CourtListener 10364778•McGovern Escrow Services v. Artap CA1/4
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Filed 3/26/25 McGovern Escrow Services v. Artap CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
McGOVERN ESCROW SERVICES,
INC.,
Cross-complainant, Cross-
defendant and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE ARTAP et al., A169309
Cross-defendants, Cross-
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No.
complainants and Appellants.
SCV-261461)
Michelle Artap and U.S. Property Management, LLC (appellants)
challenge the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs to respondent
McGovern Escrow Services, Inc. (McGovern) from interpleaded funds,
arguing that the award improperly includes attorney fees incurred in
defending against appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim. Appellants
contend that neither Code of Civil Procedure1 section 386.6, nor the parties’
escrow agreement, authorizes the award of those attorney fees. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from appellants’ sale of a Wingstop franchise store.
McGovern acted as the escrow officer for the sale.
Before the close of escrow, a dispute arose between appellants and the
buyer regarding the disclosure of information related to the franchise’s
operation, and the buyer filed a complaint against appellants for, among
other claims, breach of contract and recission. The buyer named McGovern
as a defendant. McGovern filed a cross-complaint in interpleader, alleging
that, prior to the buyer’s lawsuit, appellants had demanded that McGovern
pay a final California tax bill from the net proceeds in escrow, and the buyer
instructed McGovern not to pay the bill and return any refund due to the
buyer. McGovern interpleaded the escrow funds with the trial court.
Appellants subsequently filed a cross-complaint against McGovern alleging
breach of fiduciary duty.
The litigation proceeded to a trial between McGovern and appellants
after the court dismissed the buyer’s complaint when the buyer failed to
appear for trial. On July 31, 2023, the day before the start of trial, McGovern
filed a motion seeking discharge from liability (§§ 386, 386.5, 386.6) and an
award of its attorney fees and costs under section 386.6 and/or the parties’
escrow agreement. In its motion, McGovern anticipated that appellants
would object to payment of all attorney fees incurred by McGovern, but
McGovern argued that all such fees were recoverable. In support of the
motion, McGovern’s attorney submitted a declaration stating that the
amounts sought were “incurred by McGovern in its prosecution and defense
of the interpleader in this action.” McGovern sought total attorney fees and
costs of $159,345.32 ($146,087.50 in attorney fees and $13,257.82 in costs)
and submitted its attorneys’ invoices.
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On August 1, 2023, the trial court granted appellants’ request to file an
opposition to McGovern’s motion. In their written opposition filed the next
morning, appellants argued that McGovern should not be discharged because
(1) McGovern’s motion for discharge provided appellants insufficient notice,
(2) appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim remained pending, (3) the
buyer, not appellants, was allegedly responsible for the length and
complexity of the proceedings, and (4) McGovern should be required to go
after the buyer for its attorney fees and costs.
In court on August 2, 2023, the court addressed McGovern’s motion.
After hearing argument, the court denied the motion without prejudice based
on insufficient notice. The court then told the parties that it believed the case
should proceed with trial of the interpleader first and appellants’ breach of
fiduciary duty claim second.
After addressing other trial matters, the parties conferred regarding
the court’s suggestion off the record. Back on the record, McGovern’s counsel
reported that the parties had conferred and would stipulate that McGovern
had satisfied the interpleader statute (§ 386.5) and that all that remained to
be decided by trial or court decision was the reasonableness of the attorney
fees and costs requested and whether these fees and costs would be allocated
between the buyer and appellants. McGovern disputed that there should be
any allocation, arguing that McGovern was entitled to take its fees and costs
from the interpleaded funds. Regarding the reasonableness of the fees and
costs requested, McGovern’s counsel represented that appellants had agreed
to stipulate to the authenticity of the invoices. McGovern’s counsel then said,
“[I]t’s really just a matter of putting admitted documents in front of the Court
as exhibits and letting the Court issue a ruling.” Appellants’ counsel
confirmed for the court that McGovern’s counsel’s summary of the remaining
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issues was accurate. The court and the parties then engaged in some
discussion about the procedure to be used to assess the reasonableness of
McGovern’s attorney fees and costs. The court ended the hearing by telling
the parties that the court would allow them to support or attack the
reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs, and they would discuss the
issue further after the trial.
At the start of the court trial on August 3, 2023, McGovern’s counsel
informed the court that the parties had been unable to reach a stipulation
about entering the attorney invoices into evidence. The court responded that
it would hear trial testimony and then deal with the issue. After hearing the
evidence and granting nonsuit to McGovern on appellants’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim, the court told the parties that it understood from their prior
conversation that what remained at issue with the interpleader was the
reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs and the issue of allocation
between the buyer and appellants. As to the former issue, the court asked
appellants’ counsel directly whether appellants disputed the reasonableness
of the attorney fees McGovern sought. Counsel replied, “Well, to be honest,
Your Honor, I think the Court knows that too. I think it’s very difficult to
dispute the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and the time spent on each
task during the litigation. I think it’s very hard to dispute that. And I’d
looked at the itemized invoices for the time log. You know, it’s almost
impossible for me to dispute why they spent 35 hours drafting the motions in
limine, for example. You know, so I submit I’m not going to challenge the
reasonableness of the charges, Your Honor.” The court then stated that it
had reviewed McGovern’s evidentiary submission, and it found the pretrial
amounts requested to be “reasonable and approved.” The court invited
appellants’ counsel to submit authority to support the position that
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McGovern should only be allowed to recover a portion of its fees and costs out
of the interpleaded funds, forcing McGovern to go after the buyers for the
rest. McGovern’s counsel indicated that McGovern would also be requesting
its attorney fees for the trial. The court asked the parties to come back the
next day for further hearing so the court could review any authority
submitted by appellants and finalize the procedure to be used for McGovern
to request additional fees.
Appellants filed an additional brief on August 3, 2023, after the court
proceedings. This brief cited section 386.6 and argued the trial court should
order the buyer to pay the full amount of McGovern’s attorney fees and costs.
The next morning, the court stated that it had received appellants’ brief
and would allow argument, but it intended to take the matter of attorney fees
and costs under submission. Appellants’ counsel argued that the amount
awarded should be allocated to the buyer, not taken from the interpleaded
funds. Appellants’ counsel said nothing about the reasonableness of the
amount of attorney fees and costs requested. At the end of the hearing, the
court stated that it would allow the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing the award of additional attorney fees and costs incurred at trial,
and the court set a date of August 18, 2023, for McGovern’s filing and
August 25, 2023, for appellants’ opposition.
On August 18, 2023, McGovern filed a supplemental declaration from
its attorney listing its additional attorney fees and costs and attaching
invoices. Appellants did not file an opposition.
On September 18, 2023, the trial court entered an order on the issues
raised by McGovern’s cross-complaint in interpleader and awarded McGovern
the full amount of attorney fees and costs that McGovern had requested. The
court ordered payment out of the interpleaded funds (the September 2023
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order). On the same day, the trial court entered a judgment after bench trial
on appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim.
On October 2, 2023, appellants served a notice of intent to move for a
new trial on the breach of fiduciary duty claim wherein they also argued that
the attorney fees and costs claimed by McGovern improperly included
attorney fees and costs incurred in McGovern’s defense against appellants’
cross-complaint (the October 2023 motion).
On November 17, 2023, the trial court denied appellants’ motion for a
new trial on the breach of fiduciary duty claim under section 657. Regarding
the attorney fees and costs, the trial court found “pursuant
to . . . section 1008, that there is no basis for the Court to overrule the
decision made and attorneys fees are not evidence that supports the motion.”
This appeal of the judgment and the November 17, 2023 order ensued.
DISCUSSION
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting attorney fees
because neither section 386.6, nor the parties’ escrow agreement, allowed
McGovern to recover attorney fees incurred in defending against appellants’
breach of fiduciary duty claim. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
judgment and the appealed order.
Prior to the trial court’s September 2023 order, appellants did not raise
the argument that McGovern could not recover attorney fees incurred in
defending against appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim under
section 386.6 or the parties’ contract. “It is well established that appellate
courts will ordinarily not consider errors that ‘could have been, but were not
raised below.’ [Citations.] The rule applies to defenses as well as theories of
liability, and to a ‘new theory for or against recovery’ of attorney fees.
[Citation.] ‘The policy behind the rule is fairness.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate
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courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did
not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party
has the obligation to raise any issue or infirmity that might subject the
ensuing judgment to attack. [Citation.] Bait and switch on appeal not only
subjects the parties to avoidable expense, but also wreaks havoc on a judicial
system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised
earlier.’ ” (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569 [appellant forfeited new theory of attack on attorney
fees award by not raising it below].)
Nor do appellants establish error in the trial court’s ruling on their
October 2023 motion, in which they argued for the first time that McGovern
should not recover attorney fees for defending against appellants’ breach of
fiduciary duty claim. The trial court treated this as a motion for
reconsideration under section 1008 on the issues of attorney fees and costs.
Section 1008 requires a motion for reconsideration to be based on new or
different facts, circumstances or law, some valid reason for not offering the
law earlier, and a declaration stating, among other things, what new or
different facts, circumstances or law are claimed to be shown. (§ 1008,
subd. (a); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial
(The Rutter Group 2024) ¶¶ 9:328, 9:331.) The trial court determined there
was no basis under section 1008 to overrule its prior order, it denied the
motion, and did not address the substance of appellants’ newly raised
arguments. Appellants do not mention section 1008 on appeal or show that
the trial court erred in applying this statute or in denying their October 2023
motion. We will not address appellants’ arguments that were not timely or
properly raised in the trial court.
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Appellants invite us to exercise our discretion to address the merits of
their arguments on appeal, contending their forfeiture should be excused
because McGovern filed its motion on the eve of trial without sufficient
notice. Where issues have been forfeited, we may exercise discretion to
decide pure questions of law on undisputed facts, but that discretion should
be “ ‘exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Elali & Marchoud (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 668, 682.)
This case does not meet the criteria because it does not present a pure
question of law to be decided on appeal. McGovern contends that it “showed
[below] that the charges had all been incurred in connection with the
interpleader remedy and overcoming resistance to it.” And appellants
dispute only some the attorney charges. Given the fact-intensive inquiry
about whether all of the attorney fees were or were not incurred in connection
with the interpleader, consideration of these issues for the first time on
appeal is not proper, and any remand would be unfair and burdensome to
McGovern and to the trial court.
Appellants also fail to offer a compelling reason for us to reach the
forfeited issues. They claim they had insufficient time to respond to
McGovern’s original motion, but after the trial court initially denied the
motion without prejudice based on the insufficient notice, appellants’ counsel
could easily have demanded a noticed motion be filed rather than agreeing in
court—after having reviewed McGovern’s counsel’s billing entries—that
appellants would not contest the reasonableness of the fees requested.
Furthermore, after the trial ended, appellants had three weeks to prepare
and file any opposition to McGovern’s supplemental request for attorney fees
and costs. They did not file any opposition even though McGovern’s
declarations clearly set forth the attorney fees and costs requested and even
8
though they now state that some of the attorney fees were “patently not
allowed by [s]ection 386.6.” Appellants offer no explanation for this failure,
and we decline to exercise our discretion to decide arguments that were not
timely or properly raised before the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the trial court’s November 17, 2023 order are
affirmed.
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BROWN, P. J.
We concur.
GOLDMAN, J.
SIMONDS, J.*
McGovern Escrow Servs., Inc. v. Artap et al. (A169309)
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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