In re L.R. CA1/2

CourtListener 10372375CalctappApr 3, 2025

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Filed 4/3/25 In re L.R. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170204
v.
(Solano County
S.R.,
Super. Ct. No. JD2300073)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
At a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court
sustained allegations that S.R. (mother) placed her newborn daughter L.R. at
risk because mother, who was homeless, was unable to provide safe and
stable housing, obtained no prenatal care during her pregnancy, and tested
positive for amphetamines at the hospital. The court declared L.R. a
dependent (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)), removed her from mother’s
custody and ordered reunification services.1 Mother now timely appeals the

Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
1

Institutions Code. We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.

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disposition order, challenging both the jurisdictional findings and the
determination to remove L.R. from her custody. We affirm but for a limited
remand to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) due to uncontested, conceded ICWA
violations.
DISCUSSION
In October 2023, L.R. came to the attention of the Solano County Child
Welfare Services (the Agency) the day she was born, through an emergency
referral reporting that mother tested positive for amphetamines upon her
admission to the hospital, received no prenatal care and had no provisions to
support the baby. Hospital staff provided the emergency social worker a copy
of a toxicology report indicating a positive result for methamphetamines
(“detected”). When interviewed at the hospital, mother reported she was
homeless and had received no prenatal care but denied using substances.
L.R. was ordered detained. Over the next three months, mother was
given numerous referrals for substance abuse treatment, housing programs
and other supportive resources. She reported using drugs since 11th grade
(she was 21 when the case began), reported struggling with
methamphetamine addiction since living in a homeless encampment in
December 2022, and told her lead social worker she had used
methamphetamine during her pregnancy, though she had tried to stop. By

of Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the full factual and procedural
background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or
should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely
reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive
factual or legal statement”].)

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the time of the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on March 18,
2024, she had been kicked out of one residential treatment center after two
days and admitted using methamphetamines the day she was discharged;
and had attended a meeting with her lead social worker under the influence
of drugs and incoherent and admitted she was still using. After that, the
Agency provided her with additional intensive case support through the
services of a family preservation social worker, Erika Henry, who was
assigned to meet weekly with mother to “really handhold” her and help her
engage with services. Nevertheless, by the time of the contested hearing she
was not enrolled in any substance abuse treatment and had not engaged in
any other referrals. In addition, several months before the hearing she
claimed to have stopped using methamphetamines and had agreed to
undergo voluntary drug testing, but frequently missed voluntary drug testing
appointments despite being given transportation assistance and other
support from the Agency to facilitate her drug testing. In light of this, the
juvenile court stated it could not substantiate her claims to new sobriety.
We perceive no error in the juvenile court’s decisions to declare L.R. a
dependent.2 Mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings centers
principally on her homelessness and poverty, but her drug use was also at
issue.3 As to that, she asserts there was insufficient evidence that she tested

2We presume the parties’ familiarity with the substantial evidence
standard of review governing our review of the court’s jurisdictional findings
under section 300, subdivision (b).
3 For the first time in her reply brief she asserts that substance abuse
was not pled in the petition, which she asserts was narrowly focused only on
a “single, questionable positive drug test” at the hospital. But any argument
that parental substance abuse generally was beyond the scope of the
pleadings and thus improperly considered is undeveloped, and we decline to
consider it. (See Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 [“Mere

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positive for methamphetamines at the hospital because the lab reports show
she tested negative, but we do not agree. The hospital lab reports are
difficult to read at first glance, and the juvenile court called them “a little
funky”, but they reflect that methamphetamines were “detected.”4 (Italics
added.) In addition, a medical professional told the Agency they reflect a
positive result.
Lab tests aside, we also agree with the Agency that there was ample
evidence that mother’s positive test at the hospital “was not isolated but part
of a pattern of ongoing substance abuse” which is accurately summarized in
the respondent’s brief. For example, although she denied it on the witness

suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than
general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate
review”]; accord, Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893,
910.) Such an argument also is defied by the record. Mother’s addiction
struggles, and resources and steps to help her address them, were addressed
in every status report filed below; she herself admitted she had an addiction
that made it difficult for her to stop using substances; and in closing
argument at the contested hearing, her counsel did not contend that mother’s
substance abuse generally was beyond the scope of the pleadings and
addressed the issue on the merits.
4 The October 14 report attached to the detention report indicated that
mother’s initial “screening” for drugs had been completed but a separate
“confirmation panel” was still “in process.” Her screening results concerning
amphetamines and methamphetamines indicated “T’FOLLOW” rather than
“negative,” which the emergency response social worker testified was a
descriptor that meant the lab confirmed the presence of a substance but not
the levels.
The October 17 lab result attached to the detention report stated that
both substances were in fact “detected” in mother’s “confirmation” panel.
And at the contested hearing, mother herself introduced another
document (entitled “Comment, Amphetamine Confirmation, Urine,
Amphetamine Confirmation Panel”) reporting an “abnormal” result on her
amphetamine confirmation panel. The parties stipulated it was the
confirmation lab result received from a medical social worker at the hospital.

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stand, mother herself disclosed to her lead social worker she used
methamphetamine during her pregnancy, had tried to stop when she found
out she was pregnant, but was unable to refrain from using because she was
addicted and homeless. And there is ample evidence that she continued to
use methamphetamine after L.R. was born. For example, she herself
testified she resumed two weeks after L.R. was born. And although she
claimed to have stopped about two months later (around January 1), the
court could infer from her many subsequent missed drug tests that she had
been unable to fully refrain. (See In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324,
fn. 4 [“one reasonable inference from a parent’s refusal to submit to drug
testing at the agency’s request, knowing that the agency is attempting to
confirm or rule out substance abuse, is that the parent fears such tests would
be positive”].)
Parental substance abuse alone, of course, is not a basis for asserting
dependency jurisdiction; there must also be proof it poses a substantial risk of
danger to the child, which may include an inability to provide the child with
regular care. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 559-561 (N.R.); § 300,
subd. (b)(1).) In her reply brief, mother asserts that there is no nexus
between mother’s substance abuse and a risk of harm to L.R., who was born
healthy, and that mother’s visits with her were appropriate. But this
overlooks mother’s admitted drug use during her pregnancy, which the court
could infer she knew had already placed her (as yet unborn) child at risk
because she admittedly tried to refrain while pregnant but could not.5 The
court also could reasonably infer a substantial risk mother would continue to

5 Unlike in many cases that come before us, L.R. fortunately was not
born with a positive toxicology result or any medical issues. But mother’s
drug use during her pregnancy nonetheless posed a risk that she would be
affected.

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engage in the same behavior after L.R. was born despite the danger it could
pose to an infant: her addiction was so serious that she showed up to a
meeting with her lead social worker under the influence and incoherent.
Given mother’s inability to refrain from using drugs at a juncture so critical
to her in her role as a parent, the court could reasonably infer she would have
difficulty refraining from using drugs at other equally important times when
caring for her newborn infant round the clock. And she had not yet begun
any drug treatment programs. Mother cites no authority suggesting such
evidence was insufficient to establish a substantial risk that L.R., a newborn,
would be endangered in her custody. Appellate courts have affirmed the
exercise of jurisdiction in similar circumstances. (See, e.g., In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212-213 [children properly declared dependents based
on, inter alia, mother’s past substance abuse including use of drugs while
pregnant, mother’s dishonesty about extent of drug use, missed drug tests
and fact she “had not seriously begun any services to address her issues”]; In
re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217, disapproved on another
ground in N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18; see also N.R., at p. 559
[while substance abuse alone is not prima facie evidence of risk, “a child’s
youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require
and whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial
risk of serious physical harm” and “Courts can properly take these facts
regarding a child into account, together with all other relevant evidence”].)
We also perceive no error in the juvenile court’s decision to remove L.R.
from mother’s custody rather than order family maintenance services.
There was sufficient evidence to support the order removing L.R. from
mother’s custody, a finding supported by substantial evidence measured by
the required clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. (See § 361,

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subd. (c)(1).) Mother cites no authority suggesting the evidence of substantial
danger here was insufficient. Unlike situations involving domestic violence
or physical child abuse where a child may safely reside with one or both
parents if the parents are ordered to live apart or the offending parent is
required to move out, as in the authority mother cites (see In re M.V. (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 944, 964-965, 968, 969; In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
803, 810), mother was addicted to narcotics that she was powerless at times
to resist. No court-ordered living arrangement could eliminate the risks to an
infant posed by her addiction.6 Mother’s cited authority also is inapt because
unlike in those cases (see M.V., at p. 968; Ashly F., at p. 810), apart from her
two-day stay at the first residential placement she had been offered, mother
had not participated in any of the voluntary case plan services the Agency
had made available to her and had made no progress with respect to the
Agency’s concerns.
We are not insensitive to the challenges posed by addiction. And we
commend mother’s self-reported efforts to get clean and sober, as well as the

6 Mother says the court and Agency failed to consider the lesser
alternative of allowing her to maintain custody of L.R. while living with a
relative such as her older sister and receiving family maintenance services.
But there was ample evidence no relative was willing to take her in.
Although at the detention hearing mother’s counsel reported mother was at
that time living with her older sister, later on mother stayed temporarily at
the home of the paternal grandfather who objected to her remaining there
and by the time of the contested hearing, mother was on her own—she
testified she sometimes stayed with friends (whose homes she implied
weren’t suitable for an infant (“All my friends be like, oh yeah, she can come
here. I’m like, no”)), sometimes in a hotel room and sometimes in her van.
Numerous relatives were interviewed, all of them were aware mother was
homeless, and none volunteered that they were amenable to offering a home
to mother and her baby, much less before mother had enrolled in any
substance abuse program or been able to stay free of drugs.

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uniformly positive reports of her visits with L.R. But on this record, the
court’s decision to remove L.R. from her custody was supported by
substantial evidence of danger, measured by the clear and convincing
standard. (See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 215, 217 [affirming
dispositional order removing children from custody of mother who used drugs
during pregnancy and did not meaningfully engage in services to address her
drug use].)
Mother also says the department failed to make reasonable efforts to
prevent the need for removing L.R. from her custody. But the record
demonstrates otherwise. The status reports and testimony at the hearing
contain ample evidence of the extensive efforts the Agency undertook to help
mother engage in voluntary services for three months, including through the
assistance of a dedicated, specially assigned case worker.
Finally, the parties agree that the juvenile court did not comply with its
initial duty of inquiry into L.R.’s potential Indian heritage. (§ 224.2,
subd. (b); see also § 224.1, subd. (c)(1) [defining “extended family member”].)
It is undisputed the Agency made no inquiry about L.R.’s possible Indian
heritage when it interviewed mother’s sister, A.J. or mother’s great aunt.
The parties agree these errors warrant conditional reversal. A child welfare
agency’s failure to make a proper initial inquiry under section 224.2
constitutes reversible error. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128,
1136.) An inadequate inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile
court’s order with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate
investigation, supported by record documentation in compliance with
California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5). (Dezi C., at pp. 1125, 1136.) That
is appropriate here.

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We do not agree, however, with mother’s assertion the Agency failed to
make diligent efforts to contact the paternal relatives to inquire about L.R.’s
possible Indian ancestry. She asserts there is no record of the Agency asking
the paternal grandfather about this and the reports contain no details about
father’s family history, “so it is unclear whether siblings, cousins or other
relatives of the father should have been interviewed.” But, contrary to
mother’s assertion, the Agency filed an “ICWA Relative Compliance Report”
that contains a paternal family chart listing numerous paternal relatives and
the Agency’s effort to contact them, several to no avail, including the paternal
grandfather who apparently did not return a voicemail message left for him.
The report also stated the Agency had enlisted the assistance of an outside
agency in its search for L.R.’s relatives. The Agency does not concede that
inquiry of the paternal relatives was inadequate and discusses those
documented efforts. Mother does not respond to that evidence or the
Agency’s points in her reply brief. “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential
standard of review. [Citations.] ‘ “On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” ’ ” (In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) By failing to address these
documented efforts or show how they were inadequate, mother has failed to
demonstrate that inquiry of the paternal relatives was inadequate.
Accordingly, we will limit our conditional remand to the maternal relatives.
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is conditionally reversed and the matter is
remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice

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requirements of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of
California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5), consistent with this opinion. If the
juvenile court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence has been conducted and concludes ICWA does not apply (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2)), then the court shall reinstate the disposition order. If the
juvenile court concludes ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity
with ICWA and California implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C., § 1912,
subd. (a); §§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1); 224.3, 224.4.)

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STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

In re L R. (A170204)

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