People v. Mendoza CA2/5

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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Mendoza CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B335080

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA105142)

JOEY ALFRED MENDOZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Joey Alfred Mendoza
(defendant) of the murders of Louis Garcia (Garcia) and
Charalambos “Bob” Antonelos (Antonelos). The trial court
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). We consider whether reversal of defendant’s murder
convictions is required because gang evidence was admitted at
trial even though gang sentencing allegations were not charged.
We also resolve several challenges to defendant’s sentence, some
of which were not raised below, and we review in camera records
concerning the defense’s pre-trial request for any Brady v.
Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 information concerning two
investigating detectives.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Confrontation Between Defendant and
Garcia that Led to the Shooting
In the morning on October 9, 2016, victim Garcia parked
near an El Pollo Loco restaurant located in the Harbor City
neighborhood of Los Angeles. The restaurant was situated near a
number of other businesses lining a triangular plaza; those other
enterprises included a hamburger restaurant, a small grocery
store, and a smoke shop. The shopping plaza fell within the
territory claimed by the Harbor City Boys, a criminal street gang,
and certain buildings surrounding the plaza were “tagged” with
graffiti associated with that gang.
When Garcia parked at the shopping plaza on the day in
question, he was wearing a hat emblazoned with a red “W,”
which was apparel associated with the East Side Wilmas, a
criminal street gang that is a rival of the Harbor City Boys. He
entered the El Pollo Loco, where his girlfriend Cynthia Renteria

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(Renteria) worked, and began arguing with her. After other
people intervened and succeeded in calming him down, Garcia
left.
Two hours later, however, Garcia returned to the plaza and
yelled at Renteria through the El Pollo Loco drive-through
window. At that point, defendant, who had been loitering with
others outside the plaza’s smoke shop, approached Garcia’s
vehicle. Defendant was 18 years old at the time, and he had a
tattoo on his lower right arm and hand associated with the
Harbor City Boys. Defendant confronted Garcia, an argument
ensued, and after a few minutes, defendant fled on foot and
Garcia gave chase.
Defendant ran inside the smoke shop, followed by Garcia.
As defendant hid in a back room, Garcia yelled and made “lots of
threats.” Garcia left after a shop employee who recognized him
told him to leave. The same employee also recognized defendant
because defendant was often in the plaza in the company of other
men.
The next day, defendant walked up to the El Pollo Loco
drive-through window where Renteria was working. Defendant
pushed open the window and told her, “Tell your homeboy to
come through. I have something for him.”

B. The Murders
Two days later, on October 12, 2016, Garcia was back at
the shopping plaza smoking marijuana and chatting with a
homeless man. Defendant, wearing an orange vest and blue
pants, entered the smoke shop looking to purchase a bandana.
After failing to find a bandana, defendant went to the nearby

3
market. During a ten-minute period,1 defendant, still wearing an
orange vest and blue pants, walked through the market several
times. The cashier on duty that morning recognized defendant
because he was a regular customer of the store and because she
knew the grandmother of his girlfriend. On his last trip through
the market that morning, defendant had changed his attire: he
was wearing a dark hoodie sweatshirt with the hood up and a rag
or a t-shirt wrapped around his lower face.
Defendant then walked toward the hamburger restaurant
and found Garcia inside. Defendant shot Garcia in the back
multiple times without saying anything—killing him—and then
exited the restaurant through its back door.2 Defendant’s gunfire
also hit Antonelos, the hamburger restaurant’s owner, killing
him too.

C. Police Investigation
The day after the shootings, detectives from the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) interviewed Edwin Ortiz, a
childhood friend of defendant’s. Ortiz said that, on the day of the
shooting, defendant admitted he “got him”—meaning “the fool”
from the East Wilmas who had “chased [him] through the plaza.”
Defendant also told Ortiz that he “got two people, like two people
got hit,” but appeared shocked when Ortiz revealed the second

1
Defendant’s presence in the market was captured by video
surveillance cameras.
2
Garcia suffered five gunshot wounds, including a
penetrating wound that entered his left shoulder and then his
neck before exiting the top of Garcia’s head.

4
victim was Antonelos. Ortiz also told the detectives that
defendant was a member of the Harbor City Boys.
Later that same day, law enforcement officers arrested
defendant. He was interviewed by LAPD detectives and denied
any involvement in the shootings. After the interview, however,
defendant was placed in a cell with an undercover officer posing
as an inmate.
During the conversation with the undercover officer that
ensued, which was audio recorded, defendant described himself
as a “Harbor City[ ] homie”3 and described Garcia as an “eastside
shit” who had been “bothering [defendant] for about three days.”
Defendant said that when he saw Garcia at the hamburger
restaurant, he “hit that motherfucker. That quick. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
I lit that fucker. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I just fucken blasted this fool. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] I hit that fool’s neck. . . . And before he was down, . . .
his neck was already, like, detached from his face.” Defendant
also confessed to shooting Antonelos: “Then after [shooting
Garcia], Bob came up. That was stupid. He tried to get people
out. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [So,] Bob got it too. I take over the scene and
shit.”

D. Criminal Proceedings, Including the Gang Evidence
at Trial
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant with murdering Antonelos (count 1) and Garcia (count
2). Attached to each murder charge were gang sentencing

3
Defendant later told the undercover officer that although
he had not yet been officially “jumped in” to the Harbor City
Boys, he had “t[aken] out homies.”

5
allegations (Pen. Code,4 §§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C) & (b)(5), 190.2,
subd.(a)(22)), multiple murder special circumstance allegations
(§ 190.2, subd.(a)(3)), and firearm enhancement allegations
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)).
Just before the start of defendant’s trial in June 2023, the
prosecution advised the trial court that it was not going to pursue
the gang enhancement or gang special circumstance allegations.
But the prosecution asked the court to still permit introduction of
some gang evidence at trial. The defense objected that such
evidence was not relevant if the prosecution was not proceeding
on the gang allegations. The court overruled the defendant’s
objection and found certain gang-related evidence, e.g., testimony
about the crime scene’s location in gang territory, was admissible
because it was relevant to motive.
During trial, the prosecution called LAPD officer Victor
Sosa to testify as a gang expert. At the time of the shootings,
Officer Sosa was assigned to monitor the Harbor City Boys and
he had had multiple contacts with defendant prior to his arrest
for the two charged homicides.
During his testimony, Officer Sosa described the territory
claimed by the Harbor City Boys and the gang’s history, size,
rivals, signs, apparel, and tattoos. Officer Sosa opined that
defendant was a member of the Harbor City Boys at the time of
the murders. He also explained that tattoos were a way for a
member to show loyalty to the gang, and he informed the jury
that defendant added larger and more visible Harbor City Boys
tattoos to his face and body following his arrest.

4
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

6
Officer Sosa also testified generally that territory was “100
percent important” to a gang and its members would protect the
gang’s territory “at all times” and “do whatever it takes to protect
it.” In addition, he explained that respect was a “big thing. If
you’re a gang member, you’re active and you get disrespected,
other gang members hear about it, especially within their gang,
that is weakness. Within a gang you don’t show weakness.”
Consequently, Officer Sosa explained, if a rival enters a gang’s
territory, it was incumbent on the gang’s members to defend their
territory by sending a message to the rival gang: if you come into
our territory, “either you’re going to get severely beaten or you’re
going to get killed.”
During closing argument, the prosecution maintained the
gang evidence was “important because the gang threat . . . is
interwoven through every act, through every contact. It is the
reason why the defendant took these measures to do what he
did.” The prosecutor argued that after being chased by Garcia
into the smoke shop, defendant had to send a message both to his
gang and to the East Side Wilmas: “To have a face-to-face
challenge like that, a confrontation on your home territory[,] and
back down, that can’t happen, especially if [the person you
backed down from is] wearing a rival gang[’]s colors representing
the W for Wilmas. [¶] This is a big issue. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] He can’t
let this sit. He just got chased in public, in broad daylight. He
got chased on his own home territory back into the smoke shop.”
The prosecution also argued defendant intentionally killed
Antonelos: “When Bob got shot, the defendant knew exactly what
he was doing. Bob got in the way. [Defendant] was taking over,
and that’s why Bob died.”

7
E. Conviction and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder
of Garcia and the second degree murder of Antonelos. In
addition, the jury found true the multiple murder special
circumstance and firearm enhancement allegations for each
murder.
In advance of sentencing, the defense submitted a
memorandum urging the trial court to stay the sentence for the
murder of Antonelos, stay all sentencing enhancements, and
impose only a sentence of 25 years to life for the murder of
Garcia. The defense argued this was justified in light of
defendant’s lack of a prior criminal record, relative youth at the
time of crime, and asserted mental illness.5 The prosecution
recommended an LWOP sentence.
The trial court sentenced defendant to LWOP plus 90 years
to life in prison. The court calculated this sentence as 50 years to
life for the murder of Garcia (25 years to life for the murder plus
another 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
firearm enhancement); 40 years to life for the murder of
Antonelos (15 years to life for the murder plus 25 years to life for
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement); and
LWOP for the multiple murder special circumstance findings.
The court elected to run the murder sentences consecutively

5
In support of its sentencing memorandum, the defense
submitted a report by a forensic psychiatrist who evaluated
defendant. The defense psychiatrist opined defendant suffered
from Cannabis and Alcohol Use Disorders, Separation Anxiety,
and Unspecified Anxiety Disorder as the result of various prior
traumatic events.

8
because Antonelos did not simply die “in the course of the
shooting;” defendant “chose to kill” him.
In explaining its sentencing decision, the court stated: “It
doesn’t make me happy to impose this type of sentence, and given
that you’re a youthful offender, you will have at some point a
parole hearing[.] [B]ut I am sentencing you this way because I
believe you are a danger to the community and you have a
mentality of someone who is willing to kill, and you deserve to
stay in prison, in my opinion; so that’s why I’m choosing, knowing
I have the discretion to choose otherwise.”

II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s two challenges to his convictions are meritless.
The gang evidence admitted at trial was relevant to motive and
intent, and the defense never argued below, and cannot argue
now, that the evidence should be excluded on Evidence Code
section 352 grounds. Moreover, even assuming just for
argument’s sake that there was evidentiary error, the error was
obviously harmless—the evidence against defendant (including
devastating recorded admissions) is overwhelming. Separately,
we have reviewed the in camera proceedings held in connection
with the defense pre-trial request for Brady information and hold
the trial court’s ruling that no information needed to be produced
to the defense was not an abuse of discretion. (See generally
People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 712-
715; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228 [Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 rulings are reviewed for
abuse of discretion].)
Defendant’s challenges to the sentence he received are also
unavailing in the main. His contention that his LWOP sentence

9
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is forfeited because it
was not raised in the trial court. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancements
because it reasonably concluded imposition of the enhancements
was appropriate to protect the public from the danger posed by
defendant. And the court’s remark at sentencing about the
availability of a youth offender parole hearing did not influence
the sentence imposed. There were, however, some technical
errors made at the sentencing hearing and in memorializing
defendant’s sentence. Because the trial court imposed the
maximum possible sentence, we can fix the problems ourselves.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting the Gang
Evidence and There Was No Prejudice In Any Event
Under established Supreme Court precedent, “evidence of
gang membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding,
the charged offense” because “evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like . . . can help prove identity,
motive, modus operandi, specific intent . . . or other issues
pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.” (People v. Hernandez
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049; see also People v. Montes (2014) 58
Cal.4th 809, 859 [“While gang membership evidence does create a
risk the jury will impermissibly infer a defendant has a criminal
disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged
[citation], ‘nothing bars evidence of gang affiliation that is
directly relevant to a material issue’”].) Our Supreme Court has
also “held that gang evidence, even if not admitted to prove a
gang enhancement, may still be relevant and admissible to prove
other facts related to a crime.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th

10
1169, 1208.) Appellate review of a trial court’s admission of gang
evidence under such circumstances is for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.)
There was no such abuse here. Evidence of defendant’s
membership in the Harbor City Boys (including his tattoos both
before and after his arrest), of the territory claimed by the
Harbor City Boys, of the potential significance of Garcia wearing
a hat with an emblem associated with a rival gang while in an
area marked as Harbor City Boys territory, and of the adverse
consequences that would befall a gang member if he allowed a
rival to move openly through his gang’s territory and fled without
reprisal from a confrontation were relevant to establishing
defendant’s motive and intent to kill Garcia. (See, e.g., People v.
Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 64 [trial court did not prejudicially
err in admitting gang evidence where “there was little question
that evidence of defendant’s gang membership was relevant to
motive” and “gang affiliation evidence gave context to the
shooting”]; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 [gang
evidence was relevant to “establish defendant’s motive and intent
for simply walking up to” the victim and shooting him]; see also
Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 32 [“‘“‘[B]ecause a motive is
ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its probative value
generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is
permitted in admitting evidence of its existence’”’”].)
Defendant nonetheless argues the gang evidence should
have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 as
more prejudicial than probative.6 Defendant concedes, however,

6
Evidence Code section 352 provides “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

11
that there was no contemporaneous Evidence Code section 352
objection to admission of the evidence in the trial court. That
means the argument is forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 773; People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 431 [a defendant may not argue on
appeal that the court should have excluded evidence for a reason
not asserted at trial].)
Defendant responds that he still merits relief because the
failure to raise an Evidence Code section 352 objection
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. That claim fails
because the appellate record is silent as to why there was no
objection and we can readily hypothesize satisfactory
explanations for the absence of an objection (e.g., to avoid
drawing further attention to the gang evidence). (People v.
Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189 [a defendant has the burden
to establish constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel and
if the record on direct appeal does not reveal why counsel did not
object, a reviewing court must reject an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim “‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation’”].)
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that there was
evidentiary error or ineffective assistance of counsel on this point,
there is still no prejudice to defendant on this record. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code., § 353, subd. (b); People v. Ng

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”

12
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 522-523.) We have no doubt—in view of
defendant’s several admissions to committing the murders, the
strong eyewitness testimony, and the other forensic evidence—
that the jury would have reached the same verdicts if no gang
evidence had been admitted at trial.

B. The Trial Court’s Brady Discovery Ruling Was Not
Error
In May 2023, shortly before trial, defendant filed a
Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th 696 motion to obtain any Brady
information that may be included in the personnel files of two
LAPD detectives. The trial court thereafter conducted an in
camera review of information made available by an LAPD
custodian and ordered no information needed to be disclosed to
defendant.
Defendant, without opposition, requests we review the in
camera proceedings to determine if there was any error. We have
reviewed the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing and hold
the trial court’s determination that no materials should be
produced to the defense was not an abuse of discretion.

C. Defendant’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Challenge
to His Sentence Is Forfeited
Defendant argues his sentence qualifies as cruel or unusual
punishment under article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution because he was 18 years old at the time of the
double murder. Quoting extensively from a dissenting statement
issued by Justice Evans respecting the denial of a petition for
review, defendant embellishes the argument by asserting his
sentence is cruel or unusual “when considered under current

13
societal norms and objectives, as reflected by the Legislature’s
enactment of the Racial Justice Act.”7
The cruel or unusual punishment arguments defendant
makes now were never raised in the trial court. They are
accordingly forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Salazar (2016) 63
Cal.4th 214, 239-240 [“‘[A]s a general rule, “the failure to object
to errors committed at trial relieves the reviewing court of the
obligation to consider those errors on appeal.” [Citations.] This
applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims
based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights’”]; People
v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46; People v. Brewer (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 199, 212 [“Because defendant failed to make the
contention that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment or article I,
section 17, of the California Constitution in the trial court, he has
forfeited the issue. . . . [T]he analysis requires a ‘fact specific’
inquiry [citation], and those facts and their import to the analysis
must be developed in the trial court”]; People v. Baker (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [“A claim that a sentence is cruel or
unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not

7
Relatedly, he also states that “because the applicability of
the Racial Justice Act in sentencing was new ground at the time
of [defendant’s] sentencing, and thus not raised by trial counsel,
to the extent further development of the record would assist this
Court in determining the merits of [his] challenge to his sentence
as cruel or unusual in light of the Racial Justice Act objectives,
[defendant] submits this matter should be remanded for that
purpose rather than the issue being rejected outright.” To clarify,
the Racial Justice Act took effect on January 1, 2021, and
defendant was sentenced nearly two years later, on November 1,
2023.

14
raised below”]; see also People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
76, 115.)
Insofar as we nonetheless have discretion to undertake in
the first instance the factbound but legal analysis of whether the
sentence defendant received was cruel or unusual (see generally
In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 973 [requiring analysis of
“the nature of the offense and the offender, with particular
attention to the degree of danger both pose to society”; a
comparison of the punishment imposed with the punishment of
“more serious offenses”; and a comparison of the punishment
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense]), we decline
to exercise it. (See, e.g., People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107,
1114 [explaining “strong policy reasons” support the rule that an
appellate court generally will not consider claims of error not
raised in the trial court].) In addition, and because a cruel or
unusual punishment claim at least partly turns on the facts of a
particular case, there is no reason to conclude the argument that
defendant makes only now would have been futile to make in the
trial court.

D. The Trial Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Request to
Strike the Firearm Sentencing Enhancements Was
Not Error
Defendant argues the trial court erred “in declining to
exercise its discretion to strike the enhancements or impose a
concurrent term.” His opening brief does not specify what
enhancements he is referring to, nor does he thereafter present
any argument about what term he thinks should have been
imposed concurrently. The most he offers is a statement in his
reply brief acknowledging section 1385.1 “may not . . . give a

15
court discretion to strike the non-duplicative special circumstance
finding to prevent LWOP sentencing” but arguing “the court still
had discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether to strike
or reduce the firearm enhancement terms under section 1385.”
We accordingly construe his argument to challenge the failure to
strike the firearm sentencing enhancements (that do not alter the
LWOP term) under section 1385.
Under that statute, a trial court may strike or dismiss a
sentencing enhancement in furtherance of justice “unless the
court finds dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.” (§ 1385, subds. (a), (b)(1), (c)(1)-(2).) Section 1385
identifies various circumstances the court should give “great
weight” when exercising the discretion it confers. Those
circumstances include: “(A) Application of the enhancement
would result in a discriminatory racial impact . . . . [¶] (B)
Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed. [¶] (D) The current offense is
connected to mental illness. [¶] (E) The current offense is
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma. [¶] . . . [¶]
(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed the
current offense . . . .” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
In imposing sentence, the trial court acknowledged
defendant was “young” at the time of the killings and had no
prior criminal record. The court, however, ruled it would not
strike any of the firearm enhancements the jury found true
because it found defendant was a “danger to the community.”
Defendant argues this finding was based on a factual

16
misapprehension because he believes the evidence shows
Antonelos’s murder was a random, unintended, “line-of-fire
shooting.” That is wrong for two reasons. First, and most
obviously, even if defendant’s characterization of the evidence
pertaining to Antonelos’s murder were correct, there is still
ample basis to find he posed a danger to the community. Those
who unintentionally kill bystanders that are in the line of fire of
a premeditated murder target are highly dangerous to the
community all the same. Second, defendant’s characterization of
Antonelos’s murder is at odds with evidence at trial, which the
trial court could have appropriately credited, that defendant
intentionally murdered Antonelos even if he did so without
premeditation. In his recorded conversation with the undercover
officer, defendant said he shot Antonelos because the latter tried
to help others in the restaurant, which conflicted with his
practice of “tak[ing] over the scene” when he commits a crime.

E. The Trial Court’s Youthful Parole Hearing Remark
Did Not Influence the Sentence Imposed
Defendant additionally argues the trial court may have
erred in exercising its sentencing discretion because it
mistakenly thought he would be entitled to a youth offender
parole hearing. He is correct that at one point during sentencing
the trial court made the remarks we have already quoted, i.e.,
that defendant as “a youthful offender . . . will have at some point
a parole hearing” but the court was “sentencing [him] this way
because [it] believe[d he was] a danger to the community and [he]
ha[d] a mentality of someone who is willing to kill, and [he]
deserve[d] to stay in prison, in my opinion . . . .” It is apparent,
as the law stands now, that defendant will not get such a hearing

17
(§ 3051, subd. (h); People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838-
839), but the court’s remarks themselves demonstrate the court’s
contrary belief did not adversely impact the sentence imposed. In
making its comments, the court was effectively conceding it could
not control what a parole board might later do but it was
exercising its discretion to impose a sentence that would ensure,
to the extent possible, defendant would stay in prison, which is
where the court believed he should remain.

F. Remand for Resentencing Is Not Required for
Correction of Minor Errors in Imposing and
Memorializing Defendant’s Sentence
A review of the reporter’s transcript of the sentencing
hearing, the minute order from that hearing, and the abstract of
judgment reveals several errors and omissions that require
correction. We shall enumerate them. But “[b]ecause the
resentencing court . . . imposed the maximum possible
sentence, . . . there is no need to remand the matter to the trial
court to exercise its sentencing discretion anew.” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15; accord People v. Lopez
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342.) Instead, we shall exercise
our authority to make certain modifications and require the trial
court to incorporate those modifications in a corrected minute
order and amended abstract of judgment.

1. The sentence for Garcia’s murder
For Garcia’s murder, the trial court imposed a sentence of
50 years to life (25 years to life for the murder plus another 25
years to life for the firearm enhancement) plus LWOP due to the
true finding on the multiple murder special circumstance

18
allegation. This was error because the punishment for first
degree murder where a multiple murder special circumstance
allegation has been found true is LWOP alone. (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(3); People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 164 [“The
finding of a special circumstance thus eliminates the possibility
of a 25-year-to-life sentence and leaves only the sentencing
options of death or LWOP”].) We will accordingly strike the 25
year to life sentence for Garcia’s murder which will leave only an
LWOP sentence for that crime.

2. The sentence for Antonelos’s murder
For Antonelos’s murder, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 15 years to life at the hearing, which was correct.
(§ 190, subd. (a); People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1047-
1048 & fn. 7 [“the correct sentence for [second degree murder] is a
state prison term of 15 years to life”].) The minute order and
abstract of judgment, however, reflect a sentence of 25 years to
life for Antonelos’s murder. Where there is a discrepancy
between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the sentencing
minute order or abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement
ordinarily governs. (People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224,
242.) We direct the trial court to correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment to reflect a sentence of 15 years to life for
defendant’s murder of Antonelos.

3. Punishment for the multiple murder special
circumstance
The information alleged, and the jury found true, two
multiple murder special circumstance allegations—one for each
murder. The trial court erred by allowing the jury to make

19
multiple-murder special circumstance findings as to each murder
count. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425 [“The
information alleged two multiple-murder special circumstances,
one in connection with each murder, and the jury found both
true. Defendant contends only one special circumstance finding
is proper under such circumstances. He is correct . . . ; one of the
findings should be stricken”]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1104, 1150.) In addition, at the sentencing hearing the trial court
sentenced defendant to LWOP but did specify it was imposing
that sentence only on the conviction for murdering Garcia, which
was the only count on which an LWOP sentence was authorized.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a) [LWOP permitted only for a first degree
murder conviction].)
We therefore modify the judgment by striking the multiple
murder special circumstance finding on the count one conviction
for murdering Antonelos. The abstract of judgment, which does
not reflect a sentence of LWOP for either murder conviction,
should be amended to indicate a sentence of LWOP was imposed
for the murder of Garcia.

4. Punishment for the firearm enhancements
For each murder conviction, the trial court orally imposed
sentence for the jury’s associated section 12022.53 sentencing
enhancement true finding that carries the longest term: the
subdivision (d) finding that carries a sentence of 25 years to life
in prison. That action was consistent with the statute.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (f) [“Only one additional term of imprisonment
under this section shall be imposed per person for each crime. If
more than one enhancement per person is found true under this
section, the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement

20
that provides the longest term of imprisonment”].) The minute
order and the abstract of judgment, however, indicate a sentence
of 15 years to life for a firearm enhancement finding on
Antonelos’s murder. That requires correction.
Relatedly, the record is unclear as to the trial court’s
disposition of the two lesser section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and
(c) firearm enhancements. They were not mentioned by the court
or the parties during the sentencing hearing. The associated
minute order, however, states the trial court struck the section
12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancements. Under the
circumstances (including the trial court’s comments at
sentencing), we construe the trial court to have imposed but
stayed the two sets of lesser firearm enhancements and we will
direct the trial court to amend the minute order and abstract of
judgment accordingly.8

8
That is consistent with the defense’s sentencing
memorandum, which urged the trial court to stay (not strike) all
sentencing enhancements.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect defendant was
sentenced on count 2 (Garcia’s murder) to LWOP based on a
multiple murder special circumstance found true by the jury plus
25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) true
finding, and on count 1 (Antonelos’s murder) to 15 years to life for
second degree murder plus 25 years to life for the section
12022.53, subdivision (d) true finding. The multiple murder
special circumstance finding on count 1 is stricken and the
section 12022.53 subdivision (b) and (c) firearm enhancement
findings on both counts should be memorialized as having been
imposed and stayed. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The clerk of the superior court is directed to deliver an amended
abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and to correct the
November 1, 2023, minute order as specified in this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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