People v. Sims CA3

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Filed 3/27/25 P. v. Sims CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C096896

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 93F03509)

v.

ROBERT DANIEL SIMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Robert Daniel Sims appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss his case under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et
seq.) (Act) for failing to provide a timely trial. This is not our first time reviewing
defendant’s case. (See People v. Sims (Feb. 24, 2021, C088029) [nonpub. opn.] (Sims).)
In defendant’s last appeal, we conditionally reversed the judgment finding defendant a
sexually violent predator and directed the trial court to hear defendant’s previously

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raised, but not addressed, Marsden1 and speedy trial motions, as well as any other motion
defendant’s counsel raised on remand. (Sims, supra, C088029.) On remand, the trial
court granted defendant’s Marsden motion, appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary
hearing on defendant’s speedy trial motion, and denied the motion, thus reinstating the
prior judgment finding him a sexually violent predator.
In this appeal, defendant contends his counsel on remand was prohibited from
representing him due to a conflict of interest and provided ineffective assistance of
counsel for a variety of reasons. Defendant further contends the trial court erred by
denying his speedy trial motion. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We granted defendant’s motion to incorporate the record of his prior appeal. As
we noted in our opinion from the prior appeal, the record merely provided a procedural
timeline of defendant’s case and was not developed regarding the reasons for the delay
between the filing of the petition to commit defendant as a sexually violent predator and
the eventual trial. (Sims, supra, C088029.) That problem was rectified on remand when
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss, at
which defendant, defendant’s trial counsel Robert Saria, and Saria’s investigator Randall
Costa testified. We will recount the procedural history of defendant’s proceedings from
our prior opinion and provide explanations for the various delays as taken from the
evidentiary hearing.
I
The Petition Was Filed In January 2009
“On January 29, 2009, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed a petition to
commit defendant as a sexually violent predator. . . . On February 2, 2009, . . . the trial

1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

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court ordered defendant to be held in a secure facility until a probable cause hearing
could be held. Also, Robert Saria was appointed as defendant’s attorney.” (Sims, supra,
C088029.)
Defendant testified at the hearing on his motion to dismiss that he did not recall
what occurred in February 2009. Saria testified defendant appeared in court on
February 10, 2009, and he met with defendant on February 13, 2009. At that time, four
reports were attached to the petition to commit defendant under the Act, including one
report concluding defendant did not meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator.
II
February 2009 Through July 2009
“Defendant’s probable cause hearing was continued approximately seven times
until July 20, 2009. The continuances were predominantly requested by Saria and
sometimes by others on his behalf because Saria was in trial. It appears defendant was
present for one of these hearings, at which he expressed confusion about the legal process
and asserted his right to a speedy and public trial. Defendant also wrote to the trial court
before the probable cause hearing requesting a new attorney because Saria and Saria’s
investigator[, Costa,] failed to visit him, take his calls, and investigate his case. The trial
court indicated it planned to hear defendant’s complaints during a Marsden hearing,
however, the record does not reflect the trial court ever held such hearing. At the July 20,
2009, probable cause hearing, defendant waived his right to a probable cause hearing
entirely and stipulated to the prosecution’s experts’ reports. Defendant was then
transported to Coalinga State Hospital.” (Sims, supra, C088029, fn. omitted.)
Saria testified at the dismissal hearing that he was present at the hearing when
defendant asked for a speedy trial and, as a result, Saria arranged for his investigator,
Costa, to meet with defendant. Costa met with defendant on March 12, 2009, and
e-mailed Saria his observations, which included that defendant appeared disheveled,
exhibited pressured speech, presented as anxious and tense, and was hallucinating. Costa

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also noted defendant had been in jail for 25 days without his medication. Given these
facts, Saria did not believe defendant was in an appropriate condition to be evaluated by a
defense expert or assist in his defense and, consequently, Saria did not set defendant’s
case for trial. Saria contacted the county jail and requested it assist defendant, who Saria
believed was experiencing “active symptoms of psychosis or some type of mental
illness.”
Saria contacted an expert and described defendant’s symptoms, which the expert
believed would take weeks to resolve with treatment. Because proceedings under the Act
do not permit counsel to declare a doubt as to a client’s competency, Saria believed it was
best to hurry defendant through the probable cause hearing so he could be transported to
the state hospital and “stabilized” while Saria prepared the case. Saria testified he did not
receive a letter from defendant requesting a new attorney and he did not recall being
informed of the Marsden discussion between the court and substitute counsel occurring in
his absence. According to Saria, defendant never complained of his representation in his
presence.
III
July 2009 Through June 2013
“Defendant’s case was thereafter continued multiple times, exclusively at Saria’s
request, until January 2013 when the parties set a trial date for June 27, 2013.
. . . [¶] During the three and one-half years of these requested continuances, defendant
filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus and sent two letters to the court. In the first
petition, filed in July 2011, defendant alleged Saria failed to investigate his case and
communicate with him, and also that Saria took advantage of defendant’s mental illness.
Defendant requested a ‘marsh motion’ and dismissal of his attorney. Defendant’s
petition was denied because he could seek the relief he requested in his sexually violent
predator proceeding. A copy of the order denying defendant’s petition was sent to Saria,
the prosecutor, and the trial court [hearing defendant’s matter under the Act].

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“A few months after the denial of his first petition for writ of habeas corpus,
defendant sent a letter voicing the same complaints found in his [prior] petition. Two
weeks later, defendant sent another letter, again complaining of the issues raised in his
[prior] petition. At least one of defendant’s letters was construed as a motion for
reconsideration and denied. The denial was again forwarded to Saria, the prosecutor, and
the trial court.
“In August 2012, defendant filed [a] second petition for writ of habeas corpus. In
that petition, he alleged: ‘[Defendant], has been here at Coalinga [S]tate Hospital a long
time without court. His [sic] asking this court and judge to give him a court [order]. To
grant [defendant a] speedy trial. [H]is attorney will not do this at all for him. This person
[h]as a legal right to go to court.’ Defendant’s petition was denied because he could . . .
seek his requested relief in his sexually violent predator proceeding. A copy of the order
denying defendant’s petition was forwarded to the prosecutor, Saria, and the trial court.”
(Sims, supra, C088029, fn. omitted.)
Saria testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss that, upon arriving
at Coalinga State Hospital, defendant was undergoing treatment to stabilize his mental
health. Costa visited defendant soon after his arrival and learned defendant was still
hearing voices. On September 1, 2009, Costa told Saria that defendant wanted to start
working on a release plan and he was willing to start treatment. Later in September 2009,
defendant violated parole by committing a sexual battery against an instructor at Coalinga
State Hospital and was placed in prison until June 2010. During that time, Saria and
Costa attempted to locate defendant, read defendant’s hospital records, and continued
defendant’s matter until he served his term for the parole violation and was transferred
back to Coalinga State Hospital.
Following defendant’s return to Coalinga State Hospital, Saria continued
defendant’s matter for several months. In November 2010, Costa observed and reported
to Saria that defendant was in a wheelchair and was wearing a helmet due to a seizure

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condition. Saria continued to request continuances until March 2011. While Saria
testified he informed defendant of the continuances, defendant testified he was never
notified of the continuances and never agreed for Saria to continue his trial. In March
2011, Costa observed and informed Saria that both of defendant’s legs were broken, he
was wearing a helmet due to his seizure condition, and he was rocking back and forth
during conversation. Defendant, however, was also engaged in sex offender treatment
and defendant wanted to go to court so he could go home. Between the time defendant
returned from prison until June 2011, he had been cited multiple times for being verbally
and physically aggressive and masturbating in public areas of Coalinga State Hospital.
For a successful outcome at trial, including entry into outpatient services, Saria
recommended defendant engage in treatment so he would not present to a fact finder as
unable to control his mental illness.
To give defendant more time to engage in treatment, Saria requested a continuance
from May 2011 to August 2011. In July 2011, defendant told Costa and Costa reported
to Saria that defendant’s health was improving and he was working on a release plan as
recommended by Saria. Saria acknowledged receiving an order denying defendant’s July
2011 petition for writ of habeas corpus; however, defendant never addressed the issue
with Saria and Saria was never served with defendant’s petition requesting a new
attorney to provide context to the order. Saria testified he later learned of the denial of
the construed motion for reconsideration defendant filed in October 2011. Defendant
called Costa in early October and never mentioned problems he had with Saria’s
representation. From May 2011 through October 2011, defendant was cited multiple
times for committing threatening acts towards staff and other rule violations, including
rubbing against a female staff member. Defendant was also receiving medication
involuntarily.
Saria testified he requested additional continuances to allow defendant to engage
in treatment based on his and Costa’s discussions with defendant about what was needed

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to prepare for trial and receive a successful outcome. Defendant acknowledged during
his testimony that he had conversations with Saria about the best trial strategy being to
engage in treatment for one to two years. In March or April 2012, Costa visited
defendant and reviewed defendant’s release plan. In May 2012, defendant told Costa and
Costa reported to Saria that defendant was beaten by hospital staff and appeared to have a
head injury. In late May 2012, defendant was put on a forced medication order.
Defendant further had continued to be cited for aggressive behavior and rule violations.
Saria testified he considered these circumstances setbacks to scheduling trial. Over the
course of the next several months, Saria obtained and reviewed transcripts of defendant’s
testimony at the administrative hearing resulting in his forced medication order. Saria
also reviewed defendant’s case with Costa.
Saria was unaware of defendant’s request for a speedy trial in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed on August 2012, which was later denied. In October 2012, Saria
requested a continuance to January 2013, during which time Saria was preparing for trial.
Also in October 2012, Saria learned of an altercation defendant had while in Coalinga
State Hospital and that defendant had stopped engaging in treatment. In January 2013,
defendant contacted Costa and told him he was in treatment and working to get into an
outpatient program. Defendant later told Saria he was ready to go to trial. Saria
communicated with defendant acknowledging his desire to get into outpatient treatment
and told defendant that engaging in sex offender treatment was the best way to win at
trial, especially if he wanted a conditional release. Given defendant’s request for trial,
Saria set a trial date of June 27, 2013.
IV
June 2013 Through January 2016
“At the trial readiness hearing for the June 2013 trial, Saria requested the release
of records obtained by the prosecution and the prosecution stipulated to their release.
Saria also asked the trial court to vacate the June trial and move it to July. At the July

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2013 hearing and thereafter, Saria requested multiple continuances, to which the
prosecution agreed. Defendant was not present at these hearings. Saria indicated during
several requests that he was waiting on an expert’s report, during several others that he
was waiting on records from the state hospital, and at another that he was having ‘expert
witness issues.’ Saria further represented to the trial court in January 2016 that defendant
was having ‘significant medical issues that he[ was] dealing with, and he [did not] feel
he[ was] medically stable enough in order to have the riggers [sic] of coming to
Sacramento and doing a trial.’ ” (Sims, supra, C088029.)
At the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, Saria testified that defendant’s
treatment records were released at the trial readiness hearing for the June 2013 trial. The
records consisted of thousands of pages, which Saria and the expert could not review
before the June 2013 trial, so Saria continued the trial setting date to July 12, 2013. On
June 19, 2013, Saria visited defendant and discussed trial. He then set a trial date of
September 27, 2013, with the court. When the day for trial arrived, Saria was engaged in
another trial, so defendant’s trial was taken off calendar and Saria set a trial setting date
for November 8, 2013. Saria, however, was engaged in another trial from November 6,
2013, through November 21, 2013, necessitating a continuance of defendant’s trial
setting date to January 9, 2014, to accommodate experts’ typical schedule preferences.
In the middle of November 2013, Costa met with defendant, who told him he
wanted to delay trial for a year to engage in treatment. Upon learning of this, Saria
deferred to defendant’s request not to go to trial and at the next hearing continued the
matter to February 2014. In February 2014, Saria asked for the matter to be continued to
March 2014. On March 1, 2014, defendant demanded to go to trial that summer, and
Saria set the matter for a trial readiness hearing in August 2014 and trial in late October
2014 based on his experience of the time it typically took for experts to become prepared.
By October 21, 2014, defendant’s records had still not arrived from Coalinga State

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Hospital, necessitating the matter to be continued to January 6, 2015. The records
eventually arrived on November 20, 2014.
In January 2015, Saria was not ready to go to trial because the records were over
10,000 pages, so he continued trial to March 2015. When defendant asked whether trial
would proceed, Saria responded with a status update and detailed everything that needed
to occur to proceed to trial. Saria was in trial from March 4, 2015, through March 17,
2015, and continued defendant’s trial to May 26, 2015. Also in April 2015, defendant
told Costa he had spoken to state experts, meaning there were new records that would be
delivered to Saria for review within four to six weeks. In August 2015, defendant
indicated he had experienced a grand mal seizure, requiring him to use a walker. Saria
then requested multiple continuances until November 17, 2015, because the defense
expert was not ready.
On November 9, 2015, the defense expert told Saria he could not testify favorably
for defendant because he believed defendant’s mental health condition caused him to
have no impulse control, which led to his many sexual indiscretions. While the expert
acknowledged defendant’s behavior had improved, he indicated he believed defendant’s
behavior was unpredictable and defendant was likely to reoffend. The expert
recommended defendant engage in further treatment.
In situations like this, Saria typically asked his clients whether they would be
willing to engage in treatment instead of going to trial. If the client says no to engaging
in treatment, then Saria goes to trial. Given the facts of defendant’s case, Saria believed
it was likely defendant would be found as meeting the criteria of a sexually violent
predator under the Act, so he and Costa advised defendant to reengage in treatment and
demonstrate a couple of years of good behavior before going to trial. At the next court
hearing, Saria told the trial court he had expert witness issues and was given a
continuance to January 21, 2016, with defendant’s permission.

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V
February 2016 Through July 2016
“In March 2016, defendant filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus citing
Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, and asserting a speedy trial
violation. Defendant also complained about Saria’s ineffective representation.
Defendant’s petition was denied for the same reason his petitions were denied in 2011
and 2012. The order denying defendant’s petition was sent to the prosecutor, Saria, and
the trial court. While the trial court and Saria acknowledged the order, defendant’s
concerns were not addressed.” (Sims, supra, C088029.)
Saria testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss that it was not
uncommon for a defendant in a proceeding under the Act to file multiple petitions for
writ of habeas corpus about matters related and unrelated to the pending petition. If
defendant had raised any of the issues raised in the petition personally with Saria, Saria
testified he would have communicated defendant’s wishes to the court. Defendant
testified that he did tell Saria multiple times throughout the pendency of his case and
through various methods, including through Costa, that he did not want Saria to be his
attorney and that he wanted to go to trial. After defendant filed his March 2016 petition,
Saria continued the hearings in defendant’s case due to defendant’s medical issues and to
give defendant time to heal and engage in treatment.
VI
August 2016 Through September 2018
“Starting in August 2016, Saria, and those standing in for him because he
frequently was not present, represented to the trial court that defendant was
‘programming’ and deciding whether to go to trial, which apparently defendant decided
to do in June 2017 when trial was set for the end of the year. In November 2017, Saria
had surgery and required recovery time. Defendant’s case was taken off track for trial.
In January 2018, defendant’s case was again set for trial, this time for May of that year.

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On May 3, 2018, trial for later that month was confirmed, but when the day arrived, Saria
was in trial with another client and the matter was continued to August[ 2018]. In
August[ 2018], Saria was again in trial and defendant’s trial was continued to September
2018. On September 6, 2018, the [prosecution] had ‘witness problems’ and the matter
was trailed to the next week. [¶] On September 13, 2018, defendant’s trial began.”
(Sims, supra, C088029.)
Saria testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss that he continued to
delay defendant’s matter until June 2017 so defendant could have time to engage in
treatment and demonstrate improvement. At a June 29, 2017 hearing, Saria requested a
trial date of December 5, 2017. Defendant acknowledged the December 2017 trial date
in a conversation with Costa. Saria later reset trial for January 2018 because he had
surgery. When he came back from surgery, he set defendant’s trial for May 22, 2018,
which he testified was the soonest date he could reasonably be ready for trial and that
accommodated his and the expert’s trial schedule.
In early May 2018, Saria confirmed trial for later in the month and confirmed that
he had received all records from the prosecution. Because Saria was engaged in trial
from May 14, 2018, until May 22, 2018, Saria was granted a continuance to August 7,
2018. Trial was later moved to September 2018 because Saria was engaged in trial again.
On the day set for defendant’s September 2018 trial, defendant was still located at
Coalinga State Hospital, causing trial to trail for one week. On September 13, 2018,
defendant’s case was assigned out for trial. According to Saria, while in trial, defendant
never raised any Marsden or ineffective assistance of counsel issues. According to
defendant, he told Saria and the trial judge that he did not want Saria to represent him.
Defendant also testified that he had schizophrenia, which made it difficult for him to
remember things when he was in an altered mood or angry and caused him to hallucinate.

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VII
Prior Opinion And Proceedings On Remand
Defendant appealed the judgment finding him a sexually violent predator, arguing
the trial court erred by failing to address his Marsden and dismissal motions. (Sims,
supra, C088029.) We agreed and conditionally reversed the judgment for the court to
consider defendant’s Marsden motion and motion to dismiss, in addition to any other
motion counsel may make. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court granted defendant’s Marsden motion finding the
relationship between defendant and Saria had deteriorated such that Saria could not
continue representing defendant. The trial court explicitly stated it did not consider
whether Saria acted ineffectively in his representation of defendant.
Stan Kubochi was then appointed to represent defendant. As one of his first acts
as defendant’s counsel, Kubochi, at defendant’s urging, filed a motion to release
defendant on his own recognizance and a motion to withdraw any further Marsden
motions. The trial court did not see a basis to grant defendant release on his own
recognizance considering his case under the Act was conditionally reversed. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw further Marsden motions as moot. During
the hearing on those motions, defendant expressed confusion about our prior opinion and
indicated he believed he was entitled to immediate release.
During the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, Kubochi called defendant to
testify for the purpose of making a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation. Defendant
expressed confusion about our prior opinion and the legal process at this hearing as well.
After the trial court found defendant demonstrated he had asked for a speedy trial and
waited several years to get one, the prosecution called Saria and Costa to testify. During
argument on the motion, Kubochi acknowledged defendant had the burden as the moving
party to demonstrate a speedy trial violation. Kubochi argued that Saria neglected
defendant’s case by asking for several continuances because he was unprepared and in

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trial on other clients’ matters. Kubochi acknowledged that Saria’s requested
continuances were attributed to defendant, but argued defendant was never given the
opportunity to voice his complaints to the trial court or demand a speedy trial because he
was housed 200 miles from the superior court and was never transported to a court
proceeding.
Kubochi conceded that defendant had a parole violation and significant health
issues, as well as committed serious misconduct at Coalinga State Hospital from 2009
through December 2012, making it a reasonably strategic decision not to proceed to trial.
But in early 2013 and 2014 defendant made numerous requests for trial to Saria and to
the court, demonstrating he did his best to get his case to trial in a speedy fashion.
Ultimately, Kubochi argued Saria neglected defendant’s case and the court and
prosecution failed defendant by not requiring Saria to justify his repeated delays.
The trial court issued a written order before our Supreme Court filed its opinion in
Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 379, 382 (Camacho), which clarified
the standard for motions to dismiss proceedings under the Act for speedy trial delays.
Our Supreme Court held the speedy trial factors announced in Barker v. Wingo (1972)
407 U.S. 514 (Barker) were the correct factors to utilize. (Camacho, at pp. 379, 382.)
Under Barker, the trial court found that, of the time between defendant’s first request for
a speedy trial in February 2009 and his trial in September 2018, four years four months of
the delay was attributable to continuances defendant did not request. It found no
evidence of systemic dysfunction in the administration of cases sent to the conflict
criminal defender’s office (conflict panel), of which Saria and Kubochi were both
members. On balance, the trial court found any delay attributable to the state did not
justify a conclusion defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated.
Defendant appeals.

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DISCUSSION
I
Defendant Has Not Demonstrated He Was Entitled
To An Inquiry Of Kubochi’s Alleged Conflicts Of Interest
Defendant contends Kubochi had a conflict of interest because he was appointed
and paid by the conflict panel that paid Saria for his representation of defendant and
Kubochi knew and worked with Saria. Defendant alleges the trial court had a duty to
inquire of these conflicts. We disagree.
A
Additional Background
The conflict panel maintains a list of qualified attorneys and investigators who act
as independent contractors representing criminal defendants and defendants in
proceedings under the Act, as well as under other civil commitment schemes. When
Saria began working for the conflict panel after a 12-year career as a criminal prosecutor,
he was given a large volume of cases involving mental health considerations and
continued to work on those types of cases for the next 23 years. Throughout Saria’s
years working for the conflict panel, limited and sporadic trainings about proceedings
under the Act were available. He took some trainings presented by the State Public
Defender’s Office and some trainings presented by attorneys on the conflict panel. Saria
testified it was his responsibility to provide those trainings and, while it should have been
done, it was not.
For a short time, Saria would also have periodic lunch meetings with a group of
conflict panel attorneys who litigated cases under the Act, and they would talk about best
trial practices and legal developments. Saria would also engage in frequent case
discussions with four or five attorneys from the conflict panel. At the time of the hearing
on defendant’s motion to dismiss, Saria was the deputy director of the conflict panel and
was employed by Sacramento County.

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It was Saria’s practice to rely on the services of an investigator to communicate
with clients housed in state hospitals. Other conflict panel attorneys representing clients
in proceedings under the Act used investigators as well. Indeed, several of the attorneys
on the conflict panel, in addition to Saria, used Costa as their investigator. It was Costa’s
practice to go to a specific state hospital every three weeks or so and visit clients over the
course of a week. The conflict panel had no control or oversight of communications
between Saria and Costa.
B
Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Conflicts
In People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, our Supreme Court “harmonize[d]
California conflict of interest jurisprudence with that of the United States Supreme Court
and adopt[ed] the standard set out in Mickens[ v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162].” “Both
the United States Constitution and the California Constitution guarantee criminal
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel unburdened by any conflicts of
interest.[2] [Citation.] Essentially, a claim of conflict of interest constitutes a form of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 435.) Our
Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that such conflicts ‘embrace all situations in
which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his [or
her] [or their] responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his [or her] [or
their] own interests.’ ” (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 994, disapproved on
another ground in Doolin, at p. 421 & fn. 22.)
In Mickens, the Supreme Court summarized its precedent pertaining to when the
trial court has a duty to inquire of potential conflicts of interest, such that the failure to

2 While defendant is not a criminal defendant, the People agree the proper standard
of assessing a conflict of interest in defendant’s case is the standard adopted from the
United States Supreme Court in Doolin.

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inquire requires remand for a hearing about the effects of the potential conflict.
(Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 167-172.) It pointed to Cuyler v. Sullivan
(1980) 446 U.S. 335, 347, which addressed “a trial court’s duty to inquire into the
propriety of a multiple representation, construing [past precedent] to require inquiry only
when ‘the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists,’
[citation]—which is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a vague,
unspecified possibility of conflict, such as that which ‘inheres in almost every instance of
multiple representation,’ [citation]. In Sullivan, no ‘special circumstances’ triggered the
trial court’s duty to inquire” where “the respondent was one of three defendants accused
of murder who were tried separately, represented by the same counsel. Neither counsel
nor anyone else objected to the multiple representation, and counsel’s opening argument
at Sullivan’s trial suggested that the interests of the defendants were aligned.” (Mickens,
at pp. 168-169, fn. omitted.)
The Mickens court also summarized Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, where
the Supreme Court found a duty to inquire. (Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at
pp. 169-172.) There, the trial court imposed disproportionately large fines based on an
apparent assumption the defendants’ employer would pay, the court knew defendants’
“counsel had been provided by that employer and was [advancing] a constitutional attack
rather than making the arguments for leniency,” and the prosecution “raised the conflict
problem explicitly and requested that the court [inquire] into it.” (Wood, at pp. 272-273.)
Here, neither counsel questioned the propriety of Kubochi’s representation or
raised a potential conflict of interest with the trial court. While defendant points to the
fact that Kubochi was a member of the conflict panel, like Saria, this is not enough
standing alone to require the court to inquire of possible conflicts. The conflicting
relationship must be more than that which is inherent in almost every instance of a
defendant being represented by different members of the conflict panel at different times.
(Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 348 [the possibility of conflict must be more

16
than an unspecified possibility that is inherent in every instance of multiple
representation].)
To overcome this hurdle, defendant argues Saria’s testimony demonstrated he and
Kubochi discussed cases and worked with other conflict panel attorneys to remain current
on the state of the law and to cover court appearances when necessary. This is nothing
more than what is inherent in the relationship of conflict panel members—to jointly
educate themselves on the law and make appearances for one another when necessary.
There is nothing specific in these allegations demonstrating Kubochi’s loyalties were
adverse to defendant and on the side of Saria or the conflict panel generally.
Defendant also points to the fact that Kubochi stood in for Saria in defendant’s
case on one occasion to request a continuance. The problem with defendant’s reliance on
this fact is that the trial court addressed it, finding it was purely an administrative
appearance without involving any substantive representation. Indeed, defendant appears
to agree in his opening brief that Kubochi knew little, if anything, about defendant’s case
or the reasons for Saria’s requested continuance on the day he appeared for Saria. Thus,
this too cannot show a specific conflict.
Finally, defendant argues Kubochi failed to investigate or make any argument
related to the dysfunction of the conflict panel. But, as will be discussed in more detail
post, the record does not demonstrate Kubochi failed to investigate or make available
arguments related to the dysfunction of the conflict panel. Indeed, Saria and Costa were
questioned about the nature and practices of the conflict panel, including the role of the
attorneys and investigators. Kubochi and the prosecution questioned Saria about his
caseload, his trial schedule, and whether he felt overwhelmed with cases. Kubochi
further appeared to have access to Saria’s billing records and checked Saria’s testimony
regarding defendant’s case against Costa’s recollections and contemporaneous notes. In
sum, while the record demonstrates Kubochi did not make a strong argument of systemic
dysfunction of the conflict panel, the record also demonstrates a strong argument was not

17
available based on the testimony of the witnesses regarding these topics. Thus, this also
does not provide notice to the trial court of a specific conflict of interest that needed to be
investigated.
Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated the trial court knew or reasonably
should have known that a specific conflict existed requiring more inquiry. Consequently,
remand is not warranted for a hearing on Kubochi’s alleged conflicts.
II
Kubochi Was Not Ineffective
Defendant raises a variety of arguments that Kubochi was ineffective in his
representation during the hearing on his motion to dismiss and in regard to other matters
on remand. We disagree.
Under California statute and the due process clause of the federal Constitution, a
defendant under the Act has the right to effective assistance of counsel. (In re Kerins
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1110.) Ineffective assistance of counsel claims require a
defendant to prove counsel’s performance was deficient and that he or she or they was or
were prejudiced by that deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) The reviewing court can begin with either element and does not
need to address both if one is not met. (Id. at p. 697.) “To demonstrate deficient
performance, defendant bears the burden of showing that counsel’s performance ‘ “ ‘ “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional
norms.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) “We presume ‘counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ [citations], and
accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.” (People v. Lewis (2001)
25 Cal.4th 610, 674.) For prejudice, defendant must affirmatively “show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, at p. 694.) Further, defendant must
establish prejudice as “ ‘ “ ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect

18
of the errors or omissions of counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1151.)
A
Defendant Has Not Shown Kubochi Was
Ineffective In His Investigation Of Defendant’s Case
Relying on Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, defendant contends Kubochi’s
lack of investigation fell below professional standards. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court
concluded the trial counsels’ failure to investigate the defendant’s “powerful” evidence of
family, personal, and medical history in context of mitigating a possible death penalty
sentence fell below reasonable professional standards. (Id. at pp. 524-526, 534, 536.)
The unreasonableness of the trial counsels’ professional judgment was supported by the
record showing counsel uncovered social service records detailing mitigating childhood
abuse suffered by the defendant but did not investigate or present the defense. (Id. at
pp. 518-519, 524, 534.) Unlike the facts of Wiggins, defendant has pointed only to
speculation and conjecture to support the contention that further investigation would have
led to additional evidence relevant to defendant’s motion to dismiss, and thus, he has not
demonstrated Kubochi failed to pursue a viable avenue of investigation. (See also
People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241 [“A defendant must prove prejudice
that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation’ ”].)
Defendant argues Kubochi needed to conduct depositions of conflict panel
officials and subpoena documents, such as Saria’s billing records. Defendant contends
that, if Saria would have investigated the conflict panel more, he would have discovered
Saria’s prolonged delays were due to inadequate supervision, training, and resources.
But Kubochi asked Saria and Costa questions regarding the conflict panel’s structure and
responsibilities. Costa testified the conflict panel was made of attorneys and
investigators independently contracted by the county to represent clients and they were
not employees of the conflict panel. Saria testified he was responsible for his own

19
training and attended several trainings, although he should have attended more, and took
responsibility for that failure. He testified he, and other local attorneys working in the
field, primarily learned from each other and conferenced about cases and evolving issues.
Further, the conflict panel paid investigators to assist attorneys and every attorney had the
independence to select an investigator from the conflict panel’s approved list. Being a
conflict panel attorney himself, Kubochi could have reasonably agreed with Saria’s and
Costa’s assessments and believed there was no need to call conflict panel officials to
further confirm their testimony. Defendant’s contention conflict panel officials would
have contradicted Saria’s and Costa’s testimony and provided a basis to conclude the
conflict panel was dysfunctional is speculative and thus insufficient to demonstrate
prejudice or a tactical failure.
Defendant argues Kubochi should have investigated Saria’s ignorance of his letters
and petitions to the court. Kubochi, however, did question Saria about his failure to ask
defendant about the orders denying his petitions for writ of habeas corpus and about his
claimed ignorance as to other orders. Costa was also questioned about these matters, as
well as his obligations to communicate with Saria regarding Marsden and speedy trial
requests. Defendant does not explain how investigating the trial court’s practice of
forwarding orders without context or investigating Saria’s excuses would have changed
or added to the factual record. The fact defendant’s petitions requesting a new attorney
and speedy trial were left unanswered by the court and Saria is clear and speaks for itself
when determining the fault of the court in the delay of defendant’s trial.
Defendant argues Kubochi should have exposed Saria’s competing obligations to
other cases, yet Kubochi did question Saria about his caseload and its impact on
defendant’s case. For example, Kubochi asked Saria whether he tried to intentionally
“double set” defendant’s case when Saria requested a March 2015 continuance due to a
conflicting homicide trial or when another attorney appeared for Saria on the May 22,
2018 trial date due to Saria’s conflicting trial. Kubochi further confronted Saria about

20
trial date discrepancies. He challenged Saria about his request to reset trial dates on
May 26, 2015, because his expert needed more time when in fact, a year and four months
earlier in January 2014, Saria told the court the same expert needed a month to be ready.
Kubochi and the prosecution also extensively questioned Saria about his requested
continuances and why he did not proceed to trial after defendant’s requests in 2009, 2011,
2013, 2014, and 2018. Kubochi questioned Saria about why he was unprepared for trial,
such as when he asked Saria about his unpreparedness for the January 6, 2015 trial date,
or when he pressed Saria to explain the two-year trial delay between 2015 and 2017. In
all, Kubochi asked Saria and Costa questions designed to elicit the information that
would have been elicited from a review of Saria’s business records or depositions of
conflict panel officials or independent contractors. Moreover, Saria and Costa referenced
notes and billing records throughout their testimony implying the availability of those
documents to counsel.
Defendant points to People v. DeCasas (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 785 to illustrate a
reasonable investigation of systemic dysfunction, as compared to Kubochi’s
investigation, which he characterizes as being merely a review of his case file. But the
facts of DeCasas do not point to an investigation beyond what occurred here. The
evidence introduced in DeCasas that defendant highlights, such as the testimony and
documentary evidence demonstrating the staffing reduction for attorneys representing
defendants under the Act and caseload problems, were brought to light by the defendant’s
attorneys and elicited during their testimony. (DeCasas, at pp. 790-791, 795-797, 810.)
Here, Kubochi likewise examined members of the defense team. While Saria’s testimony
indicates he was often in trial, he also testified his caseload did not impede his ability to
take defendant’s case to trial. Saria also testified that a group of four to five attorneys in
Sacramento represented defendants under the Act, which was markedly different than
when he first started 23 years before when he along with one other attorney represented
the same group of clients. There is nothing from this testimony indicating that if Kubochi

21
had questioned conflict panel officials, in addition to the defense team, that he would
have learned information relevant to a claim of systemic dysfunction. As a result,
defendant’s reliance on DeCasas is misplaced.
Defendant also faults Kubochi for not investigating a former client of Saria’s
whose case was dismissed for a speedy trial violation. (In re Jones (June 5, 2019,
C087866) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant contends an investigation into that case would
have revealed systemic dysfunction on the part of the conflict panel. We disagree. In the
case of Saria’s former client, the client was represented by four attorneys, including Saria,
and the prosecution and the trial court were also found to be causes of the long delays
because they permitted or acquiesced to continuances without a proffer of good cause.
(Ibid.) There was no dysfunction attributed to the conflict panel as a system, but instead
to the court and the client’s various attorneys who were willfully blind to his objections to
repeated continuances or misrepresented the reasons for the continuances to the court and
the client.3 (Ibid.) As a result, it is purely speculative that further investigation into
Saria’s former client’s case would produce evidence of a systemic breakdown in the
conflict panel system.
Defendant also contends Kubochi should have interviewed an expert in cases
under the Act to determine the professional norm. Kubochi questioned Saria about this
topic and elicited the professional norm of the local legal community. Costa was also
questioned about this topic and testified to his experience with Saria and the other
attorneys on the conflict panel that he worked with. Again, there is no indication that
interviewing a person other than Saria, who had over two decades of experience in the
field, or Costa would have yielded additional information.

3 The attorney who misrepresented the reasons for the requested continuances was
not Saria. (In re Jones, supra, C087866.)

22
Finally, defendant contends Kubochi should have investigated the State
Department of State Hospitals and its sexually violent predator treatment program to
determine whether it contributed to the delays in defendant’s trial or ability to
demonstrate rehabilitation. Again, defendant’s claims are speculative. Defendant
testified to his progress in the state hospital, including that he attended treatment
sporadically and had not advanced through all the treatment phases. Further, Saria and
Costa testified, and the prosecutor and Kubochi explained, the varying programs the State
Department of State Hospitals employed throughout defendant’s treatment. Unlike the
facts of Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at page 524, where the defendant’s social
service records provided more than speculation that evidence of mitigating circumstances
existed, it is unclear and speculative that further investigation into the State Department
of State Hospitals would have led to information beneficial to defendant’s case.
B
Defendant Has Not Shown Kubochi Was Ineffective In His Arguments To The Court
Defendant contends Kubochi was ineffective by abandoning defendant’s strongest
arguments and strategically disadvantaging him during the presentation of his case. We
disagree.
Kubochi’s argument to the trial court was that Saria neglected defendant by
prioritizing his other cases to the detriment of defendant’s case and also cited instances
where Saria ignored defendant’s demands for trial and lacked good cause for some of the
trial delays. Defendant contends Kubochi should have also argued that Saria’s delays
cost defendant the opportunity to present a favorable evaluator, i.e., the one evaluator out
of four who concluded before the probable cause hearing that defendant did not meet the
criteria of a sexually violent predator. But Kubochi had to demonstrate prejudice in the
context of the delay. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 392-393.) In the context of the
favorable evaluator, there were three other experts who disagreed with the favorable
diagnosis and defendant was suffering from apparent signs of active psychosis. Saria

23
consulted with his own expert and determined defendant would need to be rehabilitated
to participate in his defense. Once defendant showed signs of improvement in September
2009, defendant wanted to engage in treatment while working on a plan for release. The
delay was short in duration, requested by defense counsel, and for the purpose of
rehabilitating defendant so he would present as having control of his mental health
condition. This delay cannot be attributed to the state and alone is not a basis for granting
a motion to dismiss. (See id. at p. 393 [the defendant was unable to show prejudice
despite a favorable evaluation because he did not contemporaneously want a timely trial
and there was no indication the subsequent seven-year delay undermined his ability to
receive a fair trial].)4
Defendant also claims Kubochi was ineffective by erroneously believing his
burden was to produce a “prima facie” case. The record does not confirm defendant’s
characterization of Kubochi’s argument. The record establishes Kubochi and the trial
court’s understanding was that the defense was first establishing the threshold factor of
the Barker test, the length of the pretrial delay. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530.)
Kubochi referenced the defense’s burden during the hearing and made arguments during
closing aimed at carrying it. There is no basis in the record to conclude Kubochi did not
know of the proper standard.
Defendant argues Kubochi should have called Saria as a defense witness and
“skillfully questioned” him, but because the prosecution questioned Saria first, Kubochi
allowed it to elicit Saria’s testimony in “the best possible light.” But as described, the
record does not demonstrate that Kubochi allowed Saria to testify uncontested. Kubochi

4 For the first time in reply, defendant contends he had two favorable evaluations
before the probable cause hearing. Even if true, our conclusion would not change given
the concerns outlined here. Further, the expert referenced by Saria as the favorable
evaluator, testified at defendant’s eventual trial that his favorable evaluation suffered
from several information gaps, undermining the reliability of his evaluation.

24
did challenge Saria about his competing caseload, his continuances, and about
defendant’s demands for trial. Kubochi’s decision not to call Saria and instead cross-
examine him was a reasonable tactical decision considering leading questions are
generally only available during cross-examination and Kubochi could reasonably believe
they were better to challenge the veracity of Saria’s testimony. (See Evid. Code, § 767;
White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 356 [cross-examination has long been referred to as
“ ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’ ”]; see also People v.
Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 954 [reiterating that “ ‘ “courts should not second-guess
reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight” ’ ”].) As a
consequence, defendant has not shown Kubochi was ineffective in the presentation of his
case.
C
Defendant Has Not Shown Kubochi Was
Ineffective Regarding Matters Outside His Motion To Dismiss
Defendant contends Kubochi was ineffective for bringing a motion to withdraw
defendant’s Marsden motions and a motion for defendant’s release on his own
recognizance. Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. First, contrary to defendant’s
argument, the record reflects Kubochi filed these motions at defendant’s request. (See
People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 409 [“ ‘The invited-error doctrine operates . . .
to estop a defendant from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
acts or omissions in conformance with the defendant’s own requests’ ”].) Kubochi
indicated he filed the motion to release defendant on his own recognizance at defendant’s
request. This motion was filed at the same time as the motion to withdraw further
Marsden motions and both relied on only a declaration from defendant for support.
Taken together, it is clear Kubochi filed these motions at defendant’s request. Second,
these motions were collateral and irrelevant to defendant’s motion to dismiss. As a

25
consequence, defendant cannot demonstrate a different outcome would have resulted had
Kubochi not filed the motions. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
Defendant further contends Kubochi was ineffective for failing to file a motion for
a new trial alleging the trial court should have considered and granted a retroactive
Marsden motion against Saria given the prolonged delays in bringing defendant’s case to
trial and Saria’s failure to communicate with him. It is unclear, however, that such
motion would have been granted, and thus, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.
Saria and Costa testified they were in regular communication with defendant and
communicated the status of his case and reasons for their requested continuances. Costa
referenced his notes of meetings with defendant and Saria referenced billing records and
letters he sent to defendant. Defendant sent letters and made phone calls to Saria, which
Saria noted in his billing records, and requested visits with Costa, which Costa honored.
Defendant never referenced an immediate trial or the desire to have different counsel in
his communications with Saria or Costa. While defendant filed petitions and letters with
the court directly complaining of delay and Saria, there is no evidence in the record,
besides defendant’s self-serving statements, that defendant communicated those
criticisms to Saria or Costa. Further defendant testified he experiences memory lapses
due to his schizophrenia diagnosis. He further expressed confusion during his court
appearances, undermining his credibility concerning recall of past events. Accordingly,
the record does not indicate Saria failed to communicate to defendant such that a
retroactive Marsden motion would have been successful, i.e., the attorney client
relationship had irrevocably broken down. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395,
431 [“ ‘A defendant is entitled to have appointed counsel discharged upon a showing that
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that counsel and [the] defendant have
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is
likely to result’ ”].)

26
The same is true for the delays. While defendant’s case took a long time to
progress to trial, that is not uncommon for cases brought under the Act. (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 376 [“Extended delays [in cases brought under the Act]—in some
cases upwards of a decade—have not been uncommon”].) The record demonstrates
defendant wanted to be successful at trial and he often took Saria’s advice to engage in
treatment so his likelihood of success could increase. While defendant expressed a desire
to go to trial, he did not make demands for immediate trial directly to Saria or Costa.
When defendant requested trial, Saria scheduled trial. Defendant, however, would later
change his mind—many times to increase the likelihood of success at trial by engaging in
treatment. Thus, while the delays were long, the record does not point to an irrevocably
broken relationship.
Defendant finally argues Kubochi should have filed a motion for a new trial based
on Saria’s ineffective representation for failing to call an expert at his trial. Indeed,
defendant argues Saria should have found any expert who would have testified that
defendant did not meet the criteria for a sexually violent predator even though an expert
Saria repeatedly used had already determined defendant met the criteria. First, it is
speculative that Saria could have found an expert who would have favorably testified on
defendant’s behalf. (See People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) Second,
defendant does not attempt to demonstrate this purported expert would have been
credible during trial given the rest of the evidence, thus changing the result.
Consequently, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice in Saria’s alleged failure to
contact further experts or call one “that almost always found that the defendant was not [a
sexually violent predator].”
III
There Was No Due Process Violation
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. We
review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and its conclusions of law

27
de novo. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 383.) “ ‘[I]ts application of the law to the
facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Ibid.) When determining whether
substantial evidence exists, we “ ‘ “ ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence [that] is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the [factual findings true] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) We do not reweigh or settle conflicts in the evidence, nor
do we assess the credibility of witnesses. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640
(Caden C.).) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or make
unsupported findings of fact.
A
Relevant Authority
Recently, in Camacho, our Supreme Court considered, for “the first time,” “the
constitutional framework for evaluating the timeliness of [sexually violent predator]
trials.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368.) Our Supreme Court held, “[I]t suffices
to consider the factors laid out in Barker in deciding whether an alleged [sexually violent
predator] has been deprived of the constitutional right to a timely trial.” (Camacho, at
p. 379.) “The Barker test outlines a broadly relevant set of functional, case-dependent
factors to consider in analyzing questions of trial timing. To the extent the [sexually
violent predator] context differs from the criminal context in which Barker was decided,
the flexibility of the test allows courts to account for those differences.” (Camacho, at
p. 381.)
“[T]he Barker court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for determining when
the right has been violated. The court instead identified four factors for courts to
examine: the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his[, her, or their] right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.
[Citation.] The defendant carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation

28
under Barker’s multifactor test.’ [Citation.] Because none of these factors is dispositive,
‘courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process’ to determine
whether trial has been unconstitutionally delayed.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 380.)
B
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
1
The Length Of The Delay Weighs In Favor Of Finding A Speedy Trial Violation
“We begin with the first Barker factor, the length of the pretrial delay. This factor
operates as a threshold hurdle; ‘[u]ntil there is some delay [that] is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance.’ [Citation.] ‘If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider
. . . the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger
judicial examination of the claim.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 383.)
Here, defendant awaited trial on a petition for recommitment that was filed in
January 2009 and ultimately taken to trial in September 2018. (Sims, supra, C088029.)
Defendant’s first demand for a speedy trial was in February 2009. (Ibid.) “Although this
delay is not entirely out of line with delays seen in other [sexually violent predator] cases,
it is an exceedingly lengthy delay all the same.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 383;
see id. at p. 376, fn. 2 [reciting cases with anywhere from three- to 22-year delays, with
the average case having a delay of over 10 years].) The People concede, and we agree,
this prolonged delay weighs in defendant’s favor of demonstrating a speedy trial
violation.
Defendant points to the trial court’s analysis of this factor to demonstrate it abused
its discretion. Defendant faults the trial court for breaking his case into various time
periods so it could find the length of the delay was minimal. The problem with
defendant’s argument is that it ignores the trial court’s finding after defendant’s

29
testimony that the delay extended from the probable cause hearing to defendant’s
ultimate trial. He also ignores the trial court’s order that described the delay as occurring
over the course of nine years. Because of this threshold finding, the trial court found it
necessary to consider the other factors of the Barker test. (See Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 383.) The court’s finding defendant was responsible for some of the
delay, while stated during the analysis of the first Barker factor, was clearly a reference
to its conclusion of the second Barker factor, which pertains to the reasons for the delay.
Accordingly, defendant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion when
determining whether the length of the delay favored a finding his due process rights had
been violated.
2
The Reason For Delay Weighs Neutrally
“We next turn to the second Barker factor, the reasons for the delay. This is the
‘flag all litigants seek to capture’ [citation] because the permissibility of pretrial delay
depends to a great extent on who bears responsibility for it and why. [¶] In analyzing the
second factor, courts examine ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more
to blame for th[e] delay.’ [Citations.] Courts also examine why the delay occurred, for
‘different weights should be assigned to different reasons.’ [Citation.] If the government
deliberately delays trial to hamper the defense, for instance, that effort at manipulation
‘should be weighted heavily against the government.’ [Citation.] ‘A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 383-384.) “ ‘Between diligent prosecution and bad-
faith delay, official negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the middle ground.
While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief

30
virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable.’ ” (Id. at p. 388.)
“Because trial courts ultimately control when trial will be held, they bear particular
responsibility for preserving an alleged [sexually violent predator]’s constitutional right
to a timely trial.” (Id. at p. 389.)
“By contrast, ‘if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his[, her, or their]
waiver [of his, her, or their right to a speedy trial] may be given effect under standard
waiver doctrine.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 383-384.) Here, the trial court
found the defense requested all but one of the continuances and defendant does not
dispute that finding. “In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against
the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.” (Id. at p. 385; accord, Vermont v.
Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 92-93.) Both the United States Supreme Court and our
Supreme Court have “noted that the analysis might be different if . . . the delay was
shown to result from ‘a systemic “breakdown in the public defender system.” ’ ”
(Camacho, at p. 385.) Our Supreme Court further permitted consideration of whether
defense counsel acted against defendant’s express wishes or defendant’s time waiver was
involuntary. (Id. at pp. 385-386.)
Defendant raises several arguments the trial court erred when conducting its
analysis of this factor. First, he argues the trial court ignored whether there was a
systemic breakdown in the conflict panel when analyzing the Barker factors. While the
court may not have addressed this issue in its Barker analysis, it considered the issue as
part of its order and found there was no systemic breakdown. We are bound by this
factual determination unless unsupported by substantial evidence. (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 383.) Defendant does not claim this finding lacks sufficient support and
concedes throughout his brief there was no evidence of systemic dysfunction of the
conflict panel. Instead, defendant points to considerations he claims make the court’s
finding flawed, including Saria’s apparently heavy caseload, Kubochi’s purported
ineffective investigation, and Saria’s unwillingness to consult more than one expert as a

31
sign of insufficient funds and an underdeveloped expert pool. Defendant’s argument
amounts to a reweighing of the evidence we are precluded from undertaking. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Thus, defendant cannot demonstrate error in this regard.
Second, defendant argues the trial court ignored delays caused by the court or
prosecution. This is not supported by the court’s order. Just like the court’s analysis of
systemic dysfunction, the court analyzed the prosecution’s failures. It found the
prosecution requested a single continuance of one week and the remainder of the
continuances were at Saria’s request without objection from the prosecution. Following
this finding, the trial court analyzed the entire timeline of defendant’s case, broken into
various periods, to assess whether Saria delayed trial with defendant’s express consent,
ultimately finding under the Barker test that four years four months of the delay was
without defendant’s express consent. The court also addressed its own failings, finding it
shouldered blame for delay and failure to respond to defendant’s Marsden requests. In
the end, a reasonable reading of the court’s order is that it found the delays caused by the
prosecution and itself were for neutral reasons and were not justified, yet not egregious.
Thus, we disagree with defendant’s reliance on In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614,
660 to argue the trial court should have assigned blame for the delay to the court. The
trial court did, in fact, do so here.
To the extent defendant assigns error to the trial court because it failed to conduct
a specified form of analysis, that contention lacks merit and puts form over substance.
While Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pages 384-391 engaged in a particular organization
of analysis, there was nothing in our Supreme Court’s opinion requiring the trial court do
the same. We note the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s
Camacho opinion and clarifying analysis of an issue trial and appellate courts have
struggled with for some time. (Id. at p. 377, fn. 2.) While the court’s order does not
follow Camacho’s organization and included a Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319
due process analysis our Supreme Court deemed unnecessary, the trial court made all

32
factual findings required by Camacho and reasoned its conclusions based on those
findings at the end of the order. As a result, defendant has not demonstrated the court
applied the wrong standard or failed to make required considerations.
Third, defendant argues the trial court conflated the Barker factors analyzing his
assertion of the right to a speedy trial and resulting prejudice with the factor analyzing the
reason for the delay. We disagree this was error. Whether delay constitutes government
delay necessarily depends on whether defendant wanted the delay. If defendant agreed to
a delay, then there was no government-caused delay for purposes of assessing the reason
for a delay. Our Supreme Court said as much in Camacho when it declined to attribute a
defense counsel’s requested continuances to government delay absent a showing the
defendant objected or otherwise disapproved of the continuances. (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 385-387.) While defendant characterizes the court’s finding that
defendant would not present well at trial while he was suffering from active symptoms of
his mental health condition as a finding he was not prejudiced by delay, we read the
court’s finding as a determination about whether defendant expressly disagreed with
Saria’s decision to continue trial given the manifestations of his mental illness at the time
the decision was made. This finding is permitted under Camacho, which considered
whether counsel acted counter to a defendant’s express wishes. (Id. at p. 386.)
Defendant next analyzes each of the trial court’s determinations challenging them
as inaccurate or unreasonable. Defendant argues the trial court’s finding that the delay
between February 2009 and August 2012 was attributable to him was not supported by
substantial evidence. Defendant’s argument is a reinterpretation of the evidence and
discounts the interpretation found by the trial court. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.) Indeed, the court acknowledged defendant requested a speedy trial at a February
2009 hearing. The record reflects, however, that defendant expressed confusion at this
hearing, and when Costa and Saria followed up with defendant about his concerns, he
was suffering from active symptoms of his mental health condition and was

33
hallucinating. In Saria’s opinion, defendant was incompetent to stand trial and unable to
assist in his defense. When defendant’s mental health improved, he expressed a desire to
enter treatment and create a plan for release. This evidence leads to the reasonable
inference Saria did not act counter to an informed and express desire to go to immediate
trial. Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding the resulting delay for
defendant to regain competency could not be placed on the government but resided with
defendant.
Defendant’s journey to competency was complicated by his parole violation and,
when he returned from prison custody in June 2010, he did not object to continuances
requested by Saria and even agreed to engage in treatment prior to his March 2011
communication with Costa so he could go to trial for the purpose of going home.
Continuances for defendant to participate in treatment continued beyond August 2012
without objection from defendant to Saria or Costa, even though defendant filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in August 2012 requesting a speedy trial. Accordingly,
the evidence supports the trial court’s finding Saria’s requested continuances between
February 2009 and January 2013 were for defendant’s benefit and with his consent.
Defendant appears to agree with the trial court’s determination the delay between
mid-January 2013 and the end of May 2013 and mid-June 2013 and January 2014 were
not consented to by defendant. Instead, defendant argues the trial court should have
extended this finding to include the time between the end of May 2013 and mid-June
2013. We disagree. The trial court noted that Saria received defendant’s updated
treatment records and needed time to prepare. Reasonable preparation for trial is for
defendant’s benefit and the resulting delay is attributable to defendant. (See Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 386.) Defendant disagrees, arguing Saria should have always been
preparing for his trial and the release of updated records is common and should not
necessitate delay. But the trial court’s finding that a one-month delay was reasonable for
review of updated records is neither capricious nor unsupported by the record as Saria

34
testified it took several months to review the voluminous records produced by Coalinga
State Hospital and to consult an expert.
Defendant next challenges the court’s finding he asked for a year break in
November 2013 in a bid to attribute the delay between January 2014 and February 2014
to Saria instead of himself. He argues he did not ask for a break from Saria preparing for
trial, but that a trial should occur in November 2014. Thus, Saria’s failure to continue
preparing for trial during that time should not be counted against him. This is not the
test. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 385-386 [we look to whether counsel acted
contrary to defendant’s express wishes].) Defendant said he did not want to go to trial for
one year. It is not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence to conclude Saria could
stop preparing for two months directly after defendant said he was not seeking trial for a
year.
Defendant does not dispute the trial court’s finding the delay between February
2014 and January 2016 was without his express consent. Defendant does not appear to
take issue with the trial court’s further factual findings regarding the delay after January
2016 as with his consent, except to argue that finding should have extended only to
March 2016, instead of August 2016 as found by the trial court. The trial court based its
finding on the fact that Saria should have become aware of defendant’s demand for a
speedy trial as alleged in a March 2016 petition for writ of habeas corpus in August 2016
when he was constructively served with it. Defendant argues Saria should have been
aware at the time defendant filed the petition making his demand. We disagree.
Defendant did not mail Saria the petition or otherwise communicate his desire to go to
trial, even though he had mailed letters and called Saria in the past. Instead, defendant
sent the petition directly to the court, which addressed writ petitions in a different
department than defendant’s case. The order on the petition was forwarded to Saria and
served on replacement counsel. The court counted the subsequent time from service until
December 2016 when defendant told Saria he was no longer requesting trial as without

35
defendant’s consent, discounting Saria’s excuses for not having actual knowledge of
defendant’s speedy trial demand. This was neither unreasonable nor unsupported by the
record.
Defendant does not appear to challenge the court’s findings Saria delayed without
consent from August 2016 through November 2016, defendant consented to the delay
between December 2016 and June 2017, and Saria delayed without express consent from
June 2017 through trial in September 2018.
Ultimately, the trial court appeared to assign neutral weight to this factor such that
it neither supported nor undermined a due process claim. It assigned some weight to the
prosecution and the court for its neutral contribution to the delay in defendant’s case and
assigned only moderate weight to defendant who did not expressly consent to half of the
delay. As described, these findings are neither unreasonable nor unsupported by the
record.
3
Defendant’s Speedy Trial Assertion Weighs
Against Finding A Speedy Trial Violation
“Analysis of the third Barker factor, the [defendant]’s assertion of his[, her, or
their] right to a timely trial, does not hinge on ‘ “the number of times the accused
acquiesced or objected; rather, the focus is on the surrounding circumstances, such as the
timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence,
whether the accused was represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial conduct (as that
conduct bears on the speedy trial right), and so forth. [Citation.] The totality of the
accused’s responses to the delay is indicative of whether he or she [or they] actually
wanted a speedy trial.” ’ [Citation.] Viewing the complete picture matters because ‘[t]he
more serious the deprivation [of the right to a speedy trial], the more likely a defendant is
to complain.’ [Citation.]

36
“It bears some emphasis that assertion of the right is only one factor in the
analysis, and not a dispositive one; in Barker, the court explicitly rejected the argument
that a defendant must expressly demand a speedy trial or else be deemed to have waived
the right. [Citation.] Instead, the court instructed that ‘the defendant’s assertion of or
failure to assert his[, her, or their] right to a speedy trial’ is just one factor to balance
against the others and must be evaluated in a holistic manner. [Citation.] This flexibility
allows courts ‘to attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly
fails to object from a situation in which his[, her, or their] attorney acquiesces in long
delay without adequately informing his[, her, or their] client, or from a situation in which
no counsel is appointed.’ [Citation.] The high court emphasized, however, that ‘failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he[, she, or they] was
[or were] denied a speedy trial.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 390-391.)
Here, the court found defendant unequivocally requested a speedy trial three
times—February 2009 in court, August 2012 in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
March 2016 in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court further found
defendant’s contemporaneous and subsequent conduct demonstrated he did not genuinely
desire a speedy trial. Defendant spends much time recounting the facts in an attempt to
show the trial court’s findings lacked substantial evidence or were unreasonable. We
disagree.
Our review of the record shows defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial in
February 2009 when he was suffering from active symptoms of psychosis and
hallucinations. He also expressed confusion at that time and appeared to lack awareness
of his legal proceedings. Indeed, Saria believed defendant was unable to assist in his own
defense. After defendant was transferred to Coalinga State Hospital and began to regain
competency, he expressed a desire to engage in treatment and come up with a release
plan. Given defendant’s mental health condition, which included hallucinations, and his
subsequent conduct preferring to engage in treatment and work towards release, sufficient

37
evidence supports the trial court’s finding defendant’s request for a speedy trial in
February 2009 was not genuine.
While defendant filed a writ petition and letters with the court in 2011
complaining of Saria’s performance, he did not request a speedy trial in these
communications. It was not until August 2012 that defendant asked for a speedy trial in a
letter sent directly to the court. Defendant did not make this demand to Saria or Costa in
person. Also at this time, defendant was engaging in treatment after Saria’s March 2011
advice about how to win at trial. Defendant was later placed on an involuntary
medication order, stopped engaging in treatment, and then reengaged in treatment in
January 2013 when he requested a summer trial. Given defendant’s failure to request a
speedy trial directly from Saria or Costa and his contemporaneous behavior, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding defendant’s August 2012 request for a speedy
trial was not genuine.
Defendant’s next request for trial was in January 2013, when he told Costa he was
in treatment and prepared to go to trial. The record supports the trial court’s implied
finding this was not a request for a speedy trial, contrary to defendant’s contention. Prior
to the request, defendant had stopped going to treatment and did not reengage in
treatment until January 2013. Saria had previously, and at this time, advised defendant
he needed to engage in consistent treatment to increase his likelihood of success at trial.
When defendant requested trial in January 2013, Saria set a summer trial date to
demonstrate defendant was committed to treatment. Saria continued defendant’s trial
because he needed to review records and was in trial with another client and in November
2013, before trial occurred, defendant elected to continue with treatment for one year and
delay trial. Given defendant did not request a speedy trial, delays were necessary for trial
preparation, and defendant elected to take a break from trial preparation to engage in
treatment, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding defendant did
not request a speedy trial in January 2013.

38
In March 2014, defendant requested to go to trial in the summer of that year. Saria
complied by setting an August 2014 trial readiness date with a corresponding October
2014 trial. Several delays occurred beyond the October 2014 date until November 2015,
when Saria received defendant’s records and his expert was able to provide an evaluation.
When later confronted with the unfavorable defense expert evaluation, defendant opted to
continue engaging in treatment. Given defendant’s prior stated goal of a successful trial
and his subsequent acknowledgement he needed treatment to succeed, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding defendant’s request for trial in March
2014 was not for a speedy trial.
In March 2016, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the trial
court wherein he asked for a speedy trial. While defendant claimed to have told Saria
and Costa of his desire to go to trial, both Saria and Costa testified defendant did not tell
them he wanted to go to trial. The trial court accepted Saria’s and Costa’s versions of
events and we are bound by that factual determination. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 640.) At this time, defendant had agreed to resume treatment at the end of 2015
because of the unfavorable expert evaluation until June 2017 when his case was placed
back on calendar for trial. Given this evidence, we conclude there is sufficient support
for the trial court’s finding defendant’s March 2016 request for a speedy trial was not
genuine.
Defendant disagrees, arguing his mental health condition prevented him from
understanding he had to communicate his desire for a speedy trial to Saria, and that his
petitions to the court should be enough to demonstrate he genuinely wanted a speedy
trial. The record refutes this contention. Defendant sent numerous letters to Saria and
called him on the phone. He inquired of the status of trial and communicated about a
broad range of topics. The evidence supports a finding he was capable of communicating
his desire for a speedy trial to either Saria or Costa. While the fact defendant made
requests through petitions for writs of habeas corpus is relevant to the analysis, it is not

39
determinative given his lack of communication with counsel despite his apparent ability
to do so.
Defendant also faults the trial court for not giving him the benefit of the doubt
because he was not present in court. Our Supreme Court in Camacho, however, held that
a court cannot give defendants special consideration simply because they were not
present. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 385-386.) Our Supreme Court held
additional evidence, such as the fact counsel acted contrary to a defendant’s express
wishes, is required before finding a defendant’s absence should be held against the
government. (Ibid.) Here, defendant’s wishes were not expressed to Saria, which is
relevant to the veracity of the assertion of his speedy trial right. (Id. at p. 386.)
Finally, defendant contends the trial court put too heavy a burden on defendant to
demonstrate he wanted a speedy trial by essentially forcing him to assert his right over
and over despite Saria’s continued delay. Defendant compares his case to People v.
Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 62-63 where the appellate court
concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding the defendant did not
support his counsel’s requested continuances, but instead was forced to acquiesce so his
counsel would be prepared. Comparing cases in the sufficiency of the evidence context
is of limited utility as every case necessarily depends on its own facts. (People v. Thomas
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) In any event, the Vasquez court was tasked with identifying
evidence that supported the trial court’s findings and conclusions that the defendant’s
speedy trial rights were violated. (Vasquez, at p. 55.) We are tasked with the same duty
to identify evidence supporting the trial court’s finding. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 383.) While one interpretation may be that defendant felt he had to give into Saria’s
continuances so that Saria would be prepared, another interpretation, indeed the
interpretation the trial court made, is that defendant did not genuinely desire immediate
trial and wanted to be successful. The record supports this inference. Thus, the trial

40
court’s finding that this Barker factor weighs against defendant’s claim of a due process
violation is neither unreasonable nor unsupported by the record.
4
Prejudice To Defendant Weighs Against A Speedy Trial Violation
“The final Barker factor is the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay in
bringing the case to trial. ‘Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the
interests of defendants [that] the speedy trial right was designed to protect.’ [Citation.]
In the criminal context, the court has identified ‘three such interests: (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ ” (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 391.) While delay presumably prejudices criminal defendants, who are
judged by proof of past conduct, sexually violent predators are judged by proof of their
current conduct and evaluation, mitigating the presumption of prejudice that applies in
criminal cases. (Id. at pp. 391-392.) Similarly, “pretrial [sexually violent predator]
custody does differ from pretrial criminal detention in certain pertinent respects. After
the trial court holds a probable cause hearing, alleged [sexually violent predator]s are
confined at a state hospital, not jail, and begin receiving mental health treatment while
they await trial. [Citations.] Pretrial treatment of the underlying mental disorder that
caused the state to seek commitment in the first place may ultimately facilitate the
individual’s release before trial.” (Id. at p. 393.)
“Determining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting from pretrial custody
therefore requires a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances of the case. For individuals
who have never received a favorable expert evaluation, delay in holding trial will
generally entail less prejudice than for individuals who have a more substantial basis for
arguing they do not satisfy the criteria for [sexually violent predator] commitment.
Where an individual makes such a showing, the amount of prejudice may increase as the
length of the delay increases. For example, in the case of an individual who has expert

41
reports recommending release, a four-year delay in going to trial will generally be
significantly more prejudicial than a one-year delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 393.)
Applying these general principles to defendant’s case, the delay here had no
appreciable impact on defendant’s case. At the start of defendant’s case in 2009, one
expert concluded he did not meet the criteria for commitment. After the favorable
evaluation was made, however, defendant exhibited manifestations of a mental health
condition, including hallucinations, anxiety, and pressured speech. Given the at least two
unfavorable evaluations and defendant’s presentation, we cannot conclude defendant was
prejudiced by the 2009 delay. While commitment to the state hospital resulted from the
delay, the commitment was for the purpose of engaging in services designed to aid his
mental health condition so he could participate in his defense, and thus, cannot be
considered as oppressive as criminal confinement.
Shortly after being transported to the state hospital for mental health treatment,
defendant violated his parole by committing a sexual battery against a state hospital staff
member and was incarcerated until June 2010. Upon defendant’s return to the state
hospital, he continued to appear mentally ill, as well as physically impaired, and
committed several rule violations, including by exhibiting acts of aggression and
sexualized conduct. This conduct continued until June 2011. Given defendant’s
unavailability, incapacitation, and rule violations, which would have severely hampered
his defense had he gone to trial, we conclude his defense was not prejudiced by the delay
between his transportation to Coalinga State Hospital and June 2011.
In March 2011, defendant expressed a desire to go to trial for the purpose of going
home. Needless to say, this required defendant to be successful at his commitment
hearing. From March 2011 through January 2013 defendant committed several rule
violations consisting of threatening behavior and sexualized conduct. While his
violations decreased after January 2013, defendant was on involuntary medication orders,

42
which influenced his behavior, and was inconsistent with his engagement in treatment,
despite requesting time for treatment to increase his chances at a successful trial.
In March 2014, defendant requested trial, and Saria set it for fall 2014 so he and an
expert could prepare. By November 2015, the defense expert informed Saria he could
not testify favorably for defendant. Given the prospect that he would not be successful at
trial, defendant elected to reengage with treatment and his trial was taken off calendar
until June 2017. We cannot conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice during the
delay between March 2014 and June 2017 because his request for trial was for the
purpose of succeeding and going home, not an unconditional demand for trial, and he
cannot show he would have been successful at trial. Indeed, defendant reengaged in
treatment in early 2016 when recommended by Saria so his chances at success would
increase.
In June 2017, defendant’s case was put back on track for trial, which eventually
occurred in September 2018. While defendant had continued to engage in treatment and
does not appear to have experienced any rule violations, he was on a forced medication
order. Saria also could not find a favorable expert to testify on defendant’s behalf. Given
defendant’s continued struggles and unfavorable evaluations, it is not likely this delay
affected his case or otherwise decreased his chances at a successful trial.
The length of delay from defendant’s first request for a speedy trial—
approximately nine and a half years—is significant and defendant has been involuntarily
committed throughout that period. But, like the defendant in Camacho, there is no
indication the delay undermined the fairness of the proceedings. Prejudice is further
minimized because defendant has not shown he genuinely wanted a timely trial. (See
Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 534 [“More important than the absence of serious prejudice,
is the fact that [the defendant] did not want a speedy trial”].) Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding the prejudice factor did not weigh in favor of a
due process violation.

43
5
The Factors Balance Against A Speedy Trial Violation
Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude defendant has not demonstrated the
trial court abused its discretion by finding no violation of defendant’s due process right to
a timely trial. Only one factor—the length of the delay—strongly supports defendant’s
claim of a due process violation. Though some of the weight for the delay must be
assigned to the trial court, the prosecution, and Saria, defendant also bears some weight
by consenting to more than half of the delay throughout various points during the
pendency of his proceedings. Defendant was inconsistent in his desire for a speedy trial
and did not communicate his desires directly to his attorney; when he did, trial was set
before defendant eventually changed his mind and elected to continue treatment. Finally,
defendant did not suffer significant prejudice to his case as demonstrated by the
consistent manifestations of defendant’s mental health disorder and adverse evaluations
finding he met the criteria of a sexually violent predator. Accordingly, we conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion by finding defendant did not suffer a violation of his
right to a timely trial.

44
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

45

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