CourtListener 10358141•People v. Meheula CA4/1
Full text
Filed 3/19/25 P. v. Meheula CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082601
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD294410 )
RANDY KIMO MEHEULA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Randy Kimo Meheula of 16 counts of committing a
lewd act upon a child 14 or 15 years of age (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (c)(1);
counts 1–5, 8, 11, 13–21).2 After a separate bench trial, the court found true
the alleged aggravating factor.
The court sentenced Meheula to 12 years in prison, consisting of the
middle term of two years on count 1 and eight months (one-third the middle
term) for each of the remaining counts to run consecutively to count 1.
Meheula appeals, contending that the matter must be remanded for
resentencing because the trial court was not aware of its discretion to
sentence him to concurrent terms and substantial evidence does not exist to
support the trial court’s conclusion that each count occurred on separate
occasions or constituted separate acts. We are not persuaded. We therefore
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
In 1998, when she was 13 years old, Jane Doe moved into the house
next door to Meheula’s home. Doe became close with Meheula and his family,
eventually thinking of them like a second family. While she was still 13, Doe
began babysitting for Meheula’s family. Meheula began molesting Doe when
she was 14 years old.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 The jury hung as to the remaining counts, and the trial court declared
a mistrial as to counts 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12.
3 The briefs in the instant matter embrace a more robust discussion of
the testimony adduced at trial, including propensity evidence under Evidence
Code section 1108, the testimony of a fresh complaint witness, and the
testimony of an investigating detective. Because Meheula does not raise a
substantial evidence challenge to the jury’s verdict, we provide a limited
factual background consisting of the charged crimes against Meheula to
provide some context to the court’s sentencing decision.
2
On one occasion after Doe had babysat Meheula’s daughters, she stayed
at Meheula’s house to watch television with him. While watching television,
Meheula asked Doe if she ever watched pornography before, suggesting that
Doe should return to his house on another evening after everyone had gone to
bed.
Later that same week, Doe went over to Meheula’s house after
everyone had gone to sleep. Before going next door, Doe shaved her legs and
vaginal area and put on an outfit that included a skirt and no underwear
because it was implied that something sexual was going to happen. When
she arrived, she entered Meheula’s office through two double doors that led
directly inside. The lights were off, but the room was dimly lit by Meheula’s
computer screen on which he was watching pornography. Meheula began
touching Doe’s breasts and vaginal area, commenting on the fact that she had
shaved before he penetrated her vagina with his fingers. At some point,
Meheula left the office to retrieve a condom from the nearby laundry room.
After he returned to his chair, Meheula instructed Doe to come closer and
then to sit on his lap. When she got on his lap, Meheula penetrated her
vagina with his penis causing Doe to bleed a lot. After Meheula ejaculated,
he gave Doe a towel to clean up and she returned home. Throughout the
encounter, Meheula repeatedly warned Doe that if she told anyone, he would
call her a liar.
About two weeks later, Doe returned to Meheula’s office where he
digitally penetrated her and had intercourse with her again. Doe recalled
that intercourse happened in the office, in addition to the two specific times,
at least ten other times. Doe recalled that digital penetration in the office
happened at least ten times and noted that it occurred almost every time
there was intercourse. Doe recalled that she performed oral sex on Meheula
3
at least five times in the office. Doe and Meheula would have sex in
Meheula’s office an average of two times a month while she lived next door to
him.
When Doe was 15 years old, she moved out of the house next to
Meheula’s but would still see him and his family several times a week. In the
visits after she moved, Meheula would drive Doe to and from his house for
babysitting. On the drives home from babysitting, Meheula would park on a
side street and Doe would perform oral sex on him in the front seat, they
would have intercourse in the backseat, and Meheula would digitally
penetrate Doe in the car. Doe recalled that intercourse happened five to ten
times in the car, digital penetration happened at least five times in the car,
and oral sex happened at least three times in the car.
DISCUSSION
A. Meheula’s Contentions
Meheula argues this matter must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial did not understand it had discretion to impose concurrent
terms. In addition, he asserts that substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s conclusion that each count occurred on separate occasions or
were separate acts. We are not persuaded. As we explain post, the record
indicates that the trial court was aware it had discretion to sentence Meheula
to concurrent sentences but elected not to do so. In addition, when the court
was explaining Meheula’s sentence and that consecutive sentences were
appropriate, Meheula did not object or otherwise ask the court to provide
further clarification of his sentence. Moreover, we reject Meheula’s
alternative argument that the court’s findings justifying consecutive
sentences was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we
conclude that Meheula forfeited his objection to his sentence.
4
B. Background
A probation report was filed, which included an analysis of the factors
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425.4 The probation report
recommended consecutive sentences because “the crimes involved separate
acts upon the victim or occurred on a separate occasion. In addition, it was
believed [Meheula] had an opportunity to reflect between each act yet
continued to molest the victim . . . .”
Before sentencing, the prosecution filed a sentencing memorandum
advocating for, among other things, imposition of a 13-year sentence, which
would necessarily include consecutive sentences. Meheula filed a “statement
in mitigation and in support of probation” wherein he argued that concurrent
sentencing was appropriate under the factors in rule 4.425. Meheula’s
statement in mitigation ended with an explicit request that the trial court
exercise its discretion to impose the least amount of prison time possible by
running the subordinate counts concurrently.
At the hearing, the prosecution argued that consecutive sentences were
warranted because there was minimal mitigation, there was an aggravating
factor found true, and the jury was asked to consider separate sex acts under
each count of section 288. To this end, the prosecutor asserted:
“The same victim, same occasion analysis is if the Court
can run a sentence full strength consecutive or one-third
the mid term. That analysis does not apply in this case.
“In this case, Your Honor, these are separate sex acts, and I
do understand counsel’s argument of it occurred on the
same occasion. They are not [section] 654 and should not
be sentenced separately. The jury was asked to make
4 All further references to rule or rules are to the California Rules of
Court.
5
findings on very specific sex crimes[, and they] have
separate elements that I must prove.
“The Court―jury was given an instruction for lewd and
lascivious conduct, but they also must make a finding on
the specific sex act. Sexual penetration has completely
different elements that must be proven besides oral
copulation and vaginal sex. So to say because they
happened on the same occasion[,] he shouldn’t be punished
for all of those crimes absolutely does not apply.
“The jury made findings to each and individual sexual
assault charges that occurred. And they were even listed
separately within the charging document. This was not an
issue where the defense was not on notice or the jury, they
were alleged to be first time, middle time, last time. They
were all separate and distinct sex acts. So the same victim,
separate occasion analysis is simply not appropriate per the
law in this particular case given the facts and the charges
before the Court.”
After arguing that probation should be granted, Meheula’s trial counsel
argued that “it is well within the Court’s discretion to run subordinate terms
[concurrently].” Moreover, defense counsel asserted that the considerations
under section 654 are distinct from the trial court’s discretion to run the
sentences on counts concurrently rather than consecutively. Further, counsel
reminded the court, multiple times, that it had discretion to run Meheula’s
sentence concurrently.
After considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court sentenced
Meheula to the middle term of two years on count 1 and one-third the middle
term of eight months on each of the remaining counts, for a total of 12 years.
The trial court started by acknowledging Meheula’s duality: on the one hand
he was a law-abiding member of the community and on the other he was a
predator who groomed two young women and abused a position of trust. The
court stated that it had considered various sentences, including probation
6
and two years, which would necessarily have required the court to run
Meheula’s terms concurrently. The court concluded that, despite those less
severe options, Meheula needed to be punished for what he did to Doe
25 years ago.
After pronouncement of the 12 year sentence, the trial court
summarized as follows: “And for the record, the reason I am imposing that
12-year term, these are separate acts . . . that the jury has made separate
finding for these acts. Therefore, a separate penalty is appropriate. There is
no [section] 654 problem here.”
Meheula’s trial counsel made no additional argument; he did not object
to the trial court’s stated reasons or ask for further explanation.
C. Analysis
Section 669 states the general rule that when a person is convicted of
two or more crimes, the sentences “shall run concurrently or consecutively.”
The trial court has discretion to decide whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences. (People v. Morales (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 537, 547.)
Rule 4.425 sets forth some of the factors used in determining whether
to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. These include, among others,
whether the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of
each other, whether they involved separate acts of violence or threats of
violence, and whether the crimes were committed at different times and or
places. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Rule 4.425(b)(1).)
Meheula’s first argument is that we must remand this matter for
resentencing because the trial court was not aware it had the discretion to
impose concurrent sentences. We are not persuaded.
A trial court must exercise “informed discretion” when sentencing a
defendant. (See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) However,
7
“ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977, citing People v. Superior Court (Du)
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831.) The burden is placed on the appellant
because a reviewing court presumes that the trial court understood its full
sentencing discretion under the law, unless the record establishes otherwise.
(See People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct
statutory and case law’ ”]; Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307,
321 [“An order is presumed correct; all intendments are indulged in to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown”].)
Here, the record does not suggest that the trial court was unaware it
had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences. In fact, the trial court
stated at the sentencing hearing that it considered imposing a two year
sentence, which would have required the court to run the sentences
concurrently. If the trial court had believed, as Meheula now suggests, that
consecutive punishment was mandatory, the trial court would not have
mentioned that it considered a two year sentence.
Additionally, the trial court stated that it was using the factors in
aggravation to justify the consecutive terms; thus, it would be unfair to
Meheula to also use the aggravating factors to impose the upper term:
“[I]n fairness to the defendant, I am taking into consideration his violation of
trust, the emotional impact on the victims, their vulnerability . . . for all of
the entire sentence that I don’t think it would be fair to him to use those
factors to aggravate to the upper term.” The court’s recognition that it would
be unfair (and improper) to make a dual use of the aggravating factors to
8
impose the upper term along with a consecutive sentence shows that the
court understood it had discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive terms
but chose the latter based on the aggravating factors. (See People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350, fn. 12 (Scott) [finding that the trial court could not
use the same fact to impose both the upper term and consecutive
punishment].) The trial court’s reference to the potential “dual use” issue
underscores that it understood it had discretion as to concurrent versus
consecutive sentences that required justification beyond the analysis under
section 654. In addition, the comments appear to be a tacit reference to
rule 4.425. (See Rule 4.425(b)(1) [an aggravating factor cannot be used to
both justify the upper term and justify imposition of a consecutive sentence].)
Our conclusion that the trial court realized that it had discretion to
sentence Meheula to concurrent terms is buttressed by the arguments of both
the prosecution and Meheula’s trial counsel below. Each party specifically
addressed whether the court should sentence Meheula to consecutive or
concurrent terms. At no time during those arguments did anyone claim that
the court lacked the discretion to sentence Meheula to concurrent sentences.
Moreover, the court, in considering these arguments, never indicated that it
did not have discretion to impose concurrent sentences on Meheula.
Accordingly, we would have to all but ignore the record before us to even
entertain the argument that the trial court did not realize the extent of its
discretion in sentencing Meheula to concurrent or consecutive sentences.
Thus, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Meheula to consecutive terms.
Next, Meheula claims error because the trial court did not provide
adequate reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. However, he failed to
object on this ground below, forfeiting the claim.
9
In Scott, our high court explained, “complaints about the manner in
which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its
supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356.) “[C]laims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” are subject
to forfeiture, including “cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not
apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred
because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the
various factors, or failed to state any reasons or to give a sufficient number of
valid reasons.” (Id. at p. 353; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233,
242 (Anderson) [defendant’s argument that trial court failed to articulate
reasons for upper term forfeited for failure to object]; People v. Sperling
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100–1102 (Sperling) [defendant forfeited dual
use issue, among other sentencing claims, for failure to object].)
Thus, by failing to object to the court’s alleged lack of reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences, Meheula forfeited that claim of error on
appeal.5 (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 356; Anderson, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 242.)
5 In his reply brief, for the first time, Meheula argues that if we find
forfeiture then he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, we do
not address issues raised the first time in a reply brief without good cause.
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 197.) We thus decline to address this
issue here. Moreover, we are guided by the principle that, except in those
rare instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s
actions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas
corpus, not on direct appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264,
266–267.) This is particularly true where the alleged incompetence stems
from counsel’s failure to object. “[D]eciding whether to object is inherently
tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.”
(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.) Additionally, for any claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that he or she
10
Finally, in the alternative, Meheula argues that insufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s conclusion the offenses occurred on separate
occasions or were separate acts. In this sense, Meheula appears to be
arguing that substantial evidence does not support a determination that
consecutive sentences are warranted under rule 4.425(a)(1)6 or
rule 4.425(a)(3).7
However, as the People note, although Meheula ostensibly claims no
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that each offense was a
separate act, Meheula includes no argument, citation to the record, or legal
authority supporting that position. Rather, his substantive arguments are
aimed solely at the claim that substantial evidence does not support the
court’s conclusion that the offenses occurred on separate occasions.
Consequently, he has waived his claim that substantial evidence does not
support a finding that the offenses constituted separate acts. (See People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661,
672–673.) Thus, the only argument before us is Meheula’s contention that
substantial evidence does not support a finding that the offenses occurred on
separate occasions.
was prejudiced by his or her counsel’s action (or lack of action). (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692.) Based on the record before us, we
are not persuaded that Meheula was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to
object or failure to request further explanation from the court regarding
Meheula’s sentence.
6 Rule 4.425(a)(1) provides: “The crimes and their objectives were
predominately independent of each other.”
7 Rule 4.425(a)(3) states: “The crimes were committed at different times
or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place
as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.”
11
“The criteria applicable to the trial court’s discretion are set forth
in . . . rule 4.425, which states that in imposing consecutive sentences a trial
court may consider: (1) whether the ‘crimes and their objectives were
predominately independent of each other’; (2) whether the ‘crimes involved
separate acts of violence or threats of violence’; and (3) whether the ‘crimes
were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being
committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of
aberrant behavior.’ ” (People v. Caesar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060,
fn. omitted.)
In addition to the factors laid out in rule 4.425(a), rule 4.425(b)
provides that the trial court may rely on, “any circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation, whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the
judge in a court trial . . . in deciding whether to impose consecutive rather
than concurrent sentences.” (Rule 4.425(b).) Reliance on any one
aggravating factor, or any criterion from rule 4.425(a), is sufficient to justify
imposition of consecutive punishment. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th
463, 552 [“Only one criterion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support
a consecutive sentence”].)
Therefore, rule 4.425 acts as a guideline for the trial court and not a
requirement: “[f]actors affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather
than concurrent sentences include . . . .” (Rule 4.425; see People v. Calderon
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82, 86–87 [“[the factors in rule 4.425] are guidelines,
not rigid rules courts are bound to apply in every case”].)
Moreover, rule 4.408(a) provides: “The listing of factors in these rules
for making discretionary sentencing decisions is not exhaustive and does not
prohibit a trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably related to the
12
decision being made. Any such additional criteria must be stated on the
record by the sentencing judge.”
Here, Meheula’s alternative argument relies on his assertion that the
trial court imposed consecutive punishment based on a finding that
rule 4.425(a)(3) applied and each count occurred at separate times or in
separate places. The record does not support Meheula’s assertion.
Below, the trial court found true that for each count Meheula had
abused a position of trust and confidence to commit the crime within the
meaning of rule 4.421(a)(11) as charged in the information. The court also
found that Doe was particularly vulnerable, Meheula had no remorse, and
Meheula’s crimes had caused lasting emotional harm to his victim.
Therefore, it appears, based on the record before us, that the trial court
grounded its sentencing decision on those factors. Indeed, the court made
clear that he was not using those factors to impose an upper term. Thus, it
logically follows that, in not relying on those factors to justify an upper term,
the court mentioned them to justify the imposition of consecutive prison
terms. Our conclusion is further buoyed by the fact that the trial court was
permitted to rely on the aggravating factors to justify imposing consecutive
punishment because it did not rely on the aggravating factors to select the
upper term. (See Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104 [“The trial court
imposed the middle term—not the upper term—on count 1. Thus, in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court could
have considered the same aggravating factors it had considered in deciding to
impose the middle term”].)
Meheula’s substantial evidence argument is primarily based on an
isolated reading of the statement made by the trial court after it announced
the sentence, “the reasons I am imposing that 12-year term, these are
13
separate acts . . . that the jury has made a separate finding for these acts.
Therefore, a separate penalty is appropriate. There is no [section] 654
problem here.”
Yet, reviewing the trial court’s statement in context, the record
supports a conclusion that the court relied on the aggravating factors to
impose consecutive punishment and its mention of section 654 was intended
to explain why it believed it possessed discretion to do so. Additionally, the
trial court’s statement that the crimes were “separate acts” appears to be a
reference to rule 4.425(a)(1) and not rule 4.425(a)(3).
Moreover, the court’s reliance on rule 4.425(a)(1) was proper. As
Meheula correctly concedes, each count was a separate sex act, thus multiple
punishments were permitted under section 654. (See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 344, fn. 6 [“[M]ultple sex acts committed on a single occasion can result
in multiple statutory violations. Such offenses are generally ‘divisible’ from
one another under section 654, and separate punishment is usually
allowed”].)
As the People acknowledge, however, the analysis under section 654 is
distinct from a trial court’s decision whether to impose consecutive
punishment under rule 4.425. Nonetheless, our Supreme Court’s analysis of
sex offenses under section 654 is helpful here. (People v. Deloza (1998)
18 Cal.4th 585, 594 [“Thus, the question of whether sentences should be
concurrent or consecutive is separate from the question of whether
section 654 prohibits multiple punishment”].)
For example, in Harrison, our high court refused to expand
section 654’s single intent test to multiple individual sex acts because a
“ ‘defendant who attempts to achieve gratification by committing a number of
base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a
14
defendant who commits only one such act.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989)
48 Cal.3d 321, 336.) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court found
multiple punishments proper despite section 654 even where multiple sex
offenses occurred on the same occasion, closely in time, and were committed
with the same general objective of sexual gratification. (See id. at
pp. 334–337.) Similarly, under rule 4.425(a)(1), the trial court may consider
whether “the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of
each other,” when exercising its discretion to impose consecutive punishment.
In the instant action, none of the sex acts committed by Meheula on
any occasion were incidental to another; each was distinct from the other,
and each had a distinct objective (to satisfy Meheula’s prurient desires via
each specific sex act). (See People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552
[“Assertion of a sole intent and objective to achieve sexual gratification is
akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as the sole intent and objective in
committing a series of separate thefts”].) Where, as here, the trial court
implicitly referenced rule 4.425(a)(1) when it noted that the crimes were
“separate acts,” it is reasonable to conclude that the trial court believed each
sexual offense was independent of the other and each was motivated by
Meheula’s desire to achieve sexual gratification via each sexual act. This is
consistent with what the jury found in convicting Meheula of 16 separate sex
acts. It was, therefore, proper for the trial court to exercise its discretion to
impose consecutive punishment for each count because Meheula was more
culpable than an offender who committed only one sex offense against a
victim. We therefore conclude Meheula’s claim of error is without merit.
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
RUBIN, J.
16
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.