People v. Madrigal CA4/1

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Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Madrigal CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081707

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD286055)

JUAN CARLOS MADRIGAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Christine Y. Friedman, and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Juan Carlos Madrigal of first degree murder for
shooting and killing Debron Moore, and of attempted murder for shooting at
Moore’s girlfriend, Moria Howard. His primary arguments concern the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict. He first asserts that
any reasonable jury would have found he acted in self-defense or at least in
the heat of passion. He also contends that, at a minimum, the jury could not
fairly conclude that the killing was premeditated and deliberate. But
applying the required standard of review, which is deferential to the jury’s
findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or evaluate whether other
interpretations of the facts are equally plausible. Rather, we conclude the
record adequately supports a finding that Madrigal instigated a deadly
confrontation, pursuing Moore and threatening him with a gun before finally
shooting him. These same facts allowed the jury to find that Madrigal
engaged in sufficient planning and deliberation during his encounter with
Moore to support his conviction for first degree murder.
Madrigal next claims the court committed reversible error by excluding
evidence that the victim and his girlfriend might have stolen guns in a
burglary committed the month before the shooting. Even assuming the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding this evidence, Madrigal has not
shown any reasonable likelihood this affected the outcome of his trial.
Madrigal further argues the court abused its discretion by denying his
request for juror information, which he claimed was necessary to support his
motion for a new trial. But the basis for Madrigal’s request was his desire to
question jurors about the influence of the prosecutor’s closing argument on
their verdict, which is inadmissible evidence. As we explain, the court
properly denied both his request and the motion for new trial.
Finally, Madrigal contends (and the People do not dispute) that his
abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect 1,035 days of custody
credit rather than 1,034. We correct the abstract of judgment in this respect,
and otherwise affirm the judgment.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On the evening of April 12, 2020, Moore (the eventual victim) and
Howard (his girlfriend) argued as they left a family member’s home. Moore
followed Howard as she walked west on University Avenue toward the
intersection with College Avenue. The argument turned physical when
Moore “body slammed” Howard and “banged [her] on a car” near Alanberto’s
taco shop on the southeast corner of the intersection.
At trial, the prosecution showed the following aerial image of the
intersection and the taco shop, which is where most of the pertinent events
occurred:

A man parked by the taco shop with his family observed Moore
battering Howard and tried to intervene. Moore responded by punching the
man in the face multiple times. Howard, who had walked away from Moore,
approached the group—which now included the man’s family—and said, “if

1 Where there is inconsistent evidence, these facts are summarized in the
light most favorable to the convictions in accordance with the standard of
review applicable to Madrigal’s first claims. We include additional facts for
context or in connection with our analysis of other issues.
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you don’t fucking stop, I’m going to take that gun out of my bag.” Howard
testified she said this “[t]o scare them and make them stop,” but that she did
not actually have a gun. Within a few seconds, Howard began walking away
again, heading south on College Avenue. Moore stopped fighting and
apologized to the family.
Moore then approached an employee at the drive-through window of
the taco shop and apologized for “the drama.” As he was talking to the
employee, he stepped backwards over the curb and into the street on College
Avenue. Just then, a white truck driving down College Avenue in the right
turn lane clipped Moore. Madrigal’s brother was driving the truck, Madrigal
was in the front passenger seat, and their friend was in a rear passenger’s
seat.
The truck stopped and reversed toward Moore. As the truck came to a
stop, Moore pounded on the passenger’s side door and yelled, “Hey, what the
fuck. You just hit me.” “Watch where you are going.” Madrigal, whose
window was open, yelled profanities at him. Moore walked backwards—away
from the truck and the street—as he and Madrigal shouted obscenities at
each other, including the N-word.
Madrigal brandished a gun out the window, pointing it down toward
the sidewalk, and said “Oh, what’s up [N-word].” Moore responded by saying,
“I’m on what you on,” and he grabbed his backpack as though to indicate “he
was not backing down.” Madrigal then pulled the slide back on the gun,
chambering a round. He yelled to Moore, “What you want to do?”
Madrigal’s brother drove forward on College, turned right on
University, turned right into the taco shop parking lot, then drove through
the lot and stopped at the exit perpendicular to College, almost circling back
to their starting point. As the truck made its loop around the taco shop,

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Moore took off running. When the truck stopped, Madrigal jumped out and
chased Moore, carrying the gun. Madrigal returned to the truck, which
turned onto College, drove around the corner again and entered the parking
lot once more from the University entrance.
The truck stopped near the entrance at the north end of the taco shop
parking lot. Madrigal and one or both of the truck’s other occupants got out
and once again chased Moore. A witness saw at least one gun among the
group chasing Moore. Another saw three men exit the truck and push Moore,
trying to get him to fight, and then start beating Moore while he was “trying
to protect himself.”
At this point, Howard, who had walked south on College Avenue while
these events were unfolding, heard people yelling. She assumed Moore had
gotten into another fight and ran back down College Avenue toward the
commotion. As she got closer to Moore and Madrigal, she said, “Baby, what
the fuck?” Madrigal was now close to the passenger side of the truck, Moore
was standing a few feet away from Madrigal, and Howard a few feet further
away from Madrigal, on the far side of Moore. Howard shouted something
like “[b]ack the fuck up before I shoot your ass,” and made a gesture with her
purse to imply she had a gun. Moore yelled, “shoot him, baby.”
Approximately five seconds elapsed between Howard shouting, “[b]ack
the fuck up before I shoot your ass,” and when the first shot rang out. In that
time, Madrigal reached into the truck, grabbed the gun, made eye contact
with Howard, and said either, “what’s up now?” or “you ain’t talking shit no
more, huh?” He then fired at Moore and Howard. Witnesses who testified at
trial heard or saw between three and six shots. Surveillance footage from
that evening recorded what sounds like six shots.

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Moore and Howard began running toward the street and then east
down University Avenue after the first shot. Howard indicated that the two
ran out of the parking lot and around the side of a neighboring building,
marking their approximate path in red pen:

One of the bullets hit the wall of the ARCO gas station on the northwest
corner of the intersection; an employee working that night heard the shot hit
the building. Another bullet fatally struck Moore as he ran, entering his back
and exiting through his left chest.
Madrigal and his companions fled in the truck. A few minutes later, an
officer responding to the scene of the shooting saw the truck and began a

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pursuit with his patrol car’s lights and siren on. The truck ran multiple
traffic lights and entered the freeway, leading the officer, another patrol unit,
and a police helicopter on a chase. During the chase, Madrigal threw the gun
out of the truck window into some brush, where it was later recovered.
Officers recovered four shell casings from the taco shop parking lot. A
firearms expert testified that the casings had been fired from the gun
Madrigal discarded. Investigators found gunshot residue on Madrigal’s
hands, indicating that he had recently fired a gun or touched a surface with
gunshot residue.
Howard denied having a gun, and her hands did not test positive for
gunshot residue. Law enforcement did not find a firearm or any additional
shell casings besides the four that matched Madrigal’s gun.
Madrigal was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a)), attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a); 187, subd. (a));
and shooting at an occupied building (Pen. Code, § 246). A jury found him
guilty on all charges. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term
of 50 years to life.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Madrigal’s Convictions for
Murder and Attempted Murder
Madrigal contends there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions for murder and attempted murder because any reasonable jury
would have that found that he acted in self-defense or defense of others.
Alternatively, he contends his murder conviction should be reduced to
involuntary manslaughter because any reasonable jury would have found he
acted in imperfect self-defense, or with the actual, but unreasonable, belief
that self-defense or defense of others was required. Finally, Madrigal argues

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his murder conviction should at a minimum be reduced to voluntary
manslaughter because any reasonable jury would have concluded he acted in
the heat of passion on adequate provocation.
1. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict
finding a defendant guilty of a criminal offense, we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review.” (People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 26,
57.) We “view[ ] the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presum[e] every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from
that evidence.” (People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 319.) We “ ‘ “must
accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence
even if [we] would have concluded otherwise[.]” ’ ” (People v. Solomon (2010)
49 Cal.4th 792, 811–812.) “Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the
exclusive province of the . . . jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (People
v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) “Reversal . . . is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
2. Self-Defense or Defense of Others—Perfect and Imperfect
“It is well established that the ordinary self-defense doctrine—
applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety is
endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission
of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or
pursuit is legally justified.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773,

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fn. 1.) The same is true with respect to Madrigal’s assertion that he was at
most guilty of manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-
defense/defense of others. (Ibid.) Substantial evidence would support a
conclusion that Madrigal created and escalated a confrontation to the point
that Howard’s intervention was legally justified. It was thus reasonable for
the jury to reject Madrigal’s claims of self-defense and imperfect self-defense.
Madrigal was the aggressor in his exchange with the murder victim,
Moore. Moore posed no apparent threat to Madrigal or his companions in the
truck, yet Madrigal continued to pursue him for several minutes in the
vehicle and on foot as he tried to evade them. At the very beginning of the
interaction, Madrigal brandished his gun and then chased Moore with it,
threatening deadly force before any assertedly adequate provocation from
Moore or Howard. One witness saw Madrigal assault Moore while Moore
tried to protect himself.
Madrigal claims the shooting was a reasonable response to the threat
apparently posed by Howard, who yelled “[b]ack the fuck up before I shoot
your ass,” and pantomimed a gun. But the jury could fairly conclude that, by
the time Howard arrived, Madrigal had forfeited his right to use deadly force
due to his own wrongful conduct in initiating and escalating the conflict with
Moore. (Cf., e.g., People v. Frandsen (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275
(Frandsen) [defendant who had imprisoned victims did not have the right to
defend himself from victim’s “lawful resort to self-defense and the defense” of
another].) For this reason, it does not matter whether Madrigal believed
Howard had a gun. Either way, the murder was not justified.
Madrigal cites People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 945
(Ramirez), a case about instructional error, in support of his argument that
Howard’s sudden resort to deadly force escalated the confrontation, reviving

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his right to self-defense. Ramirez correctly holds that a defendant does not
forfeit all right to self-defense if he “contrived to use . . . nondeadly force.”
(Id. at p. 953.) But “when a defendant contrives a ‘deadly’ assault [citation],
there can be no incommensurate or unjustifiable response by the victim: he
or she is fully entitled to use deadly force and the defendant has no right to
claim self-defense against those deadly measures.” (Id. at p. 947.) Although
Madrigal argues that witnesses did not see him point his gun at Moore or fire
before Howard arrived, a witness testified that Madrigal not only brandished
a loaded gun but chambered a round. Video played for the jury reflects the
witnesses’ contemporaneous concern that Madrigal intended to shoot
someone. Madrigal was also seen to have the gun in his hand while chasing
Moore. Given this evidence, we cannot conclude it was unreasonable for the
jury to find that Madrigal was the first to threaten the use of deadly force.
Madrigal further argues “the prosecution failed to prove he did not
withdraw” from his confrontation with Moore, claiming “[t]he record reflects
that the altercation with Moore had ended, and Madrigal and his companions
had walked back to the truck before Howard’s threatening act of running
toward him and threatening to shoot.” Although Madrigal offers a string of
citations, the portions of the record he references do not support his
assertion. Although he points to the testimony of one witness who said
Madrigal “retreated” to the truck, this witness clarified she just meant
Madrigal was going back to the truck. The mere fact that Madrigal was
returning to the truck does not tend to show that he had withdrawn, as he
had been in and out of the truck throughout the encounter.
In addition, Howard testified that Madrigal had been chasing Moore
just before he retrieved the gun and began firing. A different witness
testified that the men were engaged in a yelling match right before the

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shooting. A third witness testified that Madrigal was trying to fight Moore
right before the shots. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Madrigal never withdrew from the confrontation.
3. Heat of Passion
Madrigal makes a similar sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument based
on a heat-of-passion theory and, for similar reasons, it fails. He claims,
“There was simply no evidence by which a rational juror could reasonably
infer that an ordinary person in Madrigal’s situation would have calmly
assessed the circumstances, calculated the degree of risk posed by Howard—a
person unknown to him, running toward him, across the dark parking lot,
pretending to have a gun and threatening to shoot him, Moore also yelled for
her to shoot—understood that there was no current imminent danger
(assuming that this was true), cleared his mind of fear, and, in a
dispassionate and rational frame of mind, in the seconds that elapsed, pulled
the trigger.” Again, Madrigal’s argument focuses only on the moments after
Howard appeared. When evidence concerning Madrigal’s earlier actions is
considered, it paints a different picture.
“A defendant may not provoke a fight, become the aggressor, and,
without first seeking to withdraw from the conflict, kill an adversary and
expect to reduce the crime to manslaughter by merely asserting that it was
accomplished upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. The claim of
provocation cannot be based on events for which the defendant is culpably
responsible.” (People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 83.) As
explained above, the record supports the conclusion that Madrigal provoked
the altercation, continued to be an aggressor and, without seeking to
withdraw, killed Moore. The jury reasonably rejected his heat of passion
defense.

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B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Findings of
Premeditation and Deliberation
Madrigal also claims there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for first degree murder because a rational jury could not find
premeditation or deliberation based on the evidence presented. “If [a]
murder is ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated,’ it is first degree murder.
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “In this context, ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand,’
and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of
careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed
course of action.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.) “ ‘ “ ‘The
true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the
reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold,
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14
Cal.5th 562, 580.)
The circumstances preceding the shooting constitute substantial
evidence that Moore’s murder was deliberate and premeditated. Although
their encounter was brief, the jury could reasonably find that Madrigal had
sufficient time to reflect on what he would do to Moore in response to Moore
yelling and pounding on the truck. (Cf. People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th
547, 563–564 [“A rational trier of fact could have concluded defendant,
knowing he illegally possessed a firearm, rapidly and coldly formed the idea
to kill [a police officer] during the course of [a brief traffic stop], and therefore
acted after a period of reflection rather than on an unconsidered or rash
impulse.”].)
As an initial matter, Madrigal “brought a loaded handgun with
him . . . , indicating he had considered the possibility of a violent encounter.”
(People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 (Lee).) Madrigal threatened Moore,

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brandishing the gun, racking the slide, and saying, “What you want to do?”
This implies that Madrigal considered the possibility of resorting to deadly
violence, depending on Moore’s response. (Cf. People v. Steele (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1230, 1250 [defendant’s statement “ ‘Put the phone down or I’ll kill
you’ ” was “evidence suggest[ing] a planned killing”].) Furthermore, Madrigal
was carrying the gun while chasing Moore on foot, suggesting he
contemplated shooting Moore. And Madrigal retrieved the gun from his
truck in the roughly five seconds before shooting, taking the time to jeer at
Moore. The jury could find this showed he had the opportunity to reflect on
his options even at this final juncture. (See People v. San Nicolas (2004)
34 Cal.4th 614, 658 (San Nicolas) [defendant’s testimony that he saw victim’s
reflection in mirror before turning around and stabbing her established
defendant had sufficient time “to have reached the deliberate and
premeditated decision to kill”].)
Madrigal frames his arguments almost exclusively with reference to
the factors outlined in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson).
The Supreme Court has “found planning activity, preexisting motive, and
manner of killing[, the so-called Anderson factors,] to be relevant, although
these factors do not ‘ “exclude all other types and combinations of evidence
that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.” ’ ” (People v.
Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 355.)
When viewed with reference to the Anderson factors, the evidence
amply supports a finding that Madrigal spent at least some time planning
the killing. Evidence of “planning” includes “facts about how and what
defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was
engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in,
the killing.” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26–27.) As already discussed,

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Madrigal’s actions prior to the killing support an inference that the murder
was planned.
The other two factors—motive and manner of killing—are less strongly
indicative of premeditation and deliberation, but are nonetheless consistent
with the jury’s verdict and the guidelines of Anderson. (See San Nicolas,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 658 [“Evidence of the Anderson factors need not be
present in order to support a finding of deliberation, but planning, or motive
in conjunction either with planning or with manner of killing, must be
present to support such a finding.”].) With respect to motive, although
Madrigal’s precise reason for wanting to kill Moore was unclear, the jury
could have reasonably concluded he was motivated by his ego, perhaps intent
on retaliating for perceived disrespect by Moore. There is evidence that
Madrigal was intent on chasing Moore down even though Moore sought to
disengage. This suggests Madrigal sought retribution for Moore’s
intemperate reaction to being hit by the truck.
Madrigal argues he could not have had a motive because he did not
know Moore before the confrontation. But motive can be quickly developed.
For example, in Brady, the Supreme Court upheld a first degree murder
conviction where the defendant killed a police officer mere minutes after first
encountering him. (Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 562–563.)
Madrigal broadly asserts that anger arising “on the spot because of a
confrontation is not a premeditated motive to kill.” But there is no such
categorical rule. (See Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 636 [defendant’s frustration
that a girl “refused to have sex with him” right before killing was motive
supporting conviction for first degree murder].) We look to any “facts about
the defendant’s . . . conduct with the victim from which the jury could
reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim.” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at

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p. 27.) “Motive is the emotional urge that induces a particular act.” (1
Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed. 2024) Elements, § 4.) “ ‘[T]he law does
not require that a first degree murderer have a “rational” motive for killing.’ ”
(People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1200.) Again, the jury could have
reasonably concluded Madrigal was angered by Moore’s reaction to being hit
by the truck and therefore decided to kill him. (See People v. Lunafelix (1985)
168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 [“Anger at the way the victim talked to [the
defendant] [citation] or any motive, ‘shallow and distorted but, to the
perpetrator, genuine[,]’ may be sufficient.”].)
Finally, the manner of killing is also consistent with premeditation.
Because the record supports that Madrigal retrieved his gun from the truck
before shooting, the jury could have reasonably concluded that this was
evidence of reflection. Even though Moore and Howard fled as soon as he
began shooting, Madrigal fired multiple shots. The weapon used by Madrigal
was semi-automatic, meaning he had to pull the trigger to fire each shot.
One shot ended up in the gas station to the northwest of Madrigal and one in
Moore’s back as he ran northeast of Madrigal, indicating that Madrigal was
tracking the victims with his shots as they ran away. Firing multiple shots
in the direction of the fleeing victims is consistent with a plan to kill.
In sum, although other interpretations are possible, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Madrigal’s killing of Moore was
deliberate and premeditated.
C. Any Error in Excluding Evidence Related to Victims’ Prior
Burglary and Firearm Offenses Was Harmless
1. Additional Background
Moore, Howard, and a third person committed a residential burglary
roughly a month before the shooting. Madrigal sought to show that Moore

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and the other person had stolen two guns in the burglary. He also offered
evidence that Moore had been charged with possession of a firearm in
connection with that offense.
The court ruled that Howard’s aiding and abetting the burglary was
admissible as a prior crime of moral turpitude, but excluded the fact that
firearms were stolen. The court said it was tenuous to assume Howard had
access to guns taken in the burglary because she was just the getaway driver.
Consistent with Evidence Code section 352, it reasoned that the evidence was
minimally probative but could lead to undue consumption of time and confuse
the issues. The court also questioned the relevance of Moore being charged
with theft of a firearm since his credibility was not an issue.
The trial court permitted Madrigal to present other evidence
suggesting that Moore and Howard may have procured a gun, including a
picture of a gun Howard texted to a friend the day before the shooting. When
questioned about it by defense counsel, Howard said, “I also have a picture of
full photo of that being a screenshot. I got that off of Facebook and I still
have the phone that has the full photo that’s a screenshot. I cropped half of it
out. . . . As you could see, someone is holding a picture—someone is holding a
cell phone and the gun is not real. It was a joke on Facebook and I
screenshot it and cropped around it.”
Howard sent the same picture to Moore, along with the message “Dis
n**** trying to sell this to me at the tattoo [party.]” Moore responded,
“[W]hat tattoo party[?] that shit look stupid.” Howard said she messaged
Moore about buying a gun because she “was just trying to get his attention.”
In a separate conversation that evening, Moore messaged Howard
saying, “I need a strap.” Howard testified that “strap” is slang for gun.

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The defense also submitted the following Facebook Messenger
exchange from Howard’s phone, dated that same day:
“[Howard’s cousin]: Yooo
“[Howard’s cousin]: It still work
“[Howard]: U dead ass wanna buy it? I posted it cause I thought it was
funny
“[Howard]: Someone tried to sell the lay bs to my friend
“[Howard]: It’s for sale tho
“[Howard’s cousin]: What it’s going for I collect guns just asking”
Howard said she did not know about this conversation and claimed she
shared her phone with Moore.
In addition, some witnesses believed Howard may have had a gun with
her that night. The man Moore had punched a few minutes before the
shooting thought he saw Howard holding something “black and . . . pointed”
right before shots were fired, but could not say if it was a gun, and he was not
sure who had fired. His daughter said she believed Howard was shooting at
the family’s car—which she said was in the intersection of College and
University at the time of the shooting—because she saw bullets hit the gas
station and thought it made sense based on Howard’s location. Although she
testified “it could [not] have been anyone else that shot” given the positioning
of the various parties, her memory of where Madrigal’s truck was stopped is
inconsistent with the surveillance footage. The daughter’s boyfriend testified
he thought Howard might have been shooting from a dark spot in the parking
lot. But he did not articulate his reason for believing this, he did not see
Howard at the time of the shooting, nor did he see anyone holding a gun.
Another witness told officers on the night of the shooting she believed
Howard was shooting from the ground and may have put the gun in her

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purse or a car she was standing near. In a later statement to police, though,
this witness said Madrigal was the only shooter, and she testified at trial she
was “confident” there had only been one gun and one shooter.
2. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1181.) The decision to
exclude evidence “ ‘will not be disturbed except on a showing [that] the trial
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice [citation].’ ” (People
v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 745.) Exclusion of evidence only constitutes
reversible error if there is a “reasonable probability that defendant would
have obtained a more favorable outcome had he been permitted to introduce
[the] evidence.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 828 (Gutierrez).)
3. Analysis
Madrigal argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
evidence about the guns taken in the burglary and that Moore was charged
with possession of a firearm. He claims this evidence “directly impeached
Howard’s credibility and provided circumstantial evidence supporting other
percipient[ ] [witnesses’] perception that Howard had a gun on the night of
the shooting.” We need not decide whether the trial court properly excluded
the burglary-related firearm evidence because, even assuming the court
abused its discretion, there is no reasonable probability that Madrigal would
have obtained a more favorable result had the evidence been admitted. (See,
e.g., People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 69.)
Although Madrigal argues this evidence was relevant to Howard’s
credibility, Howard frankly admitted she had lied on multiple occasions
regarding the night of the shooting:

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“Q. Had there been prior occasions when you have been asked to
talk about this case and that you have not been fully truthful?

“A. Yes, ma’am.

“Q. Okay. And is the preliminary hearing one of them?

“A. Yes, ma’am.

“Q. And some of your interviews with the officers, did you deny
things that then you admitted at the prelim or that you are
admitting today?

“A. Yes, ma’am.”

This is significantly stronger credibility evidence than the material the court
excluded.
Madrigal also argues this evidence could have convinced the jury that
Howard in fact had a gun with her that night. But there was already a
significant amount of other evidence suggesting that Howard and/or Moore
had access to firearms or at least an interest in acquiring them. The jury
heard from witnesses who thought Howard may have fired a gun, and the
defense introduced Howard’s and Moore’s messages sent the day before the
shooting, making the burglary-related evidence cumulative. (See Gutierrez,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 828 [no reasonable probability of a more favorable
outcome if trial court had admitted evidence of victim’s misdemeanor battery
conviction where defendant “was permitted to testify regarding his past
fights with the victim,” “the tumultuous nature of their relationship,” and
“the altercation that occurred between defendant and the victim on the day
she was killed”].)
In fact, the evidence regarding the firearms used in the burglary could
just as easily have confused the issue. If Moore and Howard already had a
gun from a burglary committed a month before, it undercut the salience of

19
Moore’s message, “I need a strap,” and Howard’s apparent messages about
buying a gun. In other words, if the defense theory was that Moore and
Howard already had a gun from the burglary, their messages about procuring
a gun the day before the shooting make much less sense.
Moreover, whether Howard in fact had a gun was not especially
significant. Madrigal’s defense was almost entirely consistent with Howard’s
version of events, as she admitted she threatened to shoot him and pretended
to have a gun. Madrigal only needed to reasonably believe she had a gun to
claim self-defense, something the jury could have easily concluded from
evidence presented at trial. (See People v. Ceja (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 78, 86
[“ ‘To be exculpated on a theory of self-defense one must have an honest and
reasonable belief in the need to defend.’ ”].)
For these reasons, we conclude Madrigal’s defense was not prejudiced
by the exclusion of this evidence.
D. The Trial Court Properly Denied Madrigal’s Request for Juror
Information and the Related Motion for New Trial
1. Additional Background
At trial, the prosecutor highlighted the surveillance footage, urging the
jury: “And take a listen to, when you’re determining how many gunshots,
consider whether there are four and an echo, or are there six? I listened to
that thing ten million times. You will only have had two or three chances.
Take the time to listen when you’re trying to determine what the facts are,
and look at what on that video is corroborating what the witnesses say
happened.”
After trial, Madrigal’s counsel encountered Juror No. 5 by chance
outside a restaurant and he “informed [her] that the jury did not believe that
Ms. Howard had a gun” and “that the jury believed that the two additional

20
‘shots’ [heard on surveillance footage] could have been from an echo.”
According to Madrigal, this demonstrated the jury relied on the prosecution’s
statement in closing argument rather than the evidence and could have
supported a motion for a new trial. Madrigal sought disclosure of juror
contact information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237,
subdivision (a)(1), presumably seeking to ask other jurors about the effect of
the prosecutor’s argument on their verdict.
The court held a hearing on Madrigal’s request and questioned Juror
No. 5 about his discussion with defense counsel. The juror did not
corroborate counsel’s version of the conversation, saying he had not discussed
the number of gunshots with counsel, and he did not remember discussing
whether Howard had a gun or his desire to have an audio expert address the
question of echoes. The court found Madrigal had not made the required
prima facie showing of good cause for disclosure of juror information.
Although his request for juror information was denied, Madrigal
nonetheless filed a motion for new trial on two grounds. First, he claimed the
prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing argument. The trial court
rejected Madrigal’s request for a new trial on this ground, first noting there
had been no objection from defense counsel, potentially for the tactical reason
of not highlighting a stray comment. As a result, it found the objection had
been forfeited. The court further concluded, in context, the prosecutor was
not asserting that she heard four shots and an echo, but that the jury should
listen carefully to the audio and draw its own conclusions. It suggested the
jury was entitled to draw any reasonable inferences it wanted from the
gunshot evidence, including potentially that there had been echoes. The
court finally noted the prosecutor made only one reference to a potential echo
and the defense had an opportunity to respond in its closing.

21
Second, Madrigal argued that an expert report analyzing audio of the
gunshots constituted newly discovered evidence. The trial court concluded
the proffered evidence was not newly discovered, stating, “the only thing that
is new is an interpretation by an expert.” The court also found that the
evidence would have been cumulative in some respects “because . . . the issue
was, were there six shots or four shots, because the other two shots had to be
Ms. Howard’s gun”; that the evidence would not likely change the result in
the event of a new trial; and that the defense could have discovered this
evidence with reasonable diligence.
2. Request for Juror Information
A defendant may petition the court for access to jurors’ names,
addresses, and telephone numbers. (Code Civ. Proc. § 237, subd. (b).) “The
petition [must] be supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to
establish good cause for the release of the juror’s . . . information.” (Ibid.) If
the petition establishes a prima facie showing of good cause for the release of
the juror information, “the court shall set the matter for hearing.” (Ibid.)
Madrigal’s petition failed to establish a prima facie showing of good
cause. The basis for Madrigal’s request was a conversation between defense
counsel and Juror No. 5 concerning what the jury “believed” and “did not
believe.” This evidence was not admissible in support of Madrigal’s request
for a new trial, as it concerns “the mental processes by which [the verdict]
was determined.” (See Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a) [“No evidence is
admissible to show the effect of [a] statement, conduct, condition, or event
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict
or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”].)
Madrigal contends the trial court erred by holding a hearing at which
only Juror No. 5 was questioned and improperly relied on this testimony in

22
rejecting Madrigal’s application. But the court indicated it had already
denied the request before talking to the juror. It also appears that defense
counsel expressly acquiesced to the court’s approach:
“[COURT]: [W]hat we had outlined before is that I’m going to
just set it up and indicate that [Juror No. 5] apparently had an
opportunity to have a discussion with defense counsel, and we’d
like to know how that developed and what was said. And then, at
that point, we are going to mute him again and figure out where
we go from there.

“Unless somebody has anything else specific that you want me to
address now, I'm thinking that’s the better approach.

“Defense?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s fine, Your Honor.”

In any case, no “new trial [shall be] granted, in any cause . . . for any error as
to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.) “When the error is one of state law only, it generally does not warrant
reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the
error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.)
Madrigal sought the release of juror information to obtain inadmissible
evidence concerning the jurors’ mental processes. He therefore cannot show
that any procedural error by the trial court affected the outcome of his motion
for a new trial.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Madrigal claims the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly and
prejudicially introduced a fact not supported by the evidence—the notion that
two of the gunshots heard on the surveillance footage were an echo. He also

23
argues the prosecutor improperly inserted her personal opinion as fact by
suggesting that she had listened to the recording “ten million times.”
“As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling
on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Alvarez (1996)
14 Cal.4th 155, 213.) “ ‘ “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable
likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an
improper or erroneous manner. [Citation.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do
not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least
damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” ’ ” (People v. Adams
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 577 (Adams).) The court must consider the challenged
statements in the context of the argument as a whole. (People v. Cowan
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1159.)
A defendant forfeits a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to
object. (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1043.) As Madrigal
concedes, he failed to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper
statements. In our view, he “fails to show why an objection and admonition
would have been futile.” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 829

(Blacksher).)2
Even if the issue had not been forfeited, Madrigal has not shown “ ‘ “a
manifest and unmistakable abuse of . . . discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Lightsey

2 Contrary to Madrigal’s assertion, Blacksher does not support that the
California Supreme Court “has chosen to consider prosecutorial misconduct
claims on the merits even where the defendant failed to object at trial and did
not show that objection would be futile.” In Blacksher, the court rejected a
defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the alternative “even
assuming [he] ha[d] not forfeited this claim.” (Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 829.) We similarly address the merits of Madrigal’s claim in the
alternative.
24
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 729 (Lightsey).) The evidence supported that there
was a discrepancy in the number of shots, with witnesses reporting between
three and six. Four casings were recovered, while the surveillance footage
audio apparently reflects the sound of six shots. “ ‘Prosecutors have wide
latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial. [Citation.]
Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to
decide.” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 337.) The thrust of the
prosecution’s argument was that the jury should carefully review the
evidence for itself, and her suggestion of an echo was at least arguably a fair
inference from that evidence.
In any case, even if it crossed the line of impropriety, there was no
reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied this single remark to
suggest there was direct evidence of an echo. The prosecutor told the jury to
decide for themselves what they heard. The court instructed the jury,
“Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and
closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not
evidence. Their questions are not evidence . . . .” “Jurors are presumed . . . to
have followed the court’s instructions.” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th
834, 852.) We therefore presume the jury drew its own conclusions from the
evidence. (See Adams, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 577.)
For all these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision not to grant a new trial on the ground of alleged prosecutorial
discretion.
4. Newly Discovered Evidence
Madrigal also argues the trial court should have granted his motion for
a new trial based on a newly proffered expert report from a forensic analyst

25
who opined that the surveillance footage reflected six gunshots and not
echoes.
“In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, the trial court considers the following factors: ‘ “1. That the
evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the
evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different
result probable on a retrial of the cause; 4. That the party could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That
these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328.) “ ‘In addition,
“the trial court may consider the credibility as well as materiality of the
evidence in its determination [of] whether introduction of the evidence in a
new trial would render a different result reasonably probable.” ’ ” (People v.
Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 43.)
Again, Madrigal has not shown a “ ‘ “manifest and unmistakable abuse
of . . . discretion.” ’ ” (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 729.) Assuming the
expert’s report constitutes “newly discovered” evidence, the opinions were
based entirely on evidence available to Madrigal before trial, and there is no
apparent reason this evidence could not have been developed earlier and
presented at trial. Madrigal argues that because there was no direct
evidence of an echo, he had no reason to investigate the “echo theory” until
the prosecution’s closing argument. As the trial court mentioned, however,
both Madrigal’s claim of self-defense and the number of gunshots were
squarely in dispute. Madrigal knew that Howard denied having a gun that
night and that the prosecution’s version of events did not account for two of
the six shots heard on the surveillance footage. Madrigal thus had sufficient

26
reason to investigate whether all of the sounds on the surveillance footage
audio were gunshots or something else.
Moreover, the assertedly “new” evidence is largely cumulative. The
audio from the surveillance footage does not sound like four shots and two
echoes, it sounds like six shots. One of the prosecution’s own witnesses—an
investigating detective—testified that he believed there were six shots on the
surveillance footage. Because the report is essentially cumulative, we see no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the report was not
likely to affect the outcome on retrial.
Finally, as we have already noted in a different context, the viability of
Madrigal’s self-defense or imperfect self-defense claims did not depend on the
jury believing that Howard actually possessed and fired a weapon. It was
enough that Madrigal subjectively believed his life was in danger. (Ante,
p. 23.)
E. The Abstract of Judgment Shall Be Corrected
Madrigal argues, and the People do not dispute, the abstract of
judgment fails to accurately reflect Madrigal’s custody credits. The probation
report states in the narrative that Madrigal was arrested on April 29, 2020,
but uses April 30, 2020, to calculate his custody credits. The parties only cite
one mention in the record of Madrigal’s arrest date, testimony from his
mother that he was arrested on April 29. It thus appears there is a clerical
error in the probation report. This court may correct clerical or arithmetical
errors regarding presentence credits without the necessity of a remand.
(People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 235–236.) In light of the
apparent clerical error and the People’s concession, we will order the
judgment modified to reflect an extra day of credit.

27
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect that defendant is entitled to 1035
days of actual presentence custody credit. The clerk of the superior court is
directed to prepare and forward to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this modification.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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