People v. Gallegos CA2/7

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Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Gallegos CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B328992

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PJ53988)
v.

RODOLFO GALLEGOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mario Barrera, Judge. Conditionally
reversed with directions.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

This is Rodolfo Gallegos’s third appeal since he was
convicted of murder and attempted murder in 2012 after a
shooting Gallegos committed in 1991, when he was 16 years old.
Immediately after the shooting Gallegos fled to Mexico, where he
remained for 18 years until his extradition. Gallegos appealed
from his judgment of conviction, and we affirmed, but twice
directed the court to resentence him. In our last opinion we
directed the juvenile court to hold a transfer hearing under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1 The juvenile court
held that hearing, found Gallegos was not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile court system, and transferred him
back to the criminal court.2 Gallegos appeals from that order.
While his appeal was pending, the Legislature amended
two statutes that affect the exercise and scope of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction over former minors like Gallegos. Those
amendments apply retroactively because one of them stated it
did, both of them are ameliorative, and Gallegos’s judgment was
not yet final when they went into effect. Because in transferring
Gallegos’s case to criminal court the juvenile court did not clearly
indicate it would not have exercised its discretion under one of

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2 Courts often refer to such a court as “adult court” or “adult
criminal court.” (See, e.g., In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205,
208; People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 846.) In this
opinion we distinguish the “criminal court” for adults from the
“juvenile court” for minors and former minors over whom a
juvenile court has jurisdiction.

2
the two new statutes, we direct the juvenile court to conduct
another transfer hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Gallegos Shoots at People in a Car, Killing One and
Injuring Two
Late one night in August 1991 five people were in a car
returning home from a party. As the car was stopped at a traffic
light, a white car pulled up, and someone yelled the gang
challenge, “Where are you from?” One of the passengers in the
other car shouted back they were “from nowhere,” which meant
they did not belong to any gang. Gallegos, who was in the white
car, fired several shots into the other car. (People v.
Gallegos (Oct. 19, 2021, B301515) [nonpub. opn.] (Gallegos II);
see People v. Gallegos (June 17, 2013, B238571) [nonpub. opn.]
(Gallegos I).) One person in the other car was killed, and
two were injured. (Gallegos II, supra.)
Gallegos was a member of the Blythe Street criminal street
gang and had “BST” tattooed across his chin and another BST
tattoo on his right forearm. (Gallegos I, supra, B238571.) After
the incident Gallegos told several fellow gang members that he
committed the shooting and that he made a mistake because his
victims were not members of a gang. (Ibid.) Gallegos fled to
Mexico, and in 2006 detectives applied to have Gallegos
extradited. (Gallegos II, supra, B301515; see Gallegos I, supra,
B238571.)
The People charged Gallegos with one count of murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and four counts of attempted murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664). The People alleged, among

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other things, that Gallegos committed the crimes for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street
gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in
criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of Penal
Code section 186.22, subdivision (b), and that he personally used
a firearm in committing the crimes, within the meaning of Penal
Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). (Gallegos II, supra,
B301515; Gallegos I, supra, B238571.)

B. A Jury Convicts Gallegos, the Trial Court Sentences
Him Twice, and We Conditionally Reverse the
Judgment for a Transfer Hearing in Juvenile Court
The jury convicted Gallegos on all counts and found the
gang and firearm allegations true. (Gallegos II, supra, B301515.)
In January 2012 the trial court sentenced Gallegos to a prison
term of 25 years to life for the murder conviction, plus five years
for the firearm enhancement,3 and four consecutive life terms,
each with a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, for the
attempted murder convictions. (Ibid.; Gallegos I, supra,
B238571.)
In June 2013 we affirmed Gallegos’s convictions. However,
we directed the trial court to reconsider his sentence, which we
concluded was “the ‘functional equivalent’ of a life without
possibility of parole sentence,” under the Supreme Court’s

3 When Gallegos committed his crimes, Penal Code
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), provided for an enhancement of
three, four or five years. The Legislature subsequently amended
Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), to provide for an
enhancement of three, four or 10 years. (See People v. Davis
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 367, 374 & fn. 3.)

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decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller).
(Gallegos I, supra, B238571.) After almost six years of
proceedings, the trial court in 2019 resentenced Gallegos and
imposed the same sentence. (Gallegos II, supra, B301515.)
Meanwhile, however, Proposition 57 went into effect. (See
Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, Ballot Pamp., Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57.) That measure repealed
statutory provisions that had permitted the district attorney to
file certain cases involving juveniles directly in criminal court.
On appeal after his resentencing, Gallegos argued, the People
conceded, and we agreed Proposition 57 applied retroactively to
all cases not final when the voters passed the initiative in 2016.
(See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304
(Lara); Gallegos II, supra, B301515.) Although the trial court
sentenced Gallegos in 2012, we had directed the trial court to
resentence him, which did not occur until September 2019. Thus,
we concluded, Gallegos was entitled to a new transfer hearing in
the juvenile court to determine whether the court would have
transferred Gallegos to criminal court.

C. The Juvenile Court Grants the Motion To Transfer,
and Gallegos Appeals
The People filed a petition under section 602 asking the
juvenile court to declare Gallegos a ward of the court and a
motion under section 707 to transfer Gallegos to criminal court.
At the conclusion of a four-day hearing in March 2023 the
juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence Gallegos
was “not amenable to remain in juvenile court.” The court
granted the motion to transfer and ordered Gallegos to appear in
criminal court. Gallegos timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a
minor from juvenile court to criminal court.[4] It provides that
whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to have
committed a felony, the prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the
minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’
[Citation.] The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
minor should be transferred.” (In re Miguel R. (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.); see § 707, subd. (a)(1); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)
The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024.
Effective January 1, 2023, language added to section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), states that, to find a minor should be
transferred to criminal court, the juvenile court must find “by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Stats. 2022, ch. 330 (Assem. Bill No. 2361), § 1.) The amended
statute also provides that, if the juvenile court transfers
jurisdiction, “the court shall recite the basis for its decision in an
order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons

4 Under section 602 a “minor” is “anyone under the age of
18 years at the time of the commission of the offense.” (M.E. v.
Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1205; see § 602,
subd. (a).) “Because the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is based on
age at the time of the violation of a criminal law or ordinance, ‘[i]t
is therefore possible that a person might commit a murder at
age 17, be apprehended 50 years later, and find himself subject to
juvenile court jurisdiction at age 67.’” (People v. Ramirez (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 55, 66.) Something like that happened here.

6
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Ibid.; see § 707, subd. (a)(3).) The amendments “changed the
procedure for ordering a juvenile transfer in three material ways,
by (1) raising the prosecution’s burden of proof, (2) requiring a
new specific finding regarding amenability to rehabilitation, and
(3) requiring the court to state the reasons supporting a finding
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation.” (In re J.M.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745, 752, review granted Sept. 25, 2024,
S286259; see In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) These
provisions were in effect at the time of Gallegos’s transfer
hearing.5
In determining whether a minor is amenable to
rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the juvenile
court must consider five criteria: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction”; (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”;
(4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor”; and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity
of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by
the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) “The statute also sets
forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the juvenile
court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria.” (In re
J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212; see § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii),
(B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) “Effective January 1, 2024, Senate
Bill 545 amended section 707 to require that with respect to each

5 After Gallegos’s transfer hearing the Judicial Council
revised rule 5.770 of the California Rules of Court to reflect the
changes to section 707.

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of [the] five criteria the juvenile court ‘shall give weight to any
relevant factor,’ including the specific factors listed as relevant to
each criterion. [Citations.] The previous version of the statute
made consideration of those factors discretionary, not
mandatory.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164-165.)6
Although the juvenile court must consider all enumerated
criteria and give weight to any relevant factor, no criterion or
factor is dispositive. (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166 [section 707 “requires the court to consider all five criteria
in making its determination, but the statute says nothing about
the relative weight to be given to any of the criteria”].) Thus, “the
court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the
five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even
though some or all of the other factors might point to a different
result.” (In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417.)

B. Relevant Proceedings
Gallegos argues we should direct the juvenile court to
conduct a new transfer hearing because legislative amendments
to the scope of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and commitment
options for former minors apply retroactively, and because it is
unclear whether the juvenile court would have granted the

6 “With respect to the degree of criminal sophistication,
Senate Bill 545 also added new mandatory factors for the court to
consider: whether the minor has had any involvement in the
child welfare or foster care system and whether the minor has
been ‘a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual
battery.’” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii); see Stats. 2023, ch. 716, § 1.) Gallegos
concedes this amendment is not relevant to his appeal because
there was no evidence concerning these factors.

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motion to transfer under its new, discretionary authority.
Because Gallegos’s argument involves only the second criterion
under section 707, subdivision (a)(3)—whether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction—we discuss only the evidence at the transfer hearing
and the court’s decision on that criterion.

1. The Evidence at the Transfer Hearing
At the hearing the People submitted testimony on the
second criterion from a juvenile probation officer. Gallegos
submitted testimony and reports from a clinical psychologist and
the chief operating officer of an organization that helps prisoners,
including former minors, prepare for reentry into the general
population.
Juvenile probation officer. The juvenile probation officer
submitted a report that reviewed the five criteria under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3). Regarding the second criterion,
the probation officer’s report stated Gallegos was “well beyond
the age of juvenile jurisdiction and services” because he fled to
Mexico and was a fugitive from justice for almost 20 years. The
probation officer testified neither she nor her supervisor was
aware of any programs under the juvenile court system to
rehabilitate a 48-year-old adult convicted of murder and four
attempted murders. The probation officer stated she understood
that, at the time of the hearing, a youthful offender could be
detained in a secure youth treatment facility until age 25 and
that the programs at such facilities were designed for people up
to that age. (See § 875, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The probation officer
also testified there were no services under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction to rehabilitate a 48-year-old man. She said she was

9
not aware of any former juveniles over the age of 25 who were
rehabilitated under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
Clinical psychologist. Dr. Rahn Minagawa, a clinical and
forensic psychologist, testified for Gallegos. He interviewed
Gallegos twice and reviewed certain police reports, prison
records, letters from former employers, letters of support from
friends and family, reports of other expert witnesses who testified
on behalf of Gallegos, and a mitigation report from 2016 or 2017
prepared by an investigator for the defense in connection with
Gallegos’s resentencing hearing.
Regarding the second criterion under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), Dr. Minagawa said Gallegos had shown he had
already grown and matured by leading a “crime-free” life for
31 years. He said Gallegos told him that he worked as an
apprentice to a mechanic in Mexico, taught English to students of
all ages, and was not involved in any gang activities in Mexico.
According to Dr. Minagawa, the mitigation report from Gallegos’s
resentencing hearing included information from several members
of Gallegos’s family living in Mexico, who corroborated Gallegos’s
statements about his work history and lack of gang activity in
Mexico. Dr. Minagawa admitted that he did not attempt to verify
the information in the report, but stated that there was no
evidence Gallegos committed a crime in Mexico. Dr. Minagawa
said several incidents where Gallegos violated jail and prison
rules during his incarceration did not suggest Gallegos could not
be rehabilitated.
Based on this information, Dr. Minagawa stated his
opinion Gallegos could be rehabilitated in the time remaining
under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Dr. Minagawa also
testified that, in his opinion, Gallegos was already rehabilitated

10
because he had not engaged in any criminal activity or been
involved in a gang since the 1991 shooting. (On cross-
examination Dr. Minagawa acknowledged Gallegos was a
member of a prison gang for some period of time after his
extradition.) Dr. Minagawa understood “rehabilitation” meant a
person recognized and acknowledged his or her behavior, showed
remorse for it, and was no longer a danger to the community.
Dr. Minagawa faulted the probation officer’s assessment of
the second criterion because, according to Dr. Minagawa, she
failed to account for Gallegos’s ability to grow and mature and
wrongly stated the juvenile court had no programs to offer older
former minors. According to Dr. Minagawa, other counties (he
could not “speak to” Los Angeles County) “have indicated that
they are working with older individuals either through their
adult probation department in conjunction with their juvenile
probation department or are turning to programs outside, as long
as the person is not presently a risk to the community.”
Placement and treatment programs. Barry Lindstrom of
Amity Foundation, a nonprofit corporation that serves men and
women reentering the general population after incarceration, also
testified for Gallegos. Lindstrom testified Amity could provide
Gallegos housing if he were “conditionally released or released on
community supervision.” He said Amity had a new contract with
the Board of State and Community Corrections that allowed the
foundation to house people of any age on probation or discharged
from the Division of Juvenile Justice for up to one year.7 At the

7 The Legislature closed the Division of Juvenile Justice
effective June 30, 2023 and “shift[ed] responsibility for all youth
adjudged a ward of the court . . . to county governments.”

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end of that year, Lindstrom said, Amity can place people in
“transitional housing.”
Lindstrom testified the placement he had in mind for
Gallegos housed 184 men and had correctional officers “for
rehabilitation work on site,” a “parole agent,” a “correctional
counselor,” job placement assistance, and “whatever programs
are required by the court.” Up to that point in time, however,
Lindstrom said Amity operated those programs under the
jurisdiction of the criminal court. Lindstrom said the oldest
former minor receiving services from Amity under the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction was 28 or 29 years old.

2. The Juvenile Court Finds Gallegos Is Not
Amenable to Rehabilitation Before the Court’s
Jurisdiction Expires
The court found Gallegos was not amenable to
rehabilitation before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. The
court reached this conclusion in two ways. First, the court
interpreted section 607 to bar the court from exercising
jurisdiction over Gallegos beyond the initial jurisdiction it had to
adjudicate the transfer hearing.8 At the time of the transfer
hearing, only section 607, subdivision (c), addressed

(§ 736.5, subds. (a), (e).) Gallegos’s transfer hearing took place in
March and April 2023, when the Division of Juvenile Justice was
still operating.

8 See M.E. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1199,
1205 (juvenile court has initial jurisdiction to determine whether
to retain jurisdiction over a minor); People v. Ramirez (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 55, 66 (same).

12
commitments for former minors up to and possibly beyond
25 years old.9 That provision allows the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction over a ward who committed murder “until that
person attains 25 years of age, or two years from the date of
commitment to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant to
Section 875, whichever occurs later . . . .” The court interpreted
section 607, subdivision (c), to preclude committing a person over
the age of 25 to a secure youth treatment facility; thus, the court
stated, the two-year jurisdiction extension following such a
commitment under section 607, subdivision (c), could “never
begin.” (See § 875, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Second, even assuming the court could retain jurisdiction
over Gallegos for two years under section 607, subdivision (c) (as
Gallegos argued), the court found the programming and
treatment offered in secure youth treatment facilities were not
designed for 48-year-old men. The court also explained that
releasing Gallegos directly to Amity would bypass a number of
procedural steps required by section 875. Finally, even if
section 875 permitted the court to place Gallegos with Amity, the
court said “there’s no evidence [Amity] is ready or would provide
any services or counselling or therapy” for Gallegos. The court
found Amity was a “step-down facility” for “transitional housing”
that was not designed to provide in-house services.
Regarding Gallegos’s argument he was already
rehabilitated, the juvenile court said it would not “expand the
criteria” under section 707, subdivision (a)(3), to include whether
the minor “has in fact been rehabilitated.” The court stated: “It

9 Other than “continued detentions” under section 876, which
does not apply here.

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is clear that the Legislature never thought that this [criterion]
. . . would be applied to a case of a 48-year-old man.”

C. Subsequent Legislative Changes Apply Retroactively,
and One of Them Requires a New Transfer Hearing

1. Senate Bill No. 135 and Assembly Bill No. 134
Clarified the Scope of the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdiction and Expanded Commitment
Options for Former Minors
As summarized, section 607, subdivision (c), authorized the
juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over a ward who committed
an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b) (including
murder), until that person was 25 years old, or two years from
the date of commitment to a secure youth treatment facility
under section 875, whichever is later, if the person, at the time of
adjudication, would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate
sentence of seven years or more. While that provision remains
unchanged, Senate Bill No. 135 (Sen. Bill 135) created a new
provision, section 607, subdivision (d), effective September 13,
2023, to clarify the juvenile court can retain jurisdiction over a
ward who committed an offense listed in section 707,
subdivision (b), “who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to
exceed two years from the date of disposition.” (Stats. 2023,
ch. 190 (Sen. Bill 135), §§ 12, 14; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 135 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
as amended Aug. 28, 2023, p. 3 [the bill “[c]larifies jurisdiction for
juvenile courts in cases where a person committed a serious
crime as a minor, but is now over 25 years of age, which may
arise due to resentencing efforts or cold cases, among other

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reasons”].)10 Thus, the two-year extension of juvenile court
jurisdiction is no longer dependent on a minor’s commitment to a
secure youth treatment facility and applies to persons older than
25 years of age. The new section 607, subdivision (d), also
provides: “The court shall exercise jurisdiction in conformance
with the objectives of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 190,
supra, § 12.) And Sen. Bill 135 states its amendments to
section 607 apply retroactively. (Ibid.; see § 607, subd. (m).)
Assembly Bill No. 134 (Assem. Bill 134) amended
section 875, effective July 10, 2023, to add subdivision (j), which
states: “A person who is 25 years of age or older shall not be
committed to or detained in a county juvenile facility, unless the
court finds that such a commitment or detention is in the best
interest of that person and does not find that it would create a
risk to the other youth in the juvenile facility. A juvenile court
exercising jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years of age or
older may order commitment or detention of the person into an
adult facility, including a jail or other facility established for the
confinement of adults, or into a less restrictive program, as
defined in subdivision (f), if the person is otherwise eligible for
that program.” (See Stats. 2023, ch. 47 (Assem. Bill 134), § 30.)
Thus, new section 875, subdivision (j), expanded commitment
options for former minors who at disposition are 25 years and
older beyond secure youth treatment facilities to include facilities
“established for the confinement of adults.” Assem. Bill 134 did
not specify whether its amendments apply retroactively.

10 Former section 607, subdivision (d), was renumbered
section 607, subdivision (e). (Stats. 2023, ch. 190, supra, § 12.)

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2. The Amendments Under Sen. Bill 135 and
Assem. Bill 134 Apply Retroactively
“‘The Legislature ordinarily makes laws that will apply to
events that will occur in the future. Accordingly, there is a
presumption that laws apply prospectively rather than
retroactively. But this presumption against retroactivity is a
canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
mandate. [Citation.] Therefore, the Legislature can ordinarily
enact laws that apply retroactively, either explicitly or by
implication.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 307.) An inference of
retroactivity applies where statutory amendments create the
“possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where
rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and sentenced
as an adult,” which “can result in dramatically different and more
lenient treatment.” (Id. at p. 303; see Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 169-170 [ameliorative amendments to
section 707 apply retroactively to a nonfinal judgment].) Where a
judgment of conviction is not final, an “amendatory act” imposing
lighter punishment or resulting in more lenient treatment can be
applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage.
(Lara, at p. 307; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745.)
Gallegos argues, the People concede, and we agree the
amendments to section 607 creating subdivision (d) apply to
Gallegos because Sen. Bill 135 states the amendments to section
607 apply retroactively, the amendments are ameliorative, and
the judgment is not yet final. Gallegos also argues, the People
conceded at oral argument, and we agree new section 875,
subdivision (j), applies retroactively because it is an ameliorative
change in the law. Section 875, subdivision (j), does not directly
provide for more lenient treatment of former minors, but in

16
tandem with section 607, subdivision (d), it creates new
commitment and detention options for defendants 25 years old
and older to be rehabilitated within the juvenile justice system.
Without those options, juvenile courts may find older former
minors not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court solely because there are no
appropriate options for their commitment. Thus, the addition of
section 875, subdivision (j), “ameliorated the possible punishment
for a class of persons” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308), namely
former minors 25 years of age and older. (See In re S.S. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1289 [amendments to section 707 applied
retroactively to nonfinal judgments because they “make it more
difficult to transfer juveniles from juvenile court, which . . .
reduces the possible punishment for juveniles”].)

3. Assem. Bill 134 Requires Remand
Where the Legislature enacts ameliorative legislation after
a defendant has been sentenced, “a limited remand is appropriate
. . . for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to consider
whether to exercise its newly conferred discretion.” (People v.
Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 437; see People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 777 [directing that “[f]urther proceedings on
remand are to be conducted in accordance with the current
statutory requirements” of new ameliorative sentencing
legislation]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 727
[directing “the trial court to consider whether to exercise its
newly conferred discretion under” under two recent ameliorative
sentencing statutes].) Such a remand is appropriate absent
“a clear indication that the trial court” would not have exercised
its discretion under the new legislation. (Mataele, at p. 437.)

17
Gallegos argues the juvenile court found him not amenable
to rehabilitation before the court’s jurisdiction expired because
“the court concluded jurisdiction had already expired such that it
could not provide any supervision or services.” But that was only
one basis for the juvenile court’s finding. The court made the
same finding under Gallegos’s theory the court had two years of
jurisdiction over Gallegos, which is what Sen. Bill 135 now
clarifies. There is no need to remand on this issue.
Gallegos also argues the juvenile court did not believe
existing law gave it discretion to place Gallegos with Amity or
“another appropriate facility.”11 We agree with Gallegos the
juvenile court’s decision does not “‘“clearly indicate”’” (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419) whether the court would
have found Gallegos unamenable to rehabilitation within two
years had the court known it could have committed Gallegos to
“an adult facility, including a jail or other facility established for
the confinement of adults,” as provided under new section 875,
subdivision (j). The juvenile court believed the then-existing
options—including a secure youth treatment facility and possibly
Amity’s nascent program—were not appropriate placements for a
48-year-old man. But the People did not present any evidence
concerning rehabilitative options for Gallegos in an adult facility
(because none was available at the time of the transfer hearing),
and the court did not consider any such options other than Amity,

11 Gallegos argues there are now “expanded programs” for
former minors like him, and he asks us to take judicial notice of
disposition orders in five juvenile court cases involving former
minors that purportedly identify the types of programs Gallegos
claims now exist. We deny Gallegos’s request for judicial notice
of those orders as unnecessary.

18
which the court found unsuitable for various reasons. (Cf.
Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 200
[vacating an order transferring a minor to criminal court where
the People offered “little if any evidence to demonstrate what [the
minor’s] rehabilitative needs were, much less why they could not
be met through a [juvenile] commitment”]; J.N. v. Superior Court
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 722 [juvenile court erred in
transferring a minor to criminal court where there was no
evidence existing programs were unlikely to result in the minor’s
rehabilitation].) Under section 875, subdivision (j), juvenile
courts have new options for committing former minors, including
a wider range of adult facilities and jail. On remand the court
will have the opportunity to consider those options in
determining whether Gallegos can be rehabilitated within the
two years the juvenile court can exercise jurisdiction over him.
Although the People do not address Assem. Bill 134, they
contend in connection with Gallegos’s argument regarding Sen.
Bill 135 that remand would be futile because the juvenile court
found three of the remaining four factors under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), indicated Gallegos was not amenable to
rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system. But the juvenile
court did not state whether it gave more weight to any criteria
than the others or that it would have found Gallegos unamenable
to rehabilitation even if it found under the second criterion he
could be rehabilitated within two years of juvenile court
jurisdiction. (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-
167 [even if a juvenile court finds under the second criterion of
section 707, subdivision (a)(3), a minor is amenable to
rehabilitation before the court’s jurisdiction expires, the court can
still make the ultimate finding the minor is not amenable to

19
rehabilitation ‘“while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court”’].) We cannot speculate about what the juvenile court
would have done had it known the scope of its discretionary
powers at the time of the transfer hearing and determined the
second criterion weighed in favor of amenability to rehabilitation
within the juvenile justice system. Thus, the appropriate remedy
is to direct the juvenile court to conduct a new transfer hearing.
(People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425.)

DISPOSITION

The order is conditionally reversed, and the juvenile court
is directed to hold a new transfer hearing. If the juvenile court
transfers Gallegos to criminal court, the criminal court must
reinstate his convictions and sentence. If the juvenile court does
not transfer Gallegos, the court must treat the convictions as
juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate disposition.
Gallegos’s request for judicial notice is denied.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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