CourtListener 10375333•People v. Ortiz CA2/5
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Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Ortiz CA2/5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B332933
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. KA051285
v. and KA052823)
GREGORY ROBERT ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Gregory Robert Ortiz (defendant) appeals from a judgment
entered after the trial court recalled his sentence pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.11 and, during the ensuing resentencing,
reduced his sentence from 152 years to life down to 100 years to
life. He contends the trial court did not properly apply section
1172.1 because it refused to strike one of defendant’s two prior
strike convictions, which effectively would have resulted in a
sentence close to time served. Because we conclude that the trial
court properly applied section 1172.1 and because the trial court
did not otherwise abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss one
of defendant’s prior strike convictions, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Defendant’s early criminal history
Defendant was born in 1965.
Between 1983 and 1986, defendant incurred seven
convictions, six for possession or being under the influence of a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Section 1172.1 was previously codified in section 1170,
subd. (d)(1) and section 1170.03. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.)
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controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, 11550), and
one for resisting arrest (§ 148).
In 1988, defendant was convicted of robbery (§ 211).
While on parole following the prison sentence for robbery,
defendant in 1991 was convicted of brandishing a deadly weapon
(§ 417).
While on parole following the prison sentences for robbery
and exhibition of a deadly weapon, defendant in 1994 committed
the crimes of second-degree robbery (§ 211) and assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245).
B. First criminal case2
In September 2000, defendant approached a woman as she
was getting into her Ford Explorer in the parking lot of a
restaurant. Three children were in the Explorer. Defendant held
a sharp tool to the woman’s neck and ordered her out of the
vehicle. As defendant started the Explorer’s engine, two of the
children jumped out of the vehicle and the woman grabbed the
third child. Defendant then drove away with the vehicle and the
woman’s purse.
Three weeks later, defendant entered a discount store and
brought a bag of chips to the cashier. When the cashier opened
the cash register, defendant pulled out a three-inch knife, ordered
the cashier to move, and grabbed a handful of cash from the
register.
In November 2000, defendant approached a different
cashier at the same discount store and pretended to make a
2 We summarize the evidentiary facts and procedural history
from defendant’s prior appeals. On our own motion, we take
judicial notice of our prior opinions. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd.
(d).)
3
purchase. When the cashier opened the cash register, defendant
pulled out a knife, told the cashier not to make noise, and
grabbed a handful of cash from the register.
For the first incident, the People charged defendant with
(1) carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), (2) second-degree robbery (§ 211),
and (3) grand theft auto (§ 487, subd. (d)). As to each of the
second and third incidents, the People charged defendant with
second-degree robbery (§ 211). As to all counts, the People
alleged that defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon (§ 12022). The People further alleged that defendant’s
1988 and 1994 robbery convictions constituted “strikes” within
the meaning of our State’s Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds.
(a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), as well as prior serious felonies (§
667.5, subd. (a)).
After a jury convicted defendant of each of the
aforementioned charges and found true all enhancements, and
after the court found true the prior convictions, the trial court
imposed a prison sentence of 14 years plus 77 years to life. For
the first incident, the court imposed a sentence of 29 years to life,
comprised of a sentence of 27 years to life for the carjacking
(consisting of a high-end base sentence of nine years, tripled
under the Three Strikes Law) plus two years for the personal use
of a weapon; the court stayed the associated second-degree
robbery and grand theft auto sentences. For each of the second
and third incidents, the court imposed sentences of 25 years to
life (as a third-strike felony) plus one year for the personal use of
a weapon. The court ran all of these sentences consecutively.
The court then imposed 10 additional years, five years for each
prior serious felony.
4
Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. (People v.
Ortiz (Dec. 13, 2002, B155184) [nonpub. opn.].)
C. Second criminal case
In January 2001, defendant robbed a cashier at a market at
knifepoint, taking approximately $500 from the cash register.
Less than two weeks later, defendant was arrested after
abandoning a stolen car.
For the first incident, the People charged defendant with
second-degree robbery (§ 211), and alleged that defendant
personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 12022). For the
second incident, the People charged defendant with unlawful
taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). The People
further alleged that defendant’s 1988 and 1994 robbery
convictions constituted “strikes” within the meaning of our
State’s Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds.
(b)-(i)), as well as prior serious felonies (§ 667.5, subd. (a)).
After a jury convicted defendant of the charged crimes and
found true the weapons enhancement, and after defendant
admitted the prior convictions, the trial court imposed a prison
sentence of 11 years plus 50 years to life. For the first incident,
the court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life (as a third-strike
felony) plus one year for the personal use of a weapon. For the
second incident, the court again imposed a sentence of 25 years to
life (as a third-strike felony). The court ran all of these sentences
consecutively. The court then imposed 10 additional years, five
years for each prior serious felony.
Defendant’s sentence was, in pertinent part, affirmed on
appeal. (People v. Ortiz (Sept. 12, 2002, B153271) [nonpub.
opn.].)
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II. Procedural Background
In August 2022, the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation sent a letter to the trial court, recommending
that defendant’s sentence be recalled under section 1172.1. The
letter explained that resentencing was appropriate because the
courts had been granted discretion to dismiss prior serious felony
enhancements. Accompanying the letter was a report
summarizing defendant’s offenses, criminal history, and prison
record. That report indicated that, while incarcerated, defendant
had not tested positive for drugs, had not had any reported rules
violations, received two satisfactory work reports in 2016,
received a “Laudatory Chrono” for work performance during
COVID, participated in a partnership for re-entry program,
completed two self-help classes in 2022, and was scheduled for an
elderly parole hearing in 2026. The report also indicated that
defendant was an active member of a prison gang.
During hearings on May 10, 2023, and August 24, 2023, the
trial court recalled the sentences in both cases and set the matter
for a “full resentencing” in both cases. Defendant asked the trial
court to dismiss one of the prior “strike” offenses due to their age,
which would effectively result in a sentence of time served. The
trial court declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss a “strike,”
explaining that defendant’s relatively good conduct in prison did
not outweigh the violent nature of the offenses in these two cases
or defendant’s history of re-offending, including while on parole.
The court nevertheless imposed a sentence 52 years shorter than
the original sentence, noting that this reduction would assist
defendant in his consideration for elderly parole in 2026.
Specifically, the court imposed three consecutive 25-year-to-life
sentences for the carjacking and two robberies in the first case,
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and a consecutive 25-year-to-life sentence for the robbery in the
second case. The court struck all other enhancements and stayed
the sentences for the unlawful taking of a vehicle and grand theft
auto counts.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not
exercising its discretion to dismiss one of his prior strike offenses,
thereby reducing his sentence from 152 years to time served
because (1) section 1172.1 requires a “meaningful modification” to
his sentences, and (2) the court otherwise abused its discretion in
not dismissing a strike. We review sentencing decisions,
including whether to dismiss strike allegations, for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374
(Carmony).) We review de novo any subsidiary questions of law,
including issues of statutory interpretation. (Tansavatdi v. City
of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 652.)
I. Does Section 1172.1 Require Any Resentencing To
Effect a “Meaningful Modification”?
A. Pertinent law
Section 1172.1 empowers trial courts to “recall the sentence
. . . previously ordered” for a defendant convicted of a felony and
to “resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had
not previously been sentenced”; it entails a two-step procedure.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); accord, People v. Cepeda (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 456, 469, superseded on other grounds, § 667.5,
subd. (b); People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820
(Braggs).)
First, the trial court must decide whether to recall the prior
sentence and conduct a new sentencing. When a request for
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recall and resentencing originates with a custodial or law
enforcement agency (such as the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, a county
correctional administrator, a district attorney or the Attorney
General), “[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing” that “may only be overcome if a court finds the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk” of committing
one of several “super strike” offenses. (§§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2),
1170.18, subd. (c), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) When a court
considers recalling a sentence on its own motion, no such
presumption exists. (§ 1172.1, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(4).)
Second, if the trial court recalls a defendant’s sentence and
conducts a new sentencing, the court “may, in the interest of
justice . . . [r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by
modifying the sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(A).) In deciding
what sentence to impose in this new sentencing hearing, the
court “shall” (1) “apply any changes in law that reduce sentences
or provide for judicial discretion” (id., subd. (a)(2)) and (2)
“consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to,” (a)
defendant’s “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation . . .
while incarcerated,” (b) “evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence,” and (c) “evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice” (id., subd. (a)(5)). Although the “new
sentence” imposed upon resentencing must be “no greater than
the initial sentence” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)), nothing in the text of
section 1172.1 obligates a court to impose a sentence less than
the initial sentence. (Accord, Braggs, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p.
8
820 [“the sentence ultimately imposed by the court is left to its
discretion without any further application of the presumption
[affecting whether to recall the sentence]”].)
B. Analysis
In challenging the trial court’s application of section
1172.1, defendant offers two reasons why the trial court was
obligated to reduce his aggregate sentence to a degree sufficient
to ensure his imminent or earlier release (that is, by at least 120
years).
First, defendant cites one of the legislative findings
contained within Assembly Bill 600 (AB 600), which was signed
into law on October 8, 2023 and took effect on January 1, 2024.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 446.)3 Specifically, defendant points us to the
uncodified first section of this law, which contains several
“find[ings] and declar[ations]” of the Legislature. One of them
expresses the “intent of the Legislature that, in cases where the
judge concludes that recall and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.1 . . . is appropriate, the resentencing result in a meaningful
modification. ‘Meaningful modification’ means it will cause some
actual change in the person’s circumstances, including, but not
limited to, immediate release, earlier release, and newly acquired
entitlement to review by the Board of Parole Hearings or the
advancement of eligibility for a parole hearing.” (Id., § 1(d).)
Because the resentencing in this case only reduced defendant’s
sentence to 100 years in prison, defendant contends, there was no
3 Although AB 600 was enacted after the resentencing
hearings in this case, we will assume it applies and thereby
sidestep the question whether it modifies or merely clarifies
existing law. (E.g., McClung v. Employment Development Dept.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 471-472.)
9
“meaningful modification” because he still has no opportunity for
“immediate” or “earlier release.”
We reject defendant’s reliance on this legislative finding for
two reasons.
To begin, even though “statements of the intent of the
enacting body contained in a [statute’s] preamble . . . are entitled
to consideration” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1280;
see also Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 860), the
Legislature did not express a clear intent in section 1 of AB 600.
Instead, it expressed several intents, some of which are
irreconcilable as applied here. Although the Legislature
articulated the intent that a “resentencing result in a meaningful
modification,” the Legislature simultaneously expressed the
“further intent of the Legislature that courts have full discretion
in resentencing proceedings pursuant to Section 1172.1 . . . to
reconsider past decisions to impose prior strikes.” (AB 600, §
1(b).) A trial court cannot have “full discretion” during a
resentencing while simultaneously being required to dismiss
prior strikes in order to make a meaningful modification to the
new sentence. The Legislature has not expressed any
unambiguous intent to obligate trial courts to impose meaningful
modifications.
Further, even if the Legislature had expressed an
unambiguous intent, that intent cannot be reconciled with the
plain text of section 1172.1 itself. That text provides that a trial
court, upon recalling a sentence, “may . . . modify[] the sentence.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Where, as here, a statute
uses both the terms “may” and “shall,”4 its use of the term “may”
4 Section 1172.1 is replete with uses of the word “shall.”
(See, e.g., § 1172.1, subds. (a)(2), (a)(4)-(9), (b), (b)(1)-(2), (d).)
10
connotes discretion—in this instance, discretion whether to
modify a recalled sentence at all. (Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v.
Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 [“Under ‘well-settled
principle[s] of statutory construction,’ we ‘ordinarily’ construe the
word ‘may’ as permissive . . .”].) Section 1172.1 does not state
that a court “shall” or “must” modify a recalled sentence, and it
certainly does not state that the court must do so to a degree that
would guarantee an “actual change in the person’s
circumstances.” In a case such as this one where the only way to
effect a meaningful modification is to obligate a trial court to
exercise its discretion in a specific way by dismissing strikes, the
unambiguous statutory text controls. (Frlekin v. Apple, Inc.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, 1046; In re Cervera (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1073,
1079-1080; People v. Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 315, 331 [legislative findings “cannot be relied upon
as an interpretive tool when they contradict the statute’s plain
language”]; Yeager v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103 [“Legislative findings and statements of
purpose in a statute’s preamble can be illuminating if a statute is
ambiguous”].)
Second, defendant cites several of the legislative findings
contained within Assembly Bill 1540 (AB 1540), which amended
section 1172.1 in 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719.) Section 1 of AB
1540, which was not codified, contains several “find[ings] and
declar[ations]” of the Legislature. Among them are that (1) a
significant percentage of the prison population is over 50 years
old, and it is expensive to maintain someone in prison (id., § 1,
subds. (c) and (d)(1)); (2) there is almost no evidence that long
sentences deter crimes (id., subd. (d)(3)); (3) research shows that
criminal activity “diminishes dramatically” over the age of 40 (id.,
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subd. (d)(4)); (4) Californians have repeatedly and consistently
embraced reforms to reduce California’s prison population (id.,
subd. (e)); and (5) recommendations for resentencing coming from
law enforcement agencies have been carefully scrutinized (id.,
subd. (h).) As with the legislative findings in AB 600, the
legislative findings in AB 1540 are not codified and are not listed
as factors that must be considered when recalling or resentencing
a defendant pursuant to section 1172.1. Indeed, to give these
findings the weight defendant suggests is to ignore section
1172.1’s requirement that courts examine whether there is any
“evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition . . . have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5), italics added); here,
defendant elected not to adduce any such evidence.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Declining To Dismiss One of Defendant’s Prior “Strikes”
A trial court has discretion to dismiss a “strike” allegation
under our Three Strikes’ Law. (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The Three Strikes law was
“devised” to impose long sentences on “revolving-door career
criminal[s].” (People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 320
(Gaston).) In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, the
court is instructed to “‘consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in
part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) There is a
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“strong presumption” against granting a motion to dismiss a
strike. (Id. at p. 378.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
dismiss one of defendant’s two prior “strike” convictions. As the
trial court explained, defendant was an itinerant recidivist,
committing more than a crime a year between 1983 and 1988,
and thereafter violating his parole by committing further crimes.
Although his two strikes are relatively old (as they date back to
1988 and 1994), since that time defendant has either continued to
commit crimes or been incarcerated; at no point had defendant
demonstrated a crime-free life while out of custody. (Gaston,
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 321-322 [age of prior strikes is
relevant when defendant “led a crime-free life” in the interim, but
not when he has “committed an unending series of felonies, as
well as other crimes”]; People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
304, 317 [age of conviction less relevant when “defendant had
been incarcerated for the vast majority of that period”].) The
felonies underlying the sentences defendant challenged were all
violent, and even threatened or traumatized children. And
contrary to what defendant asserts on appeal, the trial court
properly considered defendant’s conduct in prison as part of his
prospects. Defendant’s contention that the court should have
given less weight to the nature of his convictions or greater
weight to factors in his favor is a request that we reweigh the
pertinent factors and come to a different discretionary decision
than the trial court, but that is beyond our purview. (E.g., People
v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 352 [under
abuse of discretion review, appellate courts “‘“do not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial
court’s”’”].)
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Although the discretion conferred in any given context
must be “consistent” with the “intended purpose” of the statute
conferring that discretion (People v. Rodriguez (2016) 1 Cal.5th
676, 685), the text of section 1172.1—which is “typically . . . the
best and most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intended
purpose” (Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62
Cal.4th 152, 157)—provides that, if a resentencing occurs, the
trial court is to “resentence the defendant in the same manner as
if they had not previously been sentenced” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)),
which implies the application of the usual rules of sentencing,
including the usual standards applicable to evaluating whether
to dismiss a “strike.” Our conclusion is reinforced by section
1172.1’s structure which separates the decision to recall and
sentence from the decision of what sentence to impose; the
statute tilts the former decision toward granting relief when law
enforcement so recommends, but not the latter decision.
Lastly, because the “meaningful modification” standard is
not incorporated into section 1172.1, and was not in effect at the
time of defendant’s resentencing hearings, the trial court did not
somehow impermissibly delegate the determination of when a
“meaningful modification” occurs to the Board of Parole
Hearings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
I concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
14
The People v. Gregory Ortiz
B332933
BAKER, J., Concurring
Without reservation, I agree with the opinion for the court’s
holding that the Legislature’s uncodified statement of its intent
that Penal Code section 1172.1 (section 1172.1) grants of relief
result in a “meaningful modification” to a defendant’s sentence is
not binding on a trial court and should instead be viewed as
hortatory (see Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 860). The
court here thus was not statutorily obligated to reduce defendant
and appellant’s sentence more than it did.
Only with reservations, however, do I agree with the
opinion for the court’s approach to resolving the related question
of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined
to strike one of defendant’s prior “strike” crimes in fashioning the
section 1172.1 relief it granted. The opinion for the court holds a
trial court ruling on whether to strike a strike in the context of a
section 1172.1 proceeding must be evaluated solely according to
the legal standard our Supreme Court adopted decades ago—
including a “‘strong presumption’ against granting a motion to
dismiss a strike” (citing People v. Carmony (2002) 33 Cal.4th 367,
378). By all appearances, that was the trial court’s view in this
case too. On the record, the court stated its belief that its “great
power to dismiss a prior strike conviction should only be used in
extraordinary circumstances when the ends of justice demand it.”
The court was further guided by its understanding that “[a] trial
court abuses its discretion when it dismisses a defendant’s prior
strike conviction in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
that would take the defendant outside of the spirit of the Three
Strikes law.”
I believe this approach is in tension with the principle that
a court’s exercise of discretion must be informed by the legal
framework in which discretion is exercised. (See, e.g., People v.
Rodriguez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 676, 685; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
Univ. of Southern Cal. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [“‘The scope of
discretion always resides in the particular law being
applied . . .’”].) Here, that framework would seem to include not
just the Three Strikes law but also section 1172.1 and Penal Code
section 1385, the latter of which the Three Strikes law has
always kept open as an available avenue for relief. (Pen. Code,
§ 1170.12, subd. (d)(2); see also People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th
561.) I nevertheless join the holding that there was no abuse of
discretion here because I believe we are bound by Carmony’s
articulation of the limits on the exercise of discretion—at least
absent further guidance from our Supreme Court on how courts
should consider, in the specific context of a section 1172.1 recall
of sentence proceeding that can only be initiated by a court or law
enforcement agency (broadly defined to include the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation) (§ 1172.1, subd. (c)), whether
striking a strike is in furtherance of justice.
BAKER, J.
2
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