Guzman v. Hammond CA1/3

CourtListener 10372951CalctappApr 4, 2025

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Filed 4/4/25 Guzman v. Hammond CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANEL GUZMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171589
v.
TYRON HAMMOND, (Lake County Super. Ct.
No. FL216760)
Defendant and Appellant.

Tyron Hammond appeals from an order renewing Anel Guzman’s
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him and denying his
request to modify the custody and visitation order regarding their children.
Hammond avers the court abused its discretion in extending the DVRO,
failed to adequately explain its reasoning as to the custody and visitation
order, and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2021, the court granted Guzman a three-year DVRO against
Hammond that included an order for child custody and visitation.
Hammond and Guzman each requested modification of the custody and
visitation order. After holding hearings, the court issued an amended DVRO
in November 2023, set to expire in August 2024, which contained the custody
and visitation order at issue in this appeal.

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The November 2023 order provided for Hammond to have visitation
with the children twice per month without a third-party supervisor present.
In an apparent oversight, the order did not contain verbal orders made by the
court at a February 2023 hearing at which both parties were present. Those
February 2023 orders required the parties to communicate through Talking
Parents or My Family Wizard (third party co-parenting services), prohibited
Hammond from having his children around one of his sisters, and required
the children not to be left with anyone under the age of 18 when in
Hammond’s care.
Before its expiration, Guzman filed a request to renew the DVRO. She
also filed a request to modify the custody and visitation order to terminate or
require supervision for Hammond’s visitation with the children. Hammond
opposed the DVRO renewal request and filed a competing request to modify
the custody and visitation order, seeking joint custody and overnight visits.
On August 23, 2024, the court held a hearing on the DVRO renewal
request and the requests to modify the custody and visitation order.
Guzman sought permanent renewal of the DVRO, asserting she had
been psychologically, emotionally, and verbally abused by Hammond and
feared future abuse. She argued Hammond had violated the DVRO on
numerous occasions over the prior three years, primarily by contacting and
harassing her. As to visitation and custody, Guzman asserted Hammond
violated the prohibition on having the children around his sister. She further
contended Hammond harassed their 12-year-old daughter by repeatedly
asking her questions about Guzman’s personal life and insulted Guzman in
front of their daughter. Guzman requested a temporary no-visitation order
as their 12-year old did not wish to see Hammond, though she wanted for
Hammond to be able to see the children in the near future.

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Hammond admitted that he had violated the DVRO by communicating
with Guzman, even though he knew the order prohibited him from contacting
her directly or indirectly. He believed he was exercising his right to free
speech in communicating with her, but had since realized he was mistaken in
that belief. Hammond denied any misconduct toward the children and
contended he was committed to providing them a supportive environment.
He claimed the children had only been around his sister on one occasion and
with Guzman’s full awareness. Hammond requested overnight visits with
the children on the first and third weekends of the month.
On October 3, 2024, the court issued an order renewing the DVRO and
denying all requests to modify the custody and visitation order. As to the
DVRO, the court found Guzman had a reasonable fear and apprehension of
future abusive conduct by Hammond. It found Hammond had violated the
terms of the initial DVRO by contacting Guzman—as Hammond himself
admitted at the hearing—which corroborated Guzman’s apprehension of
future abuse.
The court found that both parties’ requests to modify the custody and
visitation order were not in the best interests of the children and that the
record and evidence supported continuation of the existing order. The court
modified the order to add a non-disparagement provision and to include the
oral pronouncements from February 2023 that had been unintentionally left
out of the November 2023 order (requiring communication be through a co-
parenting service, prohibiting contact with Hammond’s sister, and requiring
the children not be left with someone under the age of 18 when in
Hammond’s care). Hammond appealed.1

1 In addition to appealing the October 2024 order, Hammond listed the

February 2023 order on the notice of appeal, but his appeal from that order is

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DISCUSSION
Hammond raises three challenges to the court’s October 2024 order,
which we address in turn.
I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Renewing the DVRO
Hammond contends there was insufficient evidence supporting the
court’s decision to renew the DVRO. We disagree.
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code,2 § 6200 et
seq.; DVPA), “a court may issue a protective order ‘ “to restrain any person
for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring
a period of separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 106, 115.) The DVPA defines “abuse” as intentionally or
recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, sexual assault,
placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury, or engaging in behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to section
6320. (§ 6203.) Section 6320 includes, as relevant here, “harassing,
telephoning, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise,
. . . or disturbing the peace of the other party . . . .” (§ 6320, subd. (a).)
Section 6345 provides that a court may renew a DVRO “without a
showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” (§ 6345,
subd. (a).) If a DVRO renewal does not state an expiration date, as was the
case here, the duration of the order is three years from the date of issuance.
(Id., subd. (c).)

untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104.) In any event, the only claim in
his briefs related to that proceeding concerns his allegation of a conflict of
interest, which is unsupported by the record.
2 All further statutory references are to the Family Code.

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The standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected party
entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. (Ritchie v. Konrad
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.) This standard “does not mean the court
must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective
order is not renewed.” (Ibid.) Rather, the court should renew a DVRO if the
evidence shows “it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of
future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and
reasonable.” (Ibid.) “An imminent and present danger of abuse is not
required; there must only be a reasonable apprehension that ‘abuse will occur
at some time in the future if the protective order is allowed to expire.’ ”
(Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179, quoting Ritchie v.
Konrad, at p. 1288.)
We review the grant of a DVRO renewal for abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) In considering
the evidence supporting a DVRO, we ask “ ‘ “ ‘whether, on the entire record,
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ supporting
the trial court’s finding. [Citation.] ‘We must accept as true all evidence . . .
tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving
every conflict in favor of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Evilsizor &
Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.)
Contrary to Hammond’s assertion, substantial evidence supports the
court’s determination that Guzman had a reasonable fear and apprehension
of abusive conduct if the DVRO were not renewed. As noted, abuse under the
DVPA includes harassment and direct or indirect contact. (§§ 6203, 6320,
subd. (a).) Guzman’s testimony, in which she described numerous instances
in which Hammond contacted and harassed her over the preceding three
years, provided sufficient evidence for the court to find that she had a

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reasonable apprehension that abuse in the form of future contact would occur
if the initial DVRO were allowed to expire. (See Michael M. v. Robin J.,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) And Hammond’s own admission that he
violated the initial DVRO by contacting Guzman, even though he knew he
was prohibited from doing so, provided further support for the court’s finding.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
request to renew the DVRO.3
II. The Court Adequately Explained Its Ruling on the Custody and
Visitation Order
Hammond argues the court’s “modification” of the custody and
visitation order lacked adequate justification and was not in the best
interests of the children. We are not convinced.
“Under California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and
visitation determinations, the overarching concern is the best interest of the
child. The court and the family have ‘the widest discretion to choose a
parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ [Citation.] When
determining the best interest of the child, relevant factors include the health,
safety and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by one parent against the
child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of contact with the
parents.” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255; § 3040, subd. (e).)
We review custody and visitation orders for abuse of discretion. (Chalmers v.
Hirschkop (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 289, 299.) The appellant bears the burden
of proof to show an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

3 As we conclude the evidence described above supports the court’s

renewal of the DVRO, we do not reach Hammond’s assertion that the court’s
reference to a prior violation in April 2023 lacked corroboration.

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Here, the court denied both parties’ requests to modify the order as it
found the evidence supported continuation of the existing order as to
visitation and custody rights. In addition, and contrary to Hammond’s
contention, the court expressly cited “the best interests of the children” in
making that determination.
The only changes the court made to the custody and visitation order
were to incorporate the already existing February 2023 verbal orders and to
require that neither Hammond nor Guzman disparage the other in the
presence of the children. The court explained that the February 2023 orders
had been inadvertently left out of the November 2023 order, noting the orders
were made in the presence of the parties and were “clearly” intended to be
part of the custody and visitation order. In addition, the November 2023
order was not in conflict with those February 2023 orders and did not address
them in any way. Hence, the inclusion of these prior, existing orders does not
constitute a modification. The only actual modification was the addition of a
mutual non-disparagement order. The court heard testimony that Hammond
had made disparaging remarks about Guzman and was well within its
authority in ordering the parties to not disparage each other in front of their
children.
Courts have wide discretion in fashioning custody and visitation orders
(Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255) and Hammond has not met
his burden to show the court abused that discretion. (See Chalmers v.
Hirschkop, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.)
III. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause Does Not Apply
Hammond avers the court violated his rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment by relying on statements made by their

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children (as relayed by Guzman) without giving him the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the children.
At the August 2024 hearing, the court noted that, although neither
party had requested the 12-year-old daughter’s testimony, it would defer a
decision on whether it would be necessary and in her best interest to have her
testify. In its order, the court declined to consider new allegations raised for
the first time at the hearing that implicated witness accounts of the children
and, as a result, it would not seek the children’s testimony.
The Confrontation Clause, by its express terms, applies only to
“criminal prosecutions” and, therefore, not the case before us. (U.S. Const.,
6th Amend.; accord, People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 214 [“There is no
right to confrontation under the state and federal confrontation clause in civil
proceedings . . . .”].) To the extent Hammond instead seeks to raise a due
process claim (see People v. Otto, at p. 214), we find no error in the court’s
determination that requiring his 12-year-old daughter to testify was
unnecessary to its ruling, which, as discussed, was amply supported by other
evidence in the record.
DISPOSITION
The order granting Guzman’s request to renew the DVRO and denying
both parties’ requests to modify the custody and visitation order is affirmed.
Guzman shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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_________________________
PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.

A171589/Guzman v. Hammond

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