People v. Hurtado CA1/3

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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Hurtado CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167684
v.
NATHAN ANTHONY HURTADO, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 01-22-02139)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Nathan Anthony Hurtado guilty of a number of
offenses, including second degree burglary and vandalism. On appeal, he
contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 376.
He also contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction for felony
vandalism. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged defendant by information with second degree
burglary (Pen. Code, § 4591); vandalism causing damage over $400 (§ 594,
subd. (a)); receipt of stolen property with a value exceeding $950 (§ 496,
subd. (a)); possession of weapons on school grounds (§ 626.10, subd. (b));
trespass and refusing to leave private property (§ 602, subd. (o)); and
possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466).

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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A jury found defendant guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced
him to a total of two years in prison. The following is a brief summary of the
evidence presented at trial.
Officer Daniel Wiegand of the Contra Costa Community College
District Police Department was dispatched to the faculty offices at Diablo
Valley College (DVC) on November 5, 2022 at around 6:18 a.m. Wiegand saw
broken glass on the floor and multiple smashed sliding glass office doors.
One faculty office, number 154, was particularly disheveled, and a gouge
mark appeared on a computer monitor. The door to another office, number
158, had been forced open and a number of items were either damaged or
missing. After canvassing the area and not finding any suspects nearby,
Wiegand returned to the DVC police station to write his report.
At 9:35 a.m. the same day, Officer Wiegand was dispatched to the
social sciences division office, about 50 yards south of the first scene.
Wiegand observed a window had been smashed with a metal tool, such as a
pry bar or crowbar, to gain entry into the building, and glass on an interior
door to the division dean’s office had also been smashed to gain entry. He
searched the building but did not find anyone inside. The social sciences
dean and an administrative assistant identified various missing items.
At around 3:00 p.m. the same day, Officer Wiegand was again
dispatched, this time to the DVC ceramics building which was inaccessible to
the public and used only for storage and maintenance. Wiegand noticed fresh
pry marks on the locked door leading into the building. In a loft accessible
only by a wooden ladder, defendant was asleep on multiple bed rolls.
Wiegand had cited and released defendant for illegal lodging at DVC five
days before, with notice to not reenter for seven days or be subject to arrest.
Within arm’s reach of defendant was a locked, folded pocketknife.

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Within several feet of where defendant was sleeping were numerous
items that either belonged to DVC or its faculty members or were taken from
the office buildings that were broken into. An eight-inch knife and a metal
crowbar were found in a ventilation duct directly above defendant. Officer
Wiegand determined the width of the crowbar was consistent with the width
of the pry marks he saw on the damaged doors, and he believed the crowbar
was likely used to pry them open, as well as to smash the windows and
sliding glass doors. He arrested defendant.
A witness testified that on the afternoon of November 5, 2022, he found
broken sculptures in the ceramics room and other items that appeared to
have fallen off shelves. The broken sculptures included three that the
witness had spent 60 hours each in making. The drapes in the ceramics room
had been pulled shut, even though no one uses the room, and the witness
knew of no one who would have closed the blinds. Another witness testified
the total cost to replace the broken glass at the office locations was $5,114.88.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. CALCRIM No. 376
In instructing on the elements of second degree burglary, the trial court
told the jury the People had to prove defendant entered a building or a room
in a building with intent to commit theft. The court also instructed with
CALCRIM No. 376, as follows: “If you conclude that a defendant knew he
possessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been
recently stolen, you may not convict the defendant of Second Degree Burglary
based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that supporting evidence
tends to prove his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient
to prove he committed Second Degree Burglary. [¶] The supporting evidence

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need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may
consider how, where, and when the defendant possessed the property, along
with any other relevant circumstances tending to prove defendant’s guilt of
Second Degree Burglary. [¶] Remember that you may not convict a
defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to
the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Italics added.)
Defendant now contends that instructing with CALCRIM No. 376
violated his rights to have each element of the offense proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and to due process. Specifically, he claims “the instruction
permitted a finding of the contested elements of the crime, including that [he]
took the property or had the intent to permanently deprive, based only upon
‘slight’ corroboration.”
Initially, we reject the People’s contention that this argument has been
forfeited. Though defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, there is
no forfeiture where the alleged instructional error asserts a violation of
substantial constitutional rights. (§ 1259; People v. O’Dell (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 (O’Dell).) We turn to address the merits of the claim.
“An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo
and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.” (O’Dell,
supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is
to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration
of [] a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 573–
574.) “We look to the instructions as a whole and the entire record of the
trial, including the arguments of counsel.” (People v. Lopez (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 698, 708 (Lopez).)

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As defendant acknowledges, CALCRIM No. 376 and its materially
similar predecessor CALJIC No. 2.15 have been repeatedly upheld against
similar attacks. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 188–189,
and cases cited; O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1574–1575, and cases
cited; People v. Solorzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1035–1036
(Solorzano), and cases cited.)
In O’Dell, for instance, the court rejected the argument that “CALCRIM
No. 376 should be given only in instances of unexplained possession of the
stolen item,” stating: “ ‘[A]s CALJIC No. 2.15 acknowledges, an inference of
guilt may rationally arise from the concurrence of conscious possession and
many other circumstances. For example, where the evidence supports a
finding that an arrestee had stolen property in his pocket a short time after a
robbery and that the arrestee was seen approaching the victim a short time
before the robbery, the inference of guilt is reasonable, if not compelling,
regardless of whether or not the arrestee explained how he obtained the
property. Moreover, this inference is reasonable even if the arrestee gives a
plausible explanation for having the property. In our view, CALJIC No. 2.15
correctly prohibits the jury from drawing an inference of guilt solely from
conscious possession of recently stolen property but properly permits the jury
to draw such an inference where there is additional corroborating evidence.
As long as the corroborating evidence together with the conscious possession
could naturally and reasonably support an inference of guilt, and that
inference is sufficient to sustain a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, we
discern nothing that lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof or implicates a
defendant’s right to due process.’ ” (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1576.)

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In Solorzano, the Court of Appeal aptly noted that CALCRIM No. 376’s
requirement of slight supporting evidence prohibits the jury from finding a
defendant guilty solely on the basis of possession of stolen property. As
Solorzano explained, “the inference that possession of stolen property creates
is permissive, not mandatory. The case law is settled that requiring only
slight corroborating evidence in support of a permissive inference, like the one
that possession of stolen property creates, neither changes the prosecution’s
burden of proving every element of the offense nor otherwise violates the right
to due process if, as here, the conclusion suggested is one that common sense
and reason can justify ‘in light of the proven facts before the jury.’ [Citations.]
[¶] The permissive inference that CALCRIM No. 376 authorizes if the jury
finds slight supporting evidence is linguistically synonymous with, and
constitutionally indistinguishable from, the permissive inference that
CALJIC No. 2.15 authorizes if the jury finds slight corroborating evidence.
CALJIC No. 2.15 has withstood repeated constitutional attack.” (Solorzano,
supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1035–1036, italics added.)
We decline to depart from the long line of cases upholding the
challenged instruction, and we reject defendant’s contentions. However, we
take a moment here to address some of his specific points.
Defendant contends the error here is similar to that in United States v.
Gray (5th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 494, which involved a conspiracy charge. This
is unavailing. “Here, the issue was whether guilt on a burglary charge may
be inferred from the possession of recently stolen property along with other
supporting evidence. Gray is not analogous or persuasive.” (Lopez, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711–712.) We agree with Lopez, and notably, the
California Supreme Court has also distinguished federal conspiracy cases

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concerning instructional error similar to the error in Gray. (People v. Grimes
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 731 (Grimes).)
Defendant claims CALCRIM No. 376 was not appropriate for this case
because “[l]ittle about the circumstances of his arrest showed that [he] had
stolen the property.” But as the California Supreme Court has reasoned,
“ ‘[p]ossession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant
conviction [for theft-related offenses] there need only be, in addition to
possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the
defendant tending to show . . . guilt.’ ” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 731.)
Consistent with Grimes’s analysis, the instruction in this case told the jury,
“If you conclude that a defendant knew he possessed property and you
conclude that the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not
convict the defendant of Second Degree Burglary based on those facts alone.
However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt,
then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove he committed
Second Degree Burglary.” (Italics added.) No error appears.
Though the instruction told the jury that defendant’s knowing
possession of recently stolen property was not enough to support a second
degree burglary conviction, defendant claims the requirement for slight
corroborating evidence may have been proven by evidence that in fact
demonstrated little support for his conviction at all. For example, defendant
argues, one potential item of corroborating evidence was Officer Wiegand’s
testimony that he had previously arrested, cited, and released defendant and
that defendant was a “homeless transient” living on the college campus. In
other words, defendant asserts, “the instruction permitted a conviction for
second-degree burglary based upon his presence in the loft and the ‘slight’

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additional evidence of his being arrested, cited, and released earlier.” This is
also unpersuasive.
During closing argument, the prosecutor explained the elements of the
burglary count in a manner consistent with CALCRIM No. 376, stating she
needed to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered a
building and when he did, he intended to commit a theft.” In arguing
defendant’s guilt of burglary, she pointed to the evidence that he possessed a
crowbar that was used to force entry into various offices and buildings just
hours before, and to the evidence that he committed theft. Notably, the
prosecutor never suggested the jury could convict defendant of second degree
burglary based on his presence in the loft and the slight corroborating
evidence of his earlier arrest, citation, and release.
Considering the record as a whole, we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the jury construed the instructions as permitting it to infer
guilt on the burglary charge just because defendant was cited and released
from the campus a week prior. (People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266,
276.)
For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s contention in his reply brief
that the jury might have disregarded the burglary instruction altogether and
rendered a conviction by relying on CALCRIM No. 376 along with the
instructions on circumstantial evidence. This belated argument is difficult to
follow; defendant appears to be arguing that the jury might have believed the
only facts requiring proof were those set out in CALCRIM No. 376. But
“[j]urors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are
further presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” (People v.
Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) There is nothing in the record
suggesting the jury ignored the instruction on the elements of second degree

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burglary. Indeed, that position is unlikely given the prosecutor’s closing
argument, which recited the elements.
In sum, we reject defendant’s claim of instructional error.
B. Vandalism
Section 594, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who maliciously
commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal
property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law,
is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed
material. [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys.” In this context, “maliciously”
means “a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a
wrongful act.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4).) The crime is punishable as a felony where
the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is $400 or more. (§ 594,
subd. (b)(1).)
Defendant urges reversal of his felony vandalism conviction based on
the claimed insufficiency of the evidence concerning his identity as the
perpetrator. More specifically, he argues the evidence of his trespass and
sleeping close to a crowbar in a loft containing stolen property did not prove
his identity as the vandal. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the crowbar was the tool used to commit the vandalism, noting
Officer Wiegand “only suggested” the crowbar “could have been the tool used
in the crime” and at most said the crowbar “ ‘was likely used to smash out the
windows.’ ”
“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears

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‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Here, there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s determination
that defendant was the perpetrator. Officer Wiegand observed that multiple
doors, glass doors, and windows in three different buildings on the DVC
campus were broken on November 5, 2022, which cost over $5000 to repair.
The damage to the various doors and windows was consistent with having
been made by a tool such as a crowbar. The same day, sculptures were found
broken in the ceramics room, even though the building was inaccessible to
the public. Defendant was found asleep in a loft area of the ceramics
building, near numerous items that belonged to DVC or its faculty members
and were taken from the office buildings that were broken into. Finally,
Wiegand found a metal crowbar in a ventilation duct directly above where
defendant was sleeping.
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we
conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant perpetrated
the vandalism. Defendant’s contentions to the contrary would have us
reweigh evidence, which we decline to do.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Hurtado (A167684)

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