People v. West CA3

CourtListener 10356663CalctappMar 14, 2025

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Filed 3/14/25 P. v. West CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099829

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 15F05919)

v.

JERRY WEST, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jerry West, Jr., appeals for a third time following his most recent
resentencing. This court initially affirmed his numerous convictions for sex offenses but
twice remanded the case for the trial court to consider exercising its discretion to strike
certain enhancements or stay selected terms due to ameliorative changes in the law that
went into effect while West’s appeals were pending. At his third resentencing, the trial

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court declined to exercise its discretion under amended Penal Code1 section 1385,
subdivision (c), to strike multiple firearm and prior serious felony enhancements based on
West’s dangerousness to society. The court sentenced West to a determinate term of 103
years in state prison for the enhancements, plus an indeterminate term of 325 years to
life.
In this appeal, West contends for the first time that the trial court abused its
discretion because it applied an improper legal standard in declining to dismiss the
enhancements. He argues amended section 1385, subdivision (c) requires a trial court to
conduct a forward-looking dangerousness assessment, and that a court prejudicially errs
where it only considers a defendant’s current dangerousness. Because he would still be
subject to the 325-year indeterminate life term if the enhancements were stricken, West
argues the court abused its discretion by not striking the enhancements.
Exercising our discretion to reach the issue, we conclude that the trial court
applied an erroneous legal standard in determining whether dismissal of the
enhancements would “endanger public safety” under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
and it thereby prejudicially abused its discretion. We shall vacate the sentence and
remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
Over a three-week period in 2015, West attacked, robbed, and sexually assaulted
four different women in the Sacramento area using a gun or threats of violence. (People
v. West (Jan. 16, 2020, C084521) [nonpub. opn.].) Based on the assaults, West was found
guilty of multiple offenses against each victim.2 He was sentenced to an aggregate

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The jury found West guilty of two counts each of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a,
subd. (c)(2)), assault with intent to commit oral copulation (§ 220), and assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (b)), four counts of robbery (§ 211), and one count each of

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determinate term of 115 years in prison plus an indeterminate term of 331 years to life,
which included terms for several firearm and prior serious felony enhancements. We
affirmed his convictions on appeal, but remanded the matter for resentencing to allow the
trial court to determine whether to exercise newly granted discretion to strike the firearm
and prior serious felony enhancements given legislative changes that went into effect
while West’s first appeal was pending. (West, supra, C084521.)
Upon remand, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to strike the various
enhancements and confirmed West’s original sentence. We affirmed the trial court’s
denial order but remanded the matter to allow the trial court an opportunity to exercise its
newly granted discretion under amended section 654, which no longer required a trial
court to impose the term with the longest possible sentence. (People v. West (June 1,
2022, C093366) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following remand, West filed a letter with the court expressing remorse,
describing mental health related issues from his childhood, and detailing his rehabilitative
efforts while incarcerated. West submitted a second letter admitting his guilt, accepting
responsibility for the crimes, and recounting his difficult childhood with his drug
addicted parents, his mental health issues, his lengthy criminal history, and his substance
abuse issues; he also expressed remorse and noted his participation in treatment programs
while in prison.
The People filed an opposition, arguing the trial court should not reduce West’s
sentence under amended section 654 given the egregiousness of West’s conduct and the
need to protect the community from him. Defense counsel’s resentencing brief urged the
court to impose lesser terms under amended section 654, citing West’s two prior letters

carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), kidnapping with intent to commit robbery and/or oral
copulation (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), and attempted forcible oral copulation (§ 664, former
§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)).

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where he emphasized his remorse, his postconviction participation in self-help programs,
and his mental health challenges prior to his arrest.
At a resentencing hearing in September 2023, the trial court considered whether to
impose a lesser sentence under amended section 654 as directed by the remittitur. The
court also noted that it had “considered and applied other laws that have become effective
while this case was pending and not final pursuant to” In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, including amended section 1170, which now limits a court’s ability to impose upper
term sentences unless aggravating factors have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a trier of fact, and amended section 1385, which now requires consideration of
certain enumerated mitigating factors when determining whether to strike enhancements.
The court considered the parties’ briefs, West’s letters, as well as a supplemental
probation report. Defense counsel “request[ed] the Court consider the low term where
available,” and argued that West was entitled to any ameliorative changes in the law
under Estrada, including changes to the requirements for proving aggravating
circumstances. Counsel emphasized West’s recognition of the seriousness of his crimes,
his expressed remorse for the victims, his mental health issues, and his postconviction
efforts to obtain treatment. West told the court he was “very remorseful.”
The trial court declined to exercise its discretion to further reduce West’s sentence
under section 654 or to strike any of the enhancements under section 1385. The court did
so after considering the general sentencing objectives under rule 4.410 of the California
Rules of Court, including protecting society, punishing the defendant, and deterring
others from criminal conduct, as well as the nature and circumstances of the crimes, the
defendant’s prior convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects. The court noted West was 30 years old at the time of the present offenses, and
had a violent criminal history that included two carjacking convictions in 2009 where he
used a firearm against the separate victims; West also had been released on parole for
only two months before he committed the current violent sexual offenses using a firearm.

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While the court recognized West was remorseful and had made efforts to improve himself
while incarcerated, the court nevertheless found him to be a danger to society based on
his violent criminal history and his relatively high score on the Static-99R actuarial risk
prediction instrument as reflected in the 2017 probation report. Given the circumstances
of the crimes, the suffering of the victims, and West’s Static-99R score, the court found it
would not be in the interest of justice to modify his sentence to a shorter term under
section 654.
The court then considered whether to strike any of the enhancements under
amended section 1385, subdivision (c). In doing so, the court noted it had discretion to
strike an enhancement if it was in the furtherance of justice to do so. The presence of the
statutory mitigating factors, the court explained, “weigh[ed] greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement unless the Court finds dismissal would endanger public
safety,” which meant “there [was] a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” After considering the
mitigating factors listed in California Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b),3 the court found that
none were applicable. For the reasons previously stated, the court declined to strike any
of the enhancements because it believed doing so would seriously endanger public safety.
Finally, applying amended section 1170, the trial court imposed the middle term
on three counts, rather than the previously imposed upper terms, because neither the jury

3 California Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b), lists several mitigating factors related to a
defendant, including: (1) the absence of a prior criminal record; (2) the defendant’s
mental or physical condition significantly reducing culpability for the crime; (3) the
defendant’s experience of psychological, physical, or childhood trauma—such as abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence—when it was a factor in the commission of the
crime; (4) a connection between the current offense and the defendant’s prior
victimization or childhood trauma, or mental illness as defined by section 1385,
subdivision (c); (5) the possibility that applying an enhancement could result in a
sentence exceeding 20 years; and (6) the presence of multiple enhancements alleged in a
single case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1)-(5), (10)-(11).)

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nor the court had found the aggravating circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt,
nor had West stipulated to circumstances in aggravation as amended section 1170 now
requires. For similar reasons, the court imposed the middle term on the firearm
enhancements attached to two counts. West received an aggregate determinate term of
103 years in prison for the firearm and prior serious felony enhancements plus an
indeterminate term of 325 years to life.
Prior to concluding the hearing, the court stated: “[it was] aware that there may be
future ameliorative sentencing statutes enacted by the legislature. The Court has
thoroughly considered the sentence imposed in this case, both in the original sentencing,
the first resentencing, and now in this second resentencing. The Court will make clear
that the Court would not, even in light of future ameliorative statutes, exercise its
discretion to change or modify or reduce the defendant’s sentence in any way.” West
timely appealed in November 2023. His opening brief was filed in July 2024, and this
case became fully briefed on November 19, 2024.
DISCUSSION
West contends the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal
standard under amended section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) when determining whether to
dismiss one or more of the firearm or prior serious felony enhancements, which added
103 years to his sentence. Relying primarily on People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez) and People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057
(Williams), West asserts that the court erred by considering only whether he currently
posed a danger to the public rather than considering dangerousness at the time he would
be released if the enhancements were dismissed.
A. Forfeiture
West acknowledges that the issue may not be preserved for review by his failure to
raise it below (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [generally complaints about how
a trial court exercises its sentencing discretion may not be raised for the first time on

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appeal]), but he argues that this court should exercise its discretion to consider the issue if
forfeited (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6 [an appellate court has
authority to reach a question not preserved for review by a party]). Alternatively, West
contends trial counsel’s omission constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
While it is true that West did not raise this exact legal standard issue in his trial
briefs or during the resentencing hearing, the record shows the trial court was cognizant
that it had to apply, and did apply, amended section 1385, subdivision (c) in determining
whether to strike the enhancements. In any event, even if the precise issue was not
properly preserved, to forestall West’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we shall
exercise our discretion to consider the issue. (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 400 [declining to find forfeiture to forestall ineffective assistance of counsel claim].)
B. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s determination that dismissing the enhancements under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) would endanger public safety for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 [applying abuse of discretion
standard to § 1385, subd. (c)(2) determination]; cf. People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 371 [a trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under § 1385,
subd. (a) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion].) Where “ ‘ “a discretionary power is
statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on
appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 298.) Such an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court
based its decision on an incorrect legal standard. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 156.)
C. Analysis
Turning to the merits of West’s claim that the trial court erred in deciding whether
dismissing the enhancements would “endanger public safety,” we begin with the relevant

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statutory language. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 [the proper
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that appellate court reviews de novo].)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), provides that a sentencing court “[i]n exercising its
discretion” to dismiss a sentencing enhancement “shall consider and afford great weight
to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances, and “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” The Legislature specifically defined
“[e]ndanger public safety” to mean “there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2), italics added.)
Our Supreme Court considered the meaning of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) in
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024. The court found that section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal of an enhancement
unless a sentencing court found that dismissal would endanger public safety. (Walker, at
p. 1029.) Instead, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court
retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.”
(Ibid.) “In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public
safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight
of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1029-1030.)
Walker, admittedly, did not address the exact issue presented here—whether a trial
court must consider a defendant’s future (as opposed merely to current) dangerousness if

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dismissal were granted. Our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division One,
however, recently considered a similar issue in Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215.
The defendant in Gonzalez was found guilty of first degree murder with a gun use
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and sentenced to 75 years to life, including a term
of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. (Gonzalez, at p. 220.) The trial court
declined to dismiss the firearm enhancement because it concluded the defendant
presently represented a danger to society. (Id. at p. 224.) The appellate court reversed,
finding that “[t]he plain words of the statute do not support the trial court’s singular focus
on whether the defendant currently poses a danger.” (Id. at p. 228.)
In so concluding, the Gonzalez court emphasized that section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) focuses on the danger associated with the dismissal of an enhancement. (Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) “Although the current dangerousness of the defendant
is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing
the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the
dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence.” (Ibid.)
“A currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short
timeframe might be found by the trial court to pose a greater danger to the public than a
defendant who is currently dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison
until he is elderly.” (Ibid.) The court also noted that, for indeterminately sentenced
defendants, the dangerousness inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s
release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings, which will
have the opportunity to reassess a defendant’s dangerousness at that time and will act as a
“safety valve” against release that would endanger the public. (Ibid.; see also § 3041,
subd. (b)(1) [“The panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall grant parole to an inmate
unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the
timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

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consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this
individual”].)
Gonzalez relied on this court’s decision in Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1057,
which arose under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 and section 1170.126.
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 228-230.) There, a panel of this court found
that the trial court abused its discretion under section 1170.126 in determining that
resentencing the defendant under the Three Strikes Reform Act posed an unreasonable
risk to public safety. (Williams, at p. 1061.) Williams explained: “Determining whether
resentencing a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society is necessarily a
forward-looking inquiry. When determining whether resentencing poses an unreasonable
risk of danger, the trial court must look to when a defendant would be released if the
petition is granted and the defendant is resentenced.” (Id. at p. 1063.) This rationale
applies with even greater force, the court noted, when a defendant would still be serving a
sentence greater than a human lifespan even if the petition were granted. (Ibid.)
Much like the defendant in Williams, who was serving a sentence of 193 years to
life (Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060), West is sentenced to 325 years to life
consecutive to a determinate term of 103 years. West’s indeterminate 325-year-to-life
term is the equivalent of life without parole since he cannot obtain parole until far beyond
a human lifespan. This remains true even if the 103 years for the enhancements is
stricken under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). It is hard to see how West would pose a
danger to society if the enhancements were dismissed if he has almost no hope of ever
being released from prison, and, even if he were considered for parole at some future
date, the Board of Parole Hearings would have to determine that he did not pose a danger
to the public at that time.
We find the reasoning in Williams instructive because the relevant language in
section 1170.126, which focuses on whether a new sentence would result in an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (§ 1170.126, subd. (f)), is similar to section

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1385’s public safety language. And we agree with Gonzalez that under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), a trial court should consider whether a defendant poses a danger to
public safety at the time he or she will be released if one or more enhancements are
dismissed.
In this case, the trial court denied relief based on its assessment of West’s current
dangerousness, based largely on the nature of the present offenses and his previous score
on the Static-99R test. It does not appear, however, that the court ever considered
whether West would pose a danger to the public if the 103 years for the enhancements
were stricken and he was still subject to the 325-year indeterminate term. Failure to
consider West’s future dangerousness if the enhancements were stricken constituted an
abuse of discretion.
The People argue that even if the trial court erred in applying an incorrect legal
standard under section 1385, subdivision (c), the error is harmless because the trial court
made clear that it “would not, even in light of future ameliorative statutes, exercise its
discretion to change or modify or reduce the defendant’s sentence in any way.” We
disagree.
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the
“informed discretion” of the sentencing court.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391.) A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers does not
exercise informed discretion. (Ibid.) Under such circumstances, remand for resentencing
is the appropriate remedy unless the record “ ‘clearly indicate[s]’ ” that the trial court
would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware of the scope of its
discretion. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court’s comments give no indication of how it would rule if it did
not limit its inquiry under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) to West’s current
dangerousness notwithstanding any hypothetical future ameliorative changes in the law.
Indeed, given the sheer magnitude of West’s 325-year indeterminate term, with a

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potential release date far beyond the life expectancy for any human, it is conceivable that,
if the trial court holds a new sentencing hearing in which it does not limit its inquiry to
West’s current dangerousness, it will decide to exercise its discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) in a different manner. Under these circumstances, remand for
resentencing to correct the prejudicial error is warranted.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for resentencing.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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