Mondragon v. Let's Do Lunch CA2/5

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Filed 4/11/25 Mondragon v. Let’s Do Lunch CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

RAFAEL MONDRAGON et B321440
al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Super. Ct. No.
Appellants, 20STCV34952)

v.

LET’S DO LUNCH, INC.,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.

Mahoney Law Group and Kevin Mahoney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Seyfarth Shaw, Michele J. Beilke, Julia Y. Trankiem and
Blake E. Guerrero for Defendant and Respondent.

******
A former employee sued his employer for wrongful
termination and unfair competition. In discovery, the former
employee admitted, in contention interrogatories, that the
employer did not violate any laws or public policy; the former
employee thereafter failed to oppose the employer’s summary
judgment motion premised on those interrogatory responses.
After granting summary judgment, the trial court imposed
$123,299 in attorney fees as sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.51 because, based on his interrogatory
responses, the former employee “maintained” his lawsuit “in bad
faith without evidentiary support or factual basis.” Because the
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Let’s Do Lunch, Inc. (defendant) provides “perishable
prepared food for schools’ distributors, private-label, and retail
customers in California and throughout the United States.”
Raphael Mondragon (Mondragon) was hired as a forklift operator
at defendant’s Los Angeles-based warehouse in November 2018.
He was terminated less than six months later, in April 2019, for
initiating an aggressive verbal confrontation with a co-worker.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

2
II. Procedural Background
A. Complaint
In September 2020, Mondragon sued defendant. In this
lawsuit, Mondragon alleged that he was terminated in a
“retaliatory fashion” for complaining about (1) defendant’s “safety
practices” (namely, that his co-workers “improperly stacked
pallets” in his loading area and “enter[ed] into the path of his
forklift”) and (2) his “missing compensation” (namely, that
defendant reduced his hours and did not pay him for the time he
spent discussing his reduced hours at a human resources office).
Based on these allegations, Mondragon asserted causes of action
for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and (2)
violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17200). He was represented by Justin Lo and
Berkeh Alemzadeh, who are lawyers with the law firm Work
Lawyers, PC (collectively, counsel).2
B. Contention interrogatory responses
Among other discovery, defendant propounded contention
interrogatories. Two of them are pertinent here.
In the first, defendant asked whether Mondragon
“contend[ed] that any PERSON involved in the INCIDENT”—
which was tied to the “allegations in the operative complaint”—
“violated any statute, ordinance or regulation” and “that [such a]
violation was a legal (proximate) cause of the INCIDENT.”

2 The law firm who is representing Mondragon and his
counsel in this instant appeal is also the law firm who
represented Mondragon in a separate lawsuit he filed against
defendant alleging wage-and-hour-related claims. We have
issued a separate opinion today reversing summary judgment for
defendant in that other lawsuit.

3
Mondragon served a verified response on October 22, 2021,
raising several objections but answering, “No.”
In the second, defendant asked whether Mondragon
“contend[ed] that [defendant] took any ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT ACTION against [him] in violation of public
policy.” Mondragon served a verified response on October 22,
2021, raising several objections but answering, “Not to [my]
knowledge.”
C. Summary judgment
Within two weeks of receiving Mondragon’s responses to
the contention interrogatories, defendant moved for summary
judgment based on those responses as well as having a legitimate
business reason for terminating Mondragon.
Mondragon elected not to file an opposition to the summary
judgment motion. He nevertheless pressed forward in preparing
for the firm February 2022 trial date by twice noticing the
deposition of defendant’s person most qualified, engaging in
extensive meet and confers with defendant over that deposition,
and serving written discovery.
On January 20, 2022, the trial court granted defendant’s
summary judgment motion, noting it was “unopposed” and “well-
taken.”3

3 Within weeks of this order, Mondragon—using the other
law firm who represented in him in the wage and hour lawsuit—
again sued defendant for retaliation based on the same
allegations that Mondragon was terminated for complaining
about “unsafe forklift operating practices.” Mondragon dismissed
that retaliation action a few months later.

4
D. Sanctions
While its summary judgment motion was still pending,
defendant wrote a letter to Mondragon’s counsel on January 10,
2022, demanding the dismissal of the pending lawsuit in light of
Mondragon’s responses to the contention interrogatories and lack
of opposition to the summary judgment motion. The letter
warned that, absent dismissal, defendant would seek “attorneys’
fees and sanctions against you, your firm, and [Mondragon].”
Counsel never responded to the letter.
After summary judgment was granted, defendant filed a
motion for sanctions under section 128.5 in which it sought
$174,056 in attorney fees. Following further briefing and two
hearings, the trial court granted the motion for sanctions. At the
second hearing, the court admonished Mondragon’s counsel that
when counsel “prepared” the interrogatory responses, “which
essentially meant [Mondragon] no longer had a case,” they
“should have realized that the case was no longer justified and
dismissed it” on their own without the court “hav[ing] to hold the
hand of counsel.”
In the judgment, the trial court ordered “Mondragon and
his counsel” to pay sanctions to defendant in the amount of
$123,299 “as the reasonable amount of . . . attorneys’ fees”
defendant incurred after Mondragon served his interrogatory
responses.4 The court expressly found that the lawsuit “was
maintained in bad faith without evidentiary support or factual
basis” because (1) Mondragon “admitted he had no basis for his
claims when he provided” the interrogatory responses stating
“there was no public policy violation” by defendant, and (2)

4 The court also awarded defendant $14,777.91 in costs, but
that award is not challenged on appeal.

5
Mondragon and his counsel “continued to litigate this matter
until it was dismissed” on summary judgment.
E. Appeal
Mondragon and his counsel timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mondragon and his counsel assert that the trial court erred
in imposing sanctions against them.
I. Governing Law
A trial court may impose “reasonable” “attorney’s fees” as
sanctions against “a party, the party’s attorney, or both” if (1) the
party or attorney engaged in “actions or tactics” (2) that were
“frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” and (3)
were “made in bad faith.” (§ 128.5, subd. (a); Zarate v. McDaniel
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 484, 488; Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage &
Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1346.)
“Actions or tactics” include the decision to maintain a
lawsuit. (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(1) [defined as “includ[ing], but . . . not
limited to, . . . making or opposing of motions or the filing and
service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other
responsive pleading”].)
Whether an action or tactic is “frivolous” is adjudged
objectively by examining whether “any reasonable attorney would
agree” that the matter “is totally and completely without merit.”
(Levy v. Blum (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 625, 635 (Levy); Brubaker v.
Strum (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 497, 511; City of Rocklin v. Legacy
Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 726
(City of Rocklin); Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1062, 1070; In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb &
Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 135 (Taeb).)

6
Whether an action or tactic is made in “bad faith” turns on
subjective intent. (Levy, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 633, 635;
Taeb, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 128, 134-135; see In re
Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649 (Flaherty).)
However, a court may infer bad faith where an action or tactic is
frivolous and a party or counsel nevertheless persisted with it.
(Dolan v. Buena Engineers, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1500,
1505; West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693,
702 (West Coast).) Proof of “evil motive” is not required. (Taeb,
at p. 138.)
Because a trial court has “wide discretion” whether to
impose sanctions under section 128.5, we review solely for an
abuse of that discretion. (People v. Edwards (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1259, 1266; City of Rocklin, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 727; Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management Corp. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 26, 36-37.) In undertaking this task, we review any
subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence and any legal
conclusions de novo. (Edwards, at p. 1267.)
II. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing
sanctions against Mondragon and his counsel corresponding to
the amount of attorney fees defendant incurred after Mondragon
served his interrogatory responses admitting that the lawsuit
had no legal or factual basis.
Mondragon’s and his counsel’s conduct in maintaining the
lawsuit constitutes an “action or tactic.” (See West Coast, supra,
2 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 [“[w]hile the case may in fact have been
inconsequential, its filing and maintenance in the superior court
created consequence,” including opposing counsel having to
prepare and travel for trial].)

7
The maintenance of the lawsuit was “frivolous.” A claim is
frivolous if there is “[a] complete lack of evidence to substantiate”
any of its elements. (580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus
Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 22 (580 Folsom); Frank
Annino & Sons Construction, Inc. v. McArthur Restaurants, Inc.
(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 353, 359.) Mondragon’s claims for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for unfair
competition each require proof that a constitutional or statutory
provision has been violated. (Bruni v. The Edward Thomas
Hospitality Corp. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 247, 257 [wrongful
termination claim must be “‘tethered to fundamental policies that
are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions,’” italics
omitted]; Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-
890 [same]; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1125, 1136 [UCL claim based on “unlawful” conduct requires
violation of statute or regulation]; Cal-Tech Communications, Inc.
v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 187
[UCL claim based on “unfair” conduct requires “an incipient
violation of an antitrust law, or [conduct that] violates the policy
or spirit of one of those laws”]; Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar
Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 254-255 [applying Cal-Tech’s
rule in cases, like this one, based on harm to competitors rather
than to consumers]; see also Becerra v. McClatchy Co. (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 913, 951 [where UCL claim is derivative of
underlying violation, it stands or falls with underlying claim].)
By admitting in the sworn contention interrogatories that no
statute, ordinance, regulation, or public policy was violated
during the “incident” underlying Mondragon’s complaint,
Mondragon admitted to a “complete lack of evidence” as to a
critical element of each of his two claims.

8
Mondragon’s and his counsel’s maintenance of the lawsuit
was also done in “bad faith.” Substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s implied finding of subjective bad faith from the fact
that Mondragon and his counsel persisted in a lawsuit that was
not only frivolous, but also that they knew—by virtue of their
interrogatory answers—to be frivolous. (Childs v. PaineWebber
Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 997 (Childs) [“subjective
bad faith may be inferred from the prosecution of a frivolous
action”]; cf. 580 Folsom, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 26 [“at some
point it had to become clear . . . that [counsel’s] clients had no
evidence to support the factual allegations” yet counsel
“deliberately caused the trial court hours of work”].)
III. Counter-Arguments
Mondragon and his counsel level a barrage of attacks at the
trial court’s sanctions ruling. We have grouped their arguments
into three categories.
A. Arguments about procedure
Mondragon and his counsel raise three procedure-focused
arguments.
First, they argue that the trial court was barred from
issuing sanctions because defendant did not comply with section
128.5’s 21-day safe harbor provision. (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B).)
Mondragon and his counsel forfeited this procedural objection by
not raising it before the trial court. (City of Rocklin, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 735 [forfeited]; Levine v. Berschneider (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 916, 923 [waived].) Further, the safe harbor is
designed to give a party the opportunity to withdraw or correct a
motion or pleading soon after its filing (e.g., Changsha Metro
Group Co., Ltd. v. Xufeng (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1, 8); it does not
apply in other contexts, such as when the action or tactic at issue

9
is maintenance of a frivolous lawsuit months after its filing. (See
Taeb, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 147 [safe harbor does not apply
when sanctioned party did not correct trial court’s
misapprehension of party’s readiness for trial].)
Second, they argue that defendant should be barred from
obtaining sanctions because it did not act diligently. (§ 128.5,
subd. (f)(1) [trial court “shall consider whether [the] party seeking
sanctions has exercised due diligence”].) We disagree. Defendant
filed its summary judgment motion only 14 days after the fatal
discovery responses, thereby allowing Mondragon and his counsel
an opportunity to oppose that motion with any contrary evidence.
Defendant then filed its sanctions motion only 18 days after the
unopposed summary judgment motion was granted. Defendant
was sufficiently diligent.
Third, Mondragon and his counsel argue that the trial
court’s sanctions order is deficient. Section 128.5 requires any
order to “recite in detail the action or tactic or circumstances
justifying the order.” (§ 128.5, subd. (c); Childs, supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at p. 996 [“no more is required than a written factual
recital, with reasonable specificity, of the circumstances that led
the trial court to find the conduct before it sanctionable”].) While
concise, the order here met this standard because it identified the
action or tactic the court found to be frivolous and done in bad
faith—namely, “maintain[ing]” the lawsuit “without evidentiary
support or factual basis.” (Harris v. Rudin (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
1332, 1344-1345 [rejecting identical argument where court’s
order was “sufficient to apprise [parties] and this reviewing court
of the reasons why sanctions were imposed”]; Carpenter v. Jack
in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 470 [“The court’s
statement of reasons, although brief . . . met th[e] standard”].)

10
B. Arguments about the merits
Mondragon and his counsel make three arguments
challenging the merits of the sanctions ruling.
First, they argue that the trial court erred in finding
Mondragon’s claims to be meritless because his contention
interrogatory responses were not binding admissions and because
other evidence adduced during discovery (such as Mondragon’s
deposition testimony) contradicted those responses and
established triable issues of fact as to whether defendant violated
a statute or public policy. To be sure, contention interrogatory
responses are not binding judicial admissions; they are
evidentiary admissions that may be contradicted by other
evidence. (Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1385, 1425, fn. 21; Phillips v. Cooper Laboratories (1989) 215
Cal.App.3d 1648, 1661 [“a party may present evidence [at trial] at
variance to prior answers to interrogatories”].) But Mondragon
never contradicted his contention interrogatory responses
because he never filed an opposition to the summary judgment
motion. His attempt to effectively litigate that motion before this
court—after forgoing the opportunity to do so before the trial
court—is too little, too late.
Second, Mondragon and his counsel argue that defendant’s
conduct in initiating settlement discussions and in continuing to
prepare for the then-upcoming trial date somehow shows that
Mondragon’s lawsuit was not frivolous. It does not. Litigants
mitigate risk by entertaining settlement even in cases that lack
merit, and litigants have to defend against meritless claims that
go to trial. Thus, defendant’s conduct says nothing about
whether Mondragon’s claims were frivolous or, more to the point,

11
whether Mondragon and his counsel knew those claims were
frivolous.
Third, Mondragon and his counsel argue that there is no
evidence of subjective bad faith because Mondragon’s counsel
filed a declaration stating that he did not “believe the claims . . .
were frivolous or otherwise lacking in merit” and that his only
failing was not adequately supervising the associate who assisted
Mondragon in preparing the responses to the contention
interrogatories. The trial court acted within its discretion to give
less weight to counsel’s explanations, and we must decline the
invitation to reweigh the evidence supporting the court’s bad
faith finding. (Estate of Ivey (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 873, 881
[appellate court “may not reweigh the evidence” when reviewing
a sanctions award].)
C. Arguments about the scope of the award
Mondragon and his counsel raise three arguments
challenging the breadth and amount of the sanctions award.
First, they argue that the trial court erred in imposing
sanctions against Mondragon and his counsel because lawyers
can be sanctioned only if they are “solely responsible” for the
sanctioned conduct. We reject this argument. Section 128.5
explicitly provides that sanctions may be imposed against “a
party, the party’s attorney, or both.” (§ 128.5, subd. (a).) The
statute contains no proviso that precludes liability against
counsel (or a party-litigant) unless each is “solely responsible” for
the sanctionable conduct. What is more, the record supports the
trial court’s implicit findings that Mondragon and his counsel
worked in tandem in preparing the responses to the contention
interrogatories (because they contain legal objections but were
personally verified by Mondragon), and that the decision to

12
persist in the lawsuit after filing those responses was a joint
decision (because counsel admitted that he “advised
[Mondragon]” as to how far this lawsuit should be maintained).
(Cf. Wong v. Davidian (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 264, 272 [where
there is uncertainty about whether counsel and the client worked
in tandem and privilege issues preclude further inquiry, the
“better practice” may be to impose sanctions against the client
and leave it to the client and counsel to re-allocate liability].)5
Second, Mondragon and his counsel argue that the trial
court should have considered Mondragon’s inability to pay the
$123,299 sanctions amount. But ability to pay is not a factor
under section 128.5, as it is under other statutes; we cannot
ignore this distinction. (Cf., e.g., Fam. Code, § 271; In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 827-828
[ability to pay is relevant to Family Code section 271]; see
generally Interinsurance Exchange v. Spectrum Investment Corp.
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1243, 1258 [“Where the Legislature uses
different language in similar statutory provisions, it is presumed
it did so advertently and had a different legislative intent with
regard to each provision”].) The trial court’s reliance on the
default mechanism of a lodestar approach to calculate the
amount of sanctions was appropriate. (Cf. Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134-1136 [lodestar is approved method

5 The advancement of this challenge to the imposition of
sanctions against counsel does not provide a basis for
disqualification of Mondragon’s counsel in this appeal,
particularly because it is one based on statutory language and
case law (rather than any factual dispute) and because all of
counsel’s remaining challenges to the sanctions award would
exonerate counsel and client alike.

13
for calculating amount of reasonable fees]; PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [same].)
Third and lastly, they argue that the trial court should
have limited the amount of sanctions to the attorney fees
defendant incurred after sending the sanctions demand letter on
January 10, 2022, rather than after the date Mondragon sent his
interrogatory responses on October 22, 2021. This argument
relies on a misreading of the statute, which allows the court to
impose attorney fees as a sanction when those fees were incurred
“as a result” of the frivolous and bad faith action or tactic. (§
128.5, subds. (a) & (f)(2).) The action or tactic here was
Mondragon’s and his counsel’s continued maintenance of the
lawsuit after serving the interrogatory responses acknowledging
their awareness that the claims had no factual or legal
foundation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to its costs
on appeal.6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

6 Defendant’s request for attorney fees on appeal is denied.
(See Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650 [“‘[T]he borderline
between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is
vague indeed’”].)

14
I concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

15
Rafael Mondragon et al. v. Let’s Do Lunch, Inc.
B321440

BAKER, J., Concurring

With two exceptions, I join the opinion for the court. First,
because I agree plaintiff and appellant’s Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.5 safe harbor argument is forfeited, I find it
unnecessary to join, and do not join, the observation that the
statutory safe harbor does not apply when the action or tactic is
maintenance of a frivolous lawsuit. Second, I do not join footnote
5 in its entirety.

BAKER, J.

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