CourtListener 10376135•People v. Parker CA5
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Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Parker CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088301
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SUF23393B)
v.
DAVID DUANE PARKER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
James Bisnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and Kelly E.
LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Peña, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
Defendant David Duane Parker appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal
Code1 section 1172.6 petition seeking resentencing for a 2000 conviction for first degree
murder, with special circumstances. Defendant specifically challenges the court’s
conclusion defendant was a major participant in the murder and exhibited a reckless
indifference to human life. Following our review of the record and the relevant legal
authorities, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 1999, an information was filed in the Merced County Superior Court charging
defendant with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), kidnapping for the purpose
of committing a robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); count 2), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a);
count 3), and robbery (§ 211; count 4). The information contained special circumstance
allegations connected to the first degree murder count alleging the murder occurred while
committing or attempting to commit carjacking, kidnapping, and robbery, supporting a
conviction for felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (B), & (L)). An additional
special circumstance allegation alleged defendant committed the murder while lying in
wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). In March 2000, a jury found defendant guilty of
committing all four counts, and further found true the carjacking, kidnapping and robbery
felony-murder special circumstance allegations.
Defendant was eventually sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the
special circumstance first degree murder count, while sentences on the remaining counts
were imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654. An appeal of this conviction resulted in
this court amending the sentences for the stayed counts, but otherwise affirming the
judgment. (See People v. Parker I (Feb. 21, 2002, F035834) [nonpub. opn.].)
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by defendant in 2020 citing
legislative changes to the definition of felony murder asking to be resentenced on the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
first degree murder conviction. The petition was denied in both the trial court and later
this court. (See In re Parker (May 21, 2020, F081035) [nonpub. order].)
On April 4, 2022, defendant filed yet another petition in the trial court again
requesting resentencing on the first degree murder conviction. The trial court denied the
petition without a hearing, declaring the special circumstance findings made defendant
ineligible for the requested relief. Consistent with the Supreme Court decision in People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), this court reversed that order, stating the special
circumstance findings were made before the Supreme Court opinions in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) “and
therefore, are not dispositive on a prima facie review of the petition under
section 1172.6.” (People v. Parker II (Aug. 2, 2023, F085006) [nonpub. opn.].)
The matter was remanded, and a new hearing was set to consider resentencing.
The prosecution submitted its opposition, arguing defendant was not eligible for
resentencing. Following a hearing, the trial court again denied defendant’s section 1172.6
petition concluding he was guilty of first degree murder because he was a “major
participant” in the crime and acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” These
findings by the trial court are the basis for this appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The evidence submitted at the hearing on the section 1172.6 hearing consisted
primarily of the transcript from the original trial held in 2000. No other testimony was
offered. At this trial, defendant was one of two defendants being tried in the same
proceeding. Because this appeal is brought only by defendant, we will attempt to focus,
as much as possible, on the facts illustrating defendant’s participation in this crime.
On the morning of December 5, 1997, a motorist observed a body on the side of a
rural road near Highway 99. The motorist immediately dialed 911 to report what he had
observed. A California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer responded to the call and
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confirmed there was a partially burned body on the side of the road. The CHP officer
then protected the scene while he waited for the sheriff’s department to arrive.
A pathologist testified he was asked to respond to the scene to help determine the
cause of death. The pathologist stated his belief the time of death had occurred within the
prior 12 hours. A more detailed autopsy was conducted on December 8, 1997. After
detailing the significant blunt force trauma inflicted to the head and upper portion of the
victim’s body, as well as the burns inflicted mostly to the lower half of the body, the
pathologist concluded any burning occurred at or right after the time of death. After
providing a more detailed description of the various injuries inflicted, the pathologist
concluded the cause of death was “blunt force injury to the right side of the head and the
brain,” and further, that the burning of the body was not a contributing factor to the death.
CHP Officer Larry Chambers testified that around 9:00 p.m. on December 4, 1997,
he stopped a car that was speeding on southbound Highway 99. Chambers observed
two men in the front seat of the car, and three women in the back seat. Chambers
eventually determined that the driver was unlicensed and that while the car was a rental,
the person who had apparently rented the car was not present. Because of this, Chambers
decided to impound the car and escort the occupants of that car off the freeway. The
ticket issued for this incident by Chambers was signed by defendant using his own name.
The occupants were then dropped off, along with their luggage, outside a nearby
restaurant.
Among the occupants in the car when it was pulled over by Chambers were
three young women, N.W., M.J., and J.G, who were all minors at that time. In her
testimony, N.W. identified both defendant and his codefendant Jameel Coles as the
two males the minors were traveling with. N.W. testified that when they were dropped
off at the nearby restaurant, there was a discussion about needing a car. N.W. stated the
five were eventually able to get a ride from a man they met at this location who had a tan
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colored van. The man they met was Nathaniel Thompson, who would eventually become
the victim in this case.
While they were driving, N.W. recalled hearing defendant and Coles whispering
that “they had to get the car.” Soon thereafter, Thompson pulled off the freeway and
stopped in a parking lot. Thompson got out of the van, along with defendant and Coles,
and opened the side door to the van to start removing their luggage. N.W. testified that at
this point, Thompson was hit and landed halfway into the van through that side door.
While not identifying who hit Thompson, N.W. recalled defendant was the closest to
Thompson when this happened and that she heard defendant say, “ ‘I busted my fist.’ ”
N.W. also recalled seeing blood on defendant’s hand. M.J., one of the other young
women who had been in the van that night, later confirmed in her testimony that
defendant was closest to Thompson when he was hit. After defendant and Coles moved
Thompson further into the van, Coles got on top of him to restrain him while defendant
got into the driver’s seat and returned to the highway. While being held down by Coles,
Thompson woke up and pleaded to be let go.
At some point, defendant drove the van away from the freeway and stopped on a
rural road. Defendant then got out of the van and walked around to open the side door.
M.J. testified Thompson was taken out of the van “by force.”
J.G., the third young woman in the van, provided testimony that both defendant
and Coles started to beat Thompson when he was taken out of the van. J.G. specifically
stated that defendant and Coles were “kicking him,” while Thompson was on the ground.
After observing Coles take a pillow from the van and smothering Thompson with that
pillow, J.G. stated Coles then retrieved a ladder from the van.2 Seconds later, J.G.
witnessed Thompson’s body on fire. J.G. confirmed defendant was still outside the van
2 Other testimony provided by Coles accused M.J. and J.G. of putting the pillow
over Thompson’s head to suffocate him.
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when the fire started. J.G. later testified during cross-examination that when she asked
defendant why this had occurred, defendant told J.G. “it wasn’t supposed to happen this
way,” and Thompson was not supposed to die.
Defense
Defendant did not testify in his own defense. However, Coles did testify.
Coles admitted in his testimony that he and defendant planned to drive N.W., M.J.,
and J.G. to Las Vegas to put them to work as prostitutes. Coles admitted he and
defendant also discussed stealing a car, but not carjacking one. Coles testified he was
surprised when defendant hit Thompson in the head after Thompson had stopped to let
them out in the parking lot. Coles acknowledged pulling Thompson into the van after he
was hit by defendant, and also admitted holding Thompson down when defendant took
over as the driver.
After traveling a short distance, defendant stopped the van on a rural road. Coles
testified Thompson “f[ell] out” of the van and bear crawled on the ground. While Coles
admitted kicking Thompson in his chest after Thompson kicked him, he denied kicking
Thompson in the head. Coles instead implied that J.G. and M.J. got out of the van and
kicked Thompson in a manner that caused his death. Coles also described how M.J. and
J.G. put the pillow over Thompson’s head to suffocate him.
While he believed defendant was outside the van, Coles could not remember
exactly where defendant was when each of these acts unfolded.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s main contention is that substantial evidence does not support the trial
court’s ruling, and that as a result, he should have been eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6.
I. Is Defendant Eligible For Resentencing Under Section 1172.6?
A. Applicable Law
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides:
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“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner
to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts .…”
Resentencing is not automatic, requiring a hearing to determine whether the defendant
meets the criteria for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition after the evidentiary
hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) “Under
[the substantial evidence] standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) The
standard of review is “highly deferential.” (People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
533, 538.) “ ‘We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6
Cal.5th 632, 713.)
When death occurs during the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery,
first degree murder liability extends to any “major participant” in the offense who acted
with “reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) The elements of major
participation and reckless indifference to human life were incorporated into the statute
defining murder by legislative decree in 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; see § 189,
subd. (e)(3).) In doing so, the Legislature codified the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
these concepts which were expressed in two separate cases. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 710.)
In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, the Supreme Court addressed factors considered
relevant to deciding when “an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a
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major participant.” (Id. at p. 794.) The Banks factors include: “What role did the
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What
role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did
the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used,
or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do
after lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The Supreme Court in Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, soon thereafter addressed the
factors relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Id. at pp. 618–623.) The Clark factors have been summarized to include:
“Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many
weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did
he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the
duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or
likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the
risks of violence during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins), citing Clark, at pp. 618–623.)
Courts are encouraged not to focus on any single Banks or Clark factor as
determinative—or even necessary. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 618, 621–623.) Instead, courts are to assess the totality of a defendant’s
culpability within a “spectrum” of culpability expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison) and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458
U.S. 782 (Enmund). (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 705.)
The Banks court offered the following summary of the Enmund case which was
the earlier of the two cases before the United States Supreme Court:
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“[D]efendant Earl Enmund purchased a calf from victim Thomas Kersey
and in the process learned Kersey was in the habit of carrying large sums of
cash on his person. A few weeks later, Enmund drove two armed
confederates to Kersey’s house and waited nearby while they entered.
When Kersey’s wife appeared with a gun, the confederates shot and killed
both Kerseys. Enmund thereafter drove his confederates away from the
scene and helped dispose of the murder weapons, which were never found.
He was convicted of robbery and first degree murder .…
“On these facts, the United States Supreme Court reversed Enmund’s death
sentence as prohibited by the federal Constitution. The court found a broad
consensus against imposing death in cases ‘where the defendant did not
commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did
not participate in a plot or scheme to murder.’ (Enmund …, supra, 458 U.S.
at p. 795.) Accordingly, it held the Eighth Amendment bars the death
penalty for any felony-murder aider and abettor ‘who does not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be
employed.’ (Enmund, at p. 797.) The intent to commit an armed robbery is
insufficient; absent the further ‘intention of participating in or facilitating a
murder’ (id. at p. 798), a defendant who acts as ‘the person in the car by the
side of the road at the time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers
escape’ (id. at p. 788) cannot constitutionally be sentenced to death.”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 799.)
The Banks court then provided a summary of the Tison case, which applied the test
expressed in Enmund:
“In Tison …, supra, 481 U.S. 137, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
[special circumstance] sentences for those guilty of felony murder as
accomplices. Prisoner Gary Tison’s sons Ricky, Raymond, and Donald
Tison conducted an armed breakout of Gary and his cellmate from prison,
holding guards and visitors at gunpoint. During the subsequent escape,
their car, already down to its spare tire, suffered another flat, so the
five men agreed to flag down a passing motorist in order to steal a
replacement car. Raymond waved down a family of four; the others then
emerged from hiding and captured the family at gunpoint. Raymond and
Donald drove the family into the desert in the Tisons’ original car with the
others following. Ricky and the cellmate removed the family’s possessions
from their car and transferred the Tison gang’s possessions to it; Gary and
his cellmate then killed all four family members.… Ricky and Raymond
Tison and the cellmate were tried and sentenced to death. The trial court
made findings that Ricky and Raymond’s role in the series of crimes was
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‘ “very substantial” ’ and they could have foreseen their actions would
‘ “create a grave risk of … death.” ’ (Id. at p. 142.)”
“The United States Supreme Court granted Ricky’s and Raymond’s
petitions to consider the application of Enmund to these facts.…
Specifically, Tison described the range of felony-murder participants as a
spectrum. At one extreme were people like ‘Enmund himself: the minor
actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor
was found to have had any culpable mental state.’ ([Tison, supra, 481 U.S.]
at p. 149.) At the other extreme were actual killers and those who
attempted or intended to kill. (Id. at p. 150.) Under Enmund, Tison held,
death was disproportional and impermissible for those at the former pole,
but permissible for those at the latter. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court then
addressed the gray area in between, the proportionality of capital
punishment for felony-murder participants who, like the two surviving
Tison brothers, fell ‘into neither of these neat categories.’ (Ibid.) Here, the
court announced, ‘major participation in the felony committed, combined
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund
culpability requirement.’ (Id. at p. 158.)” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
pp. 799–800.)
The Tison court ultimately vacated the death penalty imposed on the two brothers and
remanded the matter for further proceedings, noting the trial court had used an improper
standard. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.) The Banks court noted that it was the
language requiring “ ‘major participation’ ” and a “ ‘reckless indifference to human
life,’ ” from the Tison opinion that was later codified by the electorate into section 190.2,
subdivision (d). (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 800.)
B. Application
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and
applied the correct standards as expressed in relevant statutes and case law. (People v.
Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
1. Was defendant a “major participant?”
Again, we turn to the Banks opinion which addressed factors considered relevant
to deciding when “an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major
participant.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) Two factors are especially applicable
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here, asking whether the defendant was present at the scene of the killing, or in a position
to facilitate or prevent the actual murder. This factor further asks whether the defendant’s
actions or inaction played a role in the death. (Id. at p. 803.) Defendant was clearly
present at the scene when Thompson was killed. Evidence in the record describes how
defendant struck Thompson, which resulted in his falling into the van. Defendant then
took over the driving duties and turned off the highway to a rural road where Thompson
was taken out of the van, while pleading for his life, and beaten to death. While each of
the other four occupants of the van testified defendant was outside the van the entire time
Thompson was being beaten, suffocated, then burned, only one witness testified
defendant participated in beating Thompson. There is also nothing in the record
indicating defendant took any action to minimize the possibility of violence.
Yet another Banks factor asks what defendant did after lethal force was used.
(Bank, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) The evidence is consistent that after Thompson’s
body was left to burn, defendant returned to the driver’s seat and continued on the trip to
Las Vegas. There was no evidence in the record showing defendant provided any
assistance to Thompson.
2. Did defendant display a “reckless indifference to human life?”
The Clark factors are also important to this determination. Of these factors we can
easily conclude the evidence shows defendant was present at the scene of the crime and
had a reasonable opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim. Furthermore, based
on the testimony provided by the various occupants of the van, defendant neither said nor
did anything to restrain Coles or anyone else from engaging in the acts that lead to
Thompson’s death, thereby failing “to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony[.]” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) In fact, at least one witness testified
that defendant engaged in kicking Thompson once he was pulled out of the van.
The evidence also shows these events did not occur spontaneously, even if
defendant told J.G. “it wasn’t supposed to happen this way.” The evidence supplies
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substantial evidence that the events unfolded over a period or “duration” of time.
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) First, Thompson offered the entire entourage a
ride and drove them toward their ultimate destination.3 Thompson was then knocked out
by defendant at this second location and held down in the van while defendant drove to a
third location. At the third location, Thompson was pulled out of the van and beaten in
such a way that caused his death. Evidence in the record provides substantial evidence
that defendant participated in the beating, or at the very least, stood by while others
engaged in the beating. At its core, “[r]eckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Id. at
p. 676, quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157.) As the events unfolded here, “a grave
risk of death” increased at each stage.
3. Where does this case fall on the spectrum between Enmund and
Tison?
Unlike the facts in Enmund, defendant was present when the “killing took place”
and, according to one witness, participated in the beating that led to Thompson’s death.
(Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 795.) There was also evidence that defendant participated
in the plot to take the van from Thompson, which he helped accomplish by knocking
Thompson out at the second location to prevent him from leaving with the van.
Thompson then drove the van to a third location on a rural road where Thompson was
taken out of the van and beaten, then burned. Even if we conclude, which we do not, that
evidence does not support the conclusion defendant participated in the beating, we cannot
ignore that defendant was close to these events, participated in moving the events along,
then did nothing to stop the progression of the events that lead to Thompson’s death.
3 While there was some testimony the group represented they wanted to go to a
nearby bus station, there is no evidence in the record about how far away that bus station
was from the location where they met Thompson.
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Instead, this case comes much closer to the facts presented in Tison. Defendant
and Coles expressed an intent to get a new car after theirs was impounded. When
Thompson offered the group a ride, defendant and Coles were overheard discussing how
they had to “get” the van. When the group stopped at the second location, defendant
struck Thompson hard enough to cause him to lose consciousness and then to be
transported to the final location where he was killed by the whole group while defendant
mostly watched.
The requirements of being a major participant and having reckless indifference to
human life overlap, “ ‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder,
the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) The trial court here found “beyond a reasonable doubt that
[defendant] was a major participant in the crime,” and that “[t]he whole crime was
horrific, and certainly reckless and indifferent to human life.” (See People v. Cody
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 113.)
Our review of the record confirms that substantial evidence, of “ ‘ “ ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value,’ ” ’ ” supports the trial court’s findings that defendant was a
major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) As a result, the denial of defendant’s section 1172.6 petition
was not made in error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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