CourtListener 10363616•Pointe Assets v. Viracon CA2/7
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Filed 3/25/25 Pointe Assets v. Viracon CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
POINTE ASSETS, LLC, B330587
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. EC067583)
v.
VIRACON, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ralph C. Hofer, Judge. Affirmed.
Fox Rothschild, Eric J. Nystrom, John J. Shaeffer, John C.
Ekman, Natalie I. Uhlemann; Winthrop & Weinstine and
Thomas H. Boyd, pro hac vice, for Defendant and Appellant.
Hennigh Law Corporation, Scott E. Hennigh, Mathew R.
Troughton, and Garrett M. Mott for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Viracon, Inc., a subcontractor that supplied defective
windows for a commercial office building, appeals from a
judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Pointe
Assets, LLC, the assignee of the legal claims relating to the faulty
windows. Viracon contends that Pointe Assets sustained no
injury or damages because other companies covered the cost of
the repairs of the windows. From this, Viracon concludes Pointe
Assets lacked standing, and Viracon contends the superior court
therefore had no jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award or
do anything other than dismiss the case.
These arguments are off-base. The company that assigned
its legal claims to Pointe Assets, Catalina Media Development,
LLC (Catalina Media), owned the office building at the time
Viracon supplied the defective windows. Catalina Media thus
suffered an injury that gave it standing to bring claims against
Viracon. Pointe Assets, as Catalina Media’s assignee, “stands in
the shoes” of Catalina Media, assuming its rights and remedies
with respect to the defective windows. The fact that other
entities funded the repairs of the windows does not erase the
injury. Viracon may have had an argument in the arbitration
that Catalina Media and Pointe Assets failed to establish
damages because other companies paid to replace the windows,
but that argument does not raise any standing or jurisdictional
issues. Further, Viracon has not identified any grounds under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.21 authorizing us to vacate
the award. We therefore affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Pointe Office Building
In early 2006, Catalina Media contracted with Krismar
Construction Co. (Krismar) to build a commercial office building,
The Pointe, which Catalina Media would own. The building’s
design incorporated a glass curtain wall system, which formed
the building’s entire exterior. Krismar contracted with Benson
Industries, Inc. (Benson) to supply and install the system, which
was made up of double-paned, “insulating glass units” that acted
as both wall and window.2 The subcontract expressly made
Catalina Media a third-party beneficiary. Benson contracted
with Viracon to design and supply over 4,400 windows for the
project. The Pointe was completed in April 2009.
In April 2016, a tenant notified The Pointe’s property
manager about a dirty window. Catalina Media discovered there
was a film that could not be cleaned within the hermetically
sealed space between the panes of glass. Catalina Media
reported the issue to Benson, which contacted Viracon. After
inspecting the windows, Viracon denied that the issue was
covered by its warranty and offered to replace some, but not all,
of the windows. Catalina Media countered that every window
was defective and requested Viracon replace them all, but
Viracon refused.
2 For readability, we refer to the insulating glass units as
windows.
3
B. Sale of the Membership Interest in Catalina Media and
Catalina Media’s Assignment of Claims for Defective
Windows to Pointe Assets
After the discovery of the defective windows, CMD Media
Development Investment I, LLC (CMD Investment I), the sole
member of Catalina Media, entered into a Membership Interests
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Sale Agreement) to sell its
membership interests in Catalina Media for $350 million.
The buyer wanted no involvement with the project of
replacing the defective windows. The Sale Agreement provided
that CMD Investment I along with another entity that “indirectly
owned” Catalina Media, Catalina Media Partners, LLC (CMP),
would be responsible for the costs associated with the window
remediation.
Two sections of the Sale Agreement are relevant. The first
is a “Window Replacement Holdback” provision that required
CMD Investment I and CMP collectively to contribute $18 million
to an escrow account to provide funding for repairs of the
defective windows. CMD Investment I and CMP “acknowledge[d]
and agree[d]” that the buyer “shall cause [Catalina Media] to
replace/and or repair the windows on the Building.” The three
parties further “acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that the Window
Remediation Holdback [was] intended to give Buyer assurance
that sufficient funds [were] available to achieve the Window
Remediation Completion, but that same shall not be a limitation
on [CMD Investment I’s] or CMP’s obligation to absolutely and
irrevocably, relieve Buyer . . . from any liability or obligation in
connection with the replacement of the windows.” The Sale
Agreement conditioned the closing of the deal on CMD
Investment I and CMP funding the escrow account.
4
A second section titled “Retained Claims” specified that
Pointe Assets, as the “Warranty Assignee,” “shall have all right,
title and interest in and to, and is exclusively entitled at all times
. . . to all actions, claims, [and] causes of action” with respect to
The Pointe’s defective windows.3 It further stated that any
damages “shall be the exclusive property of” Pointe Assets. The
agreement provided CMD Investment I “shall cause [Catalina
Media] to assign the [retained claims regarding the windows] to
[Pointe Assets] pursuant to that certain Assignment of Retained
Claims and Warranty Proceeds substantially in the form of
Exhibit ‘Q.’ ” Exhibit Q to the Sale Agreement was the
“Assignment and Assumption of Warranties, Claims and Related
Proceeds,” in which Catalina Media assigned to Pointe Assets all
legal claims, remedies, and proceeds regarding The Pointe’s
defective windows.
The window replacement ultimately cost $13,682,840,
which was paid out of the escrow account funded by CMD
Investment I and CMP.
C. Pointe Assets’ Lawsuit and the Arbitration Proceedings
In November 2017 Pointe Assets filed suit against Viracon
and Benson, among others, alleging breach of express and
implied warranty, negligence, strict products liability, breach of
third-party beneficiary contract, and concealment. In December
2017 Benson moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration
3 The arbitration panel found Pointe Assets was the
successor in interest to Catalina Media, which changed its name
to Pointe Assets sometime around the time the Sale Agreement
was executed.
5
provision in its subcontracting agreement with Krismar, which
identified Catalina Media as a third-party beneficiary entitled to
enforce the provisions of the agreement.4 Viracon joined the
motion to compel arbitration.
In June 2018 Pointe Assets dismissed Benson from the
case, and the superior court denied the motion to compel
arbitration as moot, without prejudice to Viracon filing a renewed
motion. In July 2018, Viracon again moved to compel arbitration.
Over Pointe Assets’ objection, the court granted Viracon’s motion.
The case initially proceeded to arbitration, but in May 2020
the arbitrator ruled that Pointe Assets’ claims were not
arbitrable. In December 2020 the superior court granted
Viracon’s motion to vacate that ruling and again ordered the case
to arbitration. Pointe Assets produced the Sale Agreement to
Viracon in August 2021.
The 14-day arbitration began in January 2022. The
hearing, which took place before a three-arbitrator panel,
involved 15 live witnesses and nearly 500 exhibits. After the
parties submitted over 2,000 pages of post-hearing briefing, in
December 2022, the arbitration panel issued a 118-page award in
Pointe Assets’ favor. The panel determined that Viracon
breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
and fraudulently concealed known defects. The panel awarded
compensatory damages based on “the cost to remove and replace
the defective [windows] plus the directly related costs such as
supervision and other administrative costs.” The damages award
totaled $20,018,729.63, including $4 million in punitive damages.
4 “A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third
person, may be enforced by him.” (Civ. Code, § 1559.)
6
D. The Confirmation of the Arbitration Award
Pointe Assets petitioned the superior court to confirm the
arbitration award. In opposition, Viracon contended the Sale
Agreement revealed that CMD Investment I and CMP, not
Catalina Media, funded the window replacement. Viracon
contended that, as a result, Pointe Assets, as Catalina Media’s
assignee, suffered no injury and lacked standing, and therefore
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
In April 2023 the court confirmed the award. Noting the
limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, the court
concluded that Viracon’s “argument that none of the damages
awarded were incurred by or transferred by the assignor
[Catalina Media] does not appear to be a matter upon which this
court can find that the arbitration panel acted in excess of its
authority, or otherwise engaged in conduct which would justify
vacating the award.”
The court determined the arbitration panel had found the
injury had been incurred by “the assignor” Catalina Media and
“assigned to the assignee” Pointe Assets. The court noted the
panel’s observation that as part of the sale of The Pointe to the
buyer, “ ‘ownership of any claims with respect to the allegedly
defective [windows] was assigned to another new entity, Pointe
Assets.’ ” The court then stated, “There have been no facts which
have developed since this finding which would somehow change
the jurisdictional posture since that time or [Pointe Assets’]
standing or justify this court in finding it now lacks jurisdiction.”
The court further stated the assignment of claims to Pointe
Assets “appears valid on its face, and the arbitration panel made
findings in its Final Award, at least twice, that the Assignment
7
was valid, covered the claims at issue, and conferred standing on
the assignee, the arbitration claimant, to pursue those claims.”
The court entered judgment in favor of Pointe Assets in April
2023, and Viracon timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“California law favors alternative dispute resolution as a
viable means of resolving legal conflicts. ‘Because the decision to
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties’ intent to bypass the
judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and
appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the
parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration.’ ” (Richey v.
AutoNation Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916.) “ ‘The scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.’ ” (E-
Commerce Lighting, Inc. v. E-Commerce Trade LLC (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 58, 63.) The California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et
seq.) provides “only limited grounds for judicial review of an
arbitration award”; under the statute, “courts are authorized to
vacate an award if it was (1) procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; (2) issued by corrupt arbitrators; (3) affected by
prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrators; or (4) in
excess of the arbitrators’ powers.” (Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1344, citing § 1286.2,
subd. (a); see Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
1071, 1085 [“The exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration
award are provided in . . . section 1286.2.”].) “ ‘[A]rbitrators do
not exceed their powers merely because they assign an erroneous
reason for their decision.’ [Citations.] A contrary holding would
8
permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial
review; a litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred and
thus exceeded his powers.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 28.)
“ ‘ “ ‘On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration
award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration
award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that
the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed
factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those
issues.’ ” ’ ” (Roussos v. Roussos (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 962, 973.)
“ ‘There is a presumption favoring the validity of the award, and
appellant bears the burden of establishing [its] claim of
invalidity.’ ” (Valencia v. Mendoza (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 427,
442.)
B. Failure to Prove Damages Does Not Equate to Lack of
Standing
Viracon attempts to make an end-run around the strict
limits imposed on judicial review of an arbitration award by
arguing the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
thus was required to dismiss the case rather than confirm the
arbitration award. It contends the superior court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because Pointe Assets, as Catalina Media’s
assignee, never suffered any harm or injury and therefore lacked
standing to sue Viracon. Viracon relies on the maxim that “[l]ack
of standing may be raised at any time in the proceeding,
9
including at trial or in an appeal.”5 (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family
Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1000; accord,
Spotlight on Coastal Corruption v. Kinsey (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
874, 882 [“ ‘Standing goes to the existence of a cause of action
[citation], and the lack of standing may be raised at any time in
the proceedings.’ ”].)
Viracon asserts that the terms of the Sale Agreement
“completely shielded” Catalina Media (and therefore shielded its
assignee Pointe Assets) “from any threatened or actual injury-in-
fact associated with the replacement” of the windows. Indeed,
the arbitration panel found that neither Catalina Media nor
Pointe Assets contributed the $18 million in the escrow account
that was used to fund the window remediation, and neither
entity had a right nor claim to any of the money in that account.
Viracon correctly notes that two different entities — CMD
Investment I and CMP — agreed to and did contribute those
funds and paid for the repair costs with respect to the windows in
their entirety. Viracon thus argues that at the time of the
assignment to Pointe Assets, Catalina Media “had no liability or
obligation to replace or fund the replacement of the [windows],
and thus, [Catalina Media] had no injury-in-fact,” which deprived
it of standing. Viracon is incorrect.
“ ‘ “Standing” is a party’s right to make a legal claim and is
a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the merits of an
5 Viracon asserts Pointe Assets improperly withheld the Sale
Agreement for almost four years, impeding Viracon’s ability to
discover and timely raise the issue of Pointe Assets’ standing that
the Sale Agreement laid bare. However, Viracon received the
Sale Agreement in August 2021, five months before the
arbitration began in January 2022.
10
action.” ’ ” (Dent v. Wolf (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 230, 233-234.) To
have standing, a party must have “a real interest in the ultimate
adjudication because he or she has either suffered or is about to
suffer an injury.” (Osborne v. Yasmeh (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1118,
1125.) “ ‘[A] cause of action for damage to real property accrues
when the defendant’s act causes “ ‘immediate and permanent
injury’ ” to the property or . . . when there is “[a]ctual and
appreciable harm” to the property.’ ” (Stofer v. Shapell
Industries, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 176, 189.) “[A] former
owner who suffered damage to . . . property while he owned it is a
real party in interest” with standing to sue for the injury.
(Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
980, 996; see Vaughn v. Dame Construction Co. (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 [“[s]ince it was the plaintiff's interest in
the property which was injured by the defendant’s defective
construction, she is the owner of the cause of action entitled to
maintain the present action,” despite the fact that the plaintiff no
longer owned the property].)
Viracon does not dispute that Catalina Media owned The
Pointe when the defective windows were installed. Thus,
Catalina Media suffered an injury to its property. That injury
gave Catalina Media standing to sue—and Pointe Assets
subsequently stood in its shoes and had standing to sue Viracon
by virtue of the assignment of legal claims to Pointe Assets, the
validity of which is unchallenged.
Viracon suggests that even though Catalina Media may at
one time have had standing by virtue of the injury from the
damaged windows, that ceased to be the case once CMD
Investment I and CMP made Catalina Media whole by paying to
replace the windows, eliminating any damages to Catalina
11
Media. However, “this argument conflates the issue of standing
with the issue of the remedies to which a party may be entitled.
That a party may ultimately be unable to prove a right to
damages . . . does not demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue
for its entitlement to them.” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010)
49 Cal.4th 758, 788-789 [holding pharmacies had standing to
assert Unfair Competition Law claims against drug
manufacturer, and rejecting argument that “ultimately
Pharmacies suffered no compensable loss because they were able
to mitigate fully any injury by passing on the overcharges”].) The
Clayworth court relied on the United States Supreme Court
decisions Adams v. Mills (1932) 286 U.S. 397 and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co. (1918) 245 U.S. 531 to
emphasize that plaintiffs’ claims, and their standing to sue,
accrue when they suffer a loss, regardless of what happens
afterwards. (Clayworth, at p. 769, quoting Adams, at p. 407
[“ ‘the claim for damages arose at the time the extra charge was
paid,’ notwithstanding any subsequent reimbursement”];
Southern Pacific, at p. 534 [“ ‘The plaintiffs suffered losses . . .
when they [over]paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory
of the law and it does not inquire into later events.’ ”].)
That other entities paid for the window replacement costs
did not extinguish Catalina Media’s standing that arose when
Viracon supplied The Pointe with defective windows. Whether
the payment for the window remediation by other entities
affected Pointe Assets’ damages is not a standing issue. Rather,
as an issue relating to damages, it was well within the purview of
the arbitration panel to decide — and far outside the “ ‘extremely
narrow’ ” scope of our review of the arbitration award. (E-
12
Commerce Lighting, Inc. v. E-Commerce Trade LLC, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 63.)
C. Even if Pointe Assets Lacked Standing, That Would Not
Mean the Superior Court Lacked Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Even if Viracon had a viable contention regarding Pointe
Assets’ lack of standing, that would not require dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction as Viracon contends. Subject matter
jurisdiction does not depend on a plaintiff’s standing to bring a
cause of action. (See Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
1333, 1338 [“the two issues (standing to sue and subject matter
jurisdiction of the court) are totally unrelated in the law”].)
“ ‘ “[A] complaint by a party lacking standing fails to state a cause
of action by the particular named plaintiff, inasmuch as the claim
belongs to somebody else. [Citation.] A more accurately stated
rationale would be that there is a defect in the parties, since the
party named as plaintiff is not the real party in interest.” ’ ”
(Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 501.)
“ ‘Defects or errors in relation to parties,’ ” however, “ ‘do not
affect subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” (The Rossdale Group, LLC v.
Walton (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 936, 944; see Jo Redland Trust,
U.A.D. 4-6-05 v. CIT Bank, N.A. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 142, 165
[“Under California law . . . ‘lack of standing as a real party in
interest is not jurisdictional; it is equivalent only to a failure to
state a cause of action.’ ”]; accord, County of Riverside v. Loma
Linda University (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 300, 319.)
Accordingly, even if Viracon were correct that Pointe Assets
was not the proper party to bring the claims, that would not
require the superior court to dismiss the case for lack of subject
13
matter jurisdiction. Rather, “courts have permitted plaintiffs
who have been determined to lack standing, or who have lost
standing after the complaint was filed, to substitute as plaintiffs
the true real parties in interest.” (Branick v. Downey Savings &
Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 243; accord, Engel v. Pech
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238 fn. 3; River’s Side at
Washington Square Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1239.)
In sum, we find no merit to Viracon’s contention that the
superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the
arbitration award. And Viracon disclaims reliance on any
arguments that the arbitration award should be vacated under
section 1286.2. We therefore affirm. (See Darby v. Sisyphian,
LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1113 [“if an award cannot be
vacated or corrected, it must be confirmed”], disapproved on
another ground in Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023)
14 Cal.5th 932, 952, fn. 3.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Pointe Assets is entitled to
recover its costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J. FEUER, J.
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