CourtListener 10378092•In re A.V. CA2/6
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Filed 4/14/25 In re A.V. CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re A.V., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B335863
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. FJ57886)
(Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A.V. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders entered after the juvenile court sustained a petition
alleging he committed battery on a person with whom he was in a
dating relationship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code,1 § 243,
subd. (e)(1)), declared him a ward of the court, and ordered him
placed at home on probation. A.V. contends: (1) there was
1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
insufficient evidence he was in a dating relationship with the
victim, and (2) the probation condition barring him from using
drugs or alcohol is overbroad and/or constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2022, W.V. lived with her grandfather M.V. in
Whitter. One afternoon W.V. yelled, “Grandpa, help me, help
me.” M.V. ran over and saw A.V. standing behind W.V. with his
arms around her chest, squeezing her tightly. He “had her
embraced and . . . didn’t let her breathe.” M.V. told A.V. to let
W.V. go. When he refused to do so, M.V. sought help from a
neighbor. The two were able to get A.V. to release W.V. after
about two minutes.
The district attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 petition alleging that A.V. committed misdemeanor
battery on W.V. A.V. thereafter failed to appear at some early
court dates. His mother told the juvenile court that he had
overdosed on drugs and was in a residential treatment program
in Mexico. The court wished A.V. “the best” and hoped the
program would benefit him.
At a subsequent proceeding A.V.’s mother told the juvenile
court that she was “nervous” about A.V.’s progress in
rehabilitation because of “how badly” he had been using drugs.
The court twice checked on his progress in Mexico. After the first
check-in the court said that A.V. was making “fantastic” progress.
During the second a counselor told the court that A.V. was “doing
very well.”
After A.V. returned to the United States he relapsed on
fentanyl and returned to rehabilitation in Mexico. He later told
the juvenile court that his relapse made him realize that recovery
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was not easy and he needed meetings, a sponsor, and church.
The court replied that it was “really proud of [A.V.] for going back
[to treatment].” It said that recovery is “not a straight line” and
“[s]ometimes it is one step up, two steps back. All that matters is
that you pick yourself up and get back in the saddle again.” The
court then arranged for A.V. to start a new residential treatment
program.
A.V. left that program and stopped going to addiction
recovery meetings. At a hearing after A.V. turned 18, the
juvenile court said it was concerned that he had had a serious
drug problem. A.V. had gone “nowhere” despite two stints in
rehabilitation programs. And he did not appear to be taking his
rehabilitation seriously. The court said, “Your mom wants to
support [you]. I want to support [you]. . . . [B]ut you got to do the
work.” The court ordered A.V. to attend Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings and said it could order him to attend an inpatient or
outpatient treatment program.
At a hearing two months later, A.V. admitted that he was
still using drugs. The juvenile court commended A.V.’s honesty
but said “[w]e got to do something.”
“Nothing to be ashamed about. It is an illness. It is
just like having diabetes, heart disease[,] or anything
else. I have plenty of people in my family [who] have
substance abuse issues. It can take a long time. It
took my brother three times in rehab to get it right.
“So I get it. I understand. It is not . . . perfection. It
is three steps up, two steps back but I gotta do
something okay. You’re a terrific young man. You
have a lot to give. You’re a young man. I don’t want
to see you throwing your life away.”
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The court suggested that A.V. enter a program called “Rights of
Passage” in Lake Tahoe. A.V. agreed, and the court ordered him
to be screened for that program. The program “didn’t work out,”
however, and A.V. again stopped going to meetings.
The juvenile court subsequently held a hearing on the
battery allegation against A.V. During the hearing M.V. testified
that W.V. had been in a “dating relationship” with A.V. for two or
three months. A.V. visited W.V. “a lot,” nearly every day. M.V.
deemed the two “boyfriend [and] girlfriend.”
The juvenile court found the battery allegation true,
declared A.V. a ward of the court, and ordered him placed at
home on probation. As a condition of probation the court ordered
A.V. not to “knowingly use any alcohol or drugs except with a
doctor’s prescription.” The court also ordered A.V. to take
withdrawal medication, attend substance abuse counseling, and
attend meetings. It said that it was “open for [A.V.] to do [it] in
any way [he] want[ed and] in the best way [he] want[ed],” and
urged him and mother to think about what made the most sense
for his situation.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the evidence
A.V. contends the true finding on the battery allegation
must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence he was
in a dating relationship with W.V. We disagree.
A dating relationship need not be long term or exclusive,
but must be more than “ ‘ “a casual relationship or . . . ordinary
fraternization between [two] individuals in a business or social
context.” ’ ” (People v. Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1322-
1323 (Upsher).) Such a relationship is defined by “frequent,
intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation
4
of affectional or sexual involvement independent of financial
considerations.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(10).) “Frequent,” in turn, is
defined as “common, usual, happening at short intervals, or often
repeated or occurring.” (M.A. v. B.F. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 559,
570 (M.A.).) And “intimate” is defined as: “(1) very close physical,
mental, or social association, connection, or contact[;] (2) a
warmly personal attitude, especially one developing through a
long or close association or by friendliness, unreserved
communication, [or] mutual appreciation and interest[;] or (3)
very close personal relationships, befitting a relationship of love,
warm or ardent liking, deep friendship, or mutual cherishing.”
(Id. at pp. 570-571.)
To determine whether there was sufficient evidence that
A.V. and W.V. were in a dating relationship, “ ‘we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the [juvenile court’s
findings] to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—
that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find’ ” that the two
shared frequent, intimate associations. (People v. Avila (2009) 46
Cal.4th 680, 701 (Avila).) When undertaking our review, we
neither evaluate witness credibility nor resolve evidentiary
conflicts (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87); such
tasks are within the exclusive province of the court below (People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181). We presume the
existence of every fact the court could reasonably deduce from the
evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of its
findings. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 515.) But it is
immaterial whether we would have drawn those same inferences
(People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811-812); so long as
“the circumstances reasonably justify the [juvenile court’s]
5
findings, reversal . . . is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also . . . be reconciled with” contrary ones.
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
Reversal is unwarranted here. During the jurisdictional
hearing M.V. testified that A.V. and W.V. were “boyfriend [and]
girlfriend,” in a “dating relationship.” He said that A.V. visited
his granddaughter at the family home almost daily, and had been
doing so for two or three months when the battery occurred there.
Those are the frequent, intimate associations indicative of a
dating relationship. (Upsher, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323
[court could infer existence of “dating relationship” where
defendant referred to victim as his “ ‘girl’ ” and “ ‘lady friend’ ”
and battery occurred at his home].)
A.V.’s reliance on M.A. is misplaced. In that case our
colleagues in the Fourth District upheld the trial court’s finding
that M.A. and B.F. lacked the frequent, intimate associations to
be in a dating relationship. (M.A., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 577.) M.A. and B.F. saw each other a total of eight times over
a period of 19 months. (Id. at p. 571.) And during the months-
long lulls between meetings M.A. initiated most of the
communications with B.F. and received no “amorous” replies
from him. (Id. at pp. 571-572.)
Here, in contrast, M.V. testified that A.V. visited W.V.
almost daily for two or three months. And their interactions
were such that M.V.—who lived with his granddaughter and
observed her relationship with A.V.—told the court he believed
the two were “boyfriend [and] girlfriend.” The court credited
M.V.’s testimony. We accordingly conclude that substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that A.V. and W.V.
had the frequent, intimate associations required to be in a dating
6
relationship, and uphold its true finding on the battery
allegation. (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 703 [testimony of single
witness sufficient to prove any fact]; People v. Farnam (2002) 28
Cal.4th 107, 153 [lay witness may offer an opinion if it is
rationally based on their perception and helpful to understanding
their testimony].)
Probation condition
A.V. contends the probation condition barring him from
using drugs or alcohol is constitutionally overbroad because it
“requir[es] more of him that [sic] is humanly reasonable” and “is
not necessarily an admonition that [he] is capable of heeding.”
We disagree.
This is not a case where the condition—to not knowingly
use unprescribed drugs or alcohol—is vague as to what was
prohibited or would require the probationer to “ ‘ “guess at its
meaning.” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Nor is
it overbroad because the prohibition of using unprescribed drugs
or alcohol was “closely tailor[ed] . . . to the purpose of the
condition,” namely, eliminating A.V.’s substance abuse. (Ibid.)
A.V. cites no authority for the proposition that a probation
condition prohibiting knowing conduct is overbroad simply
because it might prove difficult to follow. The contention is
waived. (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.)
Alternatively, A.V. contends the challenged probation
condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We
disagree.
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution proscribes
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. In doing so,
“ ‘[t]he Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency” . . . against
7
which we must evaluate penal measures.’ ” (In re Coca (1978) 85
Cal.App.3d 493, 502.) Measures that “ ‘are incompatible with
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society” ’ ” and those that “ ‘ “involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain” ’ ” are accordingly “ ‘repugnant to
the Eighth Amendment.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97 at page 104, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to [the]
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’ [citation] proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Relying on Estelle, A.V. argues the probation
condition barring him from using drugs or alcohol constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment given his status “as a drug addict
and alcoholic.” He argues the condition must be stricken because
“drug and alcohol addiction is not something that can simply be
admonished away.”
Assuming Estelle applies to probation conditions, we
disagree with A.V.’s arguments. During the proceedings below
the juvenile court was sensitive to A.V.’s struggles with drug and
alcohol addiction. When A.V. missed some initial proceedings
because he was in a drug treatment program in Mexico, the court
wished him “the best” and said it hoped the program would
benefit him. It then checked in on his progress multiple times.
When he returned to the United States, the court commended
A.V. for going through treatment. It noted that addiction is an
illness and that rehabilitation can take time; progress, not
perfection, was the goal.
A.V. further argues the juvenile court’s prohibition on using
drugs or alcohol “fail[s] to take into consideration our evolving
understanding [of] addiction as an illness . . . and the arduous
8
process of seeking sobriety.” We are not persuaded. The record
shows that the court understood A.V.’s addiction and the
challenges to achieving sobriety. It also ordered A.V. to take
withdrawal medication, attend substance abuse counseling, and
attend meetings—efforts A.V. admits were “achievable” and
“could have led to a foundation of sobriety.” Such concern for
A.V. and efforts to help him attain sobriety reinforce our
conclusion that the court was dedicated to his success and not
deliberately indifferent to his needs. The probation condition
therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
There was no Eighth Amendment violation. (See People v.
Brooks (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1353 [no Eighth
Amendment violation where court prohibited defendant from
using medical marijuana as condition of probation]; see also
People v. Mitchell (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 715, 719-720
[permissible to order alcoholic thief to maintain sobriety as
condition of probation].)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders, entered March
11, 2024, are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
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Melissa N. Widdifield, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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