People v. Golamrabbi CA6

CourtListener 10370754CalctappMar 28, 2025

Full text

Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Golamrabbi CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H048223
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1636583)

v.

HASIB BIN GOLAMRABBI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Hasib Bin Golamrabbi, after representing himself at trial, was
convicted by jury on two counts of first degree murder. The jury found defendant
murdered both victims by means of lying in wait and found true allegations attached to
both counts that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court
sentenced defendant to two terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole,
consecutive to two firearm enhancements totaling 50 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to counsel and the trial court therefore should not have permitted him to represent
himself. He also argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s lying in wait
findings and that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal on those
special circumstance allegations at the close of the prosecution’s case. With respect to
his sentence, he urges that the trial court should be given the opportunity to exercise its
discretion as to imposition of lesser or no firearm enhancements. He also asserts that his
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional. For the
reasons we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was charged by information with the April 2016 murders of his parents,
Golam and Shamima Rabbi. The information alleged defendant caused both deaths by
personally discharging a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d); unspecified
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) It also alleged as a special circumstance that
defendant committed multiple murders. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) Notably, the information
did not allege defendant committed the murders by lying in wait.
A. PRETRIAL HEARINGS REGARDING COMPETENCY AND FARETTA RIGHTS
Defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial in
February 2018. (§ 1368.) Defendant was examined by two court-appointed
psychologists, who both concluded he was mentally competent at the time of
examination.1 The trial court found defendant competent to stand trial in July 2018 and
noted that defendant waiving his right to counsel was “contemplated” at that time.
Six days later, the trial court held a hearing under Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Defendant provided the court with a signed waiver form stating
that he understood the dangers of self-representation and nonetheless wished to waive his
right to counsel. In a section of the form referencing the maximum sentence for the
charged offenses, defendant wrote, “100 to life, LWOP.” In another section pertaining to
special allegations, he wrote that the charged firearm allegations would each carry an
additional sentence of 25 years to life in prison if found true. By signing the form,
defendant certified that he had “read, understood and considered” its contents. Defendant
told the court he had completed the form without assistance.

1
The psychologists’ reports are sealed, and portions of the parties’ briefs
discussing the reports have also been filed under seal. We have reviewed the sealed
documents and describe them only in general terms where relevant to our analysis.
2
The trial court asked defendant whether he would be ready for the trial scheduled
to begin the following month, and defendant said he would. In response to further
questioning, defendant explained that he had been conducting legal research as well as
reviewing discovery materials and witness statements. A defense investigator had
interviewed potential witnesses, but defendant did not intend to subpoena anyone; his
prepared questioning was “all cross-examination.” With respect to jury selection,
defendant was aware that prospective jurors would be completing a questionnaire and he
planned to develop questions based on their responses. The court also inquired about
defendant’s educational background. He reported he had an associate’s degree in
“Business and computer information systems” and had also completed a semester at San
Jose State University, where he studied accounting.
Addressing defendant’s request to represent himself, the trial court twice described
it as “a very bad idea” and added that it was especially unwise given that defendant was
“facing an absolute life sentence.” The court told defendant he would be opposed by “an
extraordinarily experienced prosecutor” with “substantial homicide trial experience.” No
matter how gracious the prosecutor might be, the court continued, neither he nor the court
could assist defendant with trial strategy. Defendant confirmed that he understood the
court’s advisements.
The court asked defendant, “And do you understand that if you find yourself
floundering – in other words, if you find yourself drowning, that the judge can’t do
anything about that?” Defendant said he understood. The court then told defendant that
counsel would “not be appointed to [him] at that point” and he would “have to proceed
forward.” Defendant reiterated that he understood the court’s warnings.
After the prosecutor and defense counsel indicated their satisfaction with the
court’s colloquy, the court said to defendant, “I am going to grant your request. It is a
constitutional right. It is a very ill-advised idea. Do you understand all of that? And you
are really doing it – although, the Court has said to you this is a terrible idea.” Defendant
3
again stated that he understood. The court then granted defendant’s request to represent
himself and relieved defense counsel.
B. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
Defendant’s brother Omar2 testified at trial under a grant of immunity from the
prosecution. Omar was five years younger than defendant and was 20 years old at the
time of trial. Three years earlier, when defendant was 22 years old and Omar was 17
years old, they had been living with their parents at a house in San Jose. Omar described
his relationship with defendant as “love and hate.”
Omar also had a “love and hate” relationship with his parents. He described his
parents as strict and concerned about their children’s grades. When defendant and Omar
got bad grades or did something wrong, their parents would yell at them and sometimes
hit them. Defendant would often respond angrily, while Omar usually responded by
walking away or leaving the house. In the months leading up to April 2016, Omar saw
defendant argue with Golam and Shamima almost every day. Defendant sometimes
talked about wanting to “get rid of them.” Between six and nine months before the
murders, a neighbor was present for an argument between defendant and Golam and saw
defendant make stabbing motions toward Golam while his back was turned.
Omar and defendant planned to attend an anime convention in Oakland on April
23, 2016. That morning, Omar woke up between 7:00 and 8:00. Golam was already
awake, but Shamima was still sleeping. Omar went to the bathroom, leaving the door
ajar, and saw Golam walk down the hallway toward the garage. He could hear Golam
and defendant talking to each other in the garage; it sounded like a normal conversation
until Golam yelled, “Hasib, what did you do?” Omar then heard at least four or five
gunshots in quick succession.

2
For clarity, and meaning no disrespect, we refer to defendant’s relatives by their
first names. Consistent with California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we will do the same for
defendant’s friend Matthew.
4
Shamima came out of her room to see what was going on. Defendant told her to
go back in the room and hide, which she did. He told Omar to close the drapes in the
living room. Omar did so and then hid nearby, thinking there might have been an
intruder in the house. Defendant appeared to make a 911 call, but Omar could not hear
anyone on the other end of the line and thought defendant might have been pretending.
Omar heard defendant tell Shamima to “go towards the garage.” A few seconds later,
Omar heard another gunshot.
Defendant told Omar to get the bag he had packed for the convention and go to the
car. On the way to his room, Omar noticed Shamima lying on the floor of the laundry
room. He also saw a rifle in the hallway. Omar knew that Golam owned numerous guns,
including a rifle.
While Omar was getting his things together, defendant told him that what
happened was “for the best.” As he was leaving the house, Omar saw defendant write
something on a piece of paper in capital letters and stick the paper to the wall using a
knife. Defendant came outside and told Omar to “check the garage” to see “if something
is coming out.” Omar thought defendant was referring to Golam’s blood. Defendant
went back inside and Omar waited in the car for him.3 About a half hour later, around
10:00 a.m., defendant returned and began driving to Oakland. The drive took about an
hour, and the brothers did not discuss what had happened. They attended the convention
and spent the night at a hotel.
The next morning, defendant’s cousin called him and expressed concern that
Golam and Shamima had not shown up to a family dinner the previous evening.
Defendant said he was out of town but would try to contact his parents. About 15 or 20
minutes later, defendant’s cousin called again. Defendant said he had tried

3
A neighbor testified that he was outside that morning and heard someone say
something like “check the left side of the garage.” He also saw either defendant or Omar
sitting in a car.
5
unsuccessfully to contact his parents, and agreed to return to San Jose. An hour later,
defendant’s cousin called back and asked defendant where he was. Defendant said he
had “barely left” and was “picking up gas.”
Omar recalled defendant driving to San Jose and parking the car roughly a mile
away from the house. Defendant got out of the car and walked away, leaving his cell
phone behind and telling Omar to “stay.” Omar waited for a half hour or so, then got out
of the car. As he left, he saw defendant return to the car and drive away.
Family members entered the house shortly after 1:30 p.m. to check on Golam and
Shamima. They saw a message written on the kitchen floor; it said something like “sorry
my first kill was clumsy.” Defendant’s cousin recognized the handwriting as
defendant’s. Other messages were written throughout the house, including “Your cute
when you sleep.”; “I force your children to do this. They work for me now. Police, good
luck finding my DNA.”; “Nothing to worry about. Hasib, you liar. You no longer have
to lie about loving them.”; “Take care of your brother or he’s next.”; “At least she died
easy. She begged to see your dad but”; and “Hint. Hasib, what’s missing?” Family
members saw Shamima’s body in the laundry room and called the police.
Police searched the house and found Golam’s body in the garage. He had been
shot 12 times, including eight times in the back; twice in the arm or hand; once in the
chest; and once in the neck from close range. Shamima had been shot once in the back of
the head from close range, “execution style.” A loaded rifle found under a couch in the
living room had defendant’s DNA and fingerprints on it, as did a soda can found on a
table nearby. A pillow on the couch appeared to have a bullet hole in it, and there was a
noticeable “defect” in the fireplace. Defendant’s cousin told police he had seen a plastic
glove in the kitchen.
Two days later, defendant visited his friend Matthew and admitted killing his
parents. Defendant told Matthew he was forced to carry out the killings by a vengeful
man with a vendetta against Golam and Shamima. The man supposedly snuck into the
6
house once a month to sexually assault defendant, and told defendant the abuse “would
continue until he killed his parents.” Defendant confessed to Matthew that, as a result of
the man’s coercion, he had “retrieved his father’s rifle and shot his father five times in the
back.” Shamima crawled out of the room where she was hiding to see what was going
on, and defendant “told her to get back inside.” When she did not listen but instead
continued crawling, defendant shot her in the back of the head.
Defendant asked Matthew to come with him to a motel, where he planned to
“record a video of himself saying that he either would move far east or commit suicide.”
Matthew, wearing a mask and playing the role of defendant’s abuser, would then assault
defendant; mark him with a knife; and write a message on the wall using his blood. The
intended purpose of the video and the staged assault was to prove defendant’s innocence.
Matthew told defendant he would help, but in reality he did not believe defendant’s story
and had no intention of helping him. When defendant left Matthew’s house the next
morning, Matthew called the police.
Police arrested defendant later that day. In an interview with detectives, defendant
said he woke up on the morning of the killings to his abuser touching him. The man had
supposedly taken photographs and video while assaulting defendant and threatened to
share them unless defendant killed his parents. Defendant did not want to, but eventually
shot his father once in the back. When Golam did not die instantly from the first shot,
defendant’s abuser took the gun from him and “emptied the clip” while Golam screamed
defendant’s name. Defendant said he then heard the man shoot Shamima.
The day after his arrest, defendant spoke to a reporter from the San Francisco
Chronicle. Their conversation was recorded and played for the jury. Defendant told the
reporter Omar was “innocent.” While in jail, defendant sent Omar a letter asking him
and Matthew not to testify for the prosecution. (Defendant denied sending the letter.)
Defendant cross-examined Omar about various text messages. Omar once texted a
friend about Shamima, “My birth giver signed me up to some gay volunteer shit.” In
7
January 2016, Golam suffered a heart attack; when defendant texted Omar to tell him that
their father was in the hospital, Omar ignored the message. About a week before the
murders, Golam texted Omar, “It’s 10:00 p.m. When can I pick you up[?]” Omar
replied, “you should know the answer[.]” On the day his parents’ bodies were found,
Omar texted his cousin, “What is going on? How long do I have to stay in this police
car? I’m bored and need to do homework.” Omar had dyed red hair during the trial, and
stated his parents would not have allowed that.
C. DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Numerous defense witnesses recalled Golam treating defendant harshly. The
witnesses had not personally seen Golam hit defendant, but several described incidents
when they believed he had done so. Two witnesses said Golam had treated Omar better
than he treated defendant.
Defendant testified in narrative form. He said his relationship with his parents had
been “rocky” when he was younger but had later improved. Defendant “started drifting
away from Islam” (his parents’ religion), which made them unhappy at first, but he
eventually reconnected with them and they accepted his interest in Buddhism. According
to defendant, Omar’s relationship with his parents had deteriorated over time. Once, on a
hunting trip when defendant was 14 years old and Omar was nine years old, Omar had
“almost shot” Golam during an argument.
Defendant testified that on the morning of the murders, he gave Golam a back
massage in the garage and said goodbye to his parents before leaving the house. He
waited in the car for about 20 minutes and then went back inside to check on Omar.
Defendant saw Omar running to the bathroom. Omar asked defendant to close the blinds
and drapes, which he did. Defendant waited in the car for another 20 minutes, at which
point Omar came outside. He asked Omar to “check the left side gate of the house” and
make sure it was locked. After Omar did so, they left for the anime convention. Omar
listened to music in the car and did not seem like he wanted to talk.
8
That night, defendant began getting phone calls from family members about
Golam and Shamima. Defendant testified that he was not very concerned at first but tried
unsuccessfully to contact his parents. When he got another phone call the next morning,
he decided to leave the convention early. On the drive back to San Jose, Omar said to
defendant, “hey, can you say it was a self-defense.” Defendant asked, “what was self-
defense?” and Omar replied, “can you lie and say it was self-defense.” Omar explained
that he had robbed a Bengali couple using one of Golam’s “weapons” and the couple had
been “hurt.” He had used gloves so only defendant’s and Golam’s DNA would be on the
weapon, and wanted defendant to claim responsibility.
Defendant recalled Omar explaining “that he told the husband to meet him in the
garage” and “sit down on a chair” because he had “some exercises to show him.” (On
cross-examination, defendant confirmed the “exercise” described by Omar involved the
husband sitting in the chair and holding his arms out for roughly 30 seconds.) While the
husband was sitting in the chair with his back turned, Omar put on gloves and shot the
husband with the intent to kill him instantly. Instead, the husband “jumped out in pain”
and “yelled out the name of [] one of his children.” When the husband “turned around
and tried to get the weapon away from him,” Omar “fired more rounds” and “emptied the
clip on him.”
In defendant’s telling, Omar further recounted leaving the garage and finding the
wife in the living room of the house. Omar told the wife there was an intruder in the
house and “she should hide in the garage.” He “faked a 911 call and claimed to the wife
that the officer” he was speaking to “told them to go into the garage.” As the wife
crawled toward the garage, Omar panicked and shot her in the back of the head. After
telling defendant what happened, Omar revealed that the “couple” was Golam and
Shamima. Omar also said “he left a blank paper with a knife through it on the wall.”
Defendant said Omar asked him to go to the house and hide the gun. If police
found the gun, Omar warned, defendant would have to say he “did it in self-defense” or
9
Omar would tell them defendant “did it just because.” Defendant parked “about a mile
and a half” from the house and ran there to see if what Omar had told him was true. He
left his cell phone in the car because Omar told him to, so he could not call the police.
When defendant got to the house, he found Shamima’s body on the laundry room floor.
Defendant looked for Golam but did not find him because the garage was locked. To
protect Omar, defendant wrote messages on the walls of the house. The messages were
things defendant had been told by a “nasty person” who “took advantage of” him when
he was younger. Although the “nasty person” was not involved in the murders, defendant
thought about blaming him.
Defendant found a gun under the living room couch, but someone knocked on the
door before he could do anything with it. He put the gun back under the couch and left.
When defendant got back to the car, Omar was on the phone. Omar told defendant he
had already spoken to police and implicated defendant. Defendant drove away at Omar’s
suggestion.
A few days later, defendant visited Matthew at his house. Defendant told
Matthew there had been a “tragedy” and defendant’s parents had been shot. When
Matthew asked who shot them, defendant answered, “well, I don’t want to say who did it.
But if I had to, you know, I would say I was forced to. Let’s just put it that way.”
According to defendant, it was Matthew who suggested that he try to blame the murders
on an abuser. Defendant thought Matthew’s plan was “dumb” and “weird” but decided
to “go along with it” anyway. He admitted lying to detectives about his abuser’s
involvement in the murders.
Before meeting with detectives, defendant spoke audibly to himself for about two
hours in the interrogation room. His statements were recorded and played for the jury.
They included: “need to tell the truth – everyone’s going to find out – they need to know
why”; “I have to tell them”; “how are they going to believe it?”; “I have to tell the
officers what happened – it’s the only way out”; and “He made me do it – it’s his fault –
10
if … they’d still be alive – and they’re good people they didn’t deserve that but he made
me do it – remember he came back after that – yea he was there – but he’s never ever
going to come back.”
Following defendant’s testimony, the trial court stated: “Mr. Golamrabbi, the
Court would have considered a motion that is often made at the end of the prosecution’s
case under Penal Code section 1118.1, which is basically that the prosecution does not
have enough evidence to be able to let the case go to the jury.” The court asked
defendant whether he “would have made that motion” and defendant replied, “Yes. But
in the event that you would have denied it, I did not want the media to make reports of
it.” Stating its intent to preserve the issue for a possible appeal, the court said that “had
the motion been made the Court would have denied it.”
D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT, AND SENTENCING
The prosecutor requested lying-in-wait instructions as to both murder counts,
arguing that defendant’s testimony about Omar’s supposed confession could be
interpreted as a description of defendant’s own conduct—which would constitute lying in
wait. Defendant agreed to the instruction. The trial court stated that it “initially … did
not really see a lying in wait” but considered the instruction “appropriate” with respect to
Golam’s murder given “the exercise issue in the garage, and the stretching of the arms”
testified to by defendant. As to Shamima’s murder, the court told defendant: “And it’s
the same with your mother, that there is evidence – I know that, from your perspective,
Omar told her there was an intruder in the house, to not go to the garage, to get down on
her hands and knees. There was a lot of detail about what Omar told her, from your
perspective, before she was shot.” The court instructed the jury on murder by lying in
wait, and the jury found the special circumstance true as to both counts.
Between the verdict and the sentencing hearing, defendant requested and was
appointed counsel. Defendant was represented by counsel at sentencing. Before
sentencing defendant, the trial court stated on the record that the murders “were among
11
the most disturbing, violent, and heinous crimes … that can be committed.” The court
sentenced defendant to two terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for
first degree murder by means of lying in wait, consecutive to two terms of 25 years to life
in prison for the personal firearm discharge enhancements.
II. DISCUSSION
A. DEFENDANT VALIDLY WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Defendant contends his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the trial
court conducted an inadequate inquiry at the Faretta hearing and failed to properly advise
him on the risks of self-representation. The Attorney General argues defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel, and alternatively asserts any
error was harmless.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when
they knowingly and intelligently elect to do so. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–
836.) “On appeal, we examine de novo the whole record—not merely the transcript of
the hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to determine the validity of the defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070
(Koontz).) “No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who
seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the test is whether the record as a
whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-
representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” (Ibid.)
Noting that his request to represent himself came shortly after the conclusion of
competency proceedings, defendant suggests the trial court should have taken into
consideration both the timing of the request and information in the court-appointed
psychologists’ reports. Both psychologists concluded that defendant was competent to
stand trial. In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 178 (Edwards), the United States
Supreme Court held that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by
counsel for those competent enough to stand trial … but who still suffer from severe
12
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves.” The California Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to mandate
representation for such defendants but has declined to do so, instead leaving the denial of
self-representation under those circumstances to the discretion of trial courts. (See
People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 207–208; People v. Johnson (2012)
53 Cal.4th 519, 530–531 (Johnson).)
Having already found defendant competent to stand trial, the court was not
required to inquire further into defendant’s mental competence at the Faretta hearing
unless it was considering denying his request to represent himself on that basis.
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.) And Indiana v. Edwards “does not support a
claim of federal constitutional error in a case like the present one, in which defendant’s
request to represent himself was granted.” (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 878.)
To the extent defendant asserts he may have been competent to waive counsel at the time
of the Faretta hearing, but the possibility existed that he could become incompetent to
represent himself at some point during the trial, we note that any such possibility would
not preclude him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel at the
hearing. (Cf. People v. Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, 307 [“When there is reason to
doubt a defendant’s mental capacity to waive counsel, the court’s determination should
be made after a careful inquiry into the defendant’s competence, including consideration
of psychiatric evidence”].) Nor should he have been precluded from exercising his
constitutional right to self-representation simply because the Faretta hearing was held six
days after the conclusion of competency proceedings. (Cf. People v. Scott (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 [no error in denying Scott’s Faretta motion made
“immediately after the trial court denied his Marsden motion” and “only because he
wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”].)
Defendant unequivocally stated at the Faretta hearing that he wished to represent
himself, but now contends the trial court’s inquiry and advisements were insufficient to
13
confirm that his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. He focuses
primarily on two of the three suggested categories of inquiry discussed in People v.
Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 (Daniels): “ensuring the defendant’s awareness of the ‘
“dangers and disadvantages” ’ ” of self-representation and “informing the defendant that
he or she cannot later claim inadequacy of representation” on appeal. (Id. at p. 978,
citing People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 572–574 (Lopez); see also Koontz,
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1070–1071.)4 The “suggested advisements and inquiries” first
enumerated in Lopez have been treated “as a useful reference for courts to ensure the
knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.” (Daniels, at p. 978.) But “the purpose of the
suggested Lopez admonitions is to ensure a clear record of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of counsel, not to create a threshold of competency to waive counsel.” (Koontz, at
p. 1071.) Here, the record demonstrates that defendant was—through a combination of
oral and written advisements—sufficiently warned about the dangers of self-
representation.
Consistent with Lopez, the trial court orally advised defendant that representing
himself was a “very bad,” “very ill-advised,” and “terrible” idea; the court would not be
able to assist him in his defense; and he would be opposed by “an extraordinarily
experienced prosecutor” with “substantial homicide trial experience.” Defendant faults
the court for not specifically advising him that “self-representation ‘is almost always
unwise and that he may conduct a defense ultimately to his own detriment’ ” or that the
matchup between him and the prosecutor would “ ‘definitely not be a fair fight.’ ” (See
Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at pp. 572–573.) Those warnings were at a minimum
implicit in the court’s oral advisements, and the court was not required to use the precise

4
Daniels and Lopez also contemplate inquiry aimed at determining a defendant’s
“intellectual capacity” to waive counsel and represent himself. (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 978; Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 573.) Defendant does not appear to suggest
the court’s inquiry into his educational background was insufficient to establish his
intellectual capacity.
14
language from Lopez in issuing them. (See Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1070–1072.)
Defendant also completed a written waiver form, which further advised him of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
The written form advised defendant that his right to self-representation could be
revoked if he engaged in misconduct or obstructed the trial and that, by choosing to
represent himself, he would waive any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See
Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 574.) Although the trial court did not confirm on the
record that defendant had read and understood the form, defendant attested to that on the
form itself. The completed form, which defendant told the court he had prepared himself
without any assistance, also shows that defendant read and understood its contents. For
example, as defendant acknowledges in his reply brief, he correctly and thoroughly
answered questions on the form regarding the charges against him and the possible
punishment he would face if convicted. He provided similarly detailed answers to
questions regarding biographical details, education, and past employment. He placed his
initials next to all of the advisements that pertained to his case, while leaving blank those
that did not (such as advisements about sex offenses and repeat offenses). “While it is
preferable to question a defendant about his responses to a written waiver form, the
failure to do so does not necessarily invalidate a waiver where there is no indication the
defendant did not understand what he was reading and signing.” (People v. Miranda
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 978, 986.) Here, there are clear indications that defendant
understood what he read and signed.
Defendant also argues the trial court incorrectly advised him that counsel would
“not be appointed” in the event he found himself “floundering” or “drowning” while
representing himself. The Attorney General agrees the court’s warning was “perhaps
hyperbolic” and “technically inaccurate,” because the court would retain discretion to
reappoint counsel upon request, but at worst the court overstated the risks of self-
representation and the record does not indicate that defendant relied on the allegedly
15
erroneous advisement.5 Trial courts have broad discretion to deny midtrial requests for
counsel by self-represented defendants, and that a defendant regrets having waived his
right to counsel does not constitute a compelling ground for revocation of that waiver.
(People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 192–195.) On this record, we conclude the
court’s inaccurate statement on this point did not prevent a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel.
This case is distinguishable from People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536 and
People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, two cases relied on by defendant. In Ruffin, a
“master calendar court” granted Ruffin’s Faretta waiver request following a perfunctory
colloquy stating “in substance, that it was unwise for him to represent himself” and
nothing further. (Ruffin, at p. 546.) Ruffin had completed a written waiver form, but
some responses on the form were incomplete or ambiguous, and he immediately
expressed ambivalence about representing himself upon being sent to another department
for trial the same day. (Id. at pp. 546–547, 550.) In Burgener, the court did not “advise
defendant of the ‘possible pitfalls’ or ‘consequences’ of self-representation” but instead
“simply assumed that defendant was aware of them” and “actively encouraged defendant
to represent himself” at a hearing on his application to modify a verdict of death.
(Burgener, at pp. 241–243.)
Unlike in Ruffin and Burgener, the trial court here orally advised defendant
repeatedly about the negative consequences of self-representation. Defendant also
completed a written waiver form, and his responses on the form confirmed his
understanding of both its contents and the charges against him. In response to the oral

5
Defendant did eventually request (and receive) counsel between trial and
sentencing. He now asserts he “followed the trial court’s erroneous instruction that he
could not seek reappointment of counsel during his trial” by waiting until after the verdict
to request counsel. But the court’s advisement did not distinguish between the trial itself
and post-trial proceedings, and we find defendant’s interpretation of the record
implausible.
16
and written warnings, defendant unequivocally stated at the Faretta hearing that he
wished to represent himself. Aspects of defendant’s trial may illustrate why the decision
to represent oneself is rarely “intelligent” in the colloquial sense, but we must
acknowledge defendant’s constitutional right to do so. The record as a whole
demonstrates that he validly waived his right to counsel.
B. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE FINDINGS
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to show he committed either of the
killings by lying in wait. “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331 (Bolin).) “We must presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”
(People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) To overturn the jury’s finding, “it must
clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support it.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
An intentional killing is committed by means of lying in wait if three elements are
present: (1) a concealment of purpose; (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting
for an opportune time to act; and (3) a surprise attack on the victim from a position of
advantage. (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416.) “It must also be shown that
the defendant did those physical acts with the intent to take his victim unawares and for
the purpose of facilitating his attack.” (People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 183.)
“The concealment required for lying in wait ‘is that which puts the defendant in a
position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of
the defendant’s plan to take the victim by surprise.’ ” (People v. Webster (1991)
54 Cal.3d 411, 448.) “It is sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were

17
concealed by his actions or conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from
view before he attacks the victim.” (Ibid.)
With respect to Golam’s murder, defendant argues the evidence does not
sufficiently establish any of the three lying in wait elements. Defendant’s argument
depends on the premise that his own testimony about Omar’s supposed confession cannot
be treated as evidence of the manner in which defendant committed the murder. But the
jury could have concluded, as the prosecutor argued, that defendant’s testimony actually
described his own conduct. There was evidence that defendant provided shifting
explanations for the murders over time, first blaming an unidentified abuser in
conversations with Matthew and detectives before later claiming at trial that Omar was
the killer. Defendant offered progressively more detail in each recounting, while
maintaining apparent consistency with the physical evidence. The jury could have
concluded under the circumstances that he was attempting to attribute his own actions to
others. Viewed as a whole, the record supports a conclusion that defendant lured Golam
into the garage under false pretenses and waited until his back was turned to attack him
from a position of advantage with the intent to kill—thereby satisfying the elements of
lying in wait.
As to Shamima’s murder, defendant again challenges all three elements and
asserts his intent to kill her “formed at the earliest after she came out of her bedroom the
second time and persisted in reaching the garage.” The Attorney General disputes that
characterization of the evidence. Even assuming insufficient evidence of defendant’s
intent to kill Shamima before she left her room, the evidence of defendant’s actions from
that point forward support a lying in wait finding. The jury could have determined that
defendant, having already murdered his father, faked a 911 call to conceal from his
mother what he had done and convince her an intruder was in the house. The evidence
also supports the conclusion that defendant instructed Shamima to crawl toward the
garage, intending to kill her by shooting her from behind, and waited until she neared the
18
garage to attack her from a position of advantage. (Cf. People v. Nelson (2016)
1 Cal.5th 513, 551 [insufficient evidence of lying in wait where evidence only showed
Nelson “came up behind his victims on foot to take them by surprise” and no evidence
showed he “arrived before the victims or waited in ambush for their arrival”].) Evidence
to the contrary—in the form of defendant’s testimony that Omar described shooting
Shamima in a panic so she would not see Golam’s body in the garage—does not require
that defendant’s version be credited nor preclude the inference that defendant murdered
Shamima by lying in wait.
C. THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR A SECTION 1181.1 MOTION AS TO THE LYING
IN WAIT ALLEGATIONS

Relying on a discussion that took place during the defense case, defendant
contends the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal on the lying in wait
special circumstance allegations at the close of the prosecution case. At the time, the
allegations had not yet been made. Defendant essentially suggests he was entitled to a
preemptive midtrial judgment of acquittal on uncharged special circumstances, based on
post hoc legal arguments that were not before the trial court for consideration at the time.
We see no basis for such a judgment.
“In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own
motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the
jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the
offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.” (§ 1118.1.)
As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General argues defendant forfeited his claim by
failing to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution case. After
defendant testified, the trial court brought that omission to his attention and informed him
for the purpose of preserving the issue for appeal that it would have denied the motion
had one been made. We need not determine whether that colloquy was sufficient to

19
accomplish the court’s stated objective because, as we will explain, defendant’s claim
fails for other reasons.
Assuming without deciding that defendant’s claim is preserved for our review, we
conclude it lacks merit. A section 1118.1 motion made at the close of the prosecution
case must result in acquittal of any “offenses charged in the accusatory pleading” for
which there is insufficient evidence. “Review of the denial of a section 1118.1 motion
made at the close of a prosecutor’s case-in-chief focuses on the state of the evidence as it
stood at that point.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) The special
circumstances at issue here were not charged in the accusatory pleading and therefore
were not subject to a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution case. It was
only after defendant testified in his own defense, and provided new details about the
murders from which the jury could conclude they were committed by means of lying in
wait, that the prosecutor requested on the record lying in wait instructions on both murder
counts. (Though defendant asserts in his reply brief that the prosecutor “was considering
lying-in-wait theories” days before the parties discussed those theories on the record, that
is speculative and in any event would not change the fact that no lying-in-wait special
circumstances were charged before the close of evidence.)
The proper avenue for challenging the lying in wait allegations in the trial court
would have been an objection to the addition of uncharged special circumstances
following the close of evidence, not a premature motion for acquittal at the close of the
prosecution case. Rather than opposing the prosecutor’s request, however, defendant
expressly agreed on the record to the lying in wait instructions. Although it is
understandable that defendant would now consider that choice a mistake, the court had no
duty to preemptively enter a judgment of acquittal on then-uncharged allegations at an
earlier point in the trial.

20
D. RECONSIDERATION OF THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS IS NOT REQUIRED
At a sentencing hearing held on August 30, 2019, at which defendant was
represented by counsel, the trial court imposed two 25-years-to-life enhancements for
personal discharge of a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) Defense counsel
did not ask the court to strike or dismiss those enhancements, or to impose lesser
enhancements. On appeal, defendant argues we should remand the matter to allow the
trial court to exercise its discretion as to the imposition of those or lesser enhancements
under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).
We agree with the Attorney General that forfeiture applies under the
circumstances here. Several months before defendant was sentenced, one appellate court
held that when a sentencing court exercised its discretion to strike or dismiss a firearm
enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), it had discretion to
impose a lesser uncharged enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
(People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217, 222–223.) By the time of the sentencing
hearing, another appellate court had disagreed and concluded that sentencing courts
lacked discretion to impose lesser enhancements that had not been found true. (People v.
Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637, 643–644, revd. and sub. opn. by Tirado, supra,
12 Cal.5th 688.) (The California Supreme Court later granted review in that case and
ultimately agreed with Morrison in Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 697.) But it would not
have been “futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence” for
defendant to request at the time of sentencing that the court strike or dismiss the 25-
years-to-life enhancements and impose lesser ones. (See People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) Having not done so, defendant cannot now argue on a silent
appellate record that the court abused its discretion.
We also reject defendant’s alternative contention that his counsel was ineffective
in not asking the trial court to impose a lesser enhancement under Morrison. To establish
ineffectiveness of trial counsel in violation of a defendant’s right to counsel under the
21
Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient
and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171,
216–217.) Deficient performance is rarely shown if there was a tactical reason for trial
counsel’s conduct. (See People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 255–256 [“except in rare
cases, an appellate court should not attempt to second-guess trial counsel as to tactics”];
Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 317 [affirming conviction where alleged failure to object
“may well have been ‘an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable
competence’ ”].) To prove prejudice, a defendant must affirmatively show a reasonable
probability that, but for trial counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.
(Ledesma, at pp. 217–218.)
Here, counsel may have refrained from asking the trial court to impose lesser
enhancements under the reasonable belief that the court would be unlikely to do so. (See
People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 945 [“In many cases” the full scope of a
sentencing court’s discretion “may not have been mentioned at sentencing by either the
trial court or defense counsel because all those involved in the proceeding recognized
that, in view of the defendant’s background and the circumstances of the current offense,
the exercise of such discretion in the defendant’s favor was not a realistic possibility”].)
We need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient, however, because
on this record we see no reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a
lesser enhancement if asked. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697
[“The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance”].)
Before sentencing defendant, the trial court stated in part: “The Court generally
does not make long speeches at this stage of the proceedings, but I do feel it incumbent
upon the Court to make the following observations. [¶] These killings were among the
most disturbing, violent, and heinous crimes I think that can be committed.” The court
noted several aspects of the murders, including the manner in which they were committed
and their impact on members of defendant’s family and their friends. Although the court
22
determined defendant would serve two terms of life in prison without the possibility of
parole for the murders themselves, the court also imposed the two 25-years-to-life
enhancements despite presumably understanding that it had discretion to strike or dismiss
those enhancements entirely. Given its imposition of the maximum permissible sentence,
nothing in the record suggests the court might have imposed lesser enhancements had
defense counsel brought that option to its attention.
E. DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO HIS SENTENCE MUST FAIL
In his opening brief, defendant argued his mandatory sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole (§ 190.2, subd. (a)) is unconstitutional. His contention
was that section 3051, which provides youth offender parole hearings to other youthful
offenders but does not apply “to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the
person had attained 18 years of age” (§ 3051, subd. (h)), violates the equal protection
clauses of the United States and California constitutions. In People v. Hardin (2024)
15 Cal.5th 834, decided after defendant filed his opening brief, the California Supreme
Court found a rational basis for the Legislature’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole in section 3051,
subdivision (h). In his reply brief, defendant “acknowledges that Hardin controls here
but seeks to preserve the issue for purposes of federal appellate review and thus maintains
that [his] Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection is violated by section 3051’s
preclusion on parole for youthful offenders like him.” We are bound by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hardin to reject defendant’s claim. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

23
____________________________________
Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H048223
The People v. Golamrabbi

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.