People v. Bey CA1/3

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Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Bey CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168728
v.
(Sonoma County
HIRAMU EL KENYATTA BEY, Super. Ct. No. SCR7476881)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Hiramu El Kanyatta Bey of several offenses
related to his possession of a loaded firearm and methamphetamine. On
appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to quash a warrant and
suppress evidence of the drugs and firearm seized from his car. He also
challenges the trial court’s failure to bifurcate the trial on his offenses from
the aggravating circumstances for his sentence. No error appears. We also
reject his argument of insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm. Finally,
while we largely reject the various challenges to his sentence, we vacate and
remand for resentencing because the court failed to stay one of the sentences
for his firearm offenses under Penal Code section 654. (Undesignated
statutory references are to this code.) We otherwise affirm.

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BACKGROUND
A burglary of HomeEnergy, a business, occurred on June 23, 2021. On
June 28, an officer responded to a domestic disturbance in Sonoma. The
officer saw Carmina Salcido sitting in a green Mercury Mountaineer SUV
registered to Bey and parked in an alley outside of Bey’s house. Salcido
allowed the officer to search the vehicle, which revealed two
methamphetamine pipes and goods stolen from HomeEnergy. Those goods
included computers, a checkbook, and commercial GPS trackers.
The same day, officers obtained a warrant to search for stolen
HomeEnergy items in Bey’s house and “[a]ny and all vehicle[s] reasonably
believed” to be under the control of the residents. Officers collected over 100
items, such as cellphones, license plates, modems, and other electronic goods
from HomeEnergy. A search of Bey’s bedroom revealed a box of .38-caliber
ammunition, a pill bottle containing nine-millimeter ammunition, a case for a
Glock handgun, and an empty handgun magazine. During the search, Bey
noted he started parking his Cadillac truck in the alleyway behind his house.
Officers searched the truck parked against the back fence. Inside was a pill
bottle with Luger ammunition, a .380-caliber semiautomatic handgun
containing six rounds, an identity card belonging to Demond Battiest,
otherwise known as Bey, and a 10.034-gram package of methamphetamine in
the center console.
In March 2023, the district attorney charged Bey with possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1); possession of a drug while
armed with a loaded, operable handgun (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a); count 2); and possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1); count 3). The complaint also alleged six circumstances in

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aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), (7), (10) & (b)(1), (2), (3);
undesignated rule references are to these rules.)
Before trial, Bey moved to quash the warrant and suppress the
evidence seized from his Cadillac because the affidavit supporting the
warrant failed to establish probable cause that evidence from the
HomeEnergy burglary would be found there. The trial court denied the
motion. The court also denied Bey’s motion for bifurcation of the trial on
guilt from a trial on the alleged aggravating circumstances. The jury
convicted Bey of all three counts and found three circumstances in
aggravation to be true. The court sentenced him to four years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
Bey contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the
search warrant and suppress evidence obtained from his Cadillac. He argues
the affidavit supporting the warrant lacked probable cause to search his car.
We disagree.
The affidavit contained the following information: according to the
detective, officers found a green Mercury SUV with no license plates parked
in an alley behind a particular residence in Sonoma. A search of the vehicle
yielded numerous electronic devices including iPhones, laptops and ten
desktop computers, as well as license plates registered to HomeEnergy. A
representative from HomeEnergy confirmed the confiscated items were stolen
and noted there were 86 additional electronics and computers missing after a
recent burglary. The detective also recounted an officer’s interaction with
Salcido, who was sitting in the SUV. She explained Bey recently sold her the
car, and she was living at Bey’s house for approximately one and one-half
months with her husband. She denied any responsibility for the

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HomeEnergy burglary and claimed ignorance regarding whether the goods in
the car were stolen. But she also offered that there was a box of electronics in
Bey’s backyard. In addition, officers located a walking cane in HomeEnergy.
Salcido, who walked with a limp, admitted she recently lost her cane.
The detective, experienced in narcotics and property crime
investigations, explained that subjects who commit thefts divvy stolen goods
to associates and other involved parties. They often store those goods in
obscure places, such as basements, vents, or cars, to avoid law enforcement
detection. A magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of
Bey’s residence, and “[a]ny and all vehicle reasonably believed to [be] under
the control of the occupants of the residence.”
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and requires probable cause to support search warrants. (U.S. Const., 4th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824,
830–831.) Searches are presumptively reasonable if supported by a warrant,
and the “probable cause showing must be made in the warrant affidavit.”
(Price v. Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 13, 35; People v. Weiss (1999)
20 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) Probable cause supporting a search exists if “there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place” identified in the warrant. (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S.
213, 238; People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161.) When reviewing a
search based on a warrant, we determine whether, on the totality of the
circumstances, “the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a fair
probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing” — a deferential
standard of review. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040–1041;
Illinois, at p. 230.) The defendant must demonstrate the invalidity of the
warrant. (People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 393.)

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The affidavit here provided probable cause to support the belief that
Bey’s Cadillac contained items stolen from HomeEnergy. It recounted an
officer’s interaction with Salcido, who was parked outside of Bey’s house in a
Mercury SUV full of stolen HomeEnergy goods. Salcido walked with a
noticeable limp, admitted she recently lost her cane, and officers had found a
walking cane at HomeEnergy. There was a substantial basis to conclude
Salcido participated in committing the HomeEnergy burglary. (People v.
Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1041.) More importantly, relying on his
training and experience in property crimes, the detective explained it was
likely the thief distributed stolen items to associates and other involved
parties. (People v. Nicholls (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703, 711 [magistrate may
consider an officer’s expertise to support a probable cause finding].) Those
associates reasonably included Bey — Salcido admitted she had been living
at his house, he had recently sold the SUV to her, and she noted his backyard
could contain electronic goods. Alternatively, the magistrate could infer from
these facts that Salcido paid Bey for the SUV or housing with goods stolen
from HomeEnergy.
It was not an illogical leap, as Bey argues, to infer his Cadillac
contained stolen items. Bey concedes there was probable cause to search his
residence. The detective explained stolen goods are often hidden in certain
obscure locations in a house as well as cars to avoid detection by law
enforcement. (People v. Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711–712.) It
was reasonable for the detective to infer Salcido could have placed the stolen
goods in any vehicle on the property where she was living. (People v. Camel
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 989, 999 [noting it was reasonable to believe a person
hid evidence of crimes “in a vehicle on the premises other than the vehicles
he had been seen driving”].) Taken together, a magistrate making a practical

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and commonsense decision could conclude, based on this information, that
vehicles associated with the property and Bey might contain stolen items —
Bey has not demonstrated the warrant was invalid. (Illinois v. Gates, supra,
462 U.S. at p. 238; People v. Amador, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 393.) Given this
conclusion, we do not address his alternative arguments challenging the
search of the Cadillac.
II.
Bey contends the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the trial on his
charges from a trial on the aggravating circumstances. We disagree.
For background, the criminal complaint alleged six aggravating
circumstances. Three alleged aggravating circumstances — that Bey served
a prior term in prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)); he was convicted of other crimes for
which consecutive sentences could have been imposed but concurrent
sentences are being imposed (id., (a)(7)); and his prior convictions are
numerous or of increasing seriousness (id., (b)(2)) — were reserved for a
decision by the trial court. The prosecutor did not intend to submit
additional evidence to demonstrate the existence of the remaining three
circumstances — that Bey was armed with or used a weapon at the time of
committing the crime (id., (a)(2)); the crime involved a large quantity of
contraband (id., (a)(10)); and he has engaged in violent conduct that indicates
a serious danger to society (id., (b)(1)) — to the jury. Bey requested
bifurcating the latter three circumstances. The court denied this request
because the evidence to support convictions and the aggravating
circumstances for Bey’s offenses was the same.
During trial, the jury heard testimony that officers recovered a loaded
handgun and 10.034 grams of methamphetamine from Bey’s truck.
According to a witness, this was a usable amount of methamphetamine —

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below 0.1 grams is considered residue. And the parties stipulated that Bey
had previously been convicted of felonies — unlawful sexual intercourse with
a minor, receiving a stolen motor vehicle, taking a vehicle without the
owner’s consent, and felon in possession of a firearm. The stipulation
ultimately read to the jury simply referred to Bey’s prior felony case numbers
without any attendant descriptions. During closing arguments, the
prosecutor discussed the alleged aggravating circumstances, noting Bey’s
Cadillac contained a gun and 10.034 grams of methamphetamine. For the
third circumstance, the prosecutor argued methamphetamine is a serious
danger to society and “having a loaded firearm with a round in the chamber
is a serious danger to society.”
Bifurcation was unnecessary because evidence presented by the
prosecutor was admissible to prove both the charged offenses and the
aggravating circumstances. When there are three possible terms of
imprisonment for a criminal offense, the trial court must impose a sentence
that does not exceed the middle term unless aggravating circumstances
justify imposing a higher term. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2).) The defendant
must stipulate to or the fact finder must find true the aggravating
circumstances. (Id., subd. (b)(2); People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748.)
Upon request, the court must bifurcate a trial on the aggravating
circumstances from a trial of charges unless evidence supporting the
aggravating circumstance is admissible to prove or defend against the
charged offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) If the court bifurcates the
proceedings, the “jury shall not be informed of the bifurcated allegations until
there has been a conviction of a felony offense.” (Ibid.) We independently

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review issues of law, such as applying a statute.1 (People v. Galvan (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 846, 852.)
Critically, Bey fails to identify any new evidence that should have been
withheld until the trial on the aggravating circumstances, thus requiring
bifurcation. Nor can he. Each of the charged offenses required proof he
possessed a firearm or ammunition. (See, e.g., §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1) [felon in
possession of a firearm]; 30305, subd. (a)(1) [possession of ammunition by
person prohibited from possessing firearm].) One of his offenses required
demonstrating he possessed a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a) [possession of controlled substance with firearm].)
Evidence presented to prove Bey’s guilt of these offenses — testimony that
officers recovered a loaded handgun and 10.034 grams of methamphetamine
from Bey’s truck — was the same evidence supporting the aggravating
circumstances — defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of
the commission of the crime; the crime involved a large quantity of
contraband, such as a controlled substance; defendant engaged in violent
conduct indicating a serious danger to society. (Rule 4.421 (a)(2), (10), (b)(1).)
Relying on People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69 — holding a court
abused its discretion denying a bifurcation request for a prior conviction
determination where there was a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the
defendant from a unitary trial — Bey insists the failure to bifurcate
prejudiced him because the prosecutor in closing argument made negative

1 We reject Bey’s assertion that we must review the trial court’s

bifurcation decision for an abuse of discretion. The plain language of section
1170 does not confer the court with discretion to bifurcate aggravating
circumstances. Rather, it states the court “shall” bifurcate the aggravating
circumstances when requested by the defendant, except “where evidence
supporting an aggravating circumstance is admissible to prove or defend
against the charged offense or enhancement at trial.” (Id., subd. (b).)
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inferences about the evidence. Leaving aside that prosecutors may make
comments on the state of the evidence (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102,
156–157), Calderon does not assist Bey. There, the court noted “bifurcation
of the determination of the truth of a prior conviction allegation is not
required” when, “even if bifurcation were ordered, the jury still would learn of
the existence of the prior conviction before returning a verdict of guilty.”
(Calderon, at p. 78.) Indeed, where evidence supporting an enhancement is
also admissible at trial on the charged offense, “any inference of prejudice
would be dispelled, and bifurcation would not be necessary.” (People v.
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049–1050.) Those are the circumstances
here. There is no prejudice to Bey since the evidence supporting the
aggravating circumstances was admissible to prove his charged offenses.
Bifurcation was not required here.2
III.
Bey contends there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction
for possessing a drug while armed with a loaded, operable handgun. (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).) According to Bey, officers recovered his
gun from his Cadillac while he was inside his house, thus the gun was not
available for immediate use — an element of the offense. After reviewing
“the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact

2 We do not address Bey’s remaining argument that the trial court

usurped the jury’s role in determining certain other aggravating
circumstances since he raises this argument for the first time in his reply
brief. (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3 [“Points
raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good
reason is shown for failure to present them before”].)
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could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” we disagree.
(People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Rodriguez).)
The Health and Safety Code prohibits unlawful possession of
methamphetamine in any amount “while armed with a loaded, operable
firearm.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).) “Armed with” means
“having available for immediate or defensive use.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Defendants are not required to physically carry the firearm. (People v.
Superior Court (Martinez) (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 979, 990.) Nor must
defendants be physically present in the same location where officers have
recovered any firearms and narcotics. (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991,
995 [for § 12022 enhancement, defendant was “armed” even though officers
seized both cocaine and the defendant’s firearm in his bedroom while the
defendant was outside of his house]; Martinez, at p. 989 [relying on cases
interpreting § 12022’s language “personally armed with a firearm in the
commission” of a felony for interpreting the definition of “armed” under the
Health and Saf. Code, § 11370.1].) Rather, if a firearm and illegal narcotics
are found in close proximity, a jury could reasonably infer “at some point
during the period of illegal drug possession, the defendant had the firearm
close at hand and thus available for immediate use to aid in the drug offense.”
(Bland, at p. 995, italics added.)
Here, officers recovered methamphetamine from the center console of
his Cadillac. They also found a backpack bearing indicia it belonged to
Bey — it had his license inside — on the front passenger floorboard
containing a loaded firearm. The record established his knowledge of this
firearm. When officers confronted him about the firearm, he noted the
ammunition they found in his bedroom would not match the firearm
recovered from the Cadillac. Viewing this evidence in the light most

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favorable to the judgment, the jury could reasonably infer Bey, at some point
while he was in his car, was physically present with the methamphetamine
and firearm. Thus, there was substantial evidence that the firearm during
that time was readily available for immediate use. (Rodriguez, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
People v. Sanchez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 14 does not alter this
conclusion. There, the court concluded a gun that was in bag under a board
in the bed of a truck while the defendant was in the truck cab was not
available for immediate offensive or defensive use. (Id., at p. 20.) To obtain
the gun, the defendant would have had to exit the vehicle, reach into the
truck bed, remove the board, and take the gun out of the bag before operating
it. (Ibid.) Here, however, the firearm was “more proximate and available to”
Bey — he could simply retrieve the gun while sitting in the car. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supported Bey’s conviction.
IV.
Bey makes a series of arguments challenging his sentence. He
contends there was insufficient evidence supporting the three aggravating
circumstances presented to the jury — that Bey was armed with or used a
weapon at the time of committing the crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)); the crime
involved a large quantity of contraband (id., (a)(10)); and he has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (id., (b)(1)). In
addition, he argues the court wrongly relied on certain aggravating
circumstances that were also elements of his felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition offense — an improper dual use of facts for sentencing.
Finally, Bey contends the court erred by failing to stay punishment of one of
his possession offenses even though section 654 prohibits multiple
punishments for possession of the same gun. Thus, Bey argues we must

11
remand for resentencing to allow the court to exercise its discretion to stay
execution of one of the terms of imprisonment. On this last argument, we
agree, but otherwise reject the sentencing challenges.
For background, the trial court imposed an aggravated term of four
years for possessing methamphetamine while armed with a firearm, with a
concurrent aggravated term of three years for being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and a concurrent middle term of two years for possessing drug
paraphernalia. The court disavowed reliance on any aggravating factors the
jury found true during Bey’s trial when making its sentencing determination.
Instead, the court noted there were no mitigating circumstances and it relied
on two other circumstances — that that Bey served a prior term in prison
(rule 4.421(b)(3)); and his prior convictions are numerous or of increasing
seriousness (id., (b)(2)) — to impose the aggravated sentence.
First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
and presuming the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce
from this evidence, substantial evidence supports the aggravating
circumstances found true by the jury. (Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
Repeating arguments he made regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his offense for possession of methamphetamine with armed with a
firearm, he again insists he was not armed with and did not use a weapon
when committing this offense. (Rule 4.421(a)(2).) We reject this argument
for the same reasons discussed above.
Bey is no more successful in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the finding his crime involved a large quantity of contraband.
(Rule 4.421(a)(10).) An expert criminalist from the Department of Justice
noted officers seized 10.034 grams of methamphetamine from Bey’s car. She
explained .01 grams was a usable amount, while the amount recovered from

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Bey was approximately 10 sugar packets worth of methamphetamine. The
jury could reasonably infer that possession of 1,000 times the amount of
usable methamphetamine was a large quantity of contraband. (People v.
Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919 [presuming existence of every fact jury
could reasonably deduce from evidence].) That the trial court during
sentencing noted that 10.034 grams was not a large quantity of
methamphetamine is irrelevant. The jury, not the court, determined the
existence of this aggravating circumstance. More importantly, “reversal of
the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 639.)
We do, however, agree with Bey that the evidence supporting the jury’s
finding he engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society
was insufficient. (Rule 4.421 (b)(1).) The jury heard the parties’ stipulation
that he was previously convicted of a felony, and there was testimony that
officers discovered firearms and ammunition in Bey’s house and car despite
his being prohibited from possessing either. There was nothing in the record
indicating Bey’s conduct was violent or that his past conduct was violent.
But this conclusion does not require vacating Bey’s sentence and remand —
the trial court did not rely on this factor when imposing an aggravated
sentence. (People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743 [requiring
vacating a remanding sentence where trial court relied on facts not proved in
compliance with § 1170 to impose the upper term].)
Second, Bey forfeited his argument that the trial court’s reliance on the
fact that he served a prior term in prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)) and that his prior
convictions are numerous or of increasing seriousness (id, (b)(2)) to impose
the aggravated sentence was an improper dual use of the fact that he was a

13
convicted felon for sentencing. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233;
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350 [court cannot use a fact constituting
an element of an underlying offense to aggravate a sentence].) He failed to
raise it at the sentencing hearing and raises it for the first time on appeal in
his supplemental reply brief. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–
590; Campos v. Anderson, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 794, fn. 3.)
Finally, the People concede, and we agree, that the trial court erred by
failing to stay one of the sentences for the firearm possession offenses.
Section 654 provides, an “act or omission that is punishable in different ways
by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions,” but the act or omission must not be punished under more than
one provision. (Id., subd. (a).) Here, the court improperly imposed multiple
punishments for possession of the same gun that was found in Bey’s
Cadillac — a four-year aggravated term for possession of methamphetamine
while armed with a firearm, and a three-year aggravated term for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353–
354 [prohibiting multiple punishments for possession of the same gun].) We
reject the People’s argument that we should simply stay the three-year term
for the possession of a firearm offense. The court is not required to impose
the sentence with the longest term of imprisonment and stay the other term.
(People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45.) Rather, it has the “ ‘discretion
to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the
trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the
longer sentence.’ ” (Ibid.) As such, we vacate Bey’s sentence and remand for
the court to conduct a full resentencing to allow the court to consider its
sentencing choices. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded, and the trial court directed to impose
sentence on both counts one and two and then stay execution of one of those
sentences under section 654. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.

A168728; People v. Bey

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