CourtListener 10374568•People v. Baldridge CA1/3
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Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Baldridge CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170863
v.
CODY BALDRIDGE, (City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. CT23002443)
Defendant and Appellant.
Cody Baldridge appeals from a judgment convicting him of burglary
and vandalism and sentencing him to a two-year jail term. Baldridge refused
to come to court for his trial or sentencing, which were conducted in his
absence. (See Pen. Code, § 1043, subdivision (f) (§ 1043(f)); statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) On appeal, he contends that the judgment
must be reversed because his constitutional right to be present at trial was
violated. Baldridge also contends that orders committing him to county jail
must be modified because they do not state explicitly that he was awarded
604 days of presentence custody credits. We shall remand for modification of
the commitment orders but otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2023, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a felony
complaint charging Baldridge with committing three felonies at different
1
commercial establishments during nonbusiness hours: burglary with the
intent to commit larceny at the Buena Vista Cafe (§ 459, count 1); burglary
with intent to commit larceny at Square Pie Guys (§ 459, count 2); and
vandalism at Ghirardelli Square causing damage of more than $400 (§ 594,
subd. (b)(1), count 3). Baldridge failed to appear for arraignment and was
subsequently taken into custody. On March 2, he appeared, entered not
guilty pleas, and was released on his own recognizance pursuant to an order
to appear at all subsequent hearings.
Baldridge’s preliminary hearing was set for April 27, 2023. He failed to
personally appear at the hearing. On May 3, the court revoked the order
releasing Baldridge on his own recognizance, set bail, and ordered issuance of
an arrest warrant. The warrant was discharged, the preliminary hearing
was reset for July, and Baldridge was released on his own recognizance.
Baldridge failed to appear at the July hearing, another warrant was issued,
and on August 21, Baldridge was again remanded into custody. The
preliminary hearing was reset several more times. Initially, the court denied
Baldridge’s request to be released again on his own recognizance, but on
September 18, Baldridge was released pursuant to conditions, including that
he enter a treatment program and comply with electronic monitoring. In
early October, his release was terminated, and while Baldridge was in
custody, he refused to come to court multiple times despite having been
ordered to appear. Finally on December 29, Baldridge appeared in court and
was held to answer.
On January 10, 2024, the People filed an information charging
Baldridge with the three offenses alleged in the complaint. Baldridge refused
to come to court for the arraignment, which was continued several times and
then completed in his absence. Thereafter, he refused to come to court for
2
any hearing, including when the case was called for trial on March 14. On
March 19, the court declined to proceed with motions in limine because
Baldridge was not present, and the court had not received either a waiver
from Baldridge or a declaration from a deputy at the jail attesting that
Baldridge had been read his rights under section 1043 and still refused to
come to court. The court notified the parties that if Baldridge refused to come
to court the next day or thereafter, trial would proceed with defense counsel
standing in as his representative if the court was provided with a declaration
from a deputy attesting that Baldridge refused to come to court after having
been read his rights under section 1043.
On March 20, 2024, Baldridge refused to come to court for his trial.
The court had received a signed declaration from a deputy, stating that
Baldridge was admonished of his rights pursuant to section 1043(f)(1), and
still refused to come to court. The declaration, which the court read into the
record, was made on a form supplied by the court that consisted of an
admonishment to be read to Baldridge, instructions to the deputy, and space
for the deputy to provide Baldridge’s response.
The admonishment stated: “Defendant Cody BALDRIDGE, . . ., your
trial is set for today, March 20, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. [¶] 1. You have the right
and obligation to be personally present in court today for your trial, and by
refusing to go to court, you are waiving that right. [¶] 2. Your trial will
proceed without you being present today. [¶] 3. You have the right to remain
silent during the trial. [¶] 4. Your absence without good cause will constitute
a voluntary waiver of any constitutional or statutory right to confront any
witnesses against you or to testify on your own behalf at your trial. [¶] 5.
Your defense counsel will be present and will appear for you at the trial.
3
[¶] Based on these rights, are you refusing to appear in court today for your
trial?”
The directions to the deputy stated: “Deputies: Please read the above
admonition and note any observations regarding the inmate’s understanding
of the consequences of the refusal and any statements made by the inmate
related to their refusal to come to court for their trial.” The handwritten
information on the declaration stated: “INMATE STATED, ‘YEAH’ AFTER
BEING READ THIS ADMONISHMENT.”
Defense counsel objected to proceeding without Baldridge, stating that
Baldridge had told him that he would come to court that day. The court
granted a recess so defense counsel could go to the jail to talk to Baldridge,
but also observed that “we’ve already lost a day of trial due to Mr. Baldridge’s
refusal to come to Court.” The court stated that 70 potential jurors had been
waiting, and it wanted to “get this moving while obviously respecting Mr.
Baldridge’s due process rights.” When proceedings resumed several hours
later, Baldridge was not present. Defense counsel stated he had been unable
to meet with Baldridge, but the court advised that it had contacted the
sheriff’s office at the jail and obtained another confirmation that the deputy
had delivered the admonishment to Baldridge and Baldridge refused to come
to court. Accordingly, the court ruled that, pursuant to section 1043(f)(1), “I
am finding that he has refused to come to court after being advised of his
rights and advised of the fact that his defense counsel will be present and will
appear for him at trial.”
Thereafter, at the beginning of each trial day, the court made a record
of the fact that Baldridge was read the admonishment provided by the court
after which he refused to come to court. The jury was sworn on March 21,
4
and the People presented their case on March 25 and 26. The defense called
no witnesses. On March 28, the jury found Baldridge guilty of all charges.
The matter was called for sentencing on April 23, 2024. Baldridge
refused to come to court. Concluding the refusal was willful, the court relied
in part on the signed declaration of a deputy who had delivered an
admonishment to Baldridge that morning, parts of which the court read into
the record. The deputy told Baldridge his sentencing was set for that
morning, and then delivered the following admonishment: “1. You have the
right and obligation to be personally present in court today for your felony
sentencing, and by refusing to go to court, without good cause, you are
waiving that right. [¶] 2. Your sentencing will proceed without you being
present today. [¶] 3. You have the right to remain silent during the
sentencing. [¶] 4. Your absence without good cause will constitute a
voluntary waiver of any constitutional or statutory right to confront any
witnesses against you or to testify on your own behalf at your sentencing.
[¶] 5. Your defense counsel will be present and will appear for you at the
sentencing. [¶] []6. By personally waiving your right to be personally present,
you agree that notice to your defense counsel that your physical or remote
presence in court at a future date and time is required is notice to you of that
requirement. [¶] Based on these rights, are you refusing to appear in court
today for your sentencing?”
The declaration form included an instruction to the deputy to read the
admonishment to Baldridge and then note any observations regarding his
understanding of the consequences of his refusal as well as any statements
made by him relating to his refusal to come to court for sentencing. In
response, the deputy stated: “INMATE UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE
ADMONISHMENT & REFUSED COURT.”
5
At the April 23 hearing, the court also observed that the probation
department had sought a continuance because Baldridge was refusing to be
interviewed and had not completed forms to relinquish his firearm. The
court stated that it would request the department to submit a report with as
much information as it could provide. It also considered issuing an order
pursuant to section 1194 directing the deputies to bring Baldridge to court.
The defense objected to compelling Baldridge’s presence by physical force,
arguing that would violate Baldridge’s constitutional rights, and that
Baldridge was not required to be present to be sentenced. Defense counsel
agreed to appear for Baldridge pursuant to section 977 so that sentencing
could proceed. Over a defense objection, the court found good cause to
continue the sentencing hearing, to give Baldridge another opportunity to
cooperate with the probation department and appear for sentencing.1
The next sentencing hearing was held on May 21, 2024. Baldridge
refused to appear, and the court received another declaration attesting that
Baldridge had been admonished that morning and stated repeatedly that he
understood the admonishment. The court found that Baldridge had “willfully
refused” to come to court for sentencing “without good cause.” Nevertheless,
the court found that having Baldridge present would be really helpful and
that he should have a third opportunity to come to court for sentencing.
Therefore, the court again found good cause for a continuance.
The People made an oral request for an order to extract Baldridge from
jail and bring him to court at the next hearing. The defense renewed their
objection to Baldridge being physically extracted from jail, contending he “has
1 Baldridge contends, with no citation to the record, that he objected to
being sentenced in absentia. The record shows the opposite; the defense
objected that sentencing should not be continued on the ground that
Baldridge refused to appear.
6
a right to not be present, especially under the new laws.” The court made a
“point of correction,” stating that Baldridge did not have a “right not to be
present,” as he was “obligated under the law to be present for his trial [and]
for sentencing.” Then the court denied the People’s request, without
prejudice for them to file a formal motion. The court stated that it did not
think it was appropriate to compel Baldridge’s appearance under the
circumstances, that the law allowed for a defendant to be sentenced in
absentia if there was good cause, and that the court would be comfortable
sentencing Baldridge “if we give him another opportunity” to appear.
Baldridge was sentenced on June 11, 2024. He refused to come to court
that day. The court expressed its intention to make findings to proceed with
sentencing in the interest of justice and inquired whether either party
objected. The prosecutor and defense counsel both indicated they had no
objection. Baldridge had received another admonishment that morning, and
the court read parts of the deputy’s declaration into the record. The deputy
reported that Baldridge confirmed he could hear the deputy clearly and that
he understood what was read to him. Based on the recent admonishment as
well as the repeated failure of Baldridge to come to court throughout the trial
and sentencing proceedings, the court ordered that it would “permit Mr.
Baldridge to appear by counsel today at this sentencing hearing under Penal
Code section 977[, subdivision] (d)(1).”
The court also invoked its authority to pronounce judgment pursuant to
section 1193, subdivision (a)(1), which provides that a defendant convicted of
a felony need not be personally present when judgment is pronounced if
“after the exercise of reasonable diligence to procure the presence of the
Defendant, the Court finds that it will be in the interest of justice that
judgment be pronounced in the Defendant’s absence.”
7
Before pronouncing sentence, the court outlined its intended sentencing
decisions and invited argument. For the count one burglary, the court
imposed a midterm two-year sentence, citing Baldridge’s “extensive criminal
record,” and ordered that the term was servable in county jail. The court
imposed a concurrent midterm sentence for the count two burglary and a
concurrent lower term of 16 months for the vandalism conviction. Baldridge
was awarded 604 credit days toward his jail sentence, consisting of 302
actual custody days, and an additional 302 credits pursuant to section 4019.
DISCUSSION
I. Issue on Appeal and Standard of Review
Baldridge contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial
court committed constitutional error by relying on section 1043(f)(1) as the
basis for commencing trial.
Section 1043 addresses the presence or absence of a defendant from a
criminal trial. As pertinent here, subdivision (a) provides that, subject to
specified exceptions, “the defendant in a felony case shall be personally
present at the trial.” (§ 1043, subd. (a).) Two express exceptions are set forth
in section 1043, subdivision (b) (section 1043(b)), which provides that once
trial has commenced in the physical presence of the defendant, the absence of
the defendant does not prevent continuing with the trial when (1) the trial
cannot be carried on in the defendant’s presence due to his or her refusal to
cease disruptive conduct, or (2) the prosecution is for a noncapital offense and
“the defendant is voluntarily absent.”
Section 1043 also recognizes waiver as a third exception to the
requirement of personal presence. A felony defendant may waive the
personal presence requirement because subdivisions (a) and (b) do not “limit
8
the right of a defendant to waive the right to be present in accordance with
Section 977.” (§ 1043, subd. (d).)
This appeal involves a fourth exception to the personal presence
requirement, which is codified in section 1043(f). Section 1043(f)(1) provides
that a trial “shall be deemed to have commenced in the presence of the
defendant” when the trial court makes the following finding by clear and
convincing evidence: “(A) The defendant is in custody and is refusing,
without good cause, to appear in court on that day for that trial. [¶] (B) The
defendant has been informed of their right and obligation to be personally
present in court. [¶] (C) The defendant has been informed that the trial will
proceed without the defendant being present. [¶] (D) The defendant has been
informed that they have the right to remain silent during the trial.
[¶] (E) The defendant has been informed that their absence without good
cause will constitute a voluntary waiver of any constitutional or statutory
right to confront any witnesses against them or to testify on their own behalf.
[¶] (F) The defendant has been informed whether or not defense counsel will
be present.”
The section 1043(f) exception to the personal presence requirement
applies only if the defendant was not personally present in court at the
commencement of trial. (§ 1043(f)(4).) For this exception to apply, the court
must make a record of its findings under subdivision (f)(1) and its reasons for
those findings. (§ 1043(f)(2).) If the trial lasts more than one day, the
requisite findings must be made anew for each day the defendant is absent.
(§ 1043(f)(3).)
On appeal, Baldridge does not contend that the trial court failed to
comply with the requirements for invoking section 1043(f), nor does he
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings under
9
this statute. (See People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 74 [findings
regarding defendant’s voluntary absence from trial are reviewed for
substantial evidence].) Instead, Baldridge makes a sweeping claim that the
trial court violated his constitutional rights by relying on section 1043(f)(1).
Baldridge intimates that he raised this issue in the trial court, but we
disagree. Defense counsel objected to proceeding with trial without Baldridge
being present, but the objection was based primarily on the alleged
inadequacy of the admonishment, an issue he abandons on appeal. At one
point during trial, defense counsel questioned the appropriateness of using
section 1043(f)(1) in this context, opining it was intended to assist in
conducting preliminary hearings “during the COVID era.” But as best we can
tell, the defense did not dispute the constitutionality of section 1043(f)(1).
We construe Baldridge’s appellate claim as a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of this provision. “A facial challenge to the constitutional
validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself,
not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.” (Tobe v.
City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.) “The interpretation of a
statute and the determination of its constitutionality are questions of law. In
such cases, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review.” (People v.
Health Laboratories of North America, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 442, 445.)
A facial constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal.
(In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–889.)
II. Baldridge Fails To Show Section 1043(f)(1) Is Unconstitutional
Baldridge takes the position that commencing trial in his absence
based on the showing required by section 1043(f)(1) violated his
constitutional right to be personally present at trial. He cites no authority for
this proposition, which we reject.
10
“The federal and state Constitutions provide a criminal defendant with
the right to be personally present with counsel” (People v. Martinez (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 892, 912 (Martinez)), and certain statutes obligate the
defendant to be personally present. For example, section 977,
subdivision (b)(1) “provides that in felony cases, the defendant shall be
present ‘at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary
hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the
trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence.’ The defendant has
the right to be present at all other proceedings, unless he executes a written
waiver. [Citation.] Section 1043, subdivision (a), also mandates that the
defendant in a felony case be personally present at trial. These statutory
rights are coextensive with the constitutional right.” (Martinez, at p. 912.)
Importantly, the right to be present for trial is not absolute. (Martinez,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 912.) As “ ‘ “a matter of both federal and state
constitutional law,” ’ ” even a capital defendant “ ‘ “may validly waive
presence at critical stages of the trial.” ’ ” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th
701, 773.) Such a waiver can be express or implied, and implied waivers
often involve conduct by the defendant that disrupts the proceedings. (People
v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 82.) The defendant’s statutory rights to
be present at trial are also subject to qualification. (People v. Gutierrez (2003)
29 Cal.4th 1196, 1204.) For example, section 977 requires a felony defendant
to be present during specified critical proceedings, including during the
taking of evidence at trial, and it does not authorize even a written waiver of
this requirement. However, our Supreme Court has made clear that section
977’s presence requirement is subject to qualifications set forth in section
1043, including section 1043, subdivision (b)(2), which provides that after
trial has commenced in the defendant’s presence, the defendant’s voluntary
11
absence does not prevent the trial from continuing to a verdict. (Gutierrez, at
p. 1203; see also Welch, at p. 774 [section 997 subject to qualification in
section 1043, subdivision (b)(1) permitting felony trial in absence of
disruptive defendant].) “ ‘ “[T]here can be no doubt whatever that the
governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by
conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going forward.” ’ ”
(Gutierrez, at p. 1204.)
Applying these principles, we see no conflict between the constitutional
right to be present at trial and section 1043(f)(1). The findings required to
commence trial under section 1043(f)(1) ensure that the defendant has made
a knowing and informed decision not to appear in court, and such intractable
conduct does not defeat the governmental prerogative to proceed with the
trial. Baldridge does not actually address these statutory requirements or
articulate any basis for finding them constitutionally inadequate. Instead he
criticizes section 1043(f) for two reasons that do not defeat its
constitutionality.
First, Baldridge posits that courts have “long attached particular
significance” to the distinction between a defendant who was present at the
commencement of trial and those who absented themselves before trial ever
began. To support this proposition, Baldridge cites two cases: Crosby v.
United States (1993) 506 U.S. 255 (Crosby); and People v. Howard (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 1526 (Howard), disapproved on another ground in People v.
Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11. We note that both cases were
decided long before section 1043(f)(1) went into effect on January 1, 2022.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 196, § 2; see Assembly Bill No. 700 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assem. Bill 700).) In any event, neither case provides authority for
Baldridge’s constitutional challenge.
12
In Crosby, the defendant was convicted of mail fraud in violation of
federal law. (Crosby, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 256.) The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment on the ground that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43 does not permit “the trial in absentia of a defendant who
absconds prior to trial and is absent at its beginning.” (Id. at p. 256, italics
omitted.) The Court based its decision on the text of the federal rule and the
common law on which the rule was based. (Id. at pp. 258–261.) In that
context, the Court did attach significance to the distinction between a
defendant who absconded after trial commenced and a defendant who never
appeared at trial because at common law the right to be present at trial was
unwaivable, but federal law carved out an exception dictated by common
sense for cases in which a defendant absconded after trial commenced. (Id. at
pp. 259–260) In reaching its conclusions, the Crosby Court did not discuss
the constitutional right of a defendant to be present at a criminal trial, except
to note it had no occasion to reach any such claim. (Id. at p. 262.)
In Howard, the defendant was convicted by a California jury of
multiple sex offenses against a child. (Howard, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1530.) One issue on appeal pertained to whether the trial court erred by
accepting the defendant’s oral waiver of his right to be present at a bifurcated
court trial of prior conviction allegations. (Id. at p. 1535.) Finding no error,
the Howard court declined to accept the People’s concession that under
section 977, the “defendant’s waiver had to be in writing.” (Id. at p. 1539.)
To the contrary, the court found, “disruption, standing alone, waives the right
to be present,” and “voluntary absence, standing alone, even without any
written waiver, constitutes a waiver of the right to be present at trial.” (Id.
at p. 1538 [collecting cases].) The Howard court also summarized principles
pertaining to a criminal defendant’s “federal right” to be present at trial, and
13
in that context stated: “[A]lthough the right to be present for the
commencement of trial arguably cannot be waived (see Crosby v. United
States (1993) 506 U.S. 555 . . .), the right to be present thereafter is waived if”
the defendant is either disruptive or voluntarily absent. (Id. at pp. 1536–
1537.)
In his appellate brief, Baldridge focuses solely on the observation in
Howard that the federal right to be present “for the commencement of trial
arguably cannot be waived.” (Howard, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536.)
The Howard court made that observation because of Crosby, which discusses
the federal procedural rule, not a constitutional right. (Howard, at pp. 1536–
1357; Crosby, supra, 506 U.S. at pp. 258–262.) Moreover, the Howard
defendant was present when his trial commenced, so the court had no
occasion to consider whether that factor was dispositive. Baldridge points to
nothing in the Howard court’s legal analysis that supports his attack on
section 1043(f)(1). To the contrary, Howard’s holding that a felony
defendant’s voluntary absence from court can constitute a waiver of the right
to be present at trial reinforces our conclusion that the section 1043(f)
procedures are similarly adequate to protect the defendant’s constitutional
right to be present at trial.
As his second ground for this appeal, Baldridge relies on the fact that
section 1043(f)(1) was enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to
Baldridge, the legislative history of section 1043(f)(1) demonstrates that it
was adopted as an emergency measure “to alleviate pandemic-related health
concerns associated with law enforcement officers having to physically
remove defendants from their jail cells to bring them to court.” Baldridge
argues that even if such health concerns justified enacting section 1043(f)(1),
the pandemic is over and the continued application of the statute violates due
14
process. We are not persuaded by this circular argument, which continues to
presume that section 1043(f)(1) is unconstitutional without ever making that
showing. As discussed, the constitutional right to be present at trial is not
absolute and can be waived by the defendant’s disruptive conduct or
voluntary absence. Section 1043(f)(1) is consistent with these principles, as it
authorizes a trial to proceed in a felony defendant’s absence when the
defendant is in custody and refuses without good cause to appear in court.
The findings that must be made by clear and convincing evidence before this
provision can be applied assure that the defendant’s constitutional right to be
present at trial is protected.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Baldridge’s legislative history
argument.2 He relies on reports that indicate section 1043(f) was added to
the Penal Code to address two problems relating to custodial defendants who
refused to come to court. First, sheriff departments had refused to forcibly
remove defendants from their jail cells to bring them to court for preliminary
examinations or commencement of trial, out of fear of causing or incurring
injury or out of concern of the increased risk of contracting an illness,
especially during the COVID pandemic. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis
of Assem. Bill 700 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) June 27, 2021, p. 6; Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Senate Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 700
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) July 1, 2021, p. 8.) Second, judges who were
unwilling to order that a defendant be physically removed from jail and
brought to court were often also concerned that proceeding in the defendant’s
absence would violate the defendant’s statutory rights even though the
2 We grant Baldridge’s unopposed request for judicial notice of five
legislative reports pertaining to Assem. Bill 700. (But see Quelimane Co. v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9 [published
legislative history may be cited without request for judicial notice].)
15
defendant did not want to be present. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Assem. Bill 700 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) June 27, 2021, p. 6; see also e.g.
Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 700 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) Apr. 26, 2021, p. 4.)
Baldridge’s legislative history material shows that Assembly Bill 700
addressed long-standing problems relating to defendants who were in custody
and refused to come to court so their trial could be commenced. The fact that
the COVID pandemic “exacerbated” existing concerns about forcibly
removing defendants from their jail cells in no way supports Baldridge’s
constitutional challenge to section 1041(f)(1), which we reject. (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Senate Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 700
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) July 1, 2021, p. 8.) Baldridge points to nothing in the
legislative history of Assembly Bill 700 supportive of his view that section
1043(f) was proposed or adopted as a temporary measure, or that there was
ever any concern about its constitutionality.
III. Presentence Custody Credits
Baldridge contends that a remand is required because the minute order
from his sentencing hearing and his county jail commitment form are
ambiguous with respect to the amount of his presentence custody credits.
(See § 1213 [authorizing use of minute order or jail commitment form in lieu
of abstract of judgment for defendant sentenced pursuant to § 1170,
subd. (h)].) The People concede that custody credits were “incorrectly listed”
on these documents. Although the People concede too much, we agree with
Baldridge that the judgment records should be modified to clarify a potential
ambiguity and avoid a clerical error from occurring. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [mistakes in abstract of judgment are clerical
errors subject to correction at any time].)
16
At sentencing, the trial court found that Baldridge had earned credit
for 302 days of actual time served, he was eligible for custody credits
pursuant to section 4019, and with the additional 302 days of custody credits,
Baldridge had 604 credits as of the date of sentencing. The jail commitment
form and the court’s minute order both state correctly that Baldridge’s credit
for time served was recorded as 302 days, and that Baldridge was found
eligible for “half-time credits” pursuant to section 4019. However, the
judgment records do not clearly convey that the total credits awarded by the
court were 604 days. Thus, we will direct the superior court to amend the
judgment documents to make this clear.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to modify the judgment documents to clarify that Baldridge
was awarded 604 credit days toward his sentence. The trial court shall send
copies of the modified judgment documents to the pertinent authorities.
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
People v. Baldridge (A170863)
17
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