People v. Ruiz CA2/5

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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B328286

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA190220)

RICARDO RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Many years after his conviction, defendant and appellant
Ricardo Ruiz (defendant) filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1 The trial
court denied the petition because it found defendant could still be
convicted of murder under current law as a direct aider and
abettor, i.e., as an accomplice who, with either express or implied
malice, participated in a fatal group assault on one of his
jailhouse cellmates. We chiefly consider whether the trial court
applied the correct legal standard and whether substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that defendant aided and
abetted an implied malice murder. (We need not decide whether
the evidence supports the court’s alternative finding that
defendant acted with express malice, i.e., an intent to kill.)

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct
In July 1999, defendant was housed in the Los Angeles
County Men’s Central Jail in a cell with Ronnie Pintor (Pintor),
Josue Felix (Felix), Sergio Cortez (Cortez), Ramon Sandoval
(Sandoval), and victim Mauricio Avalos (Avalos). Late that night,
two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies went to
the their cell to check on Avalos’s welfare.
When the two deputies arrived at the cell, defendant was
standing at the front of the cell, with Pintor just behind him.
Avalos was in the back of the cell, and Felix, Cortez, and
Sandoval were behind defendant and Pintor. One of the
deputies, Deputy Alvarado, told the men that Avalos had a pass

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

2
to leave the cell. Defendant replied that Avalos was “not going
anywhere.” Deputy Alvarado asked again for Avalos to come out,
but that second request also went unheeded.
Deputy Alvarado then left to get a sergeant. Before that
happened, two other deputies, Garcia and Rudd, reported to the
same cell. By the time they arrived, Avalos was on the top bunk
on the far right of the cell. Defendant and Pintor were still
standing facing the cell door, and Cortez, Felix, and Sandoval
were standing in the back.
Deputy Rudd told Avalos to get off the bunk and get
handcuffed. Defendant told the deputy that Avalos was not going
to “hook up” (meaning get handcuffed). At the same time, Avalos
remained sitting on the bunk, appeared nervous, and was
shaking his head up and down.
Defendant stuck his hand out of his cell, toward a nearby
cell, and said “Casper, mandalo,” which translated into English
as, “Casper, send it.” Deputies Alvarez and Rudd told defendant
to put his hand back in the cell. Defendant complied, but then he
stuck his hand out again, saying the same thing.
After that, a sergeant, Hendrix, arrived and told the
inmates that Avalos needed to come out for a pass. Defendant
again said, “He’s not coming out.” Sergeant Hendrix told the men
to get up and get handcuffed. Defendant responded they were
not going to hook up. According to one of the deputies, defendant
yelled “Casper, they are ordering us to hook up. They are going
to spray us. Send us the word.”

3
A short time after that, defendant and Pintor tied torn up
shirts or towels around their faces.2 Defendant then climbed onto
the bunk next to Avalos and hit Avalos in the face or upper body.
Avalos fell over on the bunk after defendant hit him. Pintor then
picked Avalos up by the shirt and the groin area and slammed
him head first into the floor.3 At that point, defendant jumped off
the bunk.
All five inmates then swarmed Avalos and started kicking
and punching him while he was curled up in a ball on the floor.
One of the deputies specifically saw defendant kicking and
punching Avalos. Sergeant Hendrix ordered the inmates to stop
the assault, but they did not.
Inmates in other cells in the row began throwing items at
the deputies and yelling and screaming at them. Sergeant
Hendrix ordered the deputies to spray a substance akin to pepper
spray into the cell, which they did. That, too, did not stop the
assault on Avalos. Sergeant Hendrix then ordered the deputies
to leave the area outside the cell. As the deputies left, they could
still see defendant and the others continuing to attack Avalos.
Roughly 8 to 10 minutes later, a large contingent of
deputies arrived to restore order. Defendant, Pintor, and the
other inmates that had been beating Avalos were handcuffed and
Avalos was found under one of the bunks; his head was visibly

2
Deputy Garcia did not recall seeing defendant or Pintor
putting anything around their heads.
3
Deputy Garcia testified that Pintor pulled Avalos off the
bunk, but he stated Pintor might have lifted Avalos a few inches.
He could not see which part of Avalos’s body hit the floor first.

4
swollen and “oblong.” He later died from multiple blunt force
injuries to his head.

B. Subsequent Investigation of the Fatal Beating
A medical examiner opined that being thrown down onto
the ground could have been the cause of significant injury to
Avalos’s brain. A medical examiner also believed kicks to
Avalos’s head could have contributed to his subdural hematoma
(bleeding in the brain)—even kicks by someone wearing soft
shoes (like defendant was wearing) if the kick caused Avalos’s
head to hit another hard object.
None of Avalos’s cellmates had any injuries to their hands
the day after the beating. Pintor’s and Felix’s feet and ankles
were bruised, but none of the others’ feet were injured. The
clothing and shoes defendant and the other men were wearing
the day of the attack had Avalos’s blood on them. None of the
clothing appeared to have excessively more blood than the others,
and the blood was more concentrated on the front of the
assaulting inmates’ clothes. Avalos’s blood was found in various
parts of the cell, including on the iron gate of the cell door, the
wall near the toilet bowl, and different portions of the floor.

C. Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing
In June 2000, defendant, Pintor, and the others were each
charged with murdering Avalos. Pintor was tried first, and
separately from the others, and a jury convicted him of first
degree murder (requiring a life without possibility of parole
sentence). At defendant’s subsequent murder trial, Pintor (who
was in jail after just having been convicted of murder in another

5
case) testified in defendant’s defense and claimed he (Pintor) was
solely responsible for Avalos’s death.
Pintor testified he met Avalos when Avalos arrived at the
jail, about three or four weeks before his murder. About two
weeks before the murder, there was an incident in which
someone told Pintor that Avalos possessed a blade. Pintor
confronted Avalos, who said he had overheard talk suggesting
Pintor was out to get him. Pintor took Avalos’s blade and flushed
it down the toilet. Pintor also wanted to hurt Avalos because he
felt disrespected.
On the night of Avalos’s murder, Pintor assumed the
deputies were trying to take Avalos out on an “Operation Safety
Jail” pass, which meant he would be interviewed by deputies and
raised concerns he would inform on them or other inmates.
Pintor did not want Avalos to leave because it was obvious to him
Avalos did not want to be there, and he believed that once Avalos
left he would not be coming back. Pintor also claimed he, not
defendant, was the one who told deputies that Avalos would not
be leaving the cell.
According to Pintor, the fight with Avalos started while
both of them were standing and Avalos hit him in the face before
getting onto the bunk. Pintor admitted he then threw Avalos
from the bunk and he said Avalos hit the floor head first, at
which point Pintor started kicking and beating him. Pintor then
dragged Avalos toward the front of the cell and leaned him
against the gate to kick him in the head. Pintor claimed no one
else in the cell hit Avalos; they were just standing around like
everything was normal.
After the presentation of evidence and argument at trial,
the jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder but

6
guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 15 years to life in prison. Defendant appealed, and
a prior panel of this court affirmed the conviction. (People v.
Sandoval et al. (September 19, 2005, B176199) [nonpub. opn.].)

D. Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Resentencing Petition
Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition in November
2019. He asserted he was not the actual killer and had been
convicted of murder based solely on a natural and probable
consequences theory of liability.
The trial court initially denied defendant’s petition without
appointing counsel and relying on the statement of facts in this
court’s prior appellate opinion. Defendant appealed this denial,
and a prior panel of this court reversed and remanded with
directions to appoint counsel for defendant and thereafter
proceed as required by section 1172.6. (People v. Ruiz (June 22,
2021, B305229) [nonpub. opn.].)
The trial court did so on remand. After receiving briefs
from the parties, the court held an evidentiary hearing and
stated at the outset that it was “familiar with the record of
conviction, which includes the transcripts at issue.” The People
argued the evidence at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant was a direct aider and abettor who acted with
either express or implied malice aforethought.
The trial court found defendant took part in the jailhouse
beating that resulted in Avalos’s death. In the court’s view,
defendant and the other inmates thought Avalos was a snitch,
defendant struck the first blow to Avalos’s face (which caused
him to fall over on his bunk), and Pintor was thereafter the more
aggressive attacker—including by throwing Avalos headfirst to

7
the concrete floor. The court found that after that, the others,
including defendant, continued to kick and hit Avalos.
The court, in its oral on-the-record ruling, accordingly
“agree[d] that it can be concluded that the petitioner either acted
with express or implied malice aforethought as reflected by his
conduct when he initiated the assault by, one, taking the first
blow at the victim, which knocked him over; two, appeared to be
leading the assault; and, three, his continued brutal beating of
the victim, along with the other inmates, while the victim was
lying on the floor after suffering a severe injury to the head.”
The court believed defendant’s participation in the continued
“brutal beating by fists and kicks” after Avalos was dropped
headfirst onto the ground manifested “an express intent to kill
him.” The court also reasoned, in the alternative, that “it
can . . . be concluded from the record of conviction that
[defendant] acted with at least implied malice by engaging in
inherently reckless conduct which he should have been aware
was dangerous to human life considering the overall
circumstances of the assault.” In the court’s words, defendant “at
the very least . . . acted with implied malice, engaging in reckless
conduct after the defendant was bleeding profusely after
suffering a severe brain injury, in continuing his assault.” The
trial court therefore denied defendant’s petition and concluded
that “no matter how the overall evidence in the record of
conviction is interpreted, the petitioner could still be convicted of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt even with the amendments
brought about by Penal Code Section 1172.6.”

8
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err. The record does not establish,
as defendant contends, that the court misapplied the legal
standard governing section 1172.6 petitions. Although the court
couched its remarks in unnecessarily passive terms (“it can be
concluded”), the entirety of the court’s ruling leaves us convinced
the court understood its obligation to make its own determination
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder
even under the law as recently amended to eliminate the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. The record does establish,
again contrary to defendant’s contention, that sufficient evidence
supports the court’s finding that defendant could still be
convicted of murder as a direct aider and abettor to an implied
malice murder. Defendant’s knowledge that his conduct
endangered the life of another and his acts in conscious disregard
for life (see, e.g., People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990) are
readily seen in the substantial evidence that he struck Avalos
first and then continued the attack even after Avalos was
slammed into the floor headfirst and defenseless—and despite
prison guard orders to stop.

A. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
At an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d), “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The trial court acts as the finder
of fact when determining whether the prosecution has met its

9
burden beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 296-297.)
Defendant argues the trial court employed the wrong
standard at the evidentiary hearing because it did not make its
own beyond a reasonable doubt determination and instead
decided only that there was sufficient evidence by which some
other factfinder could determine defendant could be convicted of
murder under current law.4 Defendant specifically points to the
aforementioned “it can be concluded” passive constructions the
trial court used when ruling from the bench.
That is not our view of the record. We start from the
premise that “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we presume that
the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) In fact, there is no question in this
case that the trial court was aware of the correct legal standard
because the evidentiary hearing took place a year after the
Legislature amended section 1172.6 to specify the applicable
beyond a reasonable doubt standard and both the People and
defendant cited this standard to the court in arguing the matter.
There is no reason to believe the trial court did not follow the
standard on which the parties agreed. Although the trial court’s
passive “it can be concluded” constructions are unnecessarily
indeterminate, they are not evidence the court deviated from the
correct standard in the full context of the court’s ruling. (See,
e.g., People v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1276 [use of less

4
Defendant also asserts the trial court misunderstood the
elements of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. We
discuss and reject that claim post in the context of our discussion
of the evidence supporting an aiding and abetting implied murder
finding.

10
than artful language “cannot be equated with having applied the
wrong standard”].) The court stated, for instance, it found “the
petitioner could still be convicted of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt even with the amendments brought about by Penal Code
Section 1172.6.”5 The court also stated it “believe[d] that the
facts bear this out, as the court has stated in its ruling, at the
very least [defendant] acted with implied malice . . . .” These are
affirmative statements of the court’s own conclusion after
weighing the evidence.6

5
As used, the “could be convicted” language is not properly
read as conditional; it is instead the converse of the language of
the statute itself. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3) [a petitioner may file a
petition for resentencing if he or she “could not presently be
convicted of murder”].)
6
Defendant also suggests the order of argument at the
hearing, which seems to have been somewhat less structured and
traditional than the norm, reveals the court put the burden of
proof on the defense. That in our view is a non sequitur and it is
in any event unsupported by the trial court’s evaluation of the
evidence. People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 726 is not to
the contrary. The problem that led to reversal in that case was
twofold. There was a dearth of authority on which party bore the
burden of proof and, at the contested hearing, the trial court
asked the defense to present evidence first and only asked the
prosecutor if she wished to present witnesses after the defense
rested. (Id. at 742-43.) Neither problem is present in this case.

11
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Finding that Defendant Is a Direct Aider and Abettor
of an Implied Malice Murder
Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express
or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) Express malice is the intent to kill;
implied malice exists “where the defendant . . . acted with
conscious disregard that the . . . consequences of [his or her] act
or actions were dangerous to human life.” (People v. Gonzalez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197.) At the time of defendant’s conviction
at trial, the law allowed defendants who did not act with malice
to be found liable for murder under certain circumstances,
including under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Under current law, however, the possibility of murder
liability pursuant to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine has been eliminated. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843, 847.) That means, as relevant for our purposes,
that defendant could still be convicted of murder under current
law—the condition that forecloses section 1172.6 relief—only if
there is sufficient evidence he directly aided and abetted an
express or implied malice murder. We proceed to discuss the
latter alternative.7
“Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation
required for first degree murder.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th
593, 600.) “Implied malice requires proof of both a physical act

7
Because Pintor was tried separately, there is no
inconsistency or tension between the focus of our discussion here
and the verdict the jury reached in Pintor’s case.

12
and a mental state. Physically, a defendant must perform an act
whose natural consequences are dangerous to life, or put another
way, defendant must perform ‘an act that involves a high degree
of probability’ of death. [Citations.] To establish the mental
state required for implied malice, the defendant must
deliberately perform the act with a conscious disregard for life,
knowing the act endangers another’s life.” (Ibid.) Restated in
the context of aiding and abetting another perpetrator, the
elements of implied malice murder require act(s) by the
perpetrator endangering the victim’s life; words or conduct by the
aider and abettor that aid in the commission of the perpetrator’s
life-endangering act(s); and knowledge by the aider and abettor
that the perpetrator intended to commit the life-endangering act,
an intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and action in
conscious disregard for human life. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
991 [quoting with approval People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that all of these elements are satisfied here.8 (See

8
Focusing on the trial court’s reference to “inherently
reckless conduct” when discussing its implied malice finding,
defendant contends reversal is required because the trial court
misunderstood the meaning of implied malice. Even assuming
the argument is properly before us because the trial court’s
reasons for its ruling (not just the ruling itself) are reviewable,
and even assuming the absence of an objection to the trial court’s
articulation of its ruling does not forfeit the issue, defendant’s
contention still fails. The trial court’s “reckless” references do
admit of imprecision (§ 188; People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th
313, 327 [conscious disregard for life]; but see People v. Doyell

13
generally Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 988 [under the substantial
evidence standard, courts review the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s order].) Defendant refused the
deputies’ requests to have Avalos exit the cell, struck the initial
blow on Avalos that knocked him over and facilitated Pintor’s
body slam of Avalos headfirst on the concrete, and continued to
participate in the group beating of Avalos even after his head had
been slammed on the ground and he was defenseless.9 Put
differently, there are life-endangering acts by the perpetrator and
knowledge by defendant that Pintor and the others intended to
commit those acts (the refusal of the deputies’ requests, the

(1874) 48 Cal. 85, 96; People v. Curry (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 664,
675 [“the malice aforethought is implied from the wanton
recklessness”]), but in the context of a ruling in which the court
found defendant had the intent to kill and relied factually on
defendant continuing to assault Avalos after he had been
slammed on his head, we believe the court’s articulation is not so
deficient that it reveals a misunderstanding warranting reversal.
9
Defendant contends there was no evidence he participated
in a continued or sustained beating of Avalos because the
deputies for a time left the area outside the cell and did not
witness events that occurred after they departed. While it is true
there is no direct evidence of defendant’s role during that time,
the deputies remained outside the cell for approximately two
minutes after the first punch was thrown. During that time,
defendant and the others continued beating and kicking Avalos,
and they were still actively doing so when the deputies left the
area. That evidence of continued beating after Avalos had been
slammed on his head, plus the blood found on defendant’s (and
the other accomplices’) clothes and shoes, is amply sufficient to
support the trial court’s findings even without knowledge of what
precisely defendant did after that two-minute period.

14
positioning of the assailants and the tying of face coverings, the
headfirst body slam, and the continued beating); aiding of those
acts by defendant and the intention to aid them (refusing the
deputies’ requests, striking the first blow, and striking more
blows even after Avalos was down); knowledge that the acts were
dangerous to life (defendant could see Avalos gravely injured and
lying defenseless); and action in conscious disregard of human life
(initiating the assault and continuing to participate in beating
the gravely injured and defenseless Avalos).

C. Consideration of Defendant’s Age and Cumulative
Error
Defendant argues the trial court should have considered
defendant’s relative youth at the time of the murder (21 years
old) when making its implied malice finding but the court was
“unaware that [defendant’s] youth was a factor to consider” at the
evidentiary hearing. Even assuming youth was a proper factor to
consider, and even assuming the court was not aware of
defendant’s age at the time of the offense (despite the court’s
representation at the evidentiary hearing that it had considered
the transcripts of the trial proceedings and “the overall record of
conviction”), defendant never asked the court to consider his
youth nor did he object to the lack of such consideration after the
court made its finding that he aided and abetted an implied
malice murder. The point is accordingly forfeited. (People v.
Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 446; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 351.) Even were we to exercise our discretion to overlook the
forfeiture as the court did in People v. Pittman (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 400 at page 416, we see no reasonable probability on

15
this record that the assumed absence of any consideration of
defendant’s relative youth was prejudicial.
Defendant also makes a cumulative error argument for
reversal. The contention fails because there was no cumulative
error.

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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