People v. Malacara CA4/1

CourtListener 10367679CalctappMar 28, 2025

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Filed 3/28/25 P. v. Malacara CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082276

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD291032)

YESENITA MALACARA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador, Judge. Vacated in part and otherwise affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
One morning, Jesse1 Malacara chased 11-year-old Isaiah M. across a
busy street before putting him in a headlock, pulling him about 35 feet into
an occupied store, and releasing him. On this evidence, a jury found
Malacara guilty of kidnapping a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, §§ 207,
subd. (a), 208, subd. (b); count 1) and false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236,
237(a); count 2). The court sentenced Malacara to an aggregate prison term
of 43 years to life. Malacara challenges his convictions and sentence on
multiple grounds.
First, Malacara claims his kidnapping conviction must be overturned
for insufficient evidence. We disagree. The distance Malacara moved Isaiah
in combination with several contextual factors is sufficient to affirm
Malacara’s conviction of count 1.
Second, we accept the People’s concession that false imprisonment by
violence is a lesser included offense of kidnapping and accordingly vacate
Malacara’s conviction of count 2. This moots his challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence underlying that conviction.
Third, Malacara argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
We conclude the trial court deliberately and nonarbitrarily balanced relevant
considerations about Malacara’s background, his prior convictions, and the
current offenses; accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion.
Fourth, Malacara contends the trial court abused its discretion in
(1) failing to strike his serious felony priors under section 1385 and
(2) sentencing him to the upper term on count 1 without expressly applying
the low-term presumption of section 1170(b). Because Malacara failed to

1 Appellant’s preferred name and pronouns were used in the trial court.
We do the same in the body of the opinion.
2
object to his sentence on these grounds below, he forfeited these issues.
Further, on this silent record, we must presume the court appreciated the
scope of its sentencing discretion.
We thus vacate Malacara’s conviction of count 2 and otherwise affirm.
I.
A.
In the summer of 2021, Isaiah and his family lived on a busy street.
Isaiah—who was 11 years old; four feet, five inches tall; and weighed
75 pounds—had just started walking to a store across the street by himself.
One morning, Isaiah went to the store for sodas. On his way there, he
saw Malacara— who was 34 years old; five feet, six inches tall; and weighed
150 pounds—sitting on a log and looking at him.
On his way back home, Isaiah saw Malacara walking toward him.
Isaiah “assumed [Malacara] was going to do something” to him. Rather than
continue home, Isaiah decided to run across the street and back toward the
store, where he thought people could assist him. Isaiah looked behind him
and saw Malacara chasing him.
The sole entry to the store was up a 15-foot ramp in a parking lot.
Malacara caught up to Isaiah near the ramp’s base, about 12 feet from the
store’s entrance. He put Isaiah into a “tight” two-armed headlock and
whispered, “‘Come here.’” According to Isaiah, Malacara then “started
following [him] where [he] was going”—“back into the store.”
Upon reaching the door, Malacara kept his left arm around Isaiah’s
neck but let go with his right. Malacara was “still controlling [Isaiah’s]
movements.”

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Once inside the store, Malacara “tried taking [Isaiah] into an aisle”
Isaiah did not want to go down. The aisle was to the right of the doorway and
in the opposite direction of the cash registers, where Isaiah wanted to go.
Store workers yelled for Malacara to “‘[g]et off of’” Isaiah or “‘[l]et him
go.’” They asked Isaiah if he knew Malacara, and he “said no.” A store
worker testified Isaiah was visibly “scared” and “terrified.”
Malacara let go of Isaiah near the entry to the aisle. According to the
district attorney’s investigator, the distance from the front door to the spot of
release was 23 feet, although the distance appears far shorter on video.
Isaiah, who still felt “scared,” went behind the cash registers with the
workers.
The distance between the ramp’s base and the store’s aisle is roughly
35 feet.
B.
Malacara was charged with kidnapping and false imprisonment by
violence. A jury found him guilty of both counts.
Malacara admitted two prior strikes, and the trial court found two
aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Isaiah was
particularly vulnerable, and (2) Malacara’s prior convictions were numerous
and of increasing seriousness.
Both the People and the probation department recommended a
sentence on count 1 of 33 years to life (the upper term tripled under the
Three Strikes Law) plus 10 consecutive years for the two prior serious
felonies. They recommended a stayed term on count 2.
Malacara asked the court to (1) strike one or more of his strikes,
(2) strike both his prior serious felonies, and (3) impose the lower or middle
term.

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As to the first and second requests, Malacara argued (1) the offenses at
issue were remote; (2) they were serious, but not violent, felonies; (3) Three
Strikes punishment was disproportionate to the charged offenses’ severity
and Malacara’s criminal history; (4) his criminal history was the result of
substance addictions; (5) he had been felony-free for the last 10 years; (6) he
was willing and able to rehabilitate himself; and (7) Malacara’s mental health
conditions—identified by a psychologist as bipolar disorder, amphetamine
and alcohol use disorder, amphetamine induced psychotic disorder, and
unspecified trauma- and stressor-related disorder—reduced his culpability.
According to the psychologist’s report, Malacara’s grandfather, who raised
him, physically abused him, and another relative sexually abused him.
As to the third request, Malacara argued numerous mitigating factors
applied, including: (1) he committed the charged offenses during a substance-
induced psychotic episode during which he thought his conduct was legal,
which reduced his culpability; (2) Malacara’s childhood trauma was a factor
in the commission of the crime; (3) under section 1385(c), the offenses were
connected to Malacara’s childhood trauma; and (4) Malacara’s status as a
transgender man and his struggle with gender identity since adolescence.
After hearing argument, the court denied Malacara’s motion to strike
at least one of his prior strikes “to protect society, to punish the defendant,
and prevent[ ] him from committing new crimes by isolating him for a
significant period of incarceration[,] and increase public safety.” The court
recounted Malacara’s lengthy criminal record—including his two strikes,
which the court found to be “significant violent offenses”—and concluded
Malacara was a danger to the community because he “has not stayed law
abiding,” “went to prison for very violent offenses,” and “continue[d] to use
drugs.” It noted the charged offenses were “immensely bad, serious, [and]

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terrible” and his priors were “not that remote in time.” The court accordingly
concluded Malacara fell “squarely” within the Three Strikes Law.
As to the term imposed, the court “believe[d]” Malacara experienced
childhood trauma, but could “not find that it was a factor in the commission
of this crime.” It found section 1385(c) inapplicable and “slight value” in the
mitigating factors argued by Malacara. The court determined the two
aggravating factors found true beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed them.
It thus tripled the upper term for the kidnapping offense to 33 years to life.
Although the court noted “the defense motion to strike the serious felony
priors,” the court did not expressly rule on that motion, instead imposing a
consecutive 10-year term for the two serious felony priors. The court also
imposed but stayed an upper-term sentence on the false imprisonment by
violence offense. Defense counsel did not object to the sentence.
II.
We address in turn Malacara’s arguments on appeal.
A.
First, Malacara contends insufficient evidence supports his kidnapping
conviction. The elements of simple kidnapping are (1) unlawful movement of
a person by use of force or fear (2) without the person’s consent (3) for a
substantial distance. (People v. Jones (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 455, 462; see
also Pen. Code, § 207(a).) An increased sentencing range applies when, as
here, the person moved was under the age of 14. (§ 208(b).) Malacara
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the third element, which
is known as asportation. (People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1434.)
On this record, we conclude the asportation evidence is sufficient to support
Malacara’s conviction.

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1.
“In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307 [cleaned up].) We do not reweigh the
evidence, assess witness credibility, or choose between competing inferences.
(People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.)
For the asportation element, the factfinder “should consider the totality
of the circumstances” to determine whether the “‘scope and nature’” of the
movement was “‘substantial in character.’” (People v. Martinez (1999)
20 Cal.4th 225, 237, 236, 235.) Accordingly, “the jury might properly consider
not only the actual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as
whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed
prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased
both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the
attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” (Martinez, at
p. 237.) These additional factors are “nonexclusive” (People v. Singh (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 175, 187), are not necessarily required to convict (Martinez, at
p. 237), and can be considered even if they do not materialize (id. at p. 233).
2.
We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
the movement here was substantial in character.
Initially, the parties dispute whether the kidnapping includes the
chase—the period from when Isaiah darted across the street to avoid
Malacara until Malacara intercepted him and put him in a headlock near the

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base of the store ramp. Although we requested supplemental briefing on this
issue, we conclude we need not reach it because, considering the totality of
the circumstances in the light most favorable to the judgment, sufficient
evidence supports the asportation element even if we exclude that portion of
the incident from the kidnapping.
The distance here is roughly 35 feet. The People cite no authority, and
we have found none, where a comparable distance was itself enough—absent
contextual factors—to affirm a kidnapping conviction. The cases on which
the People rely all depend—in addition to distance—on contextual factors to
affirm the kidnapping conviction.
Yet the evidence here includes contextual factors sufficient to conclude
the distance was substantial in character. Although we reject the People’s
assertion that Malacara took Isaiah “out of public view” when he moved
Isaiah from one public place into another, Malacara nonetheless appreciably
changed Isaiah’s environment by taking him to a more secluded and less
visible public area when he dragged Isaiah into the store and attempted to
pull Isaiah down the aisle out of view of the cash registers. A reasonable
juror could conclude Malacara’s actions isolated Isaiah from other people,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of detection. (See Martinez, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 237.)
Even if we are not convinced the remaining factors identified in
Martinez support Malacara’s kidnapping conviction, they are not exclusive.
(Singh, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 187.) Here, the jury was entitled to consider
several other factors supporting Malacara’s movement of Isaiah given the
totality of the circumstances.
For example, the jury could reasonably consider the fact Isaiah was a
lone child, outside the presence of family members likely to intervene, at the

8
time the incident occurred, making him vulnerable to Malacara’s attack. It
was also entitled to consider the significant size difference, as Malacara
weighed twice as much as Isaiah and was more than a foot taller. The jury
could account for the fact the movement attempted to take Isaiah down an
aisle and further from the store’s exit, decreasing his ability to escape. (See
People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 583 [finding asportation sufficient
where defendant dragged rape victim 8 to 10 feet from smaller bathroom stall
to larger one because it took her further from exit and provided additional
room to accomplish rape and other crimes].) And even if we do not consider
the chase a part of the kidnapping itself, the pursuit is relevant to the totality
of the circumstances under which the kidnapping took place.
This contextual evidence is not strong. Yet, considered in combination
with the roughly 35 feet traveled, it is sufficient to satisfy the asportation
requirement under our deferential review.
The cases on which Malacara relies to contend otherwise are inapt. For
example, People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297, involved
kidnapping to commit robbery. The asportation element in such cases
contains an additional requirement inapplicable here: that the movement “is
not merely incidental to the commission of the underlying crime.” (Martinez,
20 Cal.4th at p. 232; see § 209(b)(2).) Washington found this additional
requirement unmet because “there was no excess or gratuitous movement of
the victims over and above that necessary to obtain the money in the vault,”
making the movement merely “incidental to the robbery.” (Washington, at
p. 299.) The court did not consider whether the movement would have been
sufficient for purposes of a simple kidnapping alone. Here, however, Isaiah’s
movement was not incidental to any other crime but instead attributable to
the kidnapping itself. People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894 is inapposite

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not only for the same reason but also because it was decided when the
asportation element for simple kidnapping depended solely on distance,
without other contextual factors. (Williams, at p. 902 [movement incidental
to robbery]; Martinez, 20 Cal.4th at p. 235 [nearly 30 years later, holding
factors other than distance are relevant to determining asportation].)
We therefore affirm Malacara’s conviction of count 1.
B.
Second, Malacara argues, and the People concede, his conviction of
count 2 must be vacated because false imprisonment by force is a lesser
included offense of simple kidnapping. (See People v. Magana (1991)
230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121.) “In this state, multiple convictions may not be
based on necessarily included offenses arising out of a single act or course of
conduct.” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518.) Accordingly, we
accept the People’s concession and vacate Malacara’s conviction of count 2.
(See Magana, at pp. 1120-1121.) Given this outcome, we need not address
Malacara’s alternative argument that insufficient evidence supported his
conviction of count 2.
C.
Third, Malacara claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his Romero motion. We conclude otherwise.
“[A] trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes [L]aw that a defendant has previously been convicted of a
serious and/or violent felony . . . ‘in furtherance of justice.’” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158, quoting § 1385(a).) We deferentially
review Romero rulings for abuse of discretion and “must consider whether, in
light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the

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defendant’s] background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though [the defendant] had not previously been convicted of one or
more” strikes. (Williams, at pp. 161-162.) As the circumstances must be
“‘extraordinary’” for a defendant to “‘be deemed to fall outside the spirit’” of
the Three Strikes Law, “the circumstances where no reasonable people could
disagree that the [defendant] falls outside the spirit of the [T]hree [S]trikes
scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378, quoting People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.)
The burden is on the appellant “to clearly show that the sentencing decision
was irrational or arbitrary.” (Carmony, at p. 376 [cleaned up].)
Malacara claims he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law
because: (1) his prior strikes were serious but not violent felonies stemming
from his addictions and were remote in time; (2) of his childhood abuse; (3) of
his bipolar disorder; (4) he was high on methamphetamine at the time, so the
charged offenses were “the result of appellant’s substance abuse induced
psychiatric episode”; (5) a psychologist opined Malacara was unlikely to
commit further crimes if he got his substance abuse under control; (6) Isaiah
was not injured; (7) Isaiah was not threatened; and (8) no weapon was used
in the current offense. The People counter that the court’s denial of
Malacara’s Romero motion was “reasonabl[e].” They note Malacara’s
“criminal history spans almost 20 years and most of his prior convictions
involved violence or threatened violence.”
We discern no abuse of discretion here. First, as to the strikes
themselves, the court acknowledged they were “serious but not violent”
felonies. Nonetheless, the court acted within its discretion in concluding the
offenses were “violent” in nature. As to the first, Malacara attacked and tried

11
to hit the victim with an ax. As to the second, he pounded a door in, wielding
a knife with a 3- to 4-inch blade, and said he was “‘going to fucking stab’” the
victim. Malacara swung the knife at the victim, eventually slashing one of
the victim’s fingers. These are serious felonies committed in a violent way.
Second, as to the strikes’ purported remoteness, “[a] prior strike
conviction is not considered ‘remote’ . . . where the defendant has not
demonstrated a prolonged period of rehabilitation (a crime free life) in the
interim.” (People v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) Although
Malacara’s strikes date from 2012 and 2013—eight to nine years before the
charged offenses—the record shows Malacara, in the words of the court, “has
not stayed law abiding.” In 2014, he “strangled his girlfriend, pushed her to
the ground, and punched her in the face,” leading to 120 days in jail. In 2019,
he violated a restraining order by going to an ex-girlfriend’s house and
threatening to kill her if she called law enforcement, leading to the revocation
of his probation and a jail stint. Months later, he assaulted his girlfriend by
threatening to kill her with a hammer and slapping her in the face. He
violated various restraining orders over the ensuing two years and served
time in jail. He was released from drug court and committed the charged
offenses only six days later. Given this history, the trial court appropriately
concluded Malacara’s strikes were “not that remote.”
Third, as to the charged offenses, even though Isaiah was not
physically injured and Malacara was unarmed, as the court acknowledged,
“[t]his is every parent’s nightmare.” Isaiah was not unscathed; according to
his mother, “Isaiah was very affected” by the incident and, “[f]or basically a
year, he wouldn’t leave or go somewhere without a friend or family member,
and for over a year, he didn’t feel comfortable to even go outside and was very
insecure.”

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Fourth, as to childhood abuse, the court “recognize[d]” Malacara “had a
terrible past.” The court was entitled to afford that factor little weight, and it
is not for us to reweigh the evidence. (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308,
317 [A reviewing court “err[s] when it reweigh[s] the circumstances in
[aggravation and] mitigation rather than limiting its review to whether the
sentencing court abused its statutory discretion.”].)
Fifth, regarding Malacara’s bipolar disorder, the court considered this
factor but found Malacara’s refusal to take medication did not help him. The
court was entitled to accord little weight to the reasons Malacara provided
the psychologist who authored an evaluation for his sentencing—that he
(1) had hepatitis C and was concerned about his liver and (2) worried he may
lose his hair. Although Malacara was allegedly open to non-medication
treatments, the record was devoid of evidence Malacara tried any.
That leaves us with Malacara’s history of substance abuse. The
psychologist opined Malacara’s “general risk of recidivism would subside” and
he would be “unlikely to behave” “erratically” if he “addresses his substance
use successfully.” But the record is replete with evidence Malacara was
unlikely to do so. Malacara admitted to probation that he first used
methamphetamine at age 15 and used it daily, including the day of the
incident. Probation noted Malacara had completed a residential treatment
program in 2020 and began participating in drug court later that year,
although he “was terminated unsuccessfully from the program in 2021” for
poor performance. He was arrested for the charged offenses just days later
following a methamphetamine bender. He scored high on an assessment
predicting his risk of recidivism. Malacara was likely under the influence of
alcohol or other substances when committing the offenses underlying his
prior convictions in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Given this history, the court

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was within its discretion to conclude from this evidence, as the prosecutor
urged, that “Malacara presents now to society . . . a danger” rather than less
culpability for his actions.
We agree with the People that People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
1134, on which Malacara relies, is factually inapposite. Malacara’s charged
offenses were exponentially more serious than the attempted robbery and
attempted extortion in Avila, in which the defendant demanded rent from
fruit sellers and stomped several bags of oranges when they failed to comply.
(Avila, at p. 1139.) Kidnapping is classified as a violent crime, whereas the
offenses in Avila are not. (Id. at p. 1142; § 667.5(c)(14).) Unlike here, the
Avila defendant’s crimes were decreasing in seriousness. (Avila, at p. 1143.)
While Avila said it was not always so, it “d[id] not disagree with the general
notion that a defendant’s drug problem may have little mitigating value
where the problem is long-standing.” (Ibid.) Consequently, Avila is
unhelpful to Malacara.
In sum, the court’s conclusion that Malacara fell within the spirit of the
Three Strikes Law after a thorough consideration of relevant factors—
including Malacara’s prior and current offenses, his background, his
character, and his prospects—was not an abuse of discretion.
D.
Finally, Malacara contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss
his two serious felony priors under section 1385(c) and (2) imposing the upper
term on count 1. The People argue—and we conclude—Malacara forfeited
these challenges by failing to object to his sentence on these bases in the
court below.
“[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised

14
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.)
Because “[r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily
prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention,” the forfeiture
doctrine helps “to reduce the number of errors committed in the first instance
and preserve the judicial resources otherwise used to correct them.” (Id. at
p. 353.)
Here, Malacara’s counsel did not object to the court’s failure to
expressly rule on his motion to dismiss the serious felony prior enhancements
or imposition of the upper term. These claims are therefore forfeited. (See,
e.g., People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 [forfeiture
of failure to consider section 1170(b) by failing to object to upper term in
lower court].)
To the extent Malacara claims the trial court abused its discretion in
making these sentencing decisions because it was unaware of the scope of its
sentencing discretion, the record is silent on this issue. “[I]n light of the
presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable
law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error
where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) Because the record does not establish on its face
that the court misunderstood its discretion, Malacara is not entitled to relief
on this basis.

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III.
We vacate Malacara’s conviction of false imprisonment by violence
(count 2) and otherwise affirm the judgment. The superior court shall
prepare an abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion and transmit it
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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