CourtListener 10360678•People v. Rushing
Full text
Filed 2/27/25; Certified for Publication 3/20/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334988
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA097346)
v.
CORY T. RUSHING,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________________
Appellant Cory T. Rushing appeals the summary denial of
his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. 1
We affirm the denial because the trial court never instructed the
jury with either of the two instructions on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, even though it read the optional
bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 400 that introduced the
theory of liability for a crime that was committed while a person
was aiding and abetting another crime.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts 2
On the evening of October 5, 2007, Gregory Powe was
driving with his 13-year-old foster son, R.R. Twenty to 25 gang
members were celebrating the Hood Day of the Fudge Town
Mafia Crips in the intersection of 105th Street and Lou Dillon
Avenue in Los Angeles. They blocked the way for Powe to drive.
Powe got out of the car and asked them to move. Rushing and his
fellow gang member Nakia Hubbard started beating Powe with
their hands and feet. Powe tried to get back inside his car, but
Hubbard stopped him. Hubbard kicked Powe in the face and
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We refer to the factual background from the Court of
Appeal opinion in People v. Rushing (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 801
(Rushing), which affirmed the judgment of conviction. These
facts are “for background purposes and to provide context for the
parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
978, fn. 2.) We do not rely on these facts to review the trial
court’s determination for Rushing’s prima facie showing. (Id. at
p. 988.)
2
slammed the back of his head onto the street, causing a “big pop”
sound.
Two eyewitnesses identified Rushing and Hubbard as the
perpetrators who attacked Powe. One of the witnesses had
grown up with Rushing and Hubbard.
The paramedics arrived and transported Powe to the
hospital. Powe was discharged after one night in the hospital.
After Powe returned home, he began shaking while in bed. His
wife called 911. Powe died in the ambulance on the way to the
hospital.
The autopsy revealed that the combination of head trauma
and immobility at the hospital and at home led to the formation
of clots around the inferior vena cava which returns blood from
the lower part of the body, back to the heart and lungs. The clots
broke loose and formed pulmonary thromboemboli which caused
Powe’s death.
Los Angeles Police Officer Samuel Marullo testified as a
gang expert. He stated that October 5 was the Hood Day for the
Fudge Town Mafia Crips gang. All gangs have a Hood Day to
celebrate their membership. The day is typically selected based
on the street affiliated with the gang. In the case of the Fudge
Town Mafia Crips, 105th Street is that street. According to
Marullo, Hubbard and Rushing were members of the Fudge Town
Mafia Crips.
II. Procedure
A. Trial
On April 29, 2009, a jury convicted Hubbard of first degree
murder and Rushing of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
and found the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) true for
3
both. On May 8, 2009, the trial court sentenced Rushing to 15
years to life.
Rushing appealed and a panel of this court affirmed the
judgment in a partially published opinion. (Rushing, supra, 197
Cal.App.4th at 803, 813.)
B. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On June 27, 2022, Rushing filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel
to represent him. On October 13, 2023, the court conducted a
prima facie hearing and denied Rushing’s petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Changes to Murder Law
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437)
amended the substantive law on accomplice liability for murder
by significantly narrowing the felony murder rule 3 and by
requiring that a principal in a crime act with malice
aforethought. (§§ 189, subd. (e), 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel).) Pertinent for our
review, the latter change requires that malice “not be imputed to
a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The change eliminated liability for murder
as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Curiel, at p. 449; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
3 Specifically, SB 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e),
providing liability only if the defendant was the actual killer, was
not the actual killer but, with intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor, or was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
4
A defendant convicted of felony murder under the prior law
or murder based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine can petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced
on any remaining counts, if he could not now be convicted of
murder because of the changes made by SB 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) Upon receipt
of a petition that contains all required information, the trial court
must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The court must also direct the prosecutor
to file a response to the petition and permit the petitioner to
reply. (Ibid.) If the court determines the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, it must issue an order to show cause
and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Id., subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
The prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court takes the petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and refrains from factfinding. (Id. at p. 972.)
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) “ ‘If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the [petitioner] is ineligible
for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.] If,
instead, the [petitioner] has made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an order to show
cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 450.)
Whether the record of conviction shows the petition is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal
question that we review de novo. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
5
II. No Instruction on the Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine
Rushing concedes that the trial court did not read either of
the two instructions on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to the jury. The trial court read CALCRIM No. 400
which defines the roles of the perpetrator and the aider and
abettor. 4 The trial court also included the optional bracketed
language in CALCRIM No. 400 that stated, “Under some specific
circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of
one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that
occurred during the commission of the first crime.” (CALCRIM
No. 400.) Rushing argues that this bracketed language allowed
the jury to convict him of murder based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 946 (Estrada)
rejected the same argument. Our colleagues in Division Eight of
this district concluded that the defendant was ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief because the trial court did not instruct the
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, even
4 The version of CALCRIM No. 400 read to the jury stated:
“A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she
may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person
the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a
perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. A person is
equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed
it.”
In April 2010, the Judicial Council revised CALCRIM No.
400 to delete the word “equally” from the phrase that stated
principals are “equally guilty” of a crime. (See Judicial Council of
Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (April 2010 Supp.).)
6
though it read the bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 400.
(Estrada, at p. 949.) The reviewing court determined that the
bracketed language alone did not sufficiently instruct the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 947 &
fn. 4.) The CALCRIM bench notes directed that the bracketed
language be read along with CALCRIM No. 402 or No. 403 5 when
proceeding under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Estrada, at pp. 946–947, citing Judicial Council of
Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No.
400.) But the trial court never instructed the jury on CALCRIM
No. 402 or No. 403. (Estrada, at p. 946.) The prosecutor also
never requested that the trial court read either to the jury. (Id.
at p. 947.)
Instead, the trial court read CALCRIM No. 401, which
described aiding and abetting intended crimes. (Estrada, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) The reviewing court concluded that
the jury instructions taken as a whole—including CALCRIM No.
401—permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, as it did, only if it concluded that he acted with
intent to kill. (Estrada, at p. 947.)
Similarly, at Rushing’s trial, the court did not instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 402 or 403. The bracketed language in
CALCRIM No. 400 was not a self-contained instruction on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. It informed the jury
5 CALCRIM No. 402 describes the natural and probable
consequences doctrine when the target and non-target offenses
are charged. CALCRIM No. 403 describes the natural and
probable consequences doctrine when only the non-target offenses
are charged.
7
of the possibility that a person may be found guilty of other
crimes that occurred during the commission of the crime that he
or she originally aided and abetted. But it did not discuss the
specific circumstances under which this may occur. It was
incomplete without CALCRIM No. 402 or 403. As in Estrada,
CALCRIM No. 401 was the only complete instruction on
accomplice liability that the trial court read to the jury.
Rushing attempts to distinguish Estrada. He points out
that in Estrada the guilty verdict on first degree murder
amounted to the jury’s finding that the defendant acted with
malice. The instructions required the jury to find Estrada acted
with intent to kill to reach that verdict. (Estrada, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 945–946.) Rushing contends that, unlike the
first degree murder conviction in Estrada, his conviction for
second degree murder “supports a reasonable possibility” that the
jury did not find he acted with malice “and instead relied on the
CALCRIM No. 400 bracketed language.” We disagree.
It is true that in Estrada, the instructions permitted the
jury to reach a guilty verdict on first degree murder only if it
concluded the defendant acted with intent to kill. (Estrada,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 945.) The trial court instructed with
CALCRIM No. 521 which discussed first degree murder based on
deliberation and premeditation. (Estrada, at p. 948.) This type
of murder requires intent to kill, as well as other elements that
show preexisting reflection, actual deliberation, or forethought. 6
6 But simply having intent to kill does not necessarily
amount to first degree murder. Express malice requires intent to
kill. (§ 188, subd. (a)(2).) Deliberation and premeditation
requires more than intent to kill. CALCRIM No. 521 states:
“The defendant acted willfully if [he/she] intended to kill. The
8
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080.) Killing with
deliberation and premeditation was the only theory for first
degree murder on which the trial court instructed the jury.
The court in Rushing’s trial similarly instructed on murder
(CALCRIM No. 520), deliberation and premeditation (CALCRIM
No. 521), general principles of aiding and abetting (CALCRIM
No. 400), and aiding and abetting intended crimes (CALCRIM
No. 401). To convict Rushing of second degree murder, the trial
court’s instructions permitted the jury to find that he was a
perpetrator 7 or a direct aider and abettor of express or implied
malice murder. The guilty verdict on second degree murder itself
does not amount to a jury finding that Rushing was liable under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Nor does it
suggest the jury relied on the bracketed language in CALCRIM
No. 400.
defendant acted deliberately if [he/she] carefully weighed the
considerations for and against [his/her] choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if [he/she] decided to kill before completing the
act[s] that caused death.”
An express malice murder committed without deliberation
and premeditation is second degree murder. (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866.)
7 The trial court read CALCRIM No. 520, which required for
a guilty verdict that the jury find “[t]he defendant committed an
act that caused the death of another person,” and “[w]hen the
defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought.”
9
III. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
Rushing contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument
permitted the jury to convict him of murder based on the
bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 400. Specifically, Rushing
claims the prosecutor separated the killing into two acts by
stating, “[W]hen you intentionally commit an act such as taking
your fists and your feet and kicking a 55-year-old man in the
head and the body, you’re intentionally committing an act, that
beating. [¶] When you kick someone in the head, the natural
consequences of that are dangerous to human life.” According to
Rushing, these statements defined the first act as an assault,
which the prosecutor described as a “beating,” and the murder
was the second act which he pinpointed with one of Hubbard’s
kicks to Powe’s head.
But by isolating these statements, Rushing ignores the
context of the prosecutor’s argument from which they were taken.
In this portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor first
discussed specific jury instructions read by the court about the
law on murder, including the definitions of murder and express
and implied malice. He proceeded to apply the facts of the case to
the elements of implied malice murder. 8 Specifically, the
prosecutor described the violent acts collectively committed by
Rushing and Hubbard against Powe, causing his fatal head
8 Implied malice requires intentionally committing an act,
the natural and probable consequences of which were dangerous
to human life, and knowledge that the act was dangerous to
human life, and deliberately acting with conscious disregard for
human life. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
10
injury. 9 The prosecutor also commented on the identical mental
states of Hubbard and Rushing when they committed these acts,
namely their knowledge of their acts’ dangerousness to human
life and their conscious disregard for human life. 10
The prosecutor continued to discuss Rushing’s and
Hubbard’s collective acts and identical mental states when he
argued they were guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder. He described how each of the many violent acts was
comprised of deliberate movements. 11 He commented that
9 The prosecutor stated: “Everyone knows that when you do
that and when you take a head of—as they did with Gregory
Powe, and throw that on the asphalt in that street to the point
where [a witness] could hear the pop and the crack of his
skull . . . that big cracked open gash in the back of Gregory
Powe’s head—that act, the consequences are dangerous to human
life.”
10 The prosecutor argued: “The head is one of the most
sensitive parts of your body. And those acts that these two
individuals did to Mr. Powe on that evening are dangerous to
human life. [¶] They certainly had knowledge of this, and
knowledge could be shown circumstantially. [¶] They aimed for
his head. While he was down on his knees, they beat him even
further, and they continued this act especially on Hood Day.
[¶] . . . [¶] And they acted with conscious disregard. They didn’t
stop. They aimed for the head. They kept on hitting him. They
kicked him. And it ended with Mr. Hubbard taking his head and
throwing it on the ground. [¶] Murder, killing of another human
being with malice, that can be shown in two ways: express
malice, which is obvious intent to kill; and implied malice, which
can also be shown as I’ve demonstrated.”
11 The prosecutor stated, “[E]very time that Mr. Rushing and
Mr. Hubbard [clenched] their fists, pulled back and decide[d] to
11
Rushing and Hubbard consciously decided to commit these
violent acts when they could have stopped at any time. 12
Based on the prosecutor’s discussion that followed the
statements highlighted by Rushing and the context from which
they were taken, the jury would not have separated the acts into
a beating and a killing to apply the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The prosecutor was only applying the law
on implied malice and deliberation and premeditation to the
factual scenario of Rushing’s and Hubbard’s collective acts in
attacking Powe. When making these arguments, he never
mentioned aiding and abetting or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. When the prosecutor finally discussed
aiding and abetting, he limited his comments to direct aiding and
abetting. 13 This portion of the closing argument, like the other
hit Mr. Powe in the head, that was deliberate. They thought
about that. Okay? They didn’t just do it once or two times or
three times. They did it many times.”
12 The prosecutor stated: “Every time they decided to take
their [feet] back and extend [them] and aim at his head or when
they decide to take his head and throw it back on the ground,
these were all conscious decisions, ladies and gentlemen. They
could have stopped any of these at any time, but they didn’t.
They decided to do it over and over again and they decided to act
in concert. That’s why this is first-degree murder.”
13 The prosecutor stated: “The final concept I want to talk to
you about is aiding and abetting. Now, a person could be guilty
of a crime in two ways. They could be a direct perpetrator of the
crime or they could aid and abet someone else who committed a
crime. Okay? Again, for example—and I give extreme examples
to demonstrate this point. [¶] The person who pulls a trigger and
shoots someone in the head, he’s a direct perpetrator of a crime.
12
parts, did not permit the jury to impute malice to Rushing based
on any isolated segment of the beating. The prosecutor’s closing
argument does not change our conclusion that the entirety of the
record conclusively establishes that Rushing is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708.)
Okay? But the person who maybe bought the gun for him, gave it
to him and said you should go kill this person on such and such
date. I made sure to leave the door open so you could get into the
house and kill them, okay, he’s aiding and abetting that murder.
He may not have even been at the crime scene, or he may have.
Maybe he went and drove him there. But he wasn’t the person
who pulled the trigger. However, the law says he’s just as guilty
and culpable as the person who does.”
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J. *
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
14
Filed 3/20/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334988
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA097346)
v.
Order Certifying Opinion
CORY T. RUSHING, for Publication
[No change in judgment]
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on February
27, 2025, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
Upon request by respondent and for good cause, it now appears
that our opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The opinion is ordered published in the
Official Reports.
EGERTON, Acting P. J. ADAMS, J. HANASONO, J. *
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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