People v. Chavez CA2/6

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Filed 4/15/25 P. v. Chavez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330872
(Super. Ct. No. 2020029604)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

JOHN CARILLO CHAVEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

John Carillo Chavez appeals his conviction, by jury,
of five counts of committing a lewd act on a child. (Pen. Code,
§ 288, subd. (a).)1 The jury also found true the following special
allegations: (1) the victim was under 18 years of age and
prosecution commenced before her 40th birthday (§ 801.1, subd.
(a)(1)); (2) appellant took advantage of a position of trust (Cal.
Rules of Ct., rule 4.421(a)(11)); (3) the victim was particularly
vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 4.421(a)(3)); and, as to counts 1

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise stated.
and 2, that appellant had substantial sexual contact with the
victim who was then under the age of 14 years. (§ 1203.066,
subd. (a)(8).) The trial court sentenced appellant to 14 years in
state prison.
Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred
by admitting evidence, under the “fresh-complaint” doctrine, that
the victim disclosed the incidents to her mother and by
instructing the jury, in terms of CALCRIM No. 318, that it could
consider the disclosure for its truth. He further contends the
trial court erred when it excluded evidence that the victim failed
to report the incidents to law enforcement when she had the
opportunity to do so. Appellant also contends the trial court
erred when it instructed the jury that it could consider a
statement made by the victim’s father, who did not testify, for its
truth. Finally, he contends the cumulative impact of these errors
resulted in prejudice. We affirm.
Facts
The victim, M.C., is appellant’s granddaughter. M.C.
was 25 years old and appellant was 83 years old at the time of
trial. When M.C. was 4 and 5 years old, appellant kissed her on
the lips and put his tongue in her mouth on at least three
separate occasions. He placed her hand on his penis at least
twice. These offenses occurred at appellant’s apartment and at
the swimming pool at the apartment complex where M.C. lived
with her mother. M.C. testified that she believed her
grandmother saw appellant kiss her at least once and also saw
appellant adjusting his pants after he had been alone with M.C.
In 1995, appellant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor
child molestation against a neighbor who was then 10 years old.

2
That incident involved appellant hugging and kissing the child on
the lips and putting his hands on her buttocks.
M.C. stopped speaking to appellant and her
grandmother when she was about 12 years old. She first told her
mother about the abuse when she was between 15 and 17 years
old. M.C.’s mother testified that, when M.C. was about 15 years
old, she disclosed to her mother that appellant had molested her.
The disclosure “involved him trying to kiss her and have her
touch him.” After M.C. made this disclosure, her mother took her
to the police station to report it. The police officer they spoke to
did not take a report about the incidents. On cross examination,
M.C.’s mother clarified that one of the incidents M.C. disclosed
was that appellant “had had her touch his penis in the jacuzzi,”
and that “he kissed her on the patio.” She later repeated on
redirect examination that M.C. did not “share all the details”
with her. Instead, M.C. told her mother that appellant “had
[M.C.] touch his penis,” and that he “would also kiss her and put
his tongue in her mouth.” M.C. also told her mother that she
thought her grandmother saw one of the kisses.
In September 2020, a police officer made a pretext
call to appellant and his wife, representing herself as M.C.
Appellant made several incriminating statements during the call.
For example, when the officer posing as M.C. asked appellant to
“explain . . . [why] you made me touch your penis,” he responded,
“I’m sorry, mija,” and “I was stupid.” Each time the detective
mentioned appellant kissing M.C. or making her touch him, he
apologized. Appellant said that, when MC.’s grandmother found
out, she “got mad with me. . . . Oh, we didn’t talk for a long
time. . . . She was mad. You know. She said we’re going to lose,
uh, we’re going to lose [M.C.] and you know, ‘cause what happen.”

3
Appellant said that he “never asked” his grandson to touch him
and that it was “just” M.C. Their conversation ended with this
exchange:
“[Det.]: [D]id we ever have sex?
“[Appellant]: No.
“[Det.]: So, it was just touching your penis?
“[Appellant]: Yeah. Yeah.”
Appellant’s wife, Anna, then spoke with the police
officer representing herself as M.C. Posing as M.C., the officer
told Anna that appellant “‘told me what Jack got upset about
with him. And he told me that, you know what he did to me
about when I was little.’”2 Anna responded, “‘I didn’t know
anything about that. And one day Jack was so angry.’” Anna
continued, “‘He was here angry with us and . . . then he came out
with that. He said – but he didn’t go into detail. He just said,
‘Um, the things you did to [M.C.], like that.”’” In her trial
testimony, Anna maintained that she did not know about the
allegations against appellant before the phone call.
About one month after the pretext call, appellant
participated in a telephone interrogation with a detective from
the Ventura Police Department during which he again made
incriminating statements. For example, when asked about M.C.’s
allegations, appellant said, “I don’t think I would kiss her on her
mouth.” The detective asked, “So you just made her touch your
penis?” Appellant responded, “That was wrong. Guess so. Yeah.”
He later stated that he made M.C. touch his penis “Only one
time.” Appellant did not remember the details of the incident but
admitted, “I show her, I show her to touch and that’s it.” He
denied having any other sexual contact with M.C.:

2 Jack is M.C.’s father. He is the son of appellant and Anna.

4
“[Det.]: So, you just, you just made her touch it and that’s
it?
“[Appellant]: Yeah, that’s all. That’s it.”
At trial, appellant, his wife and his adult daughter
denied any inappropriate contact with M.C. Appellant also
testified that he has a hearing impairment. An expert witness
testified regarding interrogation techniques and false
confessions, describing techniques that researchers associate
with false confessions. He noted that false confessions may be
associated with “the vulnerability of the suspect,” and “the nature
of the questioning . . . .” The expert witness did not offer an
opinion as to whether appellant is a “vulnerable” person or
whether any of the interrogation techniques he identified as
problematic were used in questioning appellant.
Contentions
Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred
when it admitted evidence that M.C. disclosed the abuse to her
mother when she was about 15 years old and when it instructed
the jury, in terms of CALCRIM No. 318, that it could consider
M.C.’s statement for its truth. He contends the trial court erred
when it excluded evidence that M.C. reported sexual assaults by
others, including another relative, but did not also disclose the
assaults committed against her by appellant. Appellant further
contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it
could consider for their truth the statements M.C.’s father, Jack,
made explaining why he was angry with appellant and Anna.
Finally, appellant contends the cumulative impact of these errors
requires reversal.

5
Discussion
Fresh Complaint Evidence.
The trial court admitted M.C.’s disclosure to her
mother under the “fresh-complaint” doctrine. As explained by
our Supreme Court in People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746
(Brown), “[U]nder principles generally applicable to the
determination of evidentiary relevance and admissibility, proof of
an extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a sexual
offense, disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a
limited, nonhearsay purpose – namely to establish the fact of,
and the circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure of the
assault to others – whenever the fact that the disclosure was
made and the circumstances under which it was made are
relevant to the trier of fact’s determination as to whether the
offense occurred.” (Id. at pp. 749-750, emphasis in original.)
Because evidence of the complaint or disclosure is admitted for
this nonhearsay purpose, “only the fact that a complaint was
made, and the circumstances surrounding its making, ordinarily
are admissible; admission of evidence concerning details of the
statements themselves, to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
would violate the hearsay rule.” (Id. at p. 760.) Further,
considering the limited purpose of which it is admitted, evidence
of the disclosure “should be limited to the fact of the making of
the complaint and other circumstances material to this limited
purpose.” (Id. at p. 763.)
The trial court here instructed the jury in terms of
CALCRIM No. 318, which provides “You have heard evidence of
statements that a witness made before the trial. If you decide
that the witness made those statements, you may use those
statements in two ways: 1. To evaluate whether the witness’s

6
testimony in court is believable; AND 2. As evidence that the
information in those earlier statements is true.”
Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred
because the fresh-complaint evidence it admitted was too
detailed. He further contends the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury that it could consider the fresh complaint
evidence for its truth. Respondent correctly concedes that it was
error to apply CALCRIM No. 318 to the fresh complaint evidence
at issue here. “Evidence admitted pursuant to [the fresh-
complaint] doctrine may be considered by the trier of fact for the
purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony, but not to prove
the occurrence of the crime.” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522 (Ramirez).)
However, respondent contends appellant forfeited
appellate review of this issue because, although he requested a
limiting instruction prior to trial, appellant did not raise the
issue or object to the instruction during the jury instruction
conference. Respondent further contends any error was harmless
because M.C.’s testimony was corroborated by appellant’s
admissions and by the testimony of the person he was convicted
of assaulting in 1995.
We decline to find the issue forfeited because
appellant objected to the admission of fresh complaint evidence
prior to trial. In pretrial motions, the prosecution requested
permission to admit evidence of M.C.’s disclosure to her mother.
Defense counsel moved to exclude the evidence or, in the
alternative, for a limiting instruction. The trial court denied the
defense motion, finding the “barebones” of M.C.’s disclosure
would be admitted, limited to date, nature and circumstances of

7
the disclosure. The trial court ordered, “[I]t’s limited to that. It’s
not a discussion about specific details.”
As a general rule, contentions of evidentiary or
instructional error are forfeited on appeal if not raised in the trial
court. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-821.) Failure to
object in a timely and specific manner will, however, be excused
where the objection would have been futile. (People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856,
960.)
Here, prior to trial, defense counsel objected to the
fresh complaint evidence and requested a limiting instruction.
The trial court overruled the objection and declined to give a
limiting instruction. In light of this ruling, appellant did not
forfeit appellate review of his objections by failing to repeat them
later in the trial because further objection would have been futile.
The trial court erred when it instructed the jury that
it could consider M.C.’s disclosure to her mother as evidence that
the offenses against her actually occurred. As the court
emphasized in Brown, “only the fact that a complaint was made,
and the circumstances surrounding its making, ordinarily are
admissible; admission of evidence concerning details of the
statements themselves, to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
would violate the hearsay rule.” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.
760.)
The error was, however, harmless because it is not
reasonably probable a different result would have been reached
had the evidence been excluded or had a correct instruction been
given. (People v. Manning (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 870, 880-881.)
M.C. testified at length, giving the jury ample opportunity to
evaluate her credibility. In the pretext call and telephone

8
interview, appellant made numerous admissions that
corroborated her testimony. The victim from appellant’s 1995
conviction also described being molested by appellant in similar
fashion.
M.C.’s mother, by contrast, testified that M.C.
disclosed appellant had kissed her on the mouth and made her
touch his penis. M.C. described two locations where these
incidents occurred but otherwise did not “share all the details”
about the assaults. It is not reasonably likely that this brief
testimony would have convinced the jury of M.C.’s credibility
when her own testimony and appellant’s admissions did not. Any
error in admitting the fresh complaint was harmless as was the
instructional error.
Evidence of Failure to Report.
Prior to trial, appellant requested permission to
admit evidence that M.C. reported she had been sexually
assaulted as a teenager by an adult man and, as a young child, by
one of her cousins. She did not mention at that time any sexual
assaults by appellant. The trial court concluded it would allow
defense counsel to ask M.C. whether she had ever reported a
sexual assault by appellant prior to reporting the allegations in
this case. Evidence of prior complaints against others would be
excluded under Evidence Code sections 352 and 782. Appellant
contends this ruling was an abuse of discretion. Respondent
contends the evidence was properly excluded because it was not
relevant to M.C.’s credibility and had the potential to confuse the
jury. We agree with respondent.
Evidence Code section 782 establishes a procedure for
determining prior to trial whether evidence of a complaining
witness’s sexual conduct is admissible to impeach the credibility

9
of that witness. (People v. Fontana (2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 362.)
The statute is designed to protect victims of sexual assault
against “surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy.” (Ibid.) To that end, “our courts have properly exercised
the discretion afforded by Evidence Code section 782 ‘narrowly’
[citation], and we emphasize that ‘[g]reat care must be taken to
insure that this exception to the general rule barring evidence of
a complaining witness’ prior sexual conduct . . . does not
impermissibly encroach upon the rule itself and become a “back
door” for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence.’ . . .” (Id. at
pp. 362-363, quoting People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905,
918-919.)
The theory underlying the admission of this evidence
where the complaining witness is a child “is that a child would
not have knowledge of certain sexual practices other than as a
result of the prior molestation.” (People v. Woodward (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 821, 831.) “In such a case it is relevant for the
defendant to show that the complaining witness had been
subjected to similar acts by others in order to cast doubt upon the
conclusion that the child must have learned these acts [from] the
defendant. Thus, if the acts involved in the prior molestation are
[like] the acts of which the defendant stands accused, evidence of
the prior molestation is relevant to the credibility of the
complaining witness and should be admitted.” (People v. Daggett
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, 757 (Daggett).)
Evidence Code section 782 further requires that
evidence of sexual conduct offered as impeachment must also be
admissible under Evidence Code section 352. (Doe v. Superior
Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 40, 53-55.) This means the evidence
must have more than “‘slight relevancy’” and that its probative

10
value must substantially outweigh the probability that its
admission will result in undue consumption of time, confusion of
the issues, undue prejudice or misleading the jury. (People v.
Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865.) The trial court has broad
discretion to exclude evidence on collateral matters that is offered
for impeachment. “‘“The statute empowers courts to prevent
criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition
over collateral credibility issues.” . . .’” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26
Cal.4th 334, 374-375.)
Here, evidence of M.C.’s prior sexual assault
allegations had little relevancy for impeachment purposes
because she was an adult when she disclosed the assaults at
issue here. As a result, it is not reasonable to infer that M.C.
could only have learned about kissing or fondling from being
molested by appellant. (Daggett, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p.
757.)
The trial court excluded evidence of the details of
M.C.’s reporting the prior assaults because it concluded this
evidence would “create a trial within a trial.” In effect, it found
that the probative value of that evidence was substantially
outweighed by the time it would take to explain these prior
assaults and reports, and the likelihood the jury would be
confused by that evidence. This conclusion was not an abuse of
discretion. There was ample evidence that M.C. delayed
disclosing her accusations against appellant. Evidence that she
had additional reporting opportunities would have been
duplicative.
Moreover, any error in excluding the evidence was
harmless. For the reasons we have already explained, we

11
conclude it is not reasonably probable the result would have been
different had the evidence been admitted.
Instructional Error
Appellant’s wife, Anna, testified that she was not
aware of M.C.’s accusations until the pretext call. This testimony
was impeached by her statement in that same call that their son,
M.C.’s father Jack, was angry with appellant about “the things
[appellant] did to [M.C.] . . . .” The trial court instructed the jury
in terms of CALCRIM No. 318 that it could consider evidence of
statements made by a witness before trial “[a]s evidence that the
information in those earlier statements is true.” (Ibid.)
Appellant contends the instruction, as applied to Anna’s
testimony about Jack’s statement, was error.
Unlike the evidence of M.C.’s disclosure to her
mother, this testimony was not the subject of a motion in limine.
Appellant did not attempt to exclude it and did not request any
modification or amplification of CALCRIM No. 318 at trial.
Consequently, appellant has forfeited review of the claim.
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 901; People v.
Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 364-365.)
Had the issue been preserved for review we would
reject it because any error was harmless. Anna’s testimony that
Jack was angry with his parents at some point in time was vague
and had little probative value to corroborate M.C.’s accusations.
M.C.’s testimony was fully corroborated by appellant’s own
admissions and by the testimony of the person he molested in
1995. There is no reasonable probability that Anna’s testimony
about her son’s anger would have persuaded the jury to believe
M.C. when her own testimony and appellant’s admissions did not.
(See, e.g., Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526 [admitting

12
hearsay statements was harmless error where victim testified
and “the jury did not have to rely solely on secondhand
statements she made to third parties”].)
Cumulative Error
Appellant contends he was prejudiced by the
cumulative effect of these errors. We have concluded each error
was harmless when considered separately. Considering them
together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does
not warrant reversal. For the reasons we have already
explained, there is no reasonable probability the jury would have
reached a more favorable verdict in the absence of these errors.
(People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 260; People v. Holt (1984)
37 Cal.3d 436, 459.)
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Law Offices of Christopher Muller, and Christopher Muller,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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