A.D. v. C.G. CA2/4

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Filed 3/25/25 A.D. v. C.G. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

A.D., B329351 consolidated with B329349

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 22LBPT00166,
v. 22PSRO01297)

C.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Reginald L. Neal, Judge. Affirmed.
Nonprofit Legal Services, Adam Dolce for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Office of Kasra Parsad and Kasra Parsad for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
In these consolidated appeals, appellant C.G.1 challenges
the post-hearing denial of a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) against respondent A.D. and the subsequent grant of
A.D.’s motion to disqualify C.G.’s attorney and romantic partner,
Adam Dolce. In addition to arguing that both rulings were
abuses of discretion, C.G. contends automatic reversal is required
because the trial court’s bias against her, evinced through the
challenged rulings and various procedural irregularities,
amounts to structural error. We reject C.G.’s bias argument and
affirm both orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Parties and their Relationship
C.G. and A.D. were in a nonmarital relationship for
approximately four years. They share a daughter, S., who was
born in March 2020. C.G. and A.D. ended their relationship in
mid-June 2022; C.G. left the parties’ shared San Pedro home with
S. and moved across the county to Claremont.
II. DVRO Proceedings
A. C.G.’s Request and Temporary DVRO
On July 14, 2022, C.G., acting in propria persona, filed a
request for a DVRO against A.D. at the Pomona courthouse. C.G.
alleged that the abuse from which she was seeking protection
began on June 18, 2022; prior to that date, “the tension in the
house consisted of arguments and verbal abuse” by A.D.; she also
claimed unspecified “Mental/emotional, financial, and verbal
abuse.”

1 We refer to the parties and their child by initials to protect
their privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.90(b)(1), (10),
(11).)

2
In the DVRO application, C.G. alleged that on June 18,
2022, two days after she told A.D. she planned to leave him, she
decided to record one of their verbal fights on her phone. A.D. saw
that C.G. was recording and “yanked” the phone out of her hand
while she was holding S. A.D. refused to return the phone and
ran outside with it while trying to “delete crucial evidence of the
current recording as well as past recordings of his verbal and
mental abuse.” C.G. left S. alone in the house and chased A.D.
When she caught up to him they “wrestled” over the phone, and
C.G. ripped A.D.’s shirt. A.D. responded by saying, “‘you rip my
shirt i’ll [sic] rip yours,’” and ripped C.G.’s shirt, exposing her
breast. C.G. heard S. screaming and went back into the house to
get her. C.G. took S. outside and screamed for help. A neighbor,
Silvia, came out and helped C.G. with S. C.G. called 911, and the
police responded. C.G. left with S. and did not return.
C.G. alleged that between the June 18 incident and the
July 14 DVRO request, A.D. “disturbed my peace” and that of her
family members by “insist[ing] on talking to” S. and “constantly
texting them to get to” S. C.G. sought protection for her family
members, including her mother, sister, and brother-in-law. She
attached screenshots of text messages between herself and A.D.
C.G. requested sole legal and physical custody of S.
On July 14, 2022, the same day C.G. filed the DVRO
request, the trial court, Judge Yang, issued a temporary DVRO.
The temporary DVRO protected C.G., S., and C.G.’s mother, and
gave C.G. sole legal and physical custody of S., with no visitation
for A.D. It additionally provided, “Petitioner [C.G.] is permitted
to return to family residence to retrieve personal items with law
enforcement. Any distribution of personal items/property may
constitute abuse under the DVPA [Domestic Violence Prevention

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Act].” The temporary DVRO was to remain in effect until a
hearing on August 4, 2022.
B. A.D.’s Response
On July 29, 2022, A.D., through counsel, filed a response
opposing C.G.’s DVRO request. A.D. requested pre-hearing
visitation and joint legal and physical custody of S. He disagreed
with C.G.’s requested orders. A.D. attached many additional
screenshots of text messages between himself and C.G.,
annotating some of them. He also attached several screenshots of
text messages between himself and C.G.’s brother-in-law.
Additionally, on July 20, 2022, also through counsel, A.D.
filed a parentage action concerning S. at the Torrance courthouse.
Pursuant to Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Local Rules
5.4 and 5.5, the parentage action was deemed related to the
DVRO action and became the lead action. The proceedings were
transferred to the Long Beach courthouse and assigned to Judge
Neal on August 4, 2022. The hearing on C.G.’s DVRO request
was continued to August 25, 2022.
C. August 25, 2022 and November 8, 2022 Hearings
C.G. and A.D. appeared before Judge Neal on August 25,
2022 and November 8, 2022 for hearings on C.G.’s DVRO request.
Both parties were represented by counsel. Although a reporter
was present, there is no transcript of the proceedings in the
appellate record. As discussed more fully below, C.G. filed a
settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.137.
1. C.G.’s Testimony
According to the settled statement, C.G. gave the following
testimony. She and A.D. met in October 2018 and moved in
together after dating for approximately eight months. C.G. and

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A.D. broke up in 2019 shortly before C.G. “became pregnant,” but
got back together soon after. C.G. received unemployment
benefits during her pregnancy and the pandemic; she gave them
to A.D. “based on his representation they were financially
struggling.” A.D. “controlled the purse strings in the
relationship,” “routinely criticized” C.G.’s spending, and “lock[ed]
her credit card at least two times.” A.D. also “admonished” C.G.
when she wanted to go to a yoga class “to decompress.”
After S. was born, C.G. was her “primary attendant,” which
caused C.G. “unbearable stress.” On one occasion, in November
2020, A.D. told C.G. she was “unfit to be a mother” and “forcibly”
took S. from her arms. A.D. pushed C.G. and she landed on her
back after falling over a piece of furniture. On another occasion,
in January 2022, A.D. pushed C.G. against the wall and put his
hands around her neck while she was holding S. In September
2021, A.D. became upset that C.G. had thrown away Indian food
and held the leaking bag of Indian food over C.G.’s head while
she was nursing S. On a different occasion, A.D. knocked a bowl
of pasta out of C.G.’s hand while she was eating it. C.G. and A.D.
also had verbal fights; C.G. considered the fights to be verbal
abuse and “tried to record” the incidents “out of fear they would
become very violent and aggressive.” A.D. “punched a wall once
out of frustration.”
C.G. tried to leave A.D. “on multiple occasions,” but was
“drawn back based on assurances and promises.” On June 18,
2022, after C.G. had informed A.D. that she would be leaving him
due to his abuse, the parties “began a verbal altercation.” When
C.G. tried to record the altercation, A.D. “grabbed her phone, left
the house, deleted the recording, and in wrestling the phone
away from her, ripped her shirt and exposed her breast. This

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caused S[.] to cry hysterically and for [sic] [C.G.] to flee the
property and to find sanctuary with a neighbor out of fear for her
safety.” C.G. and S. moved to C.G.’s parents’ home in Claremont,
“but were unable to take the majority of their possessions as a
result of the altercation.”
On cross-examination, C.G. conceded that she had slapped
A.D. on two separate occasions, once on his back and once on his
face. Both incidents occurred in or before October 2020. C.G.
denied excessive spending and denied overdrafting A.D.’s credit
cards.
C.G. introduced three exhibits: annotated screenshots of
text messages the parties exchanged in 2021; a February 6, 2022
Upland Police Department report documenting a “verbal only”
incident at a restaurant in which C.G. told officers she “needs
space”; and a Los Angeles Police Department report documenting
the June 18, 2022 incident.
2. A.D.’s Testimony
When he took the stand, A.D. confirmed the timeline of the
parties’ relationship but disputed much of C.G.’s other testimony.
While he acknowledged that “the parties often fought during the
relationship,” he maintained that the altercations were verbal
only and testified that he “never laid a hand on” C.G. A.D.
specifically denied pushing C.G. in November 2020 and choking
her in January 2022. He admitted confronting C.G. about
uneaten Indian food in 2021, but denied holding the food over her
head.
A.D. admitted taking C.G.’s phone on June 18, 2022, but
testified that he picked it up from a table. He also denied ripping
C.G.’s shirt. Regarding the incident in Upland, A.D. testified
that he and C.G. had been driving somewhere when she

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screamed at him to pull over because she wanted to eat dinner.
He waited in the car while C.G. and S. ate in the restaurant, and
the incident arose when he went inside and asked C.G. to leave.
He introduced screenshots of text messages the parties
exchanged the following day.
A.D. testified that C.G. hit or slapped him on two occasions
in October 2020. He also introduced screenshots of text messages
from October 2020 in which C.G. said she “slapped [him] pretty
hard” and he maintained she struck him with a closed fist.
A.D. denied any financial abuse of C.G. He testified that he
tried to talk to C.G. about their finances, including showing her
bank statements, but she refused to discuss the topic with him.
He further testified that he did not “lock” C.G.’s credit card, but
rather the card could not be used because it was over the
spending limit. A.D. testified that C.G. “overspent,” including
spending “thousands of dollars” in May 2021.
3. Court Rulings and Orders
At the request of C.G.’s counsel, the court indicated at the
conclusion of the November 8, 2022 hearing that its tentative
ruling was to deny the DVRO. After stating its tentative ruling,
the court granted C.G.’s counsel’s request to hear additional
testimony on January 18, 2023. The court ordered the temporary
DVRO to remain in effect pending that hearing, including the
language authorizing C.G. to “return to family residence to
retrieve personal items with law enforcement.” The court
increased A.D.’s visitation with S.

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D. C.G. Retrieves Property; Dolce Enters Case;
A.D. Seeks DVRO
C.G. sent A.D. a message through the Talking Parents app2
on October 18, 2022 to tell him that she would be arriving at the
house with the police momentarily to get some of her things and
needed him to leave. A.D. balked at the short notice, but
ultimately “vacated for approximately three hours while she
retrieved personal belongings.”
C.G. again contacted A.D. through Talking Parents on the
evening of November 27, 2022 to “inform [him] that I will be
packing some of my things to start the move out. Monday and
Tuesday I will be packing my boxes and setting them outside and
Wednesday I will have a moving company to move the rest. A
police dispatch will be called for all 3 days. Each day will be
about 6 hrs or so for me to pack and move out.” A.D. responded
that the following week would work better. After more back-and-
forth, including a dispute about the extent to which C.G. could
remove S.’s things, A.D. told C.G. he “fe[lt] like I am being
harassed” and planned to speak to his attorney in the morning.
A.D. sent C.G. additional messages on Talking Parents on
the morning of November 28, 2022. He advised C.G. that he and
his attorney were prepared to speak with law enforcement if they
arrived at the home.
C.G. did not respond on Talking Parents. Instead, attorney
Dolce emailed A.D.’s counsel, explaining that C.G. and her
counsel had “authorized” him “to associate in on a limited basis
for purposes of this week only,” while C.G.’s counsel was on

2 At the hearing on August 25, 2022, the court ordered the
parties to download the Talking Parents app and use it to
communicate about any matters concerning S.

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vacation. Dolce stated that he and his nonprofit firm represented
C.G. in another matter, and his role here was “limited to [C.G.]
seeking to retrieve her and her daughter’s personal
belongings. . . .” Dolce asserted that C.G. was a joint owner of the
property, the temporary DVRO permitted her to retrieve her
belongings, and A.D. was likely violating the temporary DVRO
by “being obtuse and obstructive.” He ended by stating that C.G.
“will be at the house today with the police. I strongly encourage
your client to not be there when she is.” Dolce did not disclose
that he and C.G. had been romantically involved since early
September 2022.
In a subsequent email sent at 11:46 a.m. on November 28,
“to document, in real-time, what’s happening right now,” Dolce
informed A.D.’s counsel that C.G. was at the San Pedro home
with police and A.D. was “refusing access.” In another email,
sent at 12:09 p.m., Dolce stated that C.G. was “going to access the
property, [A.D.] has been informed he is risking arrest by staying
put, so don’t be surprised if he gets arrested.” In a declaration
related to this incident, A.D. stated that he talked with police and
agreed to take his dog for a walk while the police monitored C.G.
in the home for about three hours. He stated that the police
advised him to seek court orders for protection and exclusive use
of the home. A.D.’s counsel notified C.G.’s counsel that A.D.
would be requesting those orders the following day.
At 11:29 a.m. on November 29, 2022, A.D.’s counsel filed a
request for a DVRO protecting A.D. from C.G. A.D. attached a
declaration describing the above events and asserting that C.G.
was “using her no-notice TRO to continue to frighten and bully"
him, and had caused him “anxiety and sleepless nights and is a
total disruption of my emotional calm.” He asserted that a

9
protective order providing exclusive use and possession of the
San Pedro home was necessary because C.G.’s “representatives
are encouraging her aggressive conduct over police objection.”
After associating into the case on C.G.’s behalf “for
emergency purposes only,” Dolce filed a response opposing A.D.’s
DVRO request. C.G. asserted that A.D. was already subject to a
DVRO and “is trying to use this Court to prevent me from
retrieving personal belongings that Court [sic] in the related case
has already authorized me to retrieve.”
Dolce and A.D.’s counsel exchanged several emails on the
morning of November 30, 2022. The upshot of the discussion was
that Dolce and C.G. would return to the San Pedro home as
planned but would leave immediately if the court issued A.D. a
temporary DVRO.
According to competing declarations C.G. and A.D. filed
later, C.G. and Dolce arrived at the San Pedro home around
12:15 p.m. or 12:30 p.m. A.D. was not home, but his brother was
there. According to A.D., who saw C.G. and Dolce on his doorbell
camera, C.G. “tried the door and said, ‘motherfucker locked it.’”
She and Dolce then “began attempting to remove the screens
from windows” and “eventually entered my home by pushing out
a screen in the window to my laundry room.” According to C.G.,
she “was forced to climb through an unlocked window” because
the doors were locked; she “did not believe she was prohibited
from climbing through windows I own.” She further asserted
that when she was almost done, she and Dolce “went about
tidying each room to return it to an equal or better condition as
we found it.”
At 3:01 p.m., while C.G. and Dolce were at the property, the
trial court denied A.D.’s DVRO request. A.D.’s counsel emailed

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the order to Dolce at 3:10. At 3:33, Dolce responded, “To the
surprise of no one. What a waste.”3 He continued, “I’ll be in
touch on the issues we faced here on-site. [A.D.] decided to
remotely blast his alarm over and over while [C.G.] and I moved
boxes, and his brother was here taking pictures and videos
without our consent. . . . I’ll do a debrief in more detail later, but
the blasting the alarm over and over is definitely a violation of
the TRO.”
The following day, December 1, 2022, A.D. filed a second,
ex parte request for a DVRO against C.G. In an attached
declaration, he asserted that C.G. and Dolce “entered my home
by pushing out a screen in the window to my laundry room,” and
“remov[ed] things from my home for approximately 4 hours,”
including “virtually every item of S[.]’s clothing in my
possession.” He further asserted that C.G. and Dolce “‘trashed’
my home, leaving it in disarray.” A.D. attached photos his
brother took, which he said showed the pushed-in screen in the
laundry room, the “state of disarray that my home was left in on
November 30, 2022,” and Dolce pushing a dolly up his front walk.
The trial court issued A.D. a temporary DVRO later that
afternoon and set the matter for hearing December 21, 2022. The
DVRO required C.G. to refrain from contacting A.D. and to stay
away from A.D. and the San Pedro home, with exceptions for
matters concerning S.
On December 8, 2022, C.G., through Dolce, filed a request
to dissolve or vacate A.D.’s temporary DVRO pursuant to Code of

3 Dolce later apologized to A.D.’s counsel for his “tone at the
beginning of my introduction in this case,” which he attributed to
allowing his “frustration at these bogus TROs to chip at my
professionalism.”

11
Civil Procedure sections 473 and 533. In an accompanying
memorandum of points and authorities, C.G. asserted that A.D.
“misrepresented the facts” and perpetrated a fraud on the court
by falsely claiming that C.G. and Dolce had “trashed” his home.
C.G. asserted that the photographs A.D. included in his DVRO
request “were clandestine photos taken by Petitioner’s brother, . .
. while Respondent [C.G.] was packing,” and that she in fact left
the property “in an equal or better condition . . . at the time she
left it.” C.G. supported this assertion with annotated
photographs that she said depicted the property when she
arrived and when she left. She requested the motion be heard
prior to the hearing on A.D.’s DVRO. That hearing, originally set
for December 21, 2022, was continued.
A.D. filed a written opposition to the motion on February
23, 2023. He argued that he was entitled to a hearing on the
“factual dispute over the state in which Respondent and her
attorney left Petitioner’s property,” and that neither section 473
nor section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided a basis to
vacate the order. C.G. filed a reply in support of the motion the
following day.
E. January 18, 2023 Hearing
The parties next appeared in court on January 18, 2023, for
the continued hearing on C.G.’s DVRO request. Neither C.G. nor
A.D. testified further, and nothing in the record suggests they
presented any evidence regarding C.G.’s late November 2022
move-out.
C.G.’s mother, N.R., testified that she provided C.G. and
A.D. with financial assistance for their car payments. She also
testified about a July 2022 incident in which A.D. was late to pick
up S. and “snagged her out of the restaurant mid-meal.” On

12
cross-examination, N.R. admitted that she had exchanged text
messages with A.D. in which she expressed concern about C.G.’s
mental health and “thanked [A.D.] for being thoughtful and doing
a good job.” Apparently on re-direct examination, N.R. testified
that this earlier impression of A.D. had changed after June and
July 2022.
Walter M., a neighbor who lived near the San Pedro house
but was not identified in C.G.’s DVRO request, testified that on
June 18, 2022, he heard “someone screaming in the alley-way”
and later heard a man yell from the other side of the gate. Walter
M. let C.G. and S. come into his home to wait for the police to
arrive. He said C.G.’s shirt was ripped and S. cried hysterically.
On cross-examination, Walter M. maintained that C.G.’s shirt
was torn.
A.D. called police officer Sherwin Antiporda, who
responded to the June 18, 2022 incident. Antiporda testified that
he did not recall seeing C.G. with a ripped shirt and further
testified that he only saw Silvia, the witness identified in C.G.’s
DVRO request, and not Walter M. at the scene. On cross-
examination, Antiporda testified that C.G. had looked distraught
and appeared to have been crying.
F. Ruling
The settled statement does not summarize the parties’
closing arguments, and they are not included in the limited
reporter’s transcript, which begins with the court taking the
matter under submission. The court made the following oral
ruling:
“I am going to consider it submitted. We can go on forever.
We can go on forever. [sic]

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“So here’s the court’s understanding of the situation, is that
the parties, obviously, are not together. And here is the part –
there is a part of breaking up that is just ugly. Right?
“And so it really comes down to the court – what was really
important to the court is the financial abuse and the whole
snatching of the phone, that I believe the respondent actually did.
“Here is the thing about the financial abuse, though. The
respondent is basically saying, you know, I have to, you know,
budget. I have to start cutting corners. So I couldn’t just let the
financial thing just to [sic] go on. So I could – I can understand
that argument. Not that I support it or believe that it is right,
but it is an argument, I guess, I would accept.
“So it really comes down to me, about the physical violence
between the two. Okay. So when we talk about physical
violence, we have both sides admitting that they were both
physical. And so then it really comes down to, did this happen
over the phone? And, you know, you guys are breaking up. And I
believe that your client snatched the phone out of her hand and
ran with it. So it really comes down to, am I going to issue a
domestic violence restraining order over snatching the phone, in
a relationship that was coming to an end? I don’t feel comfortable
in doing that. Okay.
“I don’t hear, you know, the type of physical violence that I
generally see in domestic violence. Not saying that, you know – I
remember the whole thing that happened with the food. You
know, I – you know, I have some questions about that. But,
generally, what I see here from you guys, are not the typical
abuse that I can really see. And I am not saying that your abuse
isn’t valid and it didn’t occur, it is just that I don’t want to put in
the middle of all this a restraining order. And, you know, I am

14
probably tipping my hand to the other restraining order that is
coming up, but I don’t want to put it in the middle of this, a
restraining order, because I do believe, ultimately, the issue is
custody and the fact that you guys just didn’t work out.
“You seem like a good couple, unfortunately you guys have
everything I believe going for you. I don’t know why you guys
couldn’t figure it out, but it is – you guys didn’t work it out.
“So the court is going to respectfully deny the restraining
order in this case; however, it is really a close call.”
The court issued two minute orders following the January
18 hearing. The first listed the witnesses who testified and
identified the exhibits admitted by reference. It also provided:
“The Court finds the party requesting the order of protection did
not sustain the applicable burden of proof and accordingly the
request is denied. Any temporary restraining order earlier issued
is hereby dissolved. The case is ordered dismissed.” The second
set forth A.D.’s visitation schedule with S. and stated that his
DVRO request was set for hearing on February 28, 2023.
G. Request for Statement of Decision and Motion
to Reconsider
On January 24, 2023, six days after the court denied her
DVRO, C.G. filed a request for a written statement of decision
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632. She requested
explanations of the court’s findings, “with references to the
evidence admitted and witness testimony,” as well as “an
explanation of the Court’s credibility determination as to each
party and their witnesses.” The court did not issue a statement
of decision.
On January 27, 2023, C.G. filed a motion to reconsider the
order denying her DVRO. She asserted that “new or different

15
facts justify the Court’s attention,” namely that A.D. “violated the
terms of [C.G.]’s TRO” by obstructing her access to the San Pedro
property from November 28 to 30, 2022, blasting his security
alarm, and having his brother take photographs while she was
there. She further alleged that A.D. “used fabricated evidence to
persuade the Court to grant [A.D.’s] no-notice TRO that,
inexplicably, the Court chose to resolve after resolution of [C.G.]’s
Petition.” Though these events all occurred prior to the January
18, 2023 hearing date on C.G.’s DVRO request, they were not
raised at that hearing. C.G. asserted in a declaration that she
“effectively shut-down from believing I had any chance at
changing the Court’s mind for purposes of the final day of
trial. . . .” The court did not immediately rule on the motion.
C.G. filed a notice of appeal from the order denying her
DVRO on April 25, 2023.
III. Disqualification Proceedings
A. Motion to Disqualify
On February 3, 2023, A.D. moved to disqualify Dolce from
representing C.G. under the advocate-witness rule, California
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.7. He also sought $15,000
in sanctions under Family Code section 271. A.D. argued that
several statements in C.G.’s motion to vacate his DVRO
demonstrated “uncertainty as to whether the attorney is
testifying as a witness or advocating as an attorney,” largely due
to Dolce’s presence at the San Pedro property during C.G.’s move-
out in late-November 2022. A.D. further argued that the three
considerations for disqualification set forth in Doe v. Yim (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 573 (Doe) all weighed in his favor: Dolce made
himself an essential witness by participating in the move-out and
was also a collateral witness for child custody issues given his

16
relationship with C.G., and there could be no tactical strategy or
prejudice to C.G. because she still had other counsel and Dolce
indicated from the outset that his involvement in the case was
only temporary. A.D. argued that sanctions were warranted
because Dolce “engaged in uncivil, unprofessional, and vexatious
conduct which has strained this case since his arrival.”
B. Opposition
C.G., through Dolce, filed an opposition to the motion on
February 21, 2023. She asserted that the motion was “nothing
more than an extension of abuse” “premised on various
misrepresentations, an unadjudicated request for a restraining
order, and faux attorney-outrage that [C.G.] exercised her rights
under the California Code of Civil Procedure.” On the merits, she
argued that disqualification was unnecessary under the advocate-
witness rule because the facts for which Dolce was a percipient
witness “are either uncontested or were set forth by [C.G.]
herself.” C.G. argued that Dolce’s statements challenged by A.D.
were “factual recitals set forth by [C.G.] for purposes of legal
argument,” and that A.D. had waived any right to call Dolce as a
witness by failing to oppose C.G.’s motions to vacate his
temporary DVRO and reconsider the denial of her own DVRO
and or subpoena Dolce as his own witness. A.D. subsequently
filed an opposition to the motion to vacate.
C.G. further argued that A.D. filed his motion for tactical
purposes only, primarily to “make [C.G.] and her attorney look
bad by being in a relationship” and “make Dolce look to be
‘egregiously unprofessional.’” C.G. asserted that A.D. had the
additional tactical aim of “lessen[ing] the blow for how culpable
he looks having committed perjury in receiving his TRO, and how
terrible it would be if the Court were to reconsider the petition for

17
a DVRO against him based on the undeniable evidence he
violated the TRO that was in place against him.” C.G. further
argued that she would be prejudiced if Dolce were removed
because she is indigent and he was representing her pro bono.
C.G. contended that sanctions were unwarranted, characterizing
the request as “an astoundingly poor waste of judicial resources
and attorney time.”
In an attached declaration, Dolce stated that his
relationship with C.G. “began in a non-legal context in early
September of 2022,” and became exclusive in early November
2022. He further stated that he “never intended on getting
involved in this case” and reviewed the Rules of Professional
Conduct prior to doing so. He additionally stated that he had
previously represented his “then-wife” in a case in New York
without incident. Specifically, he asserted that the judge in that
case denied the only disqualification motion to which Dolce had
ever been subjected. Dolce acknowledged that he “expressed
sarcasm” about A.D.’s DVRO request because it was “such a
colossal waste of resources I was shocked any attorney would
pursue it,” but stated that he subsequently apologized—and still
saw “no way” that A.D. was “going to overcome his presentation
of false evidence.”
C. Reply
In reply, A.D. disputed Dolce’s assertion that he had never
been disqualified before. He contended that public pleadings
from a court in New York, which he attached, showed that Dolce
in fact was “disqualified from representing his wife, Irene, in a
family court case in which her ex-boyfriend, Jeffrey, obtained a
restraining order against Irene after Irene demanded entry to
Jeffrey’s apartment to retrieve belongings.” A.D. also reiterated

18
his arguments that Dolce should be disqualified under California
case law interpreting the advocate-witness rule.
Dolce subsequently filed a notice of errata acknowledging
the previous disqualification and “apologiz[ing] for the oversight.”
He also filed an amended declaration.
D. February 28, 2023 Hearing and Ruling
On February 28, 2023, Dolce, A.D., and A.D.’s counsel
appeared for a hearing. No court reporter was present, nor were
C.G. or her retained counsel. On its own motion, the court
continued C.G.’s motion to reconsider the denial of her DVRO and
her motion to vacate A.D.’s temporary DVRO, though it noted
both were “to be heard before [A.D.’s] Restraining Order,” which
it also continued. According to the settled statement, the court
“declined to consider” Dolce’s request that the court “hear the
Motion to Vacate/Dissolve the TRO before it issued a
disqualification order, rendering disqualification a moot point.”
According to the minute order concerning the
disqualification motion, A.D. was sworn and the matter was
argued. “Having read the moving papers and heard all
argument,” the court granted the disqualification request but
denied the request for Family Code section 271 sanctions.
According to Dolce’s declaration filed with the settled
statement, the court inquired whether Dolce was in a
relationship with C.G. on November 30, 2022, and he responded
yes. Dolce and A.D.’s counsel then argued about whether
disqualification was appropriate. During that argument, Dolce
noted that C.G. would not be calling Dolce as a witness. The court
asked A.D.’s counsel if she would be calling Dolce, and she
answered, “100%.” A.D.’s counsel then questioned Dolce’s
competency and personal feelings toward A.D., and asserted that

19
his involvement in the case had caused A.D.’s fees and costs to
“skyrocket.” Dolce took umbrage at the allegation of
incompetency and asserted that he had no issues with A.D., “but
could not abide fraud on the Family Court, and that all the
litigation subsequent to November 30, 2022 went back to [A.D.’s]
actions above all else.” Dolce asserted that A.D. was “using
disqualification to draw attention away from his prior fraud
(relating to the TRO he had received),” but did not “recall much
discussion as to that.” Dolce also did not recall much discussion
about his assertion that he was offering his services pro bono due
to C.G.’s financial status.
According to Dolce, the court stated that it “wouldn’t ‘have
ordinarily disqualified Mr. Dolce,” but decided to do so because he
was “‘on-site’ on the day in question” and therefore “‘probably’
was a material witness.” The court noted that C.G. could seek
reconsideration of the ruling through her other counsel.
C.G timely appealed the order. After a March 15, 2023
hearing, the trial court stayed all proceedings in which Dolce was
involved pending appeal of the disqualification order, including
the motions to vacate A.D.’s temporary DVRO and reconsider the
ruling denying C.G.’s DVRO.
DISCUSSION
I. DVRO
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) is intended
“to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse
and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the
domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons
to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (Fam. Code,

20
§ 6220.) To effect this purpose, trial courts “may” issue a
restraining order upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) “No showing of the
probability of future abuse is required.” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 823 (Rodriguez).)
The DVPA defines abuse broadly. It “is not limited to the
actual infliction of physical injury or assault” (Fam. Code, § 6203,
subd. (b)), and may include behaviors such as “molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting,
battering, . . . harassing, telephoning, … destroying personal
property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the
peace of the other party.” (Fam. Code, §§ 6203, 6320, subd. (a).)
“Disturbing the peace of the other party” means “conduct that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party,” whether accomplished
directly or indirectly, including the exercise of coercive control.
(Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c).)
The “Legislature intended that the DVPA be broadly
construed in order to accomplish the purpose of the DVPA.” (In
re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498.)
The trial court is thus “‘entrusted with authority to issue
necessary orders suited to individual circumstances, with
adequate assurances that both sides of the dispute will have an
opportunity to be heard before the court.’” (Ibid.) The permissive
“may” in the DVPA gives the trial court “broad discretion in
determining whether to grant a petition for a restraining order
under this statutory scheme.” (In re Marriage of Fregoso and
Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
“Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a restraining order under the DVPA for an abuse of
discretion.” (Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 592.)

21
Whether the court applied the correct legal standard while
exercising its discretion is a question of law that we review de
novo. (Id. at pp. 592-593.) To the extent we are called upon to
review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).) Under that standard, “we examine
the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial
evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial
court’s findings.” (Ibid.) “We do not determine credibility or
reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence
supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts
exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Ibid.)
The party seeking a restraining order bears the burden of
proving the circumstances justifying the order by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 11; Jan F. v. Natalie F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.) If
the trial court expressly or impliedly concluded the party did not
meet that burden, “‘“it is misleading to characterize the failure-
of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the
judgment. . . . [Instead] the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. . . .” [Citation.]’” (Jan F. v. Natalie
F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.)
B. Analysis
C.G. contends that the trial court applied incorrect legal
standards when ruling on her DVRO request. Specifically, she
asserts it “did not reference the totality of the circumstances,” did
not make credibility findings, improperly relied on its “own
experience” to conclude the situation was atypical of abuse, did
not “address C.G.’s point that it was because of the abuse she
finally decided to leave,” and “seemed persuaded that the parties

22
breaking-up was sufficient to avoid C.G.’s need for a restraining
order.” We are not persuaded.
While its oral ruling was ineloquent, the trial court plainly
considered the totality of the circumstances when making its
ruling. It referenced multiple instances of alleged physical abuse,
the nature and severity of that alleged abuse, alleged financial
abuse, the parties’ breakup, and their ongoing dispute over
custody of S. This constellation of facts constitutes the totality of
the circumstances here.4 C.G. has not pointed to, and we have
not located, any authority holding that a court must use the
phrase “totality of the circumstances” or any other specific
wording to demonstrate consideration thereof. Likewise,
credibility findings need not be explicitly characterized as such.
The court’s finding that A.D. “actually did” the “snatching of the
phone” implies it found C.G. credible on that point despite
inconsistencies in the evidence. Indeed, it acknowledged that it
was “not saying that your abuse isn’t valid and it didn’t occur.”
Likewise, the court’s acceptance of A.D.’s testimony about the
alleged financial abuse implies it found A.D. credible on that
issue. The absence of express findings regarding the earlier,
more serious allegations of physical abuse, which C.G. raised for
the first time during the hearing, suggests that the court
impliedly found those allegations not credible. We do not revisit
these findings on appeal.
C.G. does not explain how the court’s conclusion that the
circumstances here were “not the typical abuse that I can really

4 Although C.G. alleged in her DVRO application that A.D.
harassed her and disturbed her peace through text messages
after the June 18, 2022 incident, the settled statement does not
indicate that she testified about those messages at the hearing.
The text messages she introduced into evidence were from 2021.

23
see” was an improper exercise of its discretion. Because the
“DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes between former
couples,” and a restraining order need not “issue based on any act
that upsets the petitioning party,” a trial court necessarily must
consider the nature and extent of the alleged abuse when
exercising its discretion. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.)
For instance, in Curcio, the petitioner sought a DVRO primarily
on the basis of a single Facebook post. In concluding that the post
did not “rise to the level of destruction of Curcio’s mental and
emotional calm, sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic
violence restraining order,” the Court of Appeal contrasted the
case with others involving more severe conduct, including In re
Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 and In re
Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416.
(Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 12-13.) The need to decide
each case on its own facts does not require the trial court to act in
a vacuum. Nor does it require the court to expressly address
each point made by the parties.
C.G. points to Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 816 and
In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106 (F.M.)
to support her argument that the court erred by finding the
parties’ breakup negated the need for a restraining order. These
authorities are distinguishable. In Rodriguez, the trial court
improperly relied on “the absence of actual violence in the six
month period leading up to the hearing, as well as the conclusion
that respondent had left the area.” (Rodriguez, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) The court in F.M. similarly “relied on the
fact that [the petitioner] no longer lives with father as a basis for
denying her DVRO request,” and “repeatedly stated on the record
that mother’s protection from abuse could be accomplished
simply by having her and parties’ six children move out of the
house.” (F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 119-120.)

24
Here, the court referenced the parties’ breakup as the
backdrop for the primary incident of alleged abuse—“you know,
you guys are breaking up,” “there is a part of breaking up that
just is ugly,” and “am I going to issue a domestic violence
restraining order over snatching the phone, in a relationship that
was coming to an end?” It did not deny the DVRO based on the
lack of an ongoing relationship between the parties, or conclude
that “residential separation [w]as a substitute for a DVRO.”
(F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) Instead, the court
concluded that “both sides admitt[ed] that they were both
physical” and that A.D.’s grabbing of the phone during the
parties’ breakup was not sufficiently severe to warrant a DVRO.
The evidence does not compel a contrary finding as a matter of
law.
C.G. additionally asserts that the court erred because it
“failed to consider the possibility A.D. had committed post-filing
abuse when he sought his own TRO against C.G.” While we
agree that “[e]vidence of recent abuse or violation of a TRO is
plainly relevant to whether a petitioner should be granted a
protective order” (F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117), the
record reflects that C.G. did not bring any such evidence to the
court’s attention during the DVRO proceedings. The most recent
instance of abuse addressed at the hearing was the alleged July
2022 incident mentioned by C.G.’s mother. The alleged DVRO
violations at issue occurred on November 30 and December 1,
2022, well before the January 18, 2023 hearing. Yet C.G. did not
present any evidence or argument on this issue to the court until
she filed her motion for reconsideration more than a week after
the court’s ruling. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or

25
deny C.G. a fair hearing by failing to consider evidence she did
not timely present.5
For all these reasons, C.G. has not shown the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her request for a DVRO.
II. Disqualification
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives
from its inherent power, codified at Code of Civil Procedure
section 128, subdivision (a)(5), to control the conduct of its
ministerial officers and of all other persons connected with its
proceedings in furtherance of justice.” (Doe, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 581.) The court may disqualify an attorney “as
a prophylactic measure against a prospective ethical violation
likely to have a substantial continuing impact on future
proceedings.” (Ibid.) However, the mere appearance of
impropriety alone is insufficient to support disqualification. (In
re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843.)
The prospective ethical violation at issue here was violation
of the “advocate-witness rule,” which “prohibits an attorney from
acting both as an advocate and a witness in the same
proceeding.” (Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197,
1208.) The advocate-witness rule is codified in California Rules
of Professional Conduct, rule 3.7, which provides in relevant part:
“A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s
testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the
lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained

5 We address C.G.’s related argument about the court’s
continuation of the hearing on her motion for reconsideration in
connection with her bias claim, post.

26
informed written consent from the client.” (Cal. Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 3.7, fn. omitted.)
Even if the client provides informed written consent, the
trial court retains discretion to disqualify “a lawyer who seeks to
both testify and serve as an advocate, to protect the trier of fact
from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.”6
(Id., com. 3, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d
470.) Thus, the court may “disqualify a likely advocate-witness
as counsel, notwithstanding client consent, where there is ‘a
convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury
to the integrity of the judicial process.’” (Doe, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 582.) Although the text of rule 3.7 refers
expressly to “a trial,” the rule has been interpreted broadly to
“encompass a pretrial evidentiary hearing at which counsel is
likely to testify.” (Id. at p. 583.) “The paramount concern must
be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of
justice and the integrity of the bar. The important right to
counsel of one’s choice must yield to ethical considerations that
affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.” (People
ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.)
“In exercising its discretion to disqualify counsel under the
advocate-witness rule, a court must consider: (1) ‘“‘whether
counsel’s testimony is, in fact, genuinely needed’”’; (2) ‘the
possibility [opposing] counsel is using the motion for purely
tactical reasons’; and (3) ‘the combined effects of the strong

6 C.G. suggests that the trial court failed to consider her
informed written consent. However, she does not provide any
record citation in support of this suggestion, and our review of
the record did not reveal any evidence of informed written
consent.

27
interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice,
and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort
involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case.’”
(Doe, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) “‘[T]rial judges must
indicate on the record they have considered the appropriate
factors and make specific findings of fact when weighing the
conflicting interests involved in recusal motions.’” (Id. at p. 584.)
We review the court’s ruling on a disqualification motion
for abuse of discretion. (Doe, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 581.)
“Under this standard, the trial court’s legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo, but its factual findings are reviewed only for
the existence of substantial evidence supporting them, and its
‘“application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.”’ (Id. at p. 581.) “The court’s exercise of
discretion must be affirmed on appeal if there is any fairly
debatable justification for it under the law.” (Id. at p. 584.) This
court may not “substitute its judgment for the trial court’s
express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence.”
(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change
Systems, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1143.)
B. Analysis
C.G. contends the trial court abused its discretion because
it found only that Dolce “probably” would be called as a witness,
“as to matters that were mostly undisputed.” She further
contends the court erred by failing to make findings regarding
confusion to the factfinder, C.G.’s indigency and interest in
having Dolce represent her pro bono, and A.D.’s tactical reasons
for seeking disqualification. We conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.7

7 We reject A.D.’s contention that C.G. failed to preserve the
issue for appeal.

28
Under the advocate-witness rule, an attorney “shall not act
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
witness unless” one of three criteria is satisfied. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.7.) The only criterion argued here and in the trial
court is that Dolce’s testimony “relates to an uncontested issue or
matter.” (Ibid.) This criterion is not satisfied here. Although
C.G. asserts that any potential testimony from Dolce would
pertain only to “matters that were mostly undisputed,” this
assertion is belied by the record. While it is undisputed that
Dolce was involved in and physically present during C.G.’s move-
out in late November 2022, the parties’ agreement ends there.
They dispute virtually everything else about the incident.
Indeed, C.G. repeatedly argued to the trial court that A.D.’s
version of events and supporting evidence was fraudulent. C.G.
now asserts that any factual dispute is wholly “resolvable with
photographs and videos,” and suggests testimonial evidence
therefore would no longer be relevant within the meaning of
Evidence Code section 210. We reject this assertion. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination.” (Evid.
Code, § 210.) Dolce’s testimony remains relevant under this
standard. Moreover, A.D. may rely on the evidence of his choice
to meet his burden of proof, and his counsel said she “100%”
planned to call Dolce as a witness during the hearing on A.D.’s
DVRO.
Even if we were to assume Dolce’s testimony related to an
uncontested matter, we are still not persuaded the trial court
abused its discretion. According to the settled statement, the
court found that Dolce was “probably” a percipient or material
witness to the proceedings. C.G. argues—in her reply brief—that
even if this finding is correct, it does not satisfy the requirement
that the testimony be “genuinely needed.” “We generally do not

29
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”8
(Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178.)
But even if we did, we would reject it. “In determining the
necessity of counsel’s testimony, the court should consider ‘the
significance of the matters to which he might testify, the weight
his testimony might have in resolving such matters, and the
availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence by which
those matters may be independently established.’” (Smith, Smith
& Kring v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 581.) Here,
although the parties had competing photographic and video
evidence of the move-out, the testimony of a percipient witness
would still carry great weight, and both A.D.’s compliance with
C.G.’s temporary DVRO and his entitlement to his own DVRO
were at issue. So too was the inflammatory claim by C.G. that
A.D. was perpetrating a fraud on the court.
C.G. also contends the court did not consider or make
findings related to her indigency. She points to Lopez v. Lopez
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412, 427, which found error where a court
granted a disqualification motion but “failed to demonstrate that
it had properly considered appellant’s heightened interest in
remaining represented by Boone, who had gained mastery over
the case by litigating it for over four years, and who was
providing his services pro bono or at a discounted rate.” Here,
the settled statement reflects that Dolce brought C.G.’s financial
situation to the attention of the trial court, both during the
hearing and “in the written materials the Family Court would

8 We also decline to consider C.G.’s argument that A.D. filed
the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons, which she
develops in her reply brief after asserting in the opening brief
only that “A.D. plainly sought disqualification for tactical
reasons.”

30
have reviewed.” We presume the trial court considered this
factor, particularly in light of its comments that it ordinarily
would not have disqualified Dolce. (See Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) While it
would have been preferable for the court to have made more
explicit findings, we cannot conclude on the limited record that
its ruling is arbitrary and capricious or not fairly debatable.
III. Judicial Bias
C.G. contends the trial court’s “bias against C.G. has
tainted the entire proceeding between her and A.D. and that bias
amounts to structural error requiring automatic reversal of the
orders appealed.” We disagree.
A. Additional Background
In addition to the adverse rulings challenged here, C.G.
contends that various procedural rulings and irregularities
demonstrate Judge Neal’s bias against her. We briefly
summarize those rulings and irregularities here, in roughly
chronological order.
As noted above, the trial court granted A.D.’s request for a
temporary DVRO. C.G. moved to vacate that order on the ground
that A.D. misrepresented facts and perpetrated a fraud upon the
court. The court continued the hearing on the motion to vacate.
It advanced the hearing on the disqualification motion, granted
that motion, and then stayed ruling on the motion to reconsider
in light of Dolce’s disqualification. Thus, it heard the
disqualification motion prior to the motion to vacate, even though
the latter was filed first.
As also noted above, C.G. requested a statement of decision
approximately one week after the court denied her DVRO. The
court did not provide one. The court also continued the hearing
on C.G.’s motion to reconsider the denial of her request for
DVRO, and later stayed the motion due to the pending appeal of

31
Dolce’s disqualification. During a hearing on March 15, 2023,
when the parties discussed how to proceed in light of the pending
appeals, the court at one point told Dolce that it “didn’t want to
explain” why it stayed the proceedings on motions where Dolce
was counsel.
On March 27, 2023, after staying the bulk of the
proceedings due to the appeal of Dolce’s disqualification, the
court proceeded with issues relating to custody of S., for which
C.G.’s other counsel made a limited scope appearance. At that
hearing, the court appointed counsel for S. and ordered that
counsel to “(1) assess the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
well-being in the parties [sic] respective households; (2) find out
child’s preferences regarding custody and visitation; and (3)
assess whether either parent can benefit from therapy or some
other type of service.”
After C.G. filed her notices of appeal, she completed forms
indicating her intention to proceed with settled statements in lieu
of reporter’s transcripts in both appeals. She filed proposed
settled statements with the trial court on June 20, 2023. For
reasons unclear from the record, the trial court did not take
action on the settled statements. C.G. filed documents calling the
omission to the trial court’s attention on October 23, 2023. Later
that day, the trial court filed an order requesting that C.G. make
changes to the proposed settled statement concerning the DVRO
order. Specifically, it ordered her to add: “(a) When counsel for
[C.G.] made her request for a statement of decision, counsel failed
to specify the principle [sic] controverted issues. Moreover, at the
time of the request, the Court ordered [C.G.]’s counsel to prepare
a proposed statement of decision, which counsel failed to comply
with the Court’s order. (b) When the Court denied
[C.G.’s]permanent restraining order, the Court stated that [C.G.]
did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that [A.D.’s]

32
conduct, as detailed at the hearing and in the evidence
submitted, constitutes abuse as defined in Family Codes
6203&6320. (c) When the court denied [C.G.]’s permanent
restraining order, the court stated that it could not ascertain
which party, if any, was telling the truth about the material facts
in order for this Court to make a determination of whether the
burden was met by [C.G.], and therefore [C.G.] did not meet the
burden to prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence.”
For reasons unclear from the record, the court’s October 23,
2023 order was not served on the parties or entered into the
court’s online docket. After C.G. alerted the trial court, the order
appeared on the docket “[a]t some point between February 1,
2024 to April 16, 2024.”
C.G. made the proposed changes to the settled statement,
but objected to them as contrary to the contents of the limited
reporter’s transcript from the January 18, 2023 hearing. The
trial court ultimately certified the settled statements, as C.G.
originally submitted them, on April 18, 2024, the day after C.G.
filed a motion to disqualify Judge Neal under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.1 due to his alleged bias. A different judge
denied the judicial disqualification motion as moot on May 15,
2024. C.G. asserts in her brief that the reason for this ruling was
that Judge Neal had been reassigned to a different courthouse.
B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“In the criminal and habeas corpus contexts, the federal
courts have often expressed the rule that structural error occurs
when there is a constitutionally intolerable risk or probability of
judicial bias.” (Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 186, 200 (Knudsen).) State courts also have
held, in a civil context, that “the remedy for a hearing conducted
without a neutral adjudicator (due to overlapping roles of
adjudicator and advocate) was a new hearing conducted by a new

33
officer. . . .” (Id. at p. 201, discussing Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v.
City of Beverly Hills (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81.) Knudsen
specifically rejected the notion that “the absence of an impartial
adjudicator [w]as anything other than a structural error.”
(Knudsen, supra, at p. 204.) The Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion in People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554,
observing “it would be impossible to divine how a trial would
have proceeded if a defendant had been allowed counsel or the
trial judge had not been biased.” (See also ibid. [“reversal for
structural error has been limited to instances such as
adjudication by a biased judge”].)
“In the civil context, structural error typically occurs when
the trial court violates a party’s right to due process by denying
the party a fair hearing.” (Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013)
218 Cal.Appp.4th 514, 534.) Legal errors such as the application
of an incorrect standard of proof generally are not considered
structural error that requires automatic reversal. (Id. at p. 535;
see also Garcia v. Estate of Norton (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 413,
423 [“Errors of law standing alone do not constitute bias or
prejudice for purposes of disqualification of a trial judge.”].)
“Instead, the reported cases have analyzed the error under the
Watson standard and required a showing it was reasonably
probable the appellant would have achieved a more favorable
result” absent the error. (Conservatorship of Maria B., supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)
“‘Bias or prejudice consists of a “mental attitude or
disposition of the judge towards [or against] a party to the
litigation. . . .””’ (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724, alterations in original.)
“When reviewing a charge of bias, ‘. . . the litigants’ necessarily
partisan views should not provide the applicable frame of
reference.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “Potential bias must be clearly

34
established.” (Ibid.) In the context of Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.1, a judge may be disqualified where “[a] person
aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the
judge would be able to be impartial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1,
subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).) Similarly, in the arbitration context, an
arbitration award may be vacated where “‘the average person
could well entertain doubt whether the [adjudicator] was
impartial.’” (Roitz, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 723.) “‘[A]ppellate
courts are not required to speculate whether the bias was actual
or merely apparent, or whether the result would have been the
same if the evidence had been impartially considered and the
matter dispassionately decided [citation], but should reverse the
judgment and remand the matter to a different [adjudicator] for a
new [hearing] on all issues. [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
C.G. contends that “if this Court works backwards” through
the rulings and procedural issues summarized above, “it becomes
evident the Family Court showcased bias against C.G. such that
the entire proceeding was tainted.” We are not persuaded.
Several of the events C.G. cites are legal issues subject to
review in this appeal, including the findings made in connection
with the disqualification order. Others, such as the appointment
of counsel for S., in no way evince bias. C.G. makes much of the
trial court’s failure to issue a statement of decision,9 but even if
we assume her request was timely made under Code of Civil

9 At oral argument, her counsel also contended that the court
inaccurately characterized her request for statement of decision
as lacking specification as to the principal issues. While C.G.
noted the court’s remarks in the facts section of her opening brief,
she did not identify them as evidence of bias in her argument
section.

35
Procedure section 632, any error in that regard is subject to
harmless error review. (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099,
1102.) C.G. has made no effort to show how the absence of a
statement of decision has caused her prejudice. She likewise
ignores the full context of the court’s refusal to explain why it
was staying certain orders, which was made at the conclusion of a
hearing at which the court previously engaged in colloquy with
Dolce and offered several explanations for the stay.
During oral argument, counsel for C.G. focused on the
procedural irregularities surrounding the settled statements,
primarily the court’s request for changes and delay in certifying
the statements. While these procedural irregularities are
concerning, they do not demonstrate bias. There is no indication
that the delay in certifying the statements and properly filing
them was anything more than an oversight or ministerial error.
The court’s requested changes, which ultimately were not
incorporated into the settled statements before us, were generally
in accord with the minute order prepared contemporaneously
with the DVRO hearing, in which the court stated that C.G. “did
not sustain the applicable burden of proof.” To the extent they
were not, C.G. has not carried her burden of demonstrating
structural error. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608-609.) The procedural irregularities do not establish that “the
Family Court was trying to tilt C.G.’s appeal against her.”
After carefully reviewing the entire record, we are not
persuaded that a person aware of the facts might reasonably
entertain a doubt about the court’s impartiality. We accordingly
reject C.G.’s claim of structural error due to judicial bias.

36
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own
costs of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

DAUM, J.*

_______________________
*Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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