CourtListener 10370743•People v. Martinez CA2/2
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Filed 4/1/25 P. v. Martinez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B328598
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA452909)
v.
BRIAN MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Brian Martinez appeals from the
trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.61 (former § 1170.95).2 Because defendant is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Indictment
In May 2017, a grand jury indicted defendant and five
others on charges of premeditated and deliberated murder (§ 187;
count 1) and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187; counts 2, 3, & 4).
Defendant was also charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 20.)
As to the murder and attempted murder charges, the
indictment alleged that one of defendant’s confederates
personally and intentionally fired a handgun causing death; for
defendant and the remaining codefendants, the indictment only
alleged that a principal shot the victim to death. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).) Lastly, as relevant here, the indictment alleged that
the murder and attempted murders were committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
II. Plea and Sentence
On February 27, 2020, the parties agreed to a negotiated
disposition. The information was amended to add one count for
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 22); defendant
pled guilty to that charge and to unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon. He also admitted to the gang enhancement allegation.
1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.
2
The prosecution dismissed the murder and attempted murder
charges.
Pursuant to the terms of defendant’s plea deal, the trial
court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of
22 years eight months.
III. Resentencing Petition
In March 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The prosecution filed a written opposition,
arguing that defendant was ineligible for relief because he pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter after the enactment of Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1).
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a reply contending simply
that defendant “ha[d] shown sufficient facts to proceed to a
resentencing hearing.” The reply did not raise any
counterarguments about the timing of defendant’s plea.
On January 19, 2023, the matter proceeded to a prima facie
hearing. The trial court solicited argument on “the fact that
. . . [defendant]’s plea was after the law changed[,]” specifically
asking defendant’s trial counsel if she “ha[d] any response to that
particular issue.” Counsel replied that although she was “aware
of that” issue, she “didn’t address it because obviously [she]
wasn’t go[ing to] argue against” defendant. She then submitted
on the briefs.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition, finding that he
could not make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
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77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.) To the extent that we are required to
engage in statutory interpretation, we also review those issues de
novo. (A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 290.)
II. Statutory Framework
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 effectively
abolished the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
cases of murder and limited the application of the felony-murder
doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) With one narrow exception
(§ 189, subd. (f)), Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated murder
convictions premised on any theory of imputed malice—that is,
any theory by which a person can be convicted of murder for a
killing committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People
also prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the
intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard to human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also established a petitioning
procedure (§ 1172.6) allowing defendants convicted of murder to
seek resentencing relief if they could no longer be convicted
because of the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959, 971.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) amended section 1172.6 to “[c]larif[y]
that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural
probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as
those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
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To obtain relief, a defendant who pled guilty to
manslaughter must first allege that an indictment was filed
against him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
either (1) murder under the felony murder rule, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any “other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime[;]” or (2) “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1).) The defendant must then allege that he accepted a plea
offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of
murder or attempted murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)), and that he
could not now be convicted “because of changes to Section 188 or
189 made effective January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis
to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) “[T]he prima facie
inquiry . . . is limited . . . ‘“[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the [defendant] would be entitled to relief if
his . . . factual allegations were proved.’”’” (Lewis, supra, at
p. 971.)
“‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.] If, instead, the
defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, “the court shall issue an order to show cause”’” and set the
matter for an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 469.)
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III. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
IV. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court wrongly dismissed
his section 1172.6 petition because, at the time he pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter, he still could have been prosecuted for
attempted murder under a theory of imputed malice.
The People argue that defendant forfeited this argument by
failing to object below. We agree. At the prima facie hearing, the
trial court expressly asked defendant whether the timing of his
plea affected his resentencing petition; defendant’s trial counsel
declined to offer any argument on this point. “We will not upend
the results of a proceeding based on a purported error defendant
did not even attempt to correct below.” (People v. Martinez (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 329, 337.)
Defendant’s argument also fails on the merits. When
enacting Senate Bill No. 1437, “the Legislature’s aim in the
manslaughter context was to make relief available to defendants
who were convicted . . . at a time when the prosecution could
have pursued a murder charge, but the only way of doing so
would have been a now invalid theory of imputed malice.”
(People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590 (Lezama).)
Thus, to qualify for resentencing relief, a defendant must show
that “at the time of conviction—i.e., the time the plea was
entered—the only way to . . . conviction was through an imputed
malice theory.” (Ibid.) “As a matter of law, this cannot be true
for a person, like defendant, who pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter at a time when imputed malice theories had
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already been statutorily eliminated.” (Ibid.) Accordingly,
defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
In an effort to distinguish Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
583, defendant argues that, unlike the petitioner in that case, he
also “face[d] charges of attempted murder[.]” Defendant insists
that because, at the time of defendant’s conviction, “the law was
unsettled as to the impact of Senate Bill No. 1437 on the offense
of attempted murder . . . he [still] could have faced attempted
murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he proceeded to
trial in lieu of entering a plea to voluntary manslaughter.”
(People v. Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434, 444 (Gallegos);
see § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2) [to make a prima facie case for
resentencing relief, a petitioner must show that he “was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder”], italics added.)
As explained by the Gallegos court, “this argument fails
when section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2) is read in the context of
the statute as a whole.”3 (Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 444.) The plain text of section 1172.6 focuses “on the
individual conviction at issue . . . evidenc[ing] a statutory purpose
to provide relief for specific convictions obtained under a now-
invalid theory of liability, and not . . . [for] dismissed charges
separate and apart from the conviction at issue.” (Ibid; see, e.g.,
§ 1172.6, subds. (a) [authorizing vacation of “the petitioner’s
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction” if
3 Even though defendant’s reply brief was filed over four
months after Gallegos was published, he does not attempt to
distinguish that case or argue that it does not apply to his appeal.
7
certain conditions are met], (d)(3) [following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court must vacate “the prior conviction” if the
prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof].) Thus, when
determining whether defendant has made a prima facie case for
resentencing relief, we look to his voluntary manslaughter
conviction rather than his dismissed attempted murder charges.
(See, e.g., People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 681, 705
[“‘Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser
included offense of murder’”], italics added.)
To the extent that section 1172.6 is ambiguous regarding
the effect of dismissed charges on the validity of a resentencing
petition, we agree with the Gallegos court’s interpretation of its
legislative history. That history shows that the Legislature
“intended section 1172.6 to apply to those petitioners who entered
a plea to manslaughter only if, at the time the plea was entered,
the only way to a charged murder conviction was through an
imputed malice theory eliminated by Senate Bill No. 1437.”
(Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 445, italics in original;
see, e.g., Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a) [Senate Bill No. 775
clarifies that persons “who were convicted of . . . manslaughter
under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories”]; Sen. Com.
on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, [“[t]his bill would allow a person
. . . who was convicted of manslaughter when the prosecution was
allowed to proceed on a theory of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to apply to have
their sentence vacated and be resentenced”]; Sen. Com. on Public
Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as
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amended Feb. 19, 2021, [recognizing that voluntary
manslaughter “[is] often the subject of a plea bargain in murder
cases in exchange for a dismissal of a murder charge”].)
This legislative history reinforces our conclusion that a
defendant convicted of manslaughter is not eligible for
resentencing unless the conviction could have been obtained via
an imputed malice theory of murder. Neither the plain text nor
legislative history of the statute indicates that defendant is
eligible for relief because the prosecution still could have
proceeded on an imputed malice theory on his attempted murder
charges, which are ultimately unrelated to his conviction for
voluntary manslaughter. Thus, defendant is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in denying his
petition. (See Gallegos, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
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