “indicated” during a
hearing that a section 995 motion was not viable without
evidence pertaining to the search warrant.11 He therefore was
renewing his request to suppress all of the evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing because it was the fruit of an unlawful
search.
On September 12 the People filed a combined opposition to
both motions, arguing substantial evidence at the preliminary
hearing supported the magistrate’s finding the LASD officers
were justified in performing a protective sweep of Barry’s home
and curtilage. Further, even if evidence found during the
protective sweep were suppressed, independent probable cause

10 As relevant here, section 995, subdivision (a)(2)(B),
provides that upon a defendant’s motion, a trial court must set
aside an information if “the defendant had been committed
without reasonable or probable cause.”
11 The record on appeal does not reflect any proceedings
between the June 9, 2022 preliminary hearing and the
September 14 hearing on Barry’s motions.

11
existed to justify the warrant that led to the discovery of
substantially all of the evidence supporting the commitment.
The trial court12 heard Barry’s motions on September 14,
2022. The parties did not present any additional evidence.
Observing that Barry was asking to suppress all evidence
recovered at the scene, the court found Barry was “attempting to
get around a warrant, basically a judge finding that there was
probable cause to conduct a search, and you’re seeking to ignore
it.” The court explained the proper procedural mechanism for
Barry to obtain relief from the holding order was to bring a
motion to quash or traverse the search warrant. Accordingly, the
court denied both motions without prejudice, without addressing
the parties’ substantive arguments and the magistrate’s
findings.13

12 Judge Hector M. Guzman presided over the September 14,
2022 hearing on Barry’s renewed motion to suppress and
section 995 motion.
13 The People concede, and we agree, Barry may in this
appeal challenge the warrantless entry and search of his property
notwithstanding the prosecutor’s position in the trial court that
there was sufficient information in the warrant independent from
the fruits of the warrantless search to provide probable cause for
the search and seizure. Further, Barry does not argue on appeal
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based
on a procedural determination he was required to bring a motion
to quash or traverse the warrant (challenging the sufficiency or
veracity of the statements in the search warrant affidavit) before
challenging the warrantless search. Barry has therefore forfeited
the issue. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60
Cal.4th 335, 363 [“If a party’s briefs do not provide legal
argument and citation to authority on each point raised, ‘“the

12
C. The Plea and Sentence
On February 28, 2023 Barry entered a no contest plea to
possession of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded
firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1). The
trial court14 sentenced Barry to the middle term of three years,
suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Barry on formal
probation for two years. The court dismissed the remaining
counts.
Barry timely appealed from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) ‘In California, issues relating to the
suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and
seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.’”
(People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 (Ovieda); accord,
People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 605.) “‘[T]he “physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed.”’” (Ovieda, at p. 1041,
quoting Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585.)
“‘[I]t is a cardinal principle that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or

court may treat it as waived, and pass it without
consideration.”’”].)
14 Judge Kelly Michelle Kelley presided over the plea hearing
and sentenced Barry.

13
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.”’” (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 1041; accord, Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218,
1224; see People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213 [“‘In the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within
a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’”].) “The burden
is on the People to establish an exception applies.” (Macabeo, at
p. 1213; accord, Ovieda, at p. 1041; see People v. Romeo (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939 (Romeo) [“When a defendant raises a
challenge to the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the
People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”]; People v.
Pritchett (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 355, 360 [same].)
Section 1538.5 provides in relevant part, “A defendant may
move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing
obtained as a result of a search or seizure” if the search or seizure
“without a warrant was unreasonable.” (§ 1538.5,
subd. (a)(1)(A).)
A defendant may elect to make a motion to suppress at the
preliminary hearing based on the evidence introduced by the
People at the hearing. (§ 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) In such cases, the
hearing magistrate “tries the facts, resolving credibility issues
and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing
appropriate inferences.” (Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at
p. 941; accord, People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1244.) If the motion is denied and the defendant is held to
answer the charges, the defendant “may either renew the motion
before the trial court or file a motion to dismiss under . . .

14
section 995 raising the suppression issue.” (People v. Turner
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 397, 404 (Turner); accord, People v.
Superior Court (Cooper) (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 713, 717; see
§ 1538.5, subds. (i) & (m).)
“When the defendant files a renewed motion to suppress,
the trial court independently reviews the magistrate’s legal
conclusion and evaluates any new evidence presented, and we
review the court’s determination.” (Turner, supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 404; see § 1538.5, subd. (i).) “In contrast,
when the defendant raises the suppression issue in
a . . . section 995 motion, the trial court reviews the magistrate’s
determination for substantial evidence, and we review the
magistrate’s determination, not the court’s.” (Turner, at p. 404;
see § 1538.5, subd. (m).)
“‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so
found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.’” (People v.
Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719; accord, People v. Felix (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 439, 447.) In making this determination, “we do
not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider
“the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.”’” (People
v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043.) “‘Our review of issues
related to the suppression of evidence seized by the police is
governed by federal constitutional standards.’” (Robey v.
Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1223; accord, People v.
Tran (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.)

15
Because no additional evidence was introduced in the trial
court, we review the magistrate’s factual findings at the
preliminary hearing for substantial evidence. (See Turner, supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 404 [where defendant filed a renewed motion
to suppress and a section 995 motion, appellate review of the
magistrate’s findings was “appropriate” because there was no
new evidence].) With respect to the trial court’s denial of the
suppression motion and section 995 motion, we independently
determine whether, based on the totality of the circumstances,
the warrantless search violated Barry’s Fourth Amendment
rights. (People v. Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)

B. Barry Forfeited His Contention the Use of Night-vision
Binoculars Constituted an Illegal Search
For the first time on appeal, Barry contends Detective
Yoshida’s use of night-vision binoculars to surveil Barry’s
activities in his garage constituted an illegal search in violation
of Barry’s Fourth Amendment rights. Barry forfeited this
contention by failing to object to the surveillance at the
preliminary hearing or in the trial court.
To claim Fourth Amendment protection against a
warrantless search, “‘a defendant must demonstrate that he
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable.’” (People v. Jenkins (2000)
22 Cal.4th 900, 972; accord, People v. Cartwright (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 98, 102.) Construing decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, California appellate courts have held that
enhanced surveillance methods may in some circumstances
violate a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (See, e.g.,
People v. Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505, 511-512 [use of high-

16
power binoculars from a hilltop several hundred feet away to
view the inside of a seventh-floor office was an illegal search]; cf.
People v. Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1221, 1228 [use of
night vision goggles to surveil defendant’s shed and garage from
the end of a 50 yard driveway did not invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy].)
These decisions hinge on a fact-specific consideration of the
visibility of the defendant’s activities without enhancement, the
logistics of the police surveillance, and the technology involved,
which together inform the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. (See Arno, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 509 [“if the
purpose of the optically aided view is to permit clandestine police
surveillance of that which could be seen from a more obvious
vantage point without the optical aid, there is no unconstitutional
intrusion; [but] . . . if the purpose of the optical aid is to view that
which could not be seen without it, there is”]; Lieng, supra,
190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1227-1228 [night-vision goggles used were
“available to the general public” and “merely amplif[ied] ambient
light to enable one to see something that is already exposed to
public view”].)
“‘[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence under
section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of
the specific basis for their motion.’” (People v. Silveria and Travis
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 235; accord, People v. Williams (1999)
20 Cal.4th 119, 129.) “‘[T]he scope of issues upon review must be
limited to those raised during argument . . . . This is an
elemental matter of fairness in giving each of the parties an
opportunity adequately to litigate the facts and inferences
relating to the adverse party’s contentions.’” (Williams, at p. 136;
accord, People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586, 601.) “The

17
determinative inquiry in all cases is whether the party opposing
the motion had fair notice of the moving party’s argument and
fair opportunity to present responsive evidence.” (Williams, at
p. 136.) “Defendants cannot . . . lay a trap for the prosecution by
remaining completely silent until the appeal about issues the
prosecution may have overlooked.” (Id. at p. 131.)
Barry’s motion to suppress, his subsequent motions, and
his attorney’s argument at the initial suppression hearing were
limited to the police entry onto his driveway and search of his
home. Barry never argued that Detective Yoshida’s use of night-
vision binoculars to surveil the garage invaded Barry’s privacy
expectations or generally that the surveillance was a basis to
suppress the evidence. On direct examination, Detective Yoshida
testified he had a “direct line of sight” down Barry’s driveway and
into the garage, and from his vantage point 60 feet away he could
“see” Barry dismantling the bumper and unloading the narcotics
packages. During cross-examination, Barry’s attorney asked
whether Detective Yoshida used binoculars and night vision,
which the detective answered in the affirmative, but the attorney
did not follow up with questions probing, for example, what the
detective could see unaided or what was visible from a closer but
more conspicuous vantage point. (People v. Arno, supra,
90 Cal.App.3d at p. 509.) The attorney’s question, absent any
follow up or argument about the surveillance, did not afford the
prosecutor a fair opportunity to present responsive evidence and
to litigate the facts and inferences relating to the surveillance.
Accordingly, Barry has forfeited the issue. (People v. Williams,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130 [holding “if defendants detect a
critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal
analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the

18
evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal,” but concluding
defendant had sufficiently raised the issue in his written
motion].)

C. Exigent Circumstances Justified the Officers’ Entry onto
Barry’s Driveway To Arrest Him
Barry contends the Cal-MMET team violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when officers swarmed onto his driveway and
arrested him without a warrant.15 He argues the officers had
ample time to obtain a warrant while surveilling him and could
have waited until he left his property to arrest him. Further, he
asserts, exigent circumstances did not support the warrantless
intrusion into the curtilage of his home.16 Substantial evidence
supported a finding of exigent circumstances to arrest Barry on
his driveway.

15 In his suppression motion Barry asserted the officers
detained him on his driveway (after handcuffing him) and
confined him in a squad car for several hours before formally
arresting him. He argued, and the magistrate found, the initial
detention constituted an arrest. The People do not dispute the
finding, and we assume for purposes of our analysis that Barry
was under arrest.
16 “‘[C]urtilage’” refers to the “area immediately surrounding
and associated with the home” and is “entitled to the same degree
of privacy protection as the home.” (People v. Nunes (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 1, 5-6.) Warrantless searches and seizures within
a home’s curtilage “are presumptively unreasonable.”
(Murchison v. County of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867, 883.)
We assume without deciding the location where Barry was
arrested—“no more than 10 feet” from his house—was within the
curtilage of his home.

19
“‘[W]arrentless arrests within the home are proscribed
unless exigent circumstances exist.’” (People v. Lujano (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182; accord, People v. Ramey (1976)
16 Cal.3d 263, 276 [“warrantless arrests within the home are per
se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances”].) “The
term ‘exigent circumstances’ describes ‘“‘an emergency situation
requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or
serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of
a suspect or destruction of evidence.’”’” (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 1041; accord, People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 151.)
Factors relevant to a court’s determination whether exigent
circumstances exist include, among others, “the gravity of the
offense involved; whether the subject of the arrest is reasonably
believed to be armed; whether probable cause is clear; whether
the suspect is likely to be found on the premises entered; and the
likelihood that the suspect will escape if not promptly arrested.”
(People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 122, judg. vacated and
cause remanded on other grounds sub nom. Bacigalupo v.
California (1992) 506 U.S 802.) Even so, “‘“‘[t]here is no ready
litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist,
and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be
measured by the facts known to the officers.’”’” (People v. Troyer,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 606.) “‘“[T]he reasonableness of an
officer’s conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts
available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which
would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that
the action taken was appropriate. [Citation.] And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight
must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or ‘hunches,’
but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from

20
the facts in the light of his experience.”’” (Ovieda, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor presented
substantial evidence to support a finding of exigent
circumstances.17 Barry came under the scrutiny of the Cal-
MMET team because he entered the white sedan that was
already under surveillance in connection with a vehicle-swap
drug-trafficking operation, and he drove it to his home. During
Detective Yoshida’s surveillance of the Firmona home, he
observed Barry disassembling the vehicle’s bumper and removing
large “kilo-sized” bricks of narcotics, then Gabriela shuttling
between Barry’s position and the direction of the house, and
finally Barry carrying a grocery bag of narcotics into the house.
Further, the detectives reasonably believed that at least two
other individuals were involved in the operation (Gabriela and
Sanchez). The detectives also reasonably believed the suspects
were armed, given the large-scale narcotics operation. (See
People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 368 [courts “‘recognize[]
[the] propensity of persons “engaged in selling narcotics [to]

17 As discussed, we accept the magistrate’s express and
implied factual findings provided they are supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 719.) At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate did not
separately address Barry’s arrest on his driveway. However,
Barry argued the officers did not obtain a warrant before
entering Barry’s property (including his driveway), and the
prosecutor responded that there were exigent circumstances to
detain Barry on his driveway. We therefore imply a factual
finding by the magistrate, in denying the motion to suppress,
that there were exigent circumstances to support entry onto the
driveway.

21
frequently carry firearms to protect themselves from would-be
robbers”’”]; People v. Ledesma (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857, 865
(Ledesma) [“it was reasonable to conclude that the residence was
the site of ongoing narcotics activity [and] [f]irearms are, of
course, one of the ‘“tools of the trade”’ of the narcotics business”].)
In addition, Detective Yoshida testified the decision to arrest
Barry on the driveway was made immediately after the detective
reported to the team that Barry and Sanchez were about to drive
off the property; Detective Magdaleno explained immediate
action was necessary for the team to stop Barry from departing in
the vehicle and potentially eluding detectives while they secured
the Firmona home.
On appeal Barry contends there was no exigency when the
officers decided to enter his driveway because they “believed the
movement of contraband was complete based upon their
explanation of how they believed the narcotics operation worked,”
and therefore they could have waited for a warrant before
entering the property. Conversely, Barry argues, “if officers
believed the contraband was being relocated, that negates the
need to search Barry’s property,” and they could have arrested
Barry off-site. But there was substantial evidence officers
reasonably believed narcotics were located in the home and in the
departing vehicle: Detective Yoshida observed several bricks
being taken toward the house, and Detective Magdaleno testified
based on his experience with vehicle swaps and Barry’s conduct
that additional narcotics were likely concealed in the vehicle.
Detective Magdaleno testified it would have been impossible with
the available officers (about 10) for the team, while waiting for
the detectives to obtain a search warrant, to safely tail Barry and
Sanchez after they drove off the property without losing them,

22
and at the same time secure the house where the drugs and at
least one other accomplice were present.

D. Officer Safety Justified Entry into the Firmona Home and
the Protective Sweep
Barry also contends the officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they forcibly entered and searched his
house without a warrant. Substantial evidence supports the
magistrate’s finding that the circumstances of Barry’s arrest
posed a threat to officer safety, justifying entry into the house to
perform a protective sweep.
“One recognized exigent circumstance that will support the
warrantless entry of a home—the risk of danger to police or
others on the scene—also provides the justification for a
‘protective sweep’ of a residence.” (People v. Celis (2004)
33 Cal.4th 667, 676-677, citing Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S.
325.) As the court explained in Celis at page 680, “the United
States Supreme Court has articulated certain legal rules,
allowing, for instance, a warrantless entry into a home when
exigent circumstances exist, or permitting a protective sweep of
areas of a home where persons in hiding may pose a danger to
officer safety.” A protective sweep “aimed at protecting the
arresting officers” is “not a full search of the premises” and “may
extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a
person may be found.” (Buie, at p. 335.) A protective sweep “can
be justified by a standard lower than probable cause, namely,
reasonable suspicion.” (Celis, at p. 680.) Under this standard,
officers need only “‘articulable facts’ considered together with the
rational inferences drawn from those facts, that would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer to entertain a reasonable suspicion

23
that the area to be swept harbors a person posing a danger to
officer safety.” (Id. at pp. 679-680; cf. id. at p. 677 [“‘a mere
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”’” is
insufficient].) “[I]n determining the existence of reasonable
suspicion, courts must evaluate the ‘“totality of the
circumstances”’ on a case-by-case basis to see whether the officer
has ‘“a particularized and objective basis”’ for his or her
suspicion.” (Ledesma, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 863, quoting
United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)
The totality of circumstances supports the magistrate’s
finding that exigent circumstances were “clearly apparent” based
on a threat to officer safety, which gave the officers the right to
enter the house and perform a protective sweep. Detective
Yoshida saw Barry carry a bag containing several “kilo-sized”
bricks of narcotics into the house, and he reasonably believed
Gabriela was involved in the drug operation and was inside the
house. Barry confirmed this while the officers detained him. The
location where six of the 10 officers stopped Barry and Sanchez
was “directly in line” with and “no more than 10 feet” from the
house, and several windows faced onto the driveway. Detective
Magdaleno testified that in a large-scale narcotics operation such
as this one, “we’re fearful of individuals inside locations who
could be arming themselves, or people that we have . . . not been
able to detain at that point.” As discussed, courts have held this
fear is reasonable in drug operations. (See People v. Glaser,
supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 367-368; People v. Ledesma, supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at p. 865.) The officers therefore reasonably
conducted a protective sweep of the driveway, garage, and
backyard, until they reached the rear door of the house.

24
Detective Magdaleno then banged on the door, announced
it was the Sheriff’s Department, and asked (in English and
Spanish) the occupant to come to the door. Although Detective
Magdaleno could hear footsteps and shuffling inside the house,
no one responded to his announcement and the banging on the
door, renewing his fear that individuals inside were “possibly . . .
arming themselves.”18 After waiting for a minute, officers began
to breach the door. When Gabriela finally emerged, they held her
outside while they conducted a protective sweep of the hallway,
common areas, and the rooms looking out onto the driveway.19
Barry argues that forced entry into his house cannot be
justified by an officer-safety exigency because the officers created
the exigency when they illegally entered his driveway to arrest
him in view of the house. Barry cites Kentucky v. King (2011)
563 U.S. 452, 470 (King), in which the United States Supreme
Court delineated the scope of the “police-created exigency
doctrine.” The court rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
broad and subjective interpretation of the doctrine as applying in
cases where officers either “‘deliberately created the exigent
circumstances with [] bad faith’” or “‘“it was reasonably
foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police

18 In his opening brief Barry asserts (without any citation to
the record) that Gabriela was in the shower when she heard
shouting at the back door, and she answered the door wet and
“[c]ompletely nude” because she did not have a towel nearby. No
evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing to support
these assertions.
19 Barry does not dispute that the grocery bags of narcotics
were in plain view in the hallway and the other evidence seized
from the home was later found pursuant to a search warrant.

25
would create the exigent circumstances.”’” (Id. at pp. 464-466.)
Instead, the United States Supreme Court announced a
narrower, objective standard, holding that law enforcement
cannot rely on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless
search or seizure where officers first “gain[ed] entry to premises
by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” (Id. at pp. 469.)
Here, Barry points to Detective Magdaleno’s admission
during cross-examination that it would be fair to say his team
members “created [the] exigency” to enter the house “by making
[themselves] known to the people at the residence” when they
arrested Barry and Sanchez on the driveway. But even if we
accept Detective Magdaleno’s conclusory response as evidence,
this does not establish a “police-created exigency” under King. As
discussed, the officers’ entry onto Barry’s driveway to arrest him
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, even if the
officers’ actions created an officer-safety exigency by exposing
officers to armed individuals inside the house—and even if it was
foreseeable that arresting Barry on his driveway could create this
danger—the police-created exigency doctrine does not apply. (See
King, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 471-472 [where police announced
themselves and banged on the door of a suspected drug dealer’s
apartment but did not “‘demand’” entry, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation or threatened violation; therefore, the
officers’ subsequent decision to break down door after they heard
activity inside was justified by the exigent circumstance of
evidence preservation].)

26
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

PULOS, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

27

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