Landa v. Simmons CA4/1

CourtListener 10379824CalctappApr 16, 2025

Full text

Filed 4/16/25 Landa v. Simmons CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ENRIQUE LANDA, as Trustee, etc., D083814

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00004017-CU-BC-NC)
JAMES D. SIMMONS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.

Kirby & Kirby and Michael L. Kirby for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Deleissegues Law Firm and Richard Deleissegues for Defendants and
Respondents.
The DEFA Trust dated June 2, 2003 (DEFA) filed this action by its

Trustee, Enrique Landa (Landa), against James Simmons (James)1 seeking

1 Because James Simmons and his sons, Matthew Simmons (Matt) and
Jason Simmons (Jason) share a common last name, we will refer to them by
their first names. We intend no disrespect. We refer to James, Matt, and
Jason collectively as “the Simmons family.”
to collect on secured promissory notes executed by James. It subsequently
named James’s sons, Matt and Jason, in a first amended complaint, as well
as the Diamond Rose LLC (Diamond Rose), Consultants Collaborative, Inc.
(Consultants Collaborative), and Dexter Development Group, LLC (Dexter)
(collectively, Defendants). DEFA alleged that some of the collateral secured
by the promissory notes, or proceeds therefrom, had been improperly
transferred to or withheld by these individuals and entities, and that these
individuals and entities should be held responsible for assets and income due
under the notes. The court entered judgment against James for breach of
contract and awarded damages and declaratory relief but otherwise ruled in
favor of Defendants on the remaining claims.
On appeal, DEFA contends substantial evidence does not support the
court’s rulings that the alter ego doctrine did not apply, that Jason and Matt
did not make a fraudulent conveyance involving the San Marcos Highlands
project, and that Jason and Matt’s testimony on some topics was more
credible than James’s. It further takes issue with the court’s ruling that
James was not an affiliate of Dexter. Finally, DEFA argues the court erred
in construing the note language and granting declaratory relief by limiting
the extent and scope of DEFA’s security interest in the defined collateral and
the proceeds therefrom.
Defendants defend the court’s ruling and ask us to sanction DEFA and
its attorney for pursuing a frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment and
deny the sanctions request.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Business Entities
In 1987, James formed a business with a partner that he renamed
Consultants Collaborative, Inc. in 1990. He eventually phased out his

2
partner and developed a strong reputation in the land use planning and real
estate development industry. Although Jason and Matt had provided
services for Consultants Collaborative as 1099 contract employees in the
past, both went on to pursue other business ventures. Consultants
Collaborative has not had a bank account since approximately 2014 and
ceased operations in about 2015.
James, Matt, Jason, and several other partners executed an operating
agreement to form Dexter Development Group, LLC in 2006 to pursue a
single-family residential project in the City of San Marcos. However, this
version of the LLC was never formed or capitalized.
In 2010, Jason and Matt formed Dexter doing business as CCI.
Although Dexter provided land planning services like those Consultants
Collaborative had offered, and benefited from its good reputation by using the
name CCI, Dexter is not a continuation of Consultants Collaborative or
affiliated in any way. Dexter and Consultants Collaborative operated out of
the same office space, and Dexter markets itself as a “family business” with
decades of experience. Although the brothers briefly made James a member
of Dexter in 2011 for tax reasons, they phased out his ownership interest
in 2012.
James now works for Dexter as 1099 contractor. However, Jason
testified that he and Matt are the only two who decide what projects Dexter
will accept and with which clients to contract. After receiving payment from
clients, Matt and Jason determine how to pay out the funds to the various
consultants and entities that worked on the projects. Consultants such as
James are sometimes compensated on a deferred payment basis, meaning
they are not paid until the sale closes on the project.

3
B. DEFA, Landa, and the Notes
James and Landa had known each other since about 1988, when they
began working on a water purification project on the border between the
United States and Mexico. The project originally was known as the Bajagua
Project, but by the time the instant litigation commenced, the name had been
changed to the PURA project. James had a 27 percent ownership interest in
the PURA project.
James also worked on other projects for Landa. Landa described James
as his best friend. Landa, through DEFA, loaned James money several times
over the years, and James signed notes for some of the loans. When James
came to owe DEFA close to a million dollars, Landa’s attorney recommended
consolidating all the loans into one promissory note. Landa and James
negotiated the terms of the note for over six months. As part of these
negotiations, Landa asked James how he was going to pay the note, and
James sent an e-mail listing projects he was working on from which he
anticipated receiving income that he could use to repay the debt. Specifically,
he wrote:
“Enrique, the following are the projects I am involved in
that will produce income to me that can be used to reduce
debt.
2020: June, San Marcos Highlands is scheduled to close
with KB Home. I will receive $100,000 to $200,000 from
that sale.
2021: February, Eden Park is scheduled to close and I will
receive $150,000 to $250,000 from that sale
2021 August, Melrose industrial is scheduled to clos[e] and
I will receive $400,000 to $5000,000 [sic] from that sale
2021 December, I hope PURA will close and I know what I
have in but do not at this time know how much I will
receive
All of these amounts are subject [to] the final sale price at
closing.”

4
The figures for at least the San Marcos and Melrose projects came from a
discussion with Jason about the amounts James might expect to receive in
deferred fees from his consultations.
At one point, the debt reached about 2.3 million. To help reduce the
amount of the note, Landa agreed to lessen the debt by about a million
dollars for services James had rendered on Landa’s projects and as
forgiveness of interest. James prepared invoices reflecting this work and sent
them to Landa. Landa questioned the accuracy of the amounts but did not
challenge the invoices.
Landa later sent James a draft of the note. James responded by e-mail
stating, “Enrique, I will sign this, however, I must meet with my sons to
explain, and Matt is on the road from a trip to [Oregon] to deliver his
daughter to school and will be here in the morning. I will sign over their
objections but please give me an opportunity to keep my place in the family.”
Matt and Jason testified that James discussed his outstanding debt to DEFA
with them around this time but did not show them the 2020 note. They
disagreed that James owed DEFA any money and did not believe he should
use any of the fees he received in connection with his services to Dexter to
pay the debt.
James signed the secured note for $1,396,449.07 on September 24,
2020. It provided, among other things, that James would pay Landa, as
trustee for DEFA, “$400,000.00 at its place of business concurrently with the
close of escrow of the San Marcos Highlands project.” It further provided that
as security for timely payments, James granted to DEFA “a first priority lien
and security interest in, all proceeds, dividends, fees, commissions or other
distributions that [James] or any entity affiliated with [James] or any
successor entity may receive or may be entitled to receive from any person or

5
entity and related to the development, entitlement or sale of any real
property, including without limitation, proceeds, dividends, fees, commissions
or other distributions from the entities or related to the properties identified
on Exhibit A.” Exhibit A listed the following projects: San Marcos
Highlands, Eden Park, Melrose Industrial, and PURA. James acknowledged
at trial that he signed the 2020 note because he had agreed to pay the money
to DEFA.
The next month, Landa sent a letter to the company handling the
escrow for the San Marcos Highlands project demanding that $400,000 be
paid from escrow to DEFA. He forwarded copies of the letter to his attorney
and James but did not send copies to Dexter, Jason, or Matt. On about
December 30, 2020, the date on which the San Marcos Highlands escrow was
set to close, principals involved in the purchase of the project contacted Matt
and Jason about calls the escrow company had received from Landa’s
attorney. Matt and Jason contacted James, at which point he told them
about his promise to pay $400,000 to DEFA and showed them the 2020 note.
Matt and Jason explained to James that his deferred fees for the San
Marcos Highlands project would be $50,000 and that he would have to come
up with a way to pay the remaining $350,000 to DEFA. On December 31,
2020, the escrow company released $2,021,000 to Dexter’s bank account, and
Dexter subsequently paid James $50,000. James informed Landa that he did
not have access to the $400,000 contemplated by the note.
Fifteen days later, James signed a convertible note (the 2021 note)
acknowledging that he owed DEFA $1,482,997.37 under the previous notes,
including the 2020 note. The 2021 note called for an initial payment of
$400,000, followed by monthly payments of $5,000 plus 50 percent of any
income received in excess of $7,500. It called for final payments of $500,000

6
on January 1, 2022, or upon sale of the PURA project, and $600,000 at the
note’s maturity date or upon the PURA project’s sale. James secured a loan
from another individual for the remaining $350,000 of the initial payment
due to DEFA. He made ongoing payments toward the note but did not have
funds to make the $500,000 payment and went into default.
DEFA sued James. Matt testified that he knew nothing of the 2021
note until he was added as a defendant in the lawsuit in around July 2022.
Meanwhile, James and Matt had formed Diamond Rose in September
2020 to secure an ownership interest in the Melrose Industrial project as
tenants-in-common with other owners. After Diamond Rose, Matt, and Jason
were all named in the instant lawsuit, Matt and Jason lost their ownership
interest in the Melrose property.
C. The Trial Court’s Final Statement of Decision (SOD)
Following a bench trial, the court issued a proposed statement of
decision. DEFA filed objections, which the court denied.
The court noted in the SOD that it was compelled to determine the
appropriate weight and credibility to afford each party’s testimony. It
explained:
“In assessing the parties’ credibility in this case, the court,
in light of some of James’ testimony, was left to conclude
that James’ testimony was less credible than the testimony
of Enrique, Matt or Jason. While James waffled
throughout his testimony (both deposition and trial) with
regard to whether he showed his sons the 2020 Secured
Note in September 2020 and with regard to whether he had
told his sons in September 2020 that he signed the 2020
Secured Note, ultimately the court found Jason’s and
Matt’s vehement denials that they knew of the 2020
Secured Note before December 30, 2020 extremely
credible.”

7
The court acknowledged that James discussed his debt to DEFA with his sons
but found he did not discuss with them his intention of signing a promissory
note and did not show them the 2020 note at that time.
The court rejected DEFA’s alter ego allegation, concluding DEFA had
not established that there was a unity of interest and ownership between
James and Dexter, Consultants Collaborative, or Diamond Rose. It found no
evidence that James was an “insider” in Dexter or Diamond Rose. The court
described James as an independent contractor providing services to Dexter
for which he was paid “various hourly rates and under various payment
paradigms, inclusive of deferred compensation agreements.”
Regarding the breach of contract claim against James, the court found
DEFA had met its burden of showing James failed to satisfy his obligations
under the 2021 note. It assessed the appropriate damages to be $1,082,997
plus interest pursuant to paragraph 1 of the 2021 note. The court further
granted in part DEFA’s request for declaratory relief, although, considering
the evidence presented, it limited the relief to the following:
“a. DEFA is entitled to collect $1,082,997.00, plus interest
pursuant to Paragraph I of the 2021 Convertible Note, from
James Simmons;

“b. DEFA shall have a secured lien on James Simmons’[s]
ownership interest in PURA in an amount that does not
exceed the total amount James Simmons owes to DEFA;

“c. DEFA shall have a secured lien on any fees or
disbursements to which James Simmons is entitled in
connection with the closing of escrow on the Eden Park
Project and the Melrose Industrial Project in an amount
that does not exceed the total amount James Simmons
owes to DEFA.”

The court otherwise concluded DEFA’s claim against James for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing lacked evidentiary and

8
legal support. As to its third and fourth causes of action for fraudulent
conveyance and conspiracy to commit fraudulent conveyances, the court
found no evidence Defendants transferred any assets belonging to James
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud DEFA. It likewise rejected
DEFA’s fraud claim, concluding there was no evidence James affirmatively
represented that he had an ownership interest in the San Marcos Highlands
or Eden Park projects or misrepresented his interest in the PURA project.
Although there was some evidence James misrepresented his ownership
interests in the Melrose Industrial project, the court did not find DEFA had
met its burden of proof on this claim.
DISCUSSION
DEFA contends the court’s findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, it was obligated to set forth in its opening brief all the
material evidence on each issue, not merely those facts that support its
theories. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1658.)
Further, it was required to fairly summarize the facts in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (Id. at p. 1658; see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) DEFA’s opening brief did not comply with these
conditions.
Although we could deem DEFA’s failure to set out the facts in the light
most favorable to the judgment as forfeiture of the issues (Foreman & Clark

9
Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881), we have elected not to do so and

have thoroughly reviewed the record.2
I.
Alter Ego Liability
DEFA contends the court erred by rejecting its alter ego theory
because, in its view, the SOD describes and ignores a massive commingling of
assets by Defendants. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles
“Ordinarily a corporation is considered a separate legal entity, distinct
from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct
liabilities and obligations. [Citation.] The same is true of a limited liability
company (LLC) and its members and managers.” (Curci Investments, LLC v.
Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 220 (Curci Investments).) However,
“[a] corporate identity may be disregarded—the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—
where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the equitable
ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.” (Sonora
Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 (Sonora
Diamond).) This veil piercing is referred to as the alter ego doctrine. (Curci
Investments, at p. 220.) “The alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes
into court claiming that an opposing party is using the corporate form

2 As an initial matter, DEFA indicates in its brief that it is challenging
the court’s holding that substantial evidence did not support its fraudulent
conveyance claim, but nowhere in its briefing does DEFA provide argument
or authority on this issue. Accordingly, we disregard it. (See City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 [“[W]e may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or
fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions
he wants us to adopt”].)
10
unjustly and in derogation of the plaintiff’s interests.” (Mesler v. Bragg
Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300.)
Two conditions must be met to invoke the alter ego doctrine: (1) “there
must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and
its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
shareholder do not in reality exist”; and (2) “there must be an inequitable
result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.”
(Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.) Although no one
characteristic governs, courts are instructed to examine all the
circumstances, including the following factors, to determine whether the
doctrine should be applied: “ ‘commingling of funds and other assets of the
two entities, the holding out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of the
other, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same
offices and employees, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs
of the other.’ ” (Id. at pp. 538–539.) “Other factors which have been
described in the case law include inadequate capitalization, disregard of
corporate formalities, lack of segregation of corporate records, and identical
directors and officers.” (Id. at p. 539.) Because the court’s conclusion on alter
ego liability is thus very fact-specific, we will not disturb the court’s decision
if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Constellation-F, LLC v. World
Trading 23, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 22, 29 (Constellation-F).)
In this case, DEFA effectively asked the court to employ outside reverse
veil piercing. This concept applies when a third party “seeks to satisfy the
debt of an individual through the assets of an entity of which the individual
is an insider.” (Curci Investments, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)
Although some courts in other states have adopted a variant of the
traditional veil piercing test that adds additional factors aimed at addressing

11
concerns unique to the reverse piercing context, particularly in cases
involving corporations, this District has applied the traditional test where the
entity was an LLC. (Id. at pp. 222–224.) Either way, it remains a very fact-
driven analysis. (Id. at p. 224.)
B. Analysis
DEFA appears to have cut and pasted its arguments regarding alter
ego liability from its objections to the court’s proposed statement of decision.
These arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot
do.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
“Typically, when the trier of fact determines that a party has not satisfied its
burden, that party is not entitled to a ‘do over’ on appeal where the appellate
court looks at all the evidence and arguments anew and substitutes its
judgment for that of the fact finder below.” (People v. Field (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 132, 158.)
To the contrary, “ ‘[i]n a case where the trier of fact has determined
that the party with the burden of proof did not carry its burden and that
party appeals, “it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as
whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.” [Citations.] Instead,
“where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for
a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of
the appellant as a matter of law.” [Citation.] Specifically, we ask “whether
the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of

12
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ (Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade
Financial Corp. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129, 163–164, italics added . . . .) This
is ‘an onerous standard’ (id. at p. 164) and one that is ‘almost impossible’ for a
losing plaintiff to meet, because unless the trier of fact made specific factual
findings in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the trier of fact concluded
that ‘plaintiff’s evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
burden of proof.’ ” (Estes v. Eaton Corporation (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636,
651 (Estes).) Arguments that we should simply afford greater weight to
testimony the trial court discredited will not carry the day. Nonetheless, we
address DEFA’s arguments in turn.
1. Invoices
DEFA’s primary argument is that when James used invoices for the
services he rendered for Landa on behalf of Dexter to reduce his personal
loan obligations to DEFA, it demonstrated clear commingling of assets
between the Simmons family and Dexter. It contends the court’s own
observation supports this conclusion, citing to its footnote that:
“Interestingly, the testimony at trial was that James performed many of the
services on behalf of [Landa] or DEFA as a consultant for Dexter. As a
result, the monies due under these invoices, if in fact they were accurate,
should have been paid to Dexter.” In light of this statement, which DEFA
describes as entirely accurate, it contends the court was wrong when it
stated: “Indeed, both Matt and Jason further credibly testified, which
testimony was confirmed by James, that they had no knowledge whether
amounts due under the invoices identified as Trial Ex. 120 were used as
credits against amounts James owed to DEFA.” According to DEFA, the
statement is incorrect because James testified to the opposite—that he

13
discussed with both of his sons the plan to use Dexter’s assets to reduce his
personal loan obligations and “they didn’t disagree.”
This argument falls short because DEFA asks us to disregard the
court’s weighing of the evidence and accord greater credibility to James’s
testimony than to that of Matt, Jason, and Landa, which again, we cannot do.
“In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing
court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be
upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a
different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640; Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023)

89 Cal.App.5th 352, 362.)3
Here, it is apparent from the court’s full statement that the court
simply afforded greater weight to Matt and Jason’s testimony that they were
unaware of the credit arrangement. As the court explained:
“Because the Invoices served as credit for James’ debt the
monies were never paid to Dexter, and Matt credibly
testified that he never authorized payment under those
invoices to be made to James instead of Dexter. Indeed,
both Matt and Jason further credibly testified, which
testimony was confirmed by James, that they had no
knowledge whether amounts due under the invoices

3 Later in its brief, DEFA devotes an entire section to arguing that the
court’s almost complete rejection of James’s sworn deposition testimony was
contrary to the overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence confirming
the truth of his testimony. Its argument focuses on who would have more
motive to lie—James or his sons. Here again, it is for the trier of fact to
evaluate the witness’s motives and credibility and the weight to be given to
each witness’s testimony. (See Blye v. Affonso (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 241,
243.) DEFA has not met its burden on appeal of demonstrating that
substantial evidence did not support the court’s credibility determinations.
14
identified as Trial Ex. 120 were used as credits against
amounts James owed to DEFA. All of this support the
court’s conclusion, as further set forth in this Decision, that
Jason, Matt, Dexter, and Diamond Rose, LLC were not
acting in concert with James and, in fact, engaged in no
wrongful conduct toward DEFA.”

This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. When
asked about this issue, Matt testified as follows:
“Q. Did you agree with your father getting personal credits
on his loans instead of having that revenue go to Dexter?

“A. We weren’t aware of it until after the fact.

“Q. Well, how long after the fact?

“A. After this case was brought forward, and we’ve seen the
documentation you’ve provided.”

Jason likewise stated, “I―I didn’t―I was not aware of credits for the invoices
exactly. So I know . . . he negotiated credits because after―because of this
lawsuit and other things afterwards.”
Landa’s testimony further supports the court’s conclusion that Dexter
did not issue these invoices. Landa explained that James had worked on two
projects for him—Los Alamos and Gateway—for which he would receive

deferred fees upon the finance or sale of the projects.4 To help reduce the
amount due on the note, he suggested James send him invoices for
everything he had worked on for those projects even though “[t]hey were not
due.” As Landa explained, the Los Alamos project never closed and was
“dead,” and the Gateway project remained ongoing. In other words, James
was not at that point entitled to payment of any deferred fees, regardless of

4 He further explained, “we had that agreement with many other
consultants. And it’s a common practice as―Jason testified today, that some
of his consultants defer some of the fees with a premium at the end.”
15
whether they were to be paid directly to him or to Dexter for his work. Landa
also did not contest any of the amounts in the invoices even though his
accountant said, “Enrique, these are a hundred percent invented invoices.”
Therefore, it was reasonable for the court to credit Jason and Matt’s
testimony that they were not aware of the invoices, and thus not party to
commingling of Dexter’s assets with James’s, because the fees were not
presently due to be paid to anyone. This evidence also addresses DEFA’s
argument that it is not credible that two “experienced and successful
business men” would not investigate what happened to several hundred
thousand dollars of uncollected invoices. It is quite reasonable to assume
they would not check on invoices they were unaware of and had not sent for
payments that were not presently owed.
DEFA has not directly challenged on appeal the court’s conclusion that:
“The undisputed evidence was that James: (1) did not
control the operations or business dealings of Dexter in the
2019/2020 time frame, (2) was not an officer, director, or
shareholder of Dexter, (3) was not involved in decisions
regarding how Dexter distributed its profits, and (4) did not
have access to Dexter’s bank account . . . .”

If the evidence showed James did not have authority to control Dexter’s
decisions or funds, and Matt and Jason did not know James had attempted to
encumber earnings due to Dexter, it was reasonable for the court to conclude
there was not “such a unity of interest and ownership” between Dexter,
Jason, Matt, and James that their separateness ceased to exist. (Sonora
Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.) Accordingly, we conclude
substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that James was not an
insider at Dexter for alter ego purpose.

16
2. Other Evidence
According to DEFA, additional evidence supports application of the
alter ego doctrine. DEFA first points to James’s testimony that Dexter
regularly paid his monthly home mortgage and disbursed $5,000 per month
to him, which he then used to make his monthly note payments to DEFA. It
also references an exhibit not included in the appellate record ostensibly
showing that Dexter paid approximately $250,000 in James’s personal living
expenses over a two-and-a-half-year period. Given James’s testimony that he
never sent invoices to Dexter for his work and never had a written agreement
with Dexter, DEFA contends the lack of proper documentation to support
these payments proves lack of separateness and alter ego liability.
Despite DEFA’s bald assertion that this evidence was
“overwhelming . . . and not contradicted,” DEFA does not grapple with the
contradictory evidence presented at trial and relied upon by the court.
DEFA’s burden on appeal is to demonstrate that its evidence “ ‘ “was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight
as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.) Here,
substantial evidence in the record supports the court’s contrary conclusion.
In fact, James himself refuted the implication that Dexter paid him $5,000
per month in unearned funds. When asked if he was paid that amount
whether he worked one hour or a hundred hours in a particular month, he
replied, “I always bring in more money than I take.”
Matt likewise testified as to the $250,000 paid to James, “yes, I’m
aware of what I paid him for his work.” (Italics added.) He went on to
explain, “That number is not just pay. There are reimbursables. There are
other items in there that are not just 1099 wages. [¶] . . . [¶] It’s also loans.”

17
When asked if Dexter paid James’s mortgage every month, Matt responded,
“we pay Mr. Simmons, or Jim, his money, and he pays his mortgage with the
money he earns.” Although Matt acknowledged the lack of invoices for this
work, he explained:
“[O]ur projects bill on different formats. Some are
milestones. Some are hourly. And we are very aware
what―this is what one of my . . . main roles in the company
is, is watching what each contractor does and when they hit
those points, paying them for their services.”

Jason also provided testimony suggesting this unusual payment system
is common in their business. When asked how subcontractors are
compensated, Jason described the options as follows:
“A. It varies per [subcontractor] company and per project.
Oftentimes, they’ll just get a flat rate from―from a
company saying it’s this amount. It’s $5,000, for example.
We say, okay, you get paid accordingly. Sometimes they’ll
say, well, I’ll break it up over the five months of the project.
I want to get paid a thousand each month. Say, okay,
that’s great. So it’s negotiated on every deal a little
differently. Sometimes it is hourly and tracked that way.
It varies.

“Q. Are there occasions where subcontractors don’t know
exactly what they’re going to get until they get paid?

“A. Yeah, on―on occasion they’ll be―that’s―

“(Reporter clarification.)

“THE WITNESS: That’s mostly any time there is a deferred
situation, then it will vary depending on the time frame it
takes to get a project done and the amount of work they
end up doing. Oftentimes, we don’t know how much work a
person’s going to have to do on it until we get in the middle
of a project. So we might be halfway through, and all of a
sudden we need to start renegotiating or discussing
different terms because they’re spending a lot more time on
it or no time.”
18
On this record, we cannot say DEFA’s evidence compels a finding in its favor
as to alter ego liability as a matter of law. (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 651.)
The same is true of the other evidence DEFA presents. DEFA points to
James’s testimony that: (1) Consultants Collaborative has used the moniker
“CCI” for decades; (2) Dexter and the Simmons family use the office space
Consultants Collaborative has occupied for over 25 years; (3) Consultants
Collaborative is the only name on the building’s sign; (4) Consultants
Collaborative and Dexter use the same phone number, the same website, and
the same promotional materials, and they only reference “CCI,” not Dexter;
(5) numerous customer checks made payable to “CCI, Inc.” have been
deposited in the Dexter bank account; and (6) Dexter has benefited from the
goodwill associated with using the CCI name without making any payment to
Consultants Collaborative or James. As previously discussed, although these
are all factors the court may and did consider in determining whether alter
ego liability should apply (see Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 538–539), the ultimate weighing of factors is for the trial court, and we
will uphold its decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.
(Constellation-F, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.)
We find such substantial evidence in the record. Jason testified that
Dexter registered the fictitious business names “CCI” and “CCI Connect” (the
name on its website) to notify the public that it was conducting business
under these names. No evidence was presented that Consultants
Collaborative ever registered the moniker “CCI.” Although Matt
acknowledged Dexter shared office space and a telephone number with
Consultants Collaborative, he pointed out that Consultants Collaborative
stopped operating as a business in around 2015. He explained that all their

19
consultants, not just James, were allowed to use the office space and could
use Dexter telephone numbers and e-mail addresses during their projects.
He also said Dexter had its own separate business checking account. He
acknowledged that checks had come in written to Consultants Collaborative
and CCI Connect but explained that they deposited them because the work

was done under contracts with Dexter.5 Jason testified that Dexter followed
formal company operations: it had a valid operating agreement, held annual
meetings, filed taxes, paid bills and contractors, and maintained adequate
capitalization.
Ultimately, on this record, we conclude DEFA has not met its burden of
showing error in the court’s conclusion that DEFA failed to demonstrate that
outside reverse veil piercing was warranted.
II.
Whether James is “Affiliated” with Dexter
In its opening brief, DEFA argues the court failed to decide the issue of
whether James was an “affiliate” of Dexter in 2019 to 2020. As Defendants
point out, the court did expressly rule on this issue, stating: “the evidence
demonstrated that James was not an ‘affiliate’ of Dexter at any time
after 2012, assuming he ever had been.” Acknowledging this, DEFA changes
tack in its reply brief, arguing instead that the court erred in finding that
James and Dexter were not affiliated.
DEFA’s primary argument in both briefs is effectively that no evidence
can rebut James’s sworn testimony that he was affiliated with Dexter. Had
the question been whether James could be held liable, then his admission

5 James also testified that Consultants Collaborative has not collected
any revenue since 2015. He further admitted, “I don’t control what Dexter
does. I don’t see their books. I don’t have any input to their bank accounts.
I don’t sign checks. I don’t have any access to anything they do.”
20
would likely have been significant, regardless of what testimony others
provided. But here, DEFA seeks to use James’s admission to make Dexter
liable for James’s debts. Under these circumstances, it is not irrelevant that
Jason and Matt were unaware of the notes at the time James signed them
and that other credible evidence refutes James’s assertion that he was
affiliated with Dexter. DEFA provides no authority for the proposition that
the court must afford greater weight to one witness’s testimony under oath
over another’s, even if no objections were made when that testimony was
entered. At one point, DEFA refers to James’s statement as a “party
admission,” but this is a hearsay exception. (See Evid. Code, § 1220.) It does
not impact the trier of fact’s discretion to weigh credibility and decide issues
of fact and law.
DEFA otherwise rehashes the same arguments it made in support of
applying the alter ego doctrine. As we have already concluded substantial
evidence supported the court’s rejection of DEFA’s alter ego arguments, we
conclude DEFA has similarly failed to demonstrate the court erred in
determining that James was not affiliated with Dexter.
III.
The Court’s Declaratory Judgment Language
DEFA approves of the court’s entry of a declaratory judgment but
argues the language improperly limits its security interest in the collateral
defined in the 2020 note and repeated in the 2021 note.
A. Additional Facts
In its first amended complaint, DEFA sought declaratory relief by way
of its sixth cause of action. It alleged that, “[a]n actual controversy has
arisen and now exists between Plaintiff on the one hand, and the Defendants
on the other, concerning their respective rights and obligations related to the

21
2021 Convertible Note, and the security interests and first lien created under
the 2020 Secured Note and the 2021 Convertible Note.” DEFA requested “a
judicial determination of its rights and obligations under the parties’ written
contracts.”
The notes provided:
“[James] hereby grants to [DEFA] and the assignee (if any)
of [DEFA] a security interest in and to all of the following
property (‘Collateral’) in which [James] now has or
hereafter acquires any right, title or interest, wheresoever
located and whether in the possession of [James] or any
other person or entity, and all proceeds thereof (including
but not limited to accounts, inventory, farm products,
chattel paper, documents, instruments, deposit accounts
and general intangibles):

“(i) Proceeds, dividends, fees, commissions or other
distributions that [James] or any entity affiliated
with [James] or any successor entity may receive or
may be entitled to receive from any person or entity
and related to the development, entitlement or sale of
any real property, including without limitation,
proceeds, dividends, fees, commissions or other
distributions from the entities or related to the
properties identified as . . .”

San Marcos Highlands, Eden Park, Melrose Industrial, and PURA.6
In its SOD and in the judgment, the court granted DEFA, among other
things, the following declaratory relief:
“DEFA shall have a secured lien on any fees or
disbursements to which James Simmons is entitled in
connection with the closing of escrow on the Eden Park
Project and the Melrose Industrial Project in an amount

6 Although DEFA contends the 2020 and 2021 notes contain the same
language, the only collateral listed in the 2021 note is the PURA project.
22
that does not exceed the total amount James Simmons
owes to DEFA.”

The court further granted DEFA a secured lien on James’s ownership
interest in PURA, not to exceed the total amount James owes DEFA.
B. Legal Principles
“Any person interested . . . under a contract . . . may, in cases of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties,
bring an original action . . . in the superior court for a declaration of his or
her rights and duties . . . including a determination of any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract . . . and the
court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties . . . .” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The purposes of a declaratory judgment are to “ ‘ “ ‘serve
some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural
relation’ ” ’ ” and to “ ‘ “ ‘ “liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or
controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent litigation
[citation].” ’ ” ’ ” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 647
(Meyer).) “In an action for declaratory relief, the proper function of the court
is to make a full and complete declaration, disposing of all questions of rights,
status or other legal relations encountered [sic] in construing the instrument
before it.” (American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 219
(American Enterprise).)
“ ‘In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following
a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.
[Citation.]’ ” (Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 667, 676.)

23
C. Analysis
DEFA expressly asked the court to determine the parties’ rights and
obligations under the notes, and that is what the court did. Because DEFA
does not agree with the court’s determination, it now argues the court could
not rewrite valid, unambiguous contracts. But again, that is not what the
court did here. The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to provide a
practical resolution of uncertainties and disputes (Meyer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 647) and to “dispos[e] of all questions of rights, status or other legal
relations encountered [sic] in construing the instrument before it.” (American
Enterprise, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 219.) In this case, the court made a
determination, supported by substantial evidence, that DEFA had not met its
burden of proving that James was affiliated with, or the alter ego of, Dexter.
Based on that conclusion, it declared what rights DEFA had under the notes
going forward so as to clarify the parties’ respective rights and avoid future
litigation.
In DEFA’s view, the only option the court had in granting declaratory
relief was “to interpret and enforce the parties’ written contracts as written.”
We do not disagree that “ ‘[u]nder statutory rules of contract interpretation,
the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs
interpretation . . . [and that] [s]uch intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely
from the written provisions of the contract.’ ” (Coral Farms, L.P. v. Mahony
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 719, 727.) However, DEFA did not ask the court to
simply construe the terms of the contract or determine the intention of the
parties; it asked the court to determine their rights and obligations. Even if
it was Landa’s understanding that the notes could be enforced directly
against Dexter, or James’s intention that Dexter should pay his debts, that
did not automatically bind Dexter, which was not a party to the contracts.

24
The court was required to go beyond mere contract interpretation to
determine whether Dexter could be held accountable as a matter of law
either as an affiliate or under an outside, reverse veil piercing theory.
In so doing, it was required to consider what language in the notes was
enforceable upon the parties before it. For instance, DEFA contends it was
improper for the court to omit “proceeds, dividends, . . . commissions or other
distributions” from the declaratory judgment because those additional forms
of collateral were listed in the notes. Yet no evidence was presented that
James expected to receive these other forms of income from any of the listed
projects. And, even if he were to receive income from the Eden Park or
Melrose Industrial projects that was not considered payment of “fees,” he has
not explained why said income would not fall under the court’s broader rubric
of “disbursements.” The court may only declare what has been proven by the
evidence.
Likewise, DEFA suggests the court could not remove the language
regarding affiliates or successor entities because the only question litigated in
the underlying trial was whether James was affiliated with Dexter.
However, “ ‘[t]he fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an
actual, present controversy over a proper subject.’ ” (City of Cotati v.
Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79.) “The ‘actual controversy’ referred to in
this statute is one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by
judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an
advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts.” (Selby
Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117.) The court
only had authority to decide the dispute before it between the parties before
it and could not render advisory opinions regarding what rights DEFA might
have if James claimed affiliations with nonparties or successor entities.

25
Furthermore, issuing a declaratory judgment that included language not
relevant to the matter at hand would only invite future litigation, which
would contravene the purpose of providing declaratory relief.
Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s declaratory judgment
language.
IV.
Sanctions
Jason, Matt, Dexter, and Diamond Rose (collectively, the “Moving
Parties”) move for sanctions against DEFA and its attorney of record,
Michael L. Kirby, for filing a frivolous appeal in this matter. They contend
DEFA and counsel have failed to even address the requirements of the
substantial evidence standard of review in this appeal. Additionally, the
Moving Parties argue they were brought into the case to harass them and
that in bringing this appeal, DEFA and counsel continue to hamper the
Moving Parties’ ability to conduct business. Finally, they submit that DEFA
and counsel have delayed resolution of the case at every turn.
“Whether to impose appellate sanctions is a matter within our
discretion.” (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1194; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1)
[“On motion of a party or its own motion, a Court of Appeal may
impose sanctions . . . on a party or an attorney for . . . [¶] [t]aking
a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay”]; Civ. Proc., § 907.)
“[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse
judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable
attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without
merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) However, our

26
high court has advised that the definition of frivolousness “must be read so as
to avoid a serious chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal”
and that “[c]ounsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are
arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win on
appeal.” (Ibid.)
This motion presents a close call. As discussed ante, DEFA presented
an incomplete and self-serving version of events at trial. It also provided a
skewed summary of the SOD. The Moving Parties cite several instances of
delay, and it is apparent counsel did not use the additional time to craft a
brief that reflected a careful reading of the court’s order or an effective
adherence to the appropriate standard of review. However, after our
thorough review of the record, we cannot say DEFA’s appeal was so totally
and completely devoid of merit as to be objectively frivolous. (See Malek
Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 834.) We
therefore deny the Moving Parties’ motion for monetary sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

27

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.