CourtListener 10360719•People v. Hobbs CA1/2
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Filed 3/20/25 P. v. Hobbs CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168137
v.
WILLIAM GENE HOBBS, (City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. CRI-22012177)
Defendant and Appellant.
Between November of 2021 and September of 2022, on the streets of
San Francisco, Hobbs allegedly committed a series of offenses involving 13
different women. Hobbs was eventually charged with 13 counts based on the
incidents, including one count each of felony false imprisonment and assault,
and multiple counts of simple and sexual battery. Tried by a jury, Hobbs was
found guilty of nine of the charges, and sentenced to 30 months in county jail
followed by three years in state prison. He argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a new trial as to the felony false imprisonment
count made on the grounds that the verdict was not unanimous, and that the
evidence was insufficient to establish either that he committed felony false
imprisonment or that he committed the touchings supporting the two sexual
battery convictions for sexual purposes. We affirm.
1
BACKGROUND
The Charges and Trial
On April 19, 2023, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed the
operative first amended information, charging Hobbs with one count of felony
false imprisonment (Pen. Code1, § 236) (count I), three counts of sexual
battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)) (counts II, V, and IX), eight counts of simple
battery (§ 242) (counts III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, and XIII), and one count of
assault (§ 240) (count XII). In addition, with respect to count I—the only
felony count—the information alleged multiple circumstances in aggravation
with respect to both the crime and the defendant under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421.
Hobbs was tried by jury over some 10 court days between May 2 and
May 15, 2023.2 And as it relates to the particular counts at issue on appeal3,
some of the testimony at trial was as follows:
Felony False Imprisonment of Madeleine E. (Count I)
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on November 16, 2021, Madeleine E.4 was
walking her dog along Webster Street near Broadway in San Francisco when
she stopped to clean up after it. While she was tying up the bag, “[s]omeone
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 On May 2, count IX was severed on the prosecution’s motion due to
the unavailability of the victim as a witness. On May 11, the trial court
dismissed count VIII pursuant to section 1118.1, and count III was amended,
after the testimony of the victim, to the lesser-included offense of simple
assault (§ 240) to conform to proof.
3 Because the facts underlying the other charges are not relevant to the
issues on appeal, we omit any discussion of them.
4 Because the victims at trial gave only the first initial of their last
names, we will occasionally refer to them by their first names.
2
rushed up from behind me and grabbed me, lifting me up.” Madeleine, who is
5 feet 4 inches tall, estimated that Hobbs was “a foot taller than me,” and,
while she was in his arms, she “couldn’t move [her] body.” After “what
seemed like a few minutes,” Madeleine said, “ ‘Get off of me,’ and [she] was
set back down on the ground.” She then “took a step backwards,” “[t]urned to
face the person,” and said, “ ‘What the heck?’ ” Hobbs “didn’t say anything,”
but “looked [her] dead in the eyes and then just creepily smiled.” Madeleine
testified that she was moved from Webster Street to the curb on Broadway, a
distance she estimated in court was the same as that from the court reporter
to the end of the jury box, which the trial court later estimated was
approximately 15 feet.
After Hobbs released her, Madeleine walked towards the end of the
block to a nearby school security guard. When she looked back to see if
Hobbs was following her, she saw that he “just kind of stood in that same
spot.” Madeleine called the police on the day of the incident, but did not file a
report at that time. She ultimately reported the incident in September of
2022 after seeing an image of Hobbs on social media.
Sexual battery of McCall M. (Count 2)
At approximately 10:35 a.m. on November 20, 2021, McCall M., who
was newly pregnant, was at the corner of Noe and Ford Streets in San
Francisco, preparing to walk toward Starbucks at 18th and Castro Streets to
get her morning coffee. As she passed a different coffee shop, she noticed
Hobbs—whom she estimated was between 6 feet and 6 feet 5 inches tall—
wearing bright yellow or green clothing and “grinning in . . . a very
3
exaggerated way,” which “caught [her] attention because it seemed
unnatural.”
McCall continued walking, but soon “sens[ed] someone was behind
[her].” Hobbs was walking some five or six paces behind her for about a
block, and then she “fe[lt] someone grab [her] buttocks aggressively,” in a way
that “wasn’t even a pinch, it was like a full grab, like someone wanted me to
notice them kind of thing.” According to McCall, she had “never had my butt
grabbed in that way, even by my husband, so it was unnatural. Even if it
was someone that, like, you would typically give permission to do that.”
McCall demonstrated the grab for the jury on a mannequin in the courtroom,
and stated that “the way it felt was it had to have at least been three fingers
to create a squeeze motion . . . [because] it was more than just a pinch.”
After being groped, McCall locked eyes with Hobbs and said, “What the
hell” very loud. Hobbs “briefly looked back but picked up his pace.” He then
turned back towards McCall and said, “ ‘I thought you were someone else,’
with a grin.”
McCall called her husband, who was nearby getting his own coffee. He
met her at the corner of Noe and Ford, and she told him what had happened,
described Hobbs, and told him the direction in which Hobbs had started
walking. She and her husband then separated, and shortly thereafter he
texted her a photo of Hobbs, and stated that he had witnessed Hobbs grab
another woman. McCall called the police, but decided not to press charges
after being told that Hobbs would likely be “let free” whether or not she did
so.
Sexual battery of Kelsey S. (Count 5)
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on April 30, 2022, Kelsey S. was running
south along the Embarcadero toward the Bay Bridge with her friend Rachel
4
R. As she ran, Kelsey saw Hobbs cross the street at a crosswalk, “wearing a
salmon pink-colored shirt,” with “shorter hair” and “very tall.” Shortly
thereafter, she “heard running footsteps behind” her, and then she “felt . . .
someone come up behind me and grab pretty aggressively my right butt.”
Kelsey described the way in which she was grabbed as that she was
“[s]lapped and then squeezed rather hard,” in a way that “did not feel like an
accident,” but “felt very purposeful . . . it wasn’t like somebody grazed past
me.” Kelsey stopped running and confronted Hobbs, asking him, “Why did
you do that?” Hobbs said, “ ‘Because I felt like it.’ ” Kelsey “did [her] best to
deescalate the situation” and told Hobbs, “ ‘Don’t touch me. Don’t touch
women like that ever again.’ ” She then walked a couple of steps away and
lost Hobbs in the crowd. Later, in September of 2022, Kelsey saw a news
article with Hobbs’ picture after hearing it discussed by her co-workers, at
which point she reported the incident to the police.
Rachel R. testified that as she was running with Kelsey S. on April 22,
“all of a sudden this very tall man comes out of nowhere from behind us and
accosts Kelsey.” Hobbs “ran up behind her and from my perspective it looked
like he put his hand between her legs and grabbed her, to which she shoved
him off of her.” Rachel did not remember exactly what Hobbs said, but did
remember that it was “some kind of lewd comment,” “like he was talking
about her body or something,” and that it was “really off-putting and really
creepy.” Rachel demonstrated the groping action on a mannequin at trial, in
a way the prosecutor described for the record as putting his “hands between
the mannequin’s leg and sort of moved [his] hand upward,” and then “put
[his] hand on the right buttocks of the mannequin.”
5
The Jury’s Deliberations and Verdicts
Jury deliberations began around 11:00 a.m. on May 15, continued on
May 16, and concluded at 2:36 p.m. on May 17, when the jury sent a note
indicating that it had reached unanimous verdicts on nine of the 11
remaining charges. The jury was brought into the courtroom, and the
verdicts were read aloud—guilty on each count with the exception of counts
IV and XII. Both parties waived polling of the jury. With respect to counts
IV and XII, the foreperson told the trial court that the vote on count IV had
been six to six, and that the jury did not “vote at all” on count XII, because
“[w]e polled each other individually” and “based on the discussions it didn’t
make any difference.” After the foreperson indicated that further readback of
testimony, instructions, or deliberations would not help the jury reach a
unanimous verdict on either count IV or count XII, and the jurors were
individually polled and agreed, the trial court declared a mistrial as to those
counts and the jury was discharged.
On May 30, a court trial was held on four of the circumstances in
aggravation with respect to count I: (1) that the victim was “particularly
vulnerable”; (2) that Hobbs had “prior convictions as an adult” which were
“numerous or of increasing seriousness”; (3) that Hobbs had “served a prior
term in prison or county jail under section 1170, subdivision (h)”; and (4) that
his “prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease
community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory.” (See California Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) & (b)(2), (3), (5).) The trial court found three of the
four true, with the exception of the factor that the victim was particularly
vulnerable, as to which the trial court reserved decision. Sentencing was set
for June 8.
6
Motion For a New Trial
On June 5, Hobbs filed a motion for a new trial (or alternatively, a
mistrial) as to count I pursuant to section 1181, arguing that he was deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict because one juror had,
in fact, voted not guilty on that count. The motion attached a declaration
from Juror No. 3, executed June 1, and which provided in its entirety as
follows:
“1. I served as a juror in the recent trial of People v. Bill Hobbs.
“2. I was seated as Juror Number 4.[5]
“3. On Tuesday, May 16, 2023, and Wednesday May 17, 2023, the jury
discussed Count 1.
“4. Count 1 dealt with allegations against a witness named Madeline
E.
“5. In the deliberations room, I voiced the reasons behind my vote of
not guilty as to Count 1.
“6. Other jurors, including the foreperson, disagreed with my view of
the evidence.
“7. The foreperson never said anything else about that count nor did he
ask me any questions about that count.
“8. On Wednesday, May 17, 2023, the verdict was read in court. I
heard the verdicts of ‘guilty’ read by the clerk. While this did not account for
my vote of ‘not-guilty,’ I did not know what to do at the time. Nobody in court
asked me if that was really my vote for Count 1.
5 Although the declaration stated that the juror in question was Juror
No. 4, according to both parties’ briefs, the juror was actually Juror No. 3.
7
“9. After I went home for the night, I realized my vote had been
recorded incorrectly for Count 1.
“10. After reflecting on what was read in court, that I realized a
mistake was made. Given what happened, I had trouble sleeping Wednesday
night.
“11. As soon as the Public Defender’s office opened the next day, I went
to try and have Mr. Breecker [defense counsel] fix the situation. Specifically,
I wanted him to know that my verdict for Count 1 was, in fact, not guilty.
“12. I first met with an attorney, Peter Calloway, and then briefly with
Mr. Breecker. Shortly thereafter, I spoke with Jill Schroeder, an
investigator.
“13. It is clear to me now, that the foreperson did not accurately record
my vote of not guilty for that count.
“14. My true vote for Count 1 was not guilty.”
On June 7, the prosecution filed opposition, arguing that the majority
of the statements in Juror No. 3’s declaration were inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1150—specifically “paragraph 5, paragraph 6, the
second sentence in paragraph 8, paragraph 9, both sentences in paragraph
10, the second sentence in paragraph 11, paragraph 13, and paragraph 14”—
because they were evidence of jurors’ subjective mental processes and
statements made during the course of their deliberations. The prosecution
argued that the admissible balance of the declaration did not describe any
juror misconduct that would justify a new trial.6
6 The opposition also attached the declaration of the prosecutor, stating
that after the verdict, she and defense counsel had discussed the case with
the jury for at least thirty minutes, and that “[a]t no point during these
discussions did Juror 3 state that an incorrect vote was counted as to Count
1.” The declaration further stated that that same day, “Count 1 was
8
At sentencing on June 8, after finding true the circumstance in
aggravation that Madeleine E. was particularly vulnerable, the trial court
heard argument on the motion for a new trial. The trial court then ruled as
follows:
“On the new trial motion, I’ve read the papers of both sides. And I’ve
listened to these arguments this morning, Mr. Hobbs. On the evidence point,
which is important for this motion, I do find that Evidence Code Section 1150
does apply to this particular case, Mr. Breecker. And I am persuaded by the
detailed analysis offered by Ms. Delgado the prosecutor in response to your
motion and because I am persuaded, I will strike as inadmissible those
portions of the declaration identified by Ms. Delgado. I reviewed them myself
and I agree with her points. And what is left is not information that rises to
the level of a proper challenge to the vote of Juror No. 3 for this case.
I think what is happening here, it’s my view, is that there is a difference
between 12 jurors deliberating, making a decision together, coming back into
open court, the verdicts being announced when everybody is together and on
other hand, once the jury is excused and all of the jurors go back to their
individual lives and they think about the decisions that were made when
they were all together, the aftermath when somebody is alone reconsidering
his decision, reconsidering his vote, changing his mind, one way to describe it
specifically discussed by Juror 3 and at least four other jurors in the presence
of both the defense and the prosecution . . . Nothing about an ‘incorrect vote’
as to Count 1 was raised at any point during that 30-minute or more
discussion, by Juror 3 or any other juror,” and that “[d]uring the course of the
discussion with the jurors, Juror 7 also participated in the conversation to
convey the information that the distribution of votes as to Count 12 was split
nine votes for guilty and three votes for not guilty. Juror 3 was present for
that statement by Juror 7 and the discussion about the two undecided
counts.”
9
is impeaching his own vote, I think as I view it that is what is happening
here. I want to be really clear.
“I think, I’m focusing on the juror not on you, Mr. Breecker. I’m
focusing on the juror. And I’m taking the time to lay out the difference
between everybody together and after being discharged going back
individually to life. Sometimes a person once he is on his own reconsiders
what happened when that jury was all together. That can make all of the
difference. And on the admissible evidence here, I do not see that something
happened in that jury room where his clear vote for not guilty on Count 1 was
ignored and somehow rejected by the foreperson and other members of that
jury. I don’t see that. And, therefore, I think that the verdict to Count 1 was
fairly returned unanimously. So the motion for a new trial is denied for all of
those reasons.”
Sentencing
The trial court went on to sentence Hobbs as follows: in county jail, six
months on counts II and V, and three months on the other six counts save
count I (counts VI, VII, X, XI, and XIII) all consecutive to each other, for a
total of 30 months in county jail, and the upper term of three years in state
prison on count I, consecutive to and after the county jail term.
Hobbs filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion for a New
Trial
Applicable Law
Section 1181 permits the court to grant a new trial: “3. When the jury
has separated without leave of the court after retiring to deliberate upon
their verdict, or been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due
10
consideration of the case has been prevented; [or] [¶] 4. When the verdict
has been decided by lot, or by any means other than a fair expression of
opinion on the part of all jurors.”
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides: “Upon an inquiry
as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be
received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring,
either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have
influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the
effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the
mental processes by which it was determined.” “ ‘This statute distinguishes
“between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the
subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror, which can be neither
corroborated nor disproved.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234,
1281.) Juror’s statements “ ‘must be admitted with caution,’ because
‘[s]tatements have a greater tendency than nonverbal acts to implicate the
reasoning processes of jurors.’ [Citation.] But statements made by jurors
during deliberations are admissible under Evidence Code section 1150 when
‘the very making of the statement sought to be admitted would itself
constitute misconduct.’ ” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 484.)
“ ‘[E]vidence that violates Evidence Code section 1150 is not merely
inadmissible; it is irrelevant—“of no jural consequence.” ’ ” (In re Hansen
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 906, 928–929.)
“ ‘Courts evaluate a motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct in
three steps: (1) determine what evidence is admissible; (2) if there is
admissible evidence, decide if it establishes misconduct; and (3) if there is
11
misconduct, determine whether it was prejudicial.’ (People v. Flores (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 100, 107.)” (People v. Herrera (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 178, 195.)
The first step—determining whether the evidence supporting the
motion for a new trial is admissible under Evidence Code section 1150—we
review, “like any other issue of admissibility . . . for abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Flores, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 108; Barboni v. Tuomi (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 340, 345.) “[T]he initial burden is on defendant to prove the
misconduct. [Citation.] We will not presume greater misconduct than the
evidence shows.” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657; see Donovan v.
Poway Unified School District (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 625 [“The moving
party bears the burden of establishing juror misconduct”]; Barboni v. Tuomi,
supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [same].) The second step—determining
whether the admissible evidence establishes misconduct—is “ ‘a legal
question we review independently.’ ” (People v. Herrera, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 195, quoting People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 242.)
But in doing so, we “ ‘ “accept the trial court’s credibility determinations and
findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396.)
Analysis
In his opening brief, Hobbs concedes that if the trial court’s ruling on
the prosecution’s evidentiary objections to Juror No. 3’s declaration was
correct, the balance of that declaration “did not support a grant of a new trial
as to Count 1.” We thus turn first to that ruling, a ruling, as noted above, we
review for abuse of discretion.
Hobbs’ brief asserts that the “heart of the matter” were the following
portions of Juror No. 3’s declaration: “5. In the deliberations room, I voiced
the reasons behind my vote of not guilty as to Count 1. [¶] 6. Other jurors,
12
including the foreperson, disagreed with my view of the evidence. [¶] 7. The
foreperson never said anything else about that count nor did he ask me any
questions about that count.” Hobbs argues that paragraph 5 was fully
admissible, that paragraph 6’s admissibility “depends on how it is
interpreted,”7 and that if Juror No. 3 had “stated a ‘vote of not guilty as to
Count 1,’ ” and “ ‘[t]he foreperson never said anything else about that count
nor did he ask [Juror No. 3] any questions about that count,’ a verdict was
returned in open court as to Count 1 on which all twelve jurors had not
agreed.” We are not persuaded.
The statements that Juror No. 3 “voiced the reasons behind my vote of
not guilty” and that “[o]ther jurors . . . disagreed with my view of the
evidence” are plainly directed at the jurors’ subjective thought processes and
reasoning behind their votes. And “when a juror in the course of
deliberations gives the reasons for his or her vote, the words are simply a
verbal reflection of the juror’s mental processes. Consideration of such a
statement as evidence of those processes is barred by Evidence Code section
1150.” (People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419.) The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence inadmissible. And in any
event, even if the statements were admissible, the fact that the jury
discussed the evidence—and even disagreed about it—does not reflect any
improper deliberations or misconduct.
7 Somewhat ironically, given that his opening brief repeatedly
complains of the trial court’s “rewriting” and “pruning” of Juror No. 3’s
declaration, Hobbs’ counsel argues that paragraph 6 of that declaration
“might arguably be said to have concerned other jurors’ ‘mental processes,’
but not if that paragraph is interpreted as: ‘Other jurors, including the
foreperson, [stated that they] disagreed with my view of the evidence.’ ”
13
Thus, to satisfy Hobbs’ initial evidentiary burden of demonstrating
misconduct, we are left with Juror No. 3’s oblique reference to “my vote of not
guilty on Count 1,” together with the fact that “[t]he foreperson” did not
thereafter “sa[y] anything else about that count” or “ask [Juror No. 3] any
questions about” it. But the declaration carefully—perhaps tellingly—does
not directly state that Juror No. 3 actually voted not guilty, nor does it
explain how the jury’s voting was conducted, how many votes took place,
when in the three-day process of deliberations the vote or votes where Juror
No. 3 purportedly voted not guilty on count I occurred, or how the jury
ultimately came to submit a verdict form, signed by the foreperson, indicating
a guilty verdict on count I. Nor does it offer any explanation for why Juror
No. 3, after hearing the verdict read aloud, failed to mention the purportedly
incorrect vote during the trial court’s discussion with the jury of the two
counts on which they failed to reach a verdict, or while participating in
extensive conversations about the case with the prosecutor and defense
counsel afterwards. We expect that defense counsel—who, along with
another attorney and an investigator from his office, interviewed Juror No. 3
and presumably prepared the declaration—would have included any such
details had they supported the motion.
Furthermore, as noted, in considering a claim of juror misconduct, we
accept the trial court’s credibility determinations and findings of historical
fact when supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Gamache, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 396.) Here, after considering the declarations of both Juror No.
3 and the prosecutor, the trial court concluded that “on the admissible
evidence here, I do not see that something happened in that jury room where
his clear vote for not guilty on Count 1 was ignored and somehow rejected by
the foreperson and other members of that jury.” That finding—to the extent
14
it was a finding regarding Juror No. 3’s credibility—is supported by
substantial evidence, and we must accept it. (See People v. Flores, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 109 [declining to consider declaration of juror whom trial
court found not credible on appeal from denial of motion for new trial]; People
v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1463–1465.) Given all this, we
conclude that Hobbs failed to carry his initial burden to demonstrate jury
misconduct, and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a
new trial.8
Substantial Evidence Supports Hobbs’ Conviction for Felony
False Imprisonment of Madeleine E.
Hobbs argues that there was not substantial evidence to support the
jury’s verdict finding him guilty of felony as opposed to misdemeanor false
imprisonment. We disagree.
False imprisonment is defined as the “unlawful violation of the
personal liberty of another.” (§ 236.) If it is “effected by violence, menace,
fraud, or deceit,” the crime is a felony. (§ 237, subd. (a).) “In this context,
‘violence’ means using physical force greater than the force reasonably
necessary to restrain someone. (People v. Reed (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274,
8 Hobbs also argues that Juror No. 3’s declaration was sufficient to
require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim of jury
misconduct. “We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s postverdict request for an evidentiary hearing into allegations of
jury misconduct.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1216.) “A court
must hold an evidentiary hearing on alleged jury misconduct only when the
defendant shows ‘a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has
occurred. Even upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally
be unnecessary unless the parties’ evidence presents a material conflict that
can only be resolved at such a hearing.’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58
Cal.4th 40, 55.) As discussed, Hobbs failed to make the required showing
here, and Hobbs does not identify any “ ‘material conflict’ ” in the parties’
evidence “ ‘that [could] only be resolved at such a hearing.’ ” (Ibid.)
15
280.)” (People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 130.) “The essential
element of false imprisonment, be it misdemeanor or felony, is restraint of
the person.” (People v. Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 717.)
The jury in this case was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1240,
that felony false imprisonment requires: “1.) The defendant intentionally
restrained, or confined, or detained Madeleine E. by violence or menace; [¶]
AND [¶] 2.) The defendant made Madeleine E. stay or go somewhere against
that person’s will. [¶] Violence means using physical force that is greater
than the force reasonably necessary to restrain someone. [¶] Menace means
a verbal or physical threat of harm. The threat of harm may be express or
implied. [¶] An act is done against a person’s will if that person does not
consent to the act. In order to consent, a person must act freely and
voluntarily and know the nature of the act.”
In evaluating Hobbs’ claim, “ ‘we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must
disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In
applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
“Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial
judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity
of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
16
evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v.
Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87; see People v. Waqa (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 565, 576.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Hobbs was
guilty of felony false imprisonment, i.e., that he “us[ed] physical force greater
than the force reasonably necessary to restrain” Madeleine when he picked
her up and carried her across the street. (People v. Whitmore, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 130.)
People v. Castro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 137 (Castro) is directly on
point. There, the victim was walking to a bus stop on her way to school when
the defendant grabbed her by the arm, turned her around and pulled her “a
couple of steps” toward his car. (Id. at p. 140–142.) In finding that this was
sufficient to establish felony as opposed to misdemeanor false imprisonment,
the Court of Appeal explained as follows: “In the present case, appellant
grabbed the victim and turned her around. If that is all that had happened,
we would agree with appellant that his conduct amounted only to
misdemeanor false imprisonment. But appellant pulled her toward his car,
an act more than what was required to stop her and keep her where she was
located. . . . [T]he evidence that appellant used force to pull the victim
toward his car was sufficient to establish force above that required for
misdemeanor false imprisonment. Thus, the conviction for felony false
imprisonment is supported by sufficient evidence.” (Castro, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 143; see also People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828,
834 (Ghipriel) [agreeing with Castro that “[t]he additional force required for
felony false imprisonment . . . may come in the form . . . of simply pulling a
17
victim toward a location when the victim’s liberty has already been
violated”].)
Hobbs makes unpersuasive attempts to distinguish Castro and Ghipriel
on the grounds that “a great deal more had happened to the girl in Castro,”
and “the circumstances in Ghipriel are a light-year away from those” here,
relying on the more overtly sexual acts at issue in those cases. But the
reasoning of Castro did not depend on the sexual acts of the defendant, but
rather on the fact that in pulling the victim toward his car, he used force
“more than what was required to stop her and keep her where she was
located.” (Castro, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.) So too here. Substantial
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that in lifting Madeleine from the
ground and transporting her some 15 feet to the curb across the street, Hobbs
used “physical force that [was] greater than the force reasonably necessary to
restrain” her where she was. (CALCRIM No. 1240.)
Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that Hobbs’
Touching of McCall M. and Kelsey S. Was Done For a Sexual
Purpose
Hobbs argues that there was not substantial evidence to support the
jury’s finding of specific intent required for his two convictions of
misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). Again, we disagree.
Section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) provides that “[a]ny person who
touches an intimate part of another person, if the touching is against the will
of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual
gratification, or sexual abuse, . . . is guilty of misdemeanor sexual
battery . . .” Accordingly, the jury was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No.
938, that these two counts required that: [¶] “1.) The defendant touched an
intimate part of McCall M./Kelsey S.; [¶] 2.) The touching was done against
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McCall M.’s/Kelsey S.’s will; [¶] AND [¶] 3.) The touching was done for the
specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.” The
instruction concluded: “Sexual abuse means any touching of a person’s
intimate parts in order to cause pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator
does not need to achieve any sexual arousal or sexual gratification.”
Hobbs asserts that “the reasonable view of that which occurred with
McCall M. and with Kelsey S. was simply that these events were yet other
examples of Mr. Hobbs’s maladjusted and seriously skewed perception of how
one interacts with women in a civilized society,” and that substantial
evidence does not support a finding that “when he acted he had
intended . . . ‘to cause pain, injury, or discomfort’ to either woman.’ ”
“Because intent can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it may be
inferred from the circumstances. [Citations.] Circumstances which have
been considered relevant to proving intent to satisfy sexual desires include:
the charged act, extrajudicial statements, the relationship of the parties,
other acts of lewd conduct, coercion or deceit used to obtain the victim’s
cooperation, attempts to avoid detection, offering of a reward for cooperation,
a stealthy approach to the victim, admonishment of the victim not to disclose
the occurrence, physical evidence of sexual arousal and clandestine meetings.
[Citations.]” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 299; see People v.
Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445.)
To begin with, Hobbs completely ignores that in addition to sexual
abuse, a touching constitutes sexual battery if done for the purpose of either
sexual arousal or sexual gratification. And there was ample substantial
evidence from which the jury could conclude that Hobbs’ touchings of McCall
M. and Kelsey S. were done for one of these purposes. Hobbs made a
“stealthy approach” to both women—whom he did not know—coming up to
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them quickly from behind and grabbing an intimate part of their bodies
before they were aware of his presence. (In re Jerry M., supra, 59
Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) Both women described the touchings as aggressive.
McCall’s testimony in particular at least suggested that the touching was so
sexually aggressive that it was unprecedented for her, even by her husband
or “someone . . . you would typically give permission to do that.” The jury
could infer that after touching McCall, Hobbs used deceit to obtain her
cooperation and attempted to avoid detection by “pick[ing] up his pace” before
turning back to tell her, “ ‘I thought you were someone else,’ with a grin.”
After touching Kelsey S., Hobbs told her that he did so “[b]ecause [he] felt
like it,” speaking to her in a way that her friend Rachel testified was as
though he made “some kind of lewd comment,” “like he was talking about her
body or something,” and that it was “really off-putting and really creepy.”
And the jury considered all this against the backdrop that Hobbs was
charged with two counts of sexual battery, as well as nine other counts
stemming from unwanted touchings or interactions with women on the
street, over the course of an 11-month period. All of the testimony provided
ample substantial evidence in support of the jury’s finding that Hobbs acted
with a sexual purpose under section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A168137N)
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