People v. Briones CA1/4

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Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Briones CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170083
v.
ALEXANDER BRIONES, (Napa County
Super. Ct. No. 18CR003422)
Defendant and Appellant.

Alexander Briones appeals from the trial court’s post-sentencing order
applying $1,600 confiscated during his arrest to satisfy a victim restitution
order, as authorized by Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f).1 Briones
claims his procedural due process rights were violated because he did not
receive notice of the People’s motions for this order or of the hearings on
those motions. We conclude Briones received due process when the court
addressed the confiscated funds at sentencing and, upon his counsel’s
objection that he had not reviewed section 1202.4, invited Briones to raise
any entitlement to the funds at a later time—which he never did in the years
to follow. We affirm the order.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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I. BACKGROUND
In 2018, Briones was charged with several offenses after he stole
thousands of dollars’ worth of cell phones and other products from a T-Mobile
store. He pled no contest to grand theft with a prior serious or violent felony
conviction, commonly known as a “strike,”2 (§§ 487, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)–
(i)) and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29820). In March 2019, the trial
court sentenced Briones according to the parties’ stipulation to 16 months in
prison for grand theft, doubled to 32 months based on the prior strike, and a
concurrent 16 months in prison for unlawful possession of a firearm. The
court imposed fines and fees and ordered Briones and a codefendant to pay
$1,859 in victim restitution.
Later during the sentencing hearing, the court addressed Briones’s
motion for the return of property confiscated at the time of his arrest. The
prosecutor opposed the motion only as to $1,600 in cash that was among the
confiscated items. She urged the court to apply those funds to the restitution
order per section 1202.4, subdivision (f). Briones’s counsel responded that he
“ha[d]n’t had a chance to review that specific authority,” and Briones “would
like for his child’s mother to receive those funds.” Counsel requested an
“opportunity to actually research that authority first” if the court were
“inclined to confiscate those funds for the purpose of restitution.” The court
granted Briones’s motion “with the exception of the $1[,]600” and stated its
ruling was “without prejudice to have the defense raise that issue at a later
time.” Briones did not take the court up on this offer.
The $1,600 remained with the Napa County Sheriff Department for
over four years. In February 2023, the People filed a motion to apply the
funds to the restitution order. The trial court appointed a public defender to

2 See People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 108.

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represent Briones and continued the matter several times because the People
were unable to notify Briones of the hearing.
In February 2024, the People filed another motion to apply the funds to
restitution, explaining that they had been unable to notify Briones of their
motions because they did not have his current address. In this motion, the
People argued that notice was not required under the authority of People v.
Nystrom (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Nystrom). The trial court continued the
matter again.
The public defender filed a response to the motion, explaining that she
had been unable to consult with Briones and thus could not waive his
appearance or convey whether he wished “to object, to appeal, and/or to
contest the prosecution’s factual assertions, such that [sic] the funds are not
subject to any exception (such as child or spousal support under . . . section
1202.4(f)).” The public defender argued that Nystrom did not apply because
“it does not relate to a defendant’s right [under section 977, subdivision (b)(1)
and article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution] to be personally
present in court at criminal proceedings; rather, it explains that a separately
noticed hearing is not required. Here, the prosecution is seeking just that in
filing a noticed motion. In other words, Nystrom would only apply if the
prosecution did not need the hearing it seeks.” The response urged the court
to simply “drop the matter from calendar at this point.”
The trial court held a hearing on the People’s motion, at which Briones
was not present. At the hearing, the People summarized their attempts to
notify Briones of their motions, including attempting personal service at his
last known address and speaking to his probation officer in Alameda County.
The court granted the motion, noting that Briones was arrested “in 2018 and
it’s 2024 and there’s been no evidence that Mr. Briones has ever made claim

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for the money.” The court found that Briones had “forfeited any right to the
money” in light of the “restitution obligation that was ordered as part of his
sentencing.”
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, counsel for Briones argues that the trial court violated
Briones’s due process rights by holding hearings on the People’s motions to
apply the $1,600 to the restitution order and granting the second motion
without notice to Briones.3 The People continue to urge that notice was not
required per section 1202.4, subdivision (f) and Nystrom. We agree with the
People and find no due process violation on the facts present here.
Nystrom is right on point. The defendant in that case claimed “he
should have been afforded notice and a hearing before . . . seized money was
released to the victim” to whom restitution was ordered. (Nystrom, supra, 7
Cal.App.4th at p. 1181.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that the
trial court “had already entered a valid restitution order as part of the
negotiated plea. There was, therefore, no question that the victim was
entitled to the money,” and “Nystrom was not entitled to notice and another
hearing before the court ordered payment of restitution from available
funds.”4 (Id. at pp. 1181–1182.) Nystrom was decided in 1992, and we are

3 Appellate counsel does not indicate whether he has been in contact

with Briones himself. He does not renew the public defender’s argument that
Briones had the right to be present at the hearing per section 977,
subdivision (b)(1) and article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution, so
any such argument is forfeited. (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 568,
fn. 13.)

4 We are unpersuaded by Briones’s attempt to distinguish Nystrom on

the ground that the trial court apparently held no further hearings at all in
that case. Briones does not explain or support, and has thus forfeited, any

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aware of no contrary authority. Moreover, in 2005, section 1202.4,
subdivision (f) was amended to expressly authorize a trial court to apply
“funds confiscated at the time of the defendant’s arrest . . . to [a victim]
restitution order if the funds are not exempt for spousal or child support or
subject to any other legal exemption.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f), as amended by
Stats. 2005, ch. 240, § 10.5, p. 2517, eff. Jan. 1, 2006.) The statute does not
require notice to the defendant.
Due process requires an opportunity to be heard that is “afforded ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ ” but its “precise dictates . . .
are flexible and vary according to context.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) We agree
with Nystrom that once a valid restitution order has entered, due process
does not require additional notice and another hearing before the trial court
may apply confiscated funds to the restitution order—at least so long as the
defendant has received notice that the funds may be so applied and an
opportunity to present any argument and evidence that they should not be.
Briones had that notice and opportunity here, afforded at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. He was present when his counsel
specifically addressed the confiscated $1,600 with the trial court at the
sentencing hearing and when the court denied his request for its return
“without prejudice.” He had years to present the court with any support for
his request but never did. By failing to raise the issue again, Briones
forfeited it. (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170 [“[a]s a general

argument that a court violates due process by holding hearings about
whether the defendant can and should be notified of an order where notice is
ultimately not required. (Vitug v. Alameda Point Storage, Inc. (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 407, 412.)

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matter, when a trial court denies a motion without prejudice the matter is
forfeited if not renewed”].) The court’s order did not violate due process.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order applying the confiscated funds to the victim
restitution order is affirmed.

SIMONDS, J.*

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma, assigned by

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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