People v. Lampkin CA2/7

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Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Lampkin CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B333485

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA483705)
v.

DEVAN LAMPKIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal;
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Blake
Armstrong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Devan Lampkin of second degree murder
and found true the allegation he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon in committing the murder. Lampkin argues
that the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay a statement he
made to police following his arrest, that substantial evidence did
not support his conviction for second degree murder, and that the
court abused its discretion in denying his motion under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike
his prior serious or violent felony conviction. Because none of his
arguments has merit, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Lampkin Kills Homer Montez Garcia
Lampkin began 2020 with a cup of coffee on New Year’s
Day at a 24-hour Mexican restaurant in downtown Los Angeles.
Lampkin sat at the bar, “minding his own business,” for an hour
or more. Lampkin had been homeless for about 10 years and
kept a pocketknife for protection. After drinking his coffee for a
while, Lampkin set his knife on the counter to get it “off the side
of [his] waistband.”
Around that time Homer Montez Garcia came into the
restaurant and appeared intoxicated. He sat at the counter
about four seats away from Lampkin and ordered breakfast.
After Garcia received his food a woman walked into the
restaurant, briefly placed a box near Garcia, spat at the floor, and
said something to Garcia that might have been racist or might
have been a request for food. Garcia told the woman to leave,

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and she did. Garcia became upset, walked over to Lampkin, and
said he was unable to have breakfast in peace. Lampkin
remained seated and told Garcia to go back to his seat and eat.
Over the next few minutes Garcia and Lampkin argued,
with Garcia repeatedly getting up and walking toward Lampkin,
and Lampkin repeatedly telling Garcia to sit down. Lampkin
said to Garcia, “I’m not talking to you,” “I’m still not talking to
you,” and “Go sit down and finish your food.” Garcia slurred his
speech and swerved as he walked toward Lampkin. At some
point during the argument Lampkin picked up his knife.
Lampkin stood up, and Garcia said, “‘Sit the fuck down. I’ll
fuck you up. . . . If you don’t sit down, I’m a fuck you up in here.’”
Lampkin testified he was “getting angry” because he kept telling
Garcia to leave him alone, but Garcia “wouldn’t go sit down.”
Lampkin said he was scared and did not know if Garcia had a
weapon. When Lampkin thought Garcia was “reaching for
something,” Lampkin “hugged” Garcia, stabbed him in the chest
with the knife, and pinned him against the counter. Lampkin
“threw [Garcia] to the ground,” cleaned his knife, picked up his
coffee and a cup of ice, and left the restaurant. The restaurant
owner called the 911 emergency operator, and Garcia died at the
hospital. A medical examiner determined Lampkin forced the
knife blade through one of Garcia’s ribs and into his heart.

B. Police Arrest and Interview Lampkin
The Los Angeles Police Department obtained a photograph
of Lampkin from the restaurant’s video surveillance system and
provided it to the media. An off-duty officer saw a news story on
television about the stabbing and recognized Lampkin as a
homeless person who frequented the downtown branch of the

3
Los Angeles Public Library. The next day, January 3, 2020, the
officer saw Lampkin at the library and arrested him. Lampkin
had shaved his head and beard since the stabbing.
Lampkin waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 and told detectives Garcia got “up in [his]
face” and said he was going to kick Lampkin’s “ass” and “fuck
[him] up.” Lampkin said he repeatedly told Garcia that he did
not want to talk to him, but Garcia continued to threaten him,
and Lampkin said he “couldn’t take no more.” Lampkin “wasn’t
trying to hurt anybody.” Lampkin said he stabbed Garcia only
once because he was trying to get Garcia “to back up off of [him].”
Lampkin said that, when Garcia fell, Lampkin “panicked,” picked
up his stuff, and left.

C. A Jury Convicts Lampkin, and the Trial Court
Sentences Him
The People charged Lampkin with first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and alleged that Lampkin
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the
murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), that he had a prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and that he
had a prior conviction for a serious felony within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
At trial the People played the surveillance video from the
restaurant, from when the woman carrying the box came into the
restaurant to when Lampkin stabbed Garcia. Lampkin testified
in his defense. He admitted that he “poked” Garcia with his
knife, but said that he “felt threatened” because he “didn’t know

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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what [Garcia] was going to come up and do” and he “didn’t know
what [Garcia] might have had on his waistband in his jacket.”
Lampkin stated Garcia threatened him several times, saying he
was going to kick his “ass,” “beat [him] up,” and “fuck [him] up.”
Lampkin testified he had been homeless for about 10 years
and slept on Skid Row. He said a lot of people on Skid Row used
drugs and alcohol and could be belligerent and violent. Lampkin
said he was verbally threatened every day, had been “jumped,”
had a knife pulled on him twice, and had a gun pointed at him
once. In the last incident, a man told Lampkin that he was
“‘looking to hurt somebody’” and that he would shoot Lampkin,
but another man intervened, and Lampkin walked away.
Lampkin had also seen stabbings and shootings, and frequently
heard about beatings.
Dr. Kevin Booker, a clinical psychologist who specializes in
trauma, diagnosed Lampkin with post-traumatic stress syndrome
and testified for the defense. As a result of Lampkin’s condition,
Dr. Booker stated, Lampkin struggled with “hyperarousal or
hypervigilance, meaning that he always was feeling like he
needed to be on guard.” Dr. Booker said hypervigilance can cause
people to perceive threats inaccurately, to “overprepare,” and
“invariably” to “overreact.” Dr. Booker said hypervigilance was
“the most debilitating” of the “core symptoms” of post-traumatic
stress syndrome because it left people “in constant fear for their
personal safety and well-being.”
Lampkin admitted Garcia never brandished, or said he
had, a weapon. Lampkin also admitted his “first physical
contact” with Garcia was stabbing him. Lampkin stated he never
tried to get Garcia to stop harassing him by pushing Garcia,
slapping him, or hitting him. Lampkin said he believed it was

5
“reasonable to stab someone if they’re running their mouth at
you” because “[t]alking can turn into a physical situation.”
Lampkin stated that he was not aiming at any particular part of
Garcia’s body when he stabbed him, but that he “just reached
out.” Lampkin said he felt badly after stabbing Garcia and
believed Garcia suffered only a “flesh wound.” Lampkin,
however, admitted that stabbing people in the chest where he
stabbed Garcia could kill them. Lampkin said he did not check to
see if Garcia was okay after stabbing him and throwing him to
the ground.
The jury acquitted Lampkin of first degree murder,
convicted him of second degree murder, and found true the
allegation he used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing
the murder. In a bifurcated proceeding Lampkin admitted he
had a prior conviction from 2000 for committing a lewd or
lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd.
(a)) that was a serious felony within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), and a serious or violent felony within the
meaning of the three strikes law.
Lampkin filed a motion under section 1385 and Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike his prior serious or violent felony
conviction under the three strikes law and to dismiss the
sentence enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
Lampkin argued that his prior conviction was remote in time and
that, in the 20 years since the conviction, he had committed only
two misdemeanors and one non-violent felony before committing
the current offense. The misdemeanors were for second degree
commercial burglary (§ 460, subd. (b)) in 2005 and soliciting or
engaging in “lewd or dissolute” conduct in a public place (§ 647,
subd. (a)) in 2013, both of which resulted in short sentences in

6
county jail. The non-violent felony was for failure to register as a
sex offender (§ 290, subd. (b)) in 2015, which led to a 32-month
sentence.2 Lampkin also argued that he killed Garcia in an
impulsive act influenced by his “time on the street” and that he
expressed remorse for his actions. Lampkin argued that, if the
court dismissed the prior serious or violent felony conviction and
five-year enhancement, he still would not be eligible for parole
until he was 69 years old.
The court dismissed the five-year sentence enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), but denied Lampkin’s
motion under Romero. Regarding the latter ruling, the court
stated Lampkin’s prior serious or violent felony conviction, which
involved his 12-year-old stepdaughter, was for conduct within the
spirit of the three strikes law. The court found the current
conviction was also within the spirit of the three strikes law
because Lampkin armed himself before standing up from the
counter, even though Garcia did not brandish a weapon, and
because Lampkin “surprise-attacked” Garcia, “killing him and
leaving him to die on the floor of the restaurant.” The court also
found Lampkin was a danger to public safety because he had
become more violent as he aged and he had killed a stranger in a
restaurant merely for “disrespect[ing]” him. The court also
observed Lampkin’s prison term for failure to register as a sex
offender did not deter him from committing murder several years
later. The court sentenced Lampkin to a prison term of 31 years
to life (15 years to life, doubled under the three strikes law, plus
one year for using a deadly or dangerous weapon). Lampkin
timely appealed.

2 Before his 2000 conviction, Lampkin was convicted of petty
theft (§ 488) in 1994

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DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excluding Lampkin’s
Postarrest Hearsay Statements to Police

1. Relevant Proceedings
As stated, Lampkin testified at trial. On cross-examination
the prosecutor asked Lampkin if he stayed to talk to the police
after stabbing Garcia. Lampkin said, “No.” The prosecutor
asked, “According to you, this guy had threatened you, and you
felt like you needed to defend yourself; so why not stop and talk
to the police?” Lampkin said there was no reason. The
prosecutor also asked Lampkin whether he shaved his head and
part of his beard to change his appearance after learning from
the news police were looking for him. Lampkin said he planned
to do those things anyway. The prosecutor asked if Lampkin
went to the police to tell them what happened after he learned
the police were looking for him. Lampkin said, “No.”
Before beginning his redirect examination, counsel for
Lampkin asked the court to allow her to question Lampkin about
his January 3, 2020 interview with police. She argued the
prosecutor “opened the door” to testimony about Lampkin’s
voluntary statements to police about his altercation with Garcia
by suggesting that Lampkin did not speak with police before trial
and that he fabricated his testimony about the altercation with
Garcia for the trial. For example, counsel for Lampkin stated she
wanted to elicit Lampkin’s statements to police that he stabbed
Garcia to get Garcia “off of him,” that he felt threatened, that he
did not know if Garcia had a weapon, and that, after stabbing
Garcia, he “panicked” and left the restaurant. According to

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counsel for Lampkin, this testimony would counter the
prosecutor’s insinuation Lampkin fabricated his earlier testimony
because the proposed testimony would show that what Lampkin
stated at trial was consistent with what he stated to the police.
The prosecutor argued that he did not insinuate Lampkin
had not spoken to the police or fabricated his testimony and that,
even if he had, Lampkin’s statements to the police in his
postarrest interview were not admissible as prior consistent
statements under Evidence Code section 791 because Lampkin
had a motive to fabricate his statements during the police
interview. Thus, the prosecutor argued, Lampkin’s statements to
police did not satisfy section 791, subdivision (b), which requires
“the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication,
or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.” Counsel for
Lampkin argued Lampkin did not have a motive to fabricate his
statements to police at the time of his interview because Lampkin
waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily agreed to speak to
police detectives, which he did not have to do. Instead, counsel
for Lampkin contended, Lampkin did not have a motive to
fabricate until the People charged him with murder.
The court agreed with the prosecutor. The court found
“from a commonsense perspective” the motive for Lampkin to
fabricate arose “at least when he got arrested” (and might have
arisen as soon as he stabbed Garcia). Thus, Lampkin’s
statements to the police did not satisfy the hearsay exception
under Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is

9
consistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in
compliance with [Evidence Code] Section 791.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1236.) As relevant here, section 791, subdivision (b), makes a
prior consistent statement admissible where it is offered after
(1) “[a]n express or implied charge has been made that [the
witness’s] testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated” and
(2) “the statement was made before the bias, motive for
fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”
The parties dispute only the second, temporal requirement of this
exception. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a hearsay
objection for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Portillo (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 577, 588; see People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th
285, 325 [no abuse of discretion where the trial court excluded
prior consistent statements as hearsay].)

3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Ruling Lampkin Had a Motive To Fabricate
When He Was Arrested
As the trial court recognized, a defendant generally has a
motive to fabricate his or her story following arrest. In People v.
Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th 285 the trial court excluded
statements the defendant, who had been an informant for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, made to a police detective after
the defendant was jailed following his arrested for murder. (Id.
at pp. 298, 324.) Like Lampkin, the defendant in Navarro
testified at trial and wanted to use his out-of-court statements to
bolster the truth of his testimony. (Id. at p. 325.) The Supreme
Court held the statements were inadmissible under Evidence
Code section 791, subdivision (b), because “[b]y the time of
defendant’s arrest . . . , a motive for fabrication had plainly

10
arisen.” (Navarro, at p. 325; see People v. Hitchings (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 915, 921 [hearsay statements were not admissible
under section 791, subdivision (b), where the defendant’s “arrest
provided a motive for bias or fabrication”].)3
Citing People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, Lampkin
argues a prior consistent statement is admissible so long as the
prior statement is made before the witness testified at trial.
Brents does not say that. In Brents the Supreme Court held the
temporal requirement of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision
(b), was satisfied because the implied charge of fabrication was
based on the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, and the
witness made the prior consistent statement before the
preliminary hearing. (Brents, at p. 616.) Moreover, Lampkin’s
argument would make every prior consistent statement made
before trial admissible, which is not what section 791,
subdivision (b), says. (See People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147,
200 [“‘[I]f the consistent statement was made after the time the
improper motive is alleged to have arisen, the logical thrust of
the evidence is lost and the statement is inadmissible.’”]; Cal.
Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2025) foll.
§ 791 [same].)

3 Lampkin argues People v. Hitchings, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th
915 is distinguishable because the defendant in that case did not
testify at trial. The court in Hitchings, however, held Evidence
Code section 791, subdivision (b), did not apply for two reasons:
(1) the defendant did not testify at trial and (2) he had a motive
to fabricate after his arrest. (See Hitchings, at p. 921.)

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B. Substantial Evidence Supported Lampkin’s
Conviction for Second Degree Murder

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation
required for first degree murder. [Citation.] Malice may be
express or implied. [Citation.] Malice is express when a
defendant intends to kill and implied when a defendant
consciously disregards danger to human life. [Citation.] Implied
malice requires proof of both a physical act and a mental state.
Physically, a defendant must perform an act whose natural
consequences are dangerous to life, or put another way, [the]
defendant must perform ‘“an act that involves a high degree of
probability”’ of death. [Citations.] To establish the mental state
required for implied malice, the defendant must deliberately
perform the act with a conscious disregard for life, knowing the
act endangers another’s life.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593,
600; see People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, 151, 156-
157; People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859.)
To prove implied malice, “an act that will certainly lead to
death is not required,” but “the probability of death from the act
must be more than remote or merely possible.” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 513; see People v. Superior Court
(Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 500.) “‘Phrased in
everyday language, the state of mind of a person who acts with
conscious disregard for life is, “I know my conduct is dangerous to
others, but I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.”’” (People v.
Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 713, 726.) “Implied malice can
exist even if the act results in an accidental death. [Citation.]

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And like all other elements of a crime, implied malice may be
proven by circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Superior Court
(Valenzuela), at p. 502; see Murphy, at p. 726.)
“‘In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing
court’s role is a limited one.’ [Citation.] We ‘evaluate the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (People v. Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1004; see
People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507.) “We must ‘view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the People’ and
‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.]
We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’” (People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411; see Lagunas, at p. 1004.) “In deciding
the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution
of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive
province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181; accord, Lagunas, at p. 1004.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s
Finding of Implied Malice
As a preliminary matter, Lampkin argues substantial
evidence must support findings of both implied and express
malice. Lampkin relies on People v. Guillen (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 934, which indeed states that, where “the record
does not disclose which theory the jury relied on in convicting

13
[a defendant] of second degree murder,” a reviewing court “must
determine whether there was sufficient evidence supporting [the]
second degree murder conviction[ ] under each theory of second
degree murder.” (Id. at pp. 982-983.) Here, the trial court
instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.11 and 8.30 that second
degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought and that malice may be express or implied.
The court also instructed the jurors with CALJIC No. 8.74 that, if
they found Lampkin guilty of an unlawful killing, they had to
unanimously agree whether he was guilty of murder in the first
or second degree, but the court did not instruct the jurors that
they had to agree on a theory of malice.4
The court in Guillen, however, misstated the law, at least
as applied to this case.5 The jury did not have to unanimously
agree on a theory of malice to find Lampkin guilty of second
degree murder. (See People v. Brown (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 708,
715 [“[r]ather than defining different mens reas . . . express and
implied malice are really a shorthand way of denoting the
requisite mental state for murder known as malice aforethought,”
and “the jury was not required to unanimously agree on its
theory of malice in finding [the defendant] guilty of second degree
murder”]; see also People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1256
[jury need not unanimously decide whether the defendant
committed premeditated first degree murder or first degree

4 Nor does Lampkin contend he requested such an
instruction.

5 In People v. Guillen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 934 the trial
court instructed the jury on three theories of murder: implied
malice, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. The court did not
instruct the jury on express malice. (Id. at p. 982.)

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murder by lying in wait].) Express and implied malice “are not
distinct elements of the crime but are instead merely distinct
means of committing the offense.” (Russell, at p. 1256; see Schad
v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 636 [the prosecution need not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every “enumerate[d] alternative
means of committing a crime” that do not “define separate
elements or separate crimes”]; People v. Williams (2013)
56 Cal.4th 630, 682, fn. 31 [“although ‘a jury must unanimously
agree that the defendant is guilty of the statutory offense of first
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt . . . it need not decide
which of several proffered theories of first degree murder liability
governs the case’”]; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 408
[“‘as long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant is guilty of murder as that offense is defined by
statute, it need not decide unanimously by which theory he is
guilty’”].) Thus, we need only decide whether substantial
evidence supported at least one theory of second degree murder.
(See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 168
[“‘“reversal is not necessary when the court can determine from
the record that the verdict rested on a theory which is supported
by sufficient evidence”’”]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619,
671 [same]; see also People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1003
[“Because we can ascertain from the record that the first degree
murder verdict rested on a theory supported by substantial
evidence, we need not reach the issue whether there was
sufficient evidence supporting the alternate theory of
premeditation and deliberation.”].)
Substantial evidence supported the jury finding Lampkin
acted with implied malice. Regarding the physical act
requirement of implied malice, Lampkin admitted that stabbing

15
a person in the chest could cause death. And the evidence
showed that, far from merely “poking” Garcia with a knife,
Lampkin drove the knife into Garcia’s chest with sufficient force
to penetrate a rib. Moreover, without warning, Lampkin
attacked Garcia, who Lampkin said was swerving as he walked
and having a hard time standing up.6 Stabbing an unarmed
drunk person without provocation is akin to a “sucker punch”
that catches a victim at his most vulnerable and, along with the
severity of stabbing someone in the chest, supported the finding
Lampkin’s act was dangerous to human life. (See People v.
Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 509-510 [physical component of
implied malice satisfied where the victim was unaware he needed
to defend himself against a forceful punch]; People v. Palomar
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 969, 977 [same].)
Regarding the mental state requirement of implied malice,
the jury could reasonably infer from Lampkin’s conduct and his
testimony that he deliberately stabbed Garcia in the chest
knowing it would endanger Garcia’s life. Lampkin and one of the
restaurant workers testified Lampkin “hugged” Garcia before
stabbing him and pinned him against a counter, from which the
jury could have inferred Lampkin could aim his knife at Garcia’s
chest. And as stated, Lampkin said he knew stabbing people in
the chest can kill them. Moreover, Lampkin did not show
concern for Garcia’s condition or seek help for him. (See People v.
Cravens, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511 [defendant’s failure to determine
the victim’s condition or secure emergency assistance supported
the finding of implied malice]; People v. Palomar, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 [same].) To the contrary, Lampkin

6 A blood analyst testified at trial Garcia’s blood alcohol
concentration at the time of his death was at least .26.

16
testified he “threw [Garcia] to the ground” before picking up his
cup of coffee and a cup of ice and leaving the restaurant.
Lampkin argues stabbing Garcia “only” once after Garcia
“hovered over him and assailed him while [Lampkin] remained
on his stool drinking coffee” negated the mental state necessary
for implied malice. Lampkin cites People v. Spring (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 1199, where the court held “one punch” that was
too weak to knock the victim off his feet or render him
unconscious was not “an act involving ‘a high degree of
probability that it [would] result in death.’” (Id. at p. 1205, italics
omitted.) But by finding Lampkin guilty of second degree
murder, the jury rejected Lampkin’s defense he did not act with a
conscious disregard for human life because he had an actual but
unreasonable belief he needed to defend himself from Garcia.
And a single stabbing, especially to the chest, is substantially
more dangerous to human life than a single punch. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, substantial
evidence supported the jury’s finding Lampkin deliberately
stabbed Garcia knowing that act endangered Garcia’s life and
with a conscious disregard for it.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Lampkin’s Motion Under Romero
Lampkin argues the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss his 20-year-old prior serious or violent felony
conviction. He also argues that courts considering Romero
motions should take into consideration the goals of recently
passed sentencing reform legislation and that the trial court’s
ruling conflicted with those goals. Neither argument has merit.

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The trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss in furtherance of justice a serious or
violent felony conviction for purposes of sentencing a defendant
under the three strikes law. (Wheeler v. Appellate Division of
Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1193, 1206; People v. Clancey
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 582; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.)
“In deciding whether to dismiss a prior strike, a court considers
‘whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and
the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 636-
637; see People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161
(Williams).)
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard, which requires the
defendant to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140; see
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375; People v.
Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) “It is not enough to
show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to
strike one or more prior conviction[s]. Where the record is silent,
or where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in
conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial
court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first
instance. Because the circumstances must be extraordinary
. . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the

18
spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he
commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record,
the continuation of which the law was meant to attack, the
circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that
the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, at p. 378, cleaned
up.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Lampkin’s request to dismiss his prior serious or violent felony
conviction. The “remoteness of a prior conviction, ‘by itself,
cannot be a basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction.’”
(People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 12; see People v. Dain
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 415-416, review granted May 29,
2024, S283924; see also § 667, subd. (c)(3) [“the length of time
between the prior serious or violent felony conviction and the
current felony conviction shall not affect the imposition of
sentence”]; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 342
[section 667, subdivision (c)(3), “suggests, at a minimum, that
remoteness alone cannot take a defendant outside the spirit of
the very law that expressly rejects remoteness as a basis for
avoiding the law”].) Instead, an old conviction may deserve
judicial forgiveness when it becomes a “‘pivot point’” for the
defendant’s reform. (Dain, at p. 416.) Lampkin, however, did not
reform. Even after committing a violent felony in 2000 (see
§ 667, subd. (d)(1) [defining as violent felonies the offenses listed
in section 667.5, subd. (c)]; § 667.5, subd. (c)(6) [listing a violation
of section 288, subdivision (a), as a violent felony]), he committed
second degree commercial burglary, solicited or engaged in lewd
conduct, failed to register as a sex offender, and served several
additional prison terms before committing the current, violent

19
offense. Contrary to Lampkin’s suggestion, that he managed not
to commit more violent crimes while living on the streets for
10 years does not take him outside the spirit of the three strikes
law.
Lampkin also argues the “spirit” behind sentencing reform
legislation such as section 1385, subdivision (c), which requires a
trial court to consider certain enumerated factors in deciding
whether to dismiss a sentence enhancement in the interests of
justice,7 supports his contention the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss his 20-year-old violent felony
conviction. Lampkin acknowledges that no court has applied
section 1385, subdivision (c), or its “spirit” to the three strikes
law,8 but he asserts that a decision whether to dismiss a

7 Lampkin also cites section 745 (the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020); Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.),
which amended former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, and
expanded the scope of potential relief; Senate Bill No. 136
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b), to limit prior prison term enhancements to prior
prison terms for sexually violent offenses; Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended sections 188 and 189 to
eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder; and Senate Bill
No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 12022.53,
subdivision (h), to give courts discretion to strike firearm
enhancements under section 1385.

8 Every court that has considered the issue has held that,
because “subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an
‘enhancement,’” and because the three strikes law is not an
enhancement, section 1385, subdivision (c), does not apply to the
three strikes law. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237,

20
sentencing enhancement is comparable to a decision whether to
dismiss a prior serious or violent felony conviction because in
both instances (Lampkin says) a court must consider whether
“the defendant’s circumstances indicate he or she should be
deemed to fall outside the spirit of the statutory sentencing
scheme.”
The Supreme Court in Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148,
however, held the trial court, in determining whether to dismiss
a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony under the
three strikes law, can consider only “factors intrinsic to the
scheme, such as the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects.” (Id. at pp. 160-161; see People v. Garcia (1999)
20 Cal.4th 490, 494, 498-499 [applying Williams to the
defendant’s Romero motion].) And section 1385, subdivision (c),
includes several factors extrinsic to the scheme underlying the
three strikes law, such as the consequences for a defendant in a
particular case. (See Williams, at p. 161 [“no weight whatsoever
may be given to factors extrinsic to the scheme, such as . . . bare
antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant”].) For
example, in determining whether to dismiss a sentence
enhancement, section 1385, subdivision (c), requires a court to
consider whether applying the enhancement would result in a
sentence of over 20 years. (§1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Under

244; see People v. Dowdy, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 9-10;
People v. Killian (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 191, 217; People v. Dain,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 411, review granted; People v. Olay
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 66-67; People v. Tilley (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2.)

21
Williams that is not a permissible factor to consider in
determining whether to grant a defendant’s motion under
Romero. Thus, the goals of the recent sentencing reform
legislation Lampkin identifies, such as reducing long prison
sentences and ending racial disparity in sentencing, are not
intrinsic to the scheme underlying the three strikes law, and the
trial court may not consider them in ruling on a Romero motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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