CourtListener 10355437•Daly v. Kibby CA2/7
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Filed 3/12/25 Daly v. Kibby CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
JODIE N. DALY, B329299
Petitioner and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BD572652)
v.
ROBERT E. KIBBY II,
Respondent and
Appellant.
B330453
JODIE N. DALY,
Petitioner and
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT E. KIBBY II,
Respondent and
Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Elizabeth Scully, Judge. Affirmed as to case No.
B330453; dismissed as to case No. B329299.
Robert E. Kibby II, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
_______________________________
Robert E. Kibby II, representing himself as he did in the
family court, appeals from the family court’s March 7, 2023 order
denying his request for order (RFO) seeking a disability
accommodation for his participation in family therapy (case
No. B330453). Because Kibby has failed to establish the court
committed prejudicial error in denying his RFO, we affirm the
order. Kibby also purports to appeal the court’s April 11, 2023
order declaring him a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(1), (2), and (3) (case
No. B329299). Because Kibby appeals from the minute order
directing preparation of an order after hearing, and he has not
provided a signed order after hearing, the minute order is not
appealable. Thus, we dismiss the appeal of the vexatious litigant
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The 2017 Custody Order
Jodie N. Daly and Kibby were married in 2008 and have
two minor children, L. (born in 2008) and K. (born in 2010). On
October 22, 2012 Daly filed a petition in family court for
dissolution of the marriage. After the parties reached a
stipulation and partial settlement of disputed issues, on
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February 27, 2014 the family court entered a judgment of
dissolution. The court awarded sole physical and legal custody of
the children to Daly, with visitation for Kibby every other
weekend. In 2016 the court partially granted an RFO filed by
Kibby and modified the custody order to award joint legal custody
of the children to the parents.
On October 3, 2016, when Daly picked up the children from
school, L. complained of neck pain and told Daly that on the prior
evening (during a weekend visit with Kibby) Kibby had choked
her while giving her a bath. K. confirmed L.’s account. Kibby
denied the allegation, but Daly refused to let the children visit
him. After an investigation by a social worker, who evaluated
L.’s medical records and a report to the police department, the
parties next appeared in court in December 2016. The family
court heard testimony from the parties regarding custody and
visitation, and then ordered the parents to attend eight
coparenting classes together and directed the social worker to
prepare a parenting plan assessment.
On August 23, 2017 the family court found Kibby’s
relationship with the children had been damaged, in part due to a
10-month period without visitation that resulted from the
October 2016 incident, and it was in the best interests of the
children to have “ongoing and meaningful” contact with Kibby.
The court awarded joint legal custody to the parents and sole
physical custody to Daly, with Kibby to have monitored visitation
in a therapeutic setting with a licensed therapist at least once per
week, and Kibby to complete a minimum of 10 counseling
sessions with a licensed counselor.
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B. Visitation and Conjoint Therapy Between 2018 and 2022
In August 2018 Daly filed an RFO seeking sole legal and
physical custody of the children. Daly stated in her declaration
that Kibby had not completed his court-ordered counseling
sessions and had no visitation with the children since late 2016.
Further, on August 14 Kibby went to the children’s school, which
scared the children. Daly asserted the children were afraid of
Kibby and did not want to be around him.
In a September 2018 declaration filed in support of his
opposition to the RFO, Kibby stated he had been unable to
comply with the counseling order due to financial hardship and
an unspecified disability. He declared he had “been battling with
a disability since December 2017 and/or 2 to 3 years prior,” and
he was “in the rehabilitation phase of [the] disability.” Kibby also
asserted Daly did not have any interest in her own or the
children’s education, and he requested joint physical custody. On
September 26, 2018 the family court granted Daly’s RFO and
awarded her sole physical and legal custody.
In September 2019 the family court issued an order
denying Kibby’s RFO for modification of custody and granting
Daly’s RFO seeking a move-away order. The court ordered the
parties to meet and confer “regarding manner and method of
reunification therapy.” The court held a status conference on
January 21, 2020, at which it ordered Kibby to provide Daly with
the names of two reunification therapists within 30 days, and
then for Daly to select one of the two therapists within 15 days.
The therapy sessions were ordered to take place any day except
Sunday.
On February 13, 2020 Kibby filed another RFO seeking
joint legal and physical custody. In his declaration Kibby stated
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he provided Daly with five potential counseling facilities
following the January 2020 order, but Daly refused to allow any
contact or reunification counseling between Kibby and the
children. Kibby asserted that Daly’s refusal was “a form of child
abduction.” On August 26, 2020, after hearing testimony from
the parties, the family court ordered Daly to select three
therapists who were available on Saturday afternoons. Kibby
was then to select one of the therapists and begin conjoint
therapy with the children at least once per week. After eight
therapy sessions, if approved by the therapist, Kibby could have
video calls with the children three times per week. The court
declined to modify custody. The court continued the RFO to
January 11, 2021. At that hearing the court allowed Kibby video
calls with the children twice per week.
Kibby filed another RFO on January 15, 2021, again
seeking sole legal and physical custody. Kibby alleged Daly was
not allowing the children to attend court-ordered therapy
sessions or participate in video calls with Kibby. At a hearing on
June 23, 2021 the family court1 appointed counsel for the
children “for the limited purpose of working with the parties to
select a therapist for conjoint therapy between [Kibby] and minor
children.” The court ordered that Kibby could have video calls
with the children at specified times on Wednesday evenings and
Saturday mornings.
On June 17, 2022 Kibby filed another RFO seeking sole
legal and physical custody of the children and requesting the
family court order in-person conjoint therapy and supervised
1 Judge Elizabeth Scully handled the June 23, 2021 hearing
and subsequent proceedings. Different judicial officers handled
prior hearings.
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visitation. In his declaration, Kibby stated that in
December 2021 he had begun conjoint therapy with the children
over video calls. However, Daly had caused the children to miss
“numerous” counseling sessions. In addition, the therapist the
family had been seeing left the clinic in early June 2022. Kibby
attached as exhibits May 2022 progress letters from the therapist
stating the children were reluctant to communicate with Kibby.
The therapist recommended the therapy sessions continue. After
a hearing on December 6, 2022, the court denied Kibby’s RFO.
C. Kibby’s December 12, 2022 RFO
On December 12, 2022 Kibby filed an RFO seeking a
“reasonable accommodation for family therapy/counseling
regarding scheduling time slots.” In his supporting declaration,
Kibby explained that at the December 6, 2022 hearing the family
court ordered him to contact the newly-assigned therapist to
schedule conjoint counseling. Kibby emailed the therapist and
informed her that he was disabled and had “issues with: 1)
medical/therapist appointments, 2) medical issues, 3)
transportation, and 4) medications” and “[m]ust coordinate
around availability between appointment scheduling of medical
facilities and the availability of individuals who[m] [Kibby] solely
depends on for transportation.” Kibby attached to his declaration
the emails with the therapist, in which Kibby requested that the
video counseling sessions continue to be held on Wednesday
evenings as they had been with the prior therapist. The
therapist responded that she was unavailable on Wednesday
evenings and the children had consistently been attending
sessions on Wednesday afternoons. Kibby replied that afternoons
“are in conflict with doctors appointments, therapy appointments,
etc.” and requested the “[r]easonable [a]ccommodation” of a
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Wednesday evening appointment. The therapist stated she was
unable to accommodate Kibby’s request, and she was reluctant to
have a new therapist assigned because she had developed a
rapport with the children and the children had three therapists
in the past year.
The family court held a hearing on Kibby’s RFO on
March 7, 2023.2 After hearing from the parties, the court denied
the RFO, finding Kibby had not shown a material change in
circumstances. The court also set a hearing for an order to show
cause why Kibby should not be declared a vexatious litigant, and
it invited the parties to file declarations with respect to a possible
vexatious litigant finding.
D. The Vexatious Litigant Finding
On March 28, 2023 Kibby filed a declaration urging the
family court not to find him a vexatious litigant because his
actions “fell under the Reasonable Person Standard.” (Boldface
omitted.) Kibby stated his main concern was for family
reunification, the children’s education interests, and the best
interests of the children. He asserted that Daly refused to
appropriately coparent to address educational and behavior
issues. Further, he declared, despite the fact that he had
completed his individual counseling sessions and began conjoint
therapy with the children, the court “refuses to restore” and “has
2 The docket reflects Daly filed a response to the RFO on
March 3, 2023, but the response is not included in the record on
appeal. No court reporter was present for the March 7, 2023
hearing, and Kibby did not file a settled statement pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) setting forth what
happened at the hearing.
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disregarded” the 2017 order awarding Kibby joint custody and
requiring in-person conjoint therapy.
At a hearing on April 11, 2023, after considering the
declarations filed by Kibby and Daly and Kibby’s testimony at the
hearing, the family court declared Kibby a vexatious litigant
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 391,
subdivision (b)(1), (2), and (3).3 The court stated, “[Kibby] has
filed approximately seven duplicative RFO’s relating to post-
judgment custody and visitation issues since January 1, 2021, as
well as an OSC regarding [c]ontempt which was ultimately
withdrawn and a request for domestic violence restraining orders
which was denied. [Kibby] has repeatedly relitigated post-
judgment custody modification issues and the court has
repeatedly denied [those] requests on the grounds that there has
not been a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to
support modification.” The court explained it had admonished
Kibby in April 2022 that if he continued to file “duplicative and
unmeritorious” requests, the court might declare him a vexatious
litigant. Further, Kibby did not appear to “acknowledge that his
repeated, duplicative and unmeritorious court filings have been
inappropriate or unreasonable (let alone contrary to his own
interests) and does not express an intention to change his
behavior in the future.”
The family court concluded “that under the facts and
circumstances of this case some guardrail in the form of a
prefiling order per CCP 391.7 is required . . . .” The court ordered
3 The record does not include Daly’s March 28, 2023
declaration filed in support of an order declarating Kibby a
vexatious litigant. No court reporter was present at the April 11,
2023 hearing, and Kibby did not file a settled statement.
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that Kibby must obtain permission from the presiding judge prior
to filing any future request, RFO, order to show cause, or motion
in this case. The minute order directed that counsel for Daly was
“to prepare the written Order After Hearing, serve it on the
opposition for approval as to form and content and submit same
to the Court for signature.”
Kibby timely filed notices of appeal from the family court’s
March 7, 2023 order denying his RFO (case No. B330453) and
from the April 11, 2023 order declaring him a vexatious litigant
(case No. B329299). This court denied Kibby’s motion to
consolidate the appeals, but we consider them together in this
opinion.
DISCUSSION
A. Kibby Has Failed To Show the Family Court Erred in
Denying the December 12, 2022 RFO
“Under California’s statutory scheme governing child
custody and visitation determinations, the overarching concern is
the best interest of the child.” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001)
26 Cal.4th 249, 255 (Montenegro); accord, In re Marriage of
McKean (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1088-1089.) In determining
the best interest of the child, the court must consider “all
relevant factors, including the child’s health, safety, and welfare,
any history of abuse by one parent against any child or the other
parent, and the nature and amount of the child’s contact with the
parents.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th
947, 955-956; accord, In re Marriage of McKean, at p. 1089.)
“Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent
custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement
is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for
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continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm
that may result from disruption of established patterns of care
and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily
in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In
recognition of this policy concern, we have articulated a variation
on the best interest standard, known as the changed
circumstance rule, that the trial court must apply when a parent
seeks modification of a final judicial custody determination.”
(In re Marriage of Brown & Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 956;
accord, In re Marriage of McKean, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1089.)
Under the changed circumstance rule, “a party seeking to
modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she
demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a
modification. . . . [A court] should preserve the established mode
of custody unless some significant change in circumstances
indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child’s
best interest.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256.)
However, where the requested modification “amounts to
something less than a change of legal custody,” the parent
seeking modification generally need not show changed
circumstances, and instead must show only that the change is in
the child’s best interest. (See In re Marriage of Furie (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 816, 827 [applying best interest standard to RFO
seeking modification of child’s orthodontic care].)
Generally, “[w]e review custody and visitation orders for an
abuse of discretion, and apply the substantial evidence standard
to the court’s factual findings.” (In re Marriage of Fajota (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497; see In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 32 [although abuse of discretion standard applies
10
to review of custody and visitation orders, substantial evidence
standard applied to factual determinations supporting relocation
order].) “Under this test, we must uphold the trial court ‘ruling if
it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was
actually invoked.’” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 255.)
However, a different standard applies where, as here, the
appellant had the burden of proof in the family court. “‘In the
case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded
that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden
and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the
failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports
the judgment.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, where the issue on appeal turns
on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.’” (Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc.
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979; accord, In re Marriage of
Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 566-567; Dreyer’s Grand
Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828,
838.)
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “‘This is not only a
general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the
absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in
favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
11
court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court
below which would have authorized the order complained of, it
will be presumed that such matters were presented.”’” (Jameson,
at p. 609; accord, Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc.
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833.)
Further, to overcome the presumption that the judgment is
correct, the appellant “must affirmatively establish prejudicial
error by providing an adequate record, citing to the record, and
presenting a persuasive argument with citations to supportive
legal authorities.” (LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal
Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070;
accord, Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [appellant’s
“burden on appeal ‘includes the obligation to present argument
and legal authority on each point raised’”].) “It is not our role as
an appellate court independently to review the record for error
and to construct arguments for appellants that would require
reversal of the judgment.” (LNSU#1, LLC, at p. 1070; accord,
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
Kibby contends the family court erred in denying his RFO
because his disability constituted a change in circumstances
warranting modification of the order for conjoint therapy. Kibby
has failed to provide a sufficient record on which we can
determine whether the family court abused its discretion. As
discussed, the record does not contain Daly’s response to the RFO
or a settled statement for the hearing. Thus, we are unaware of
the arguments that were raised. Nor without a settled statement
or other record of the hearing can we evaluate the basis for the
court’s order. Kibby has also failed to make reasoned arguments
to support his contentions. He has not explained the nature of
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his disability, how it prevented him from changing his schedule
to accommodate the therapist, or how his disability and
circumstances changed from December 2017 (when, according to
his September 2018 declaration, he was disabled) to the court’s
subsequent orders, and then to his December 12, 2022 RFO.
Most importantly, Kibby has not explained why changing the
children’s established therapy time was in their best interests.
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding
of the rules on appeal are, as a practical matter, more limited
than that of an experienced appellate attorney. Whenever
possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a
manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, we are
required to apply the rules on appeal and substantive rules of law
to a self-represented litigant’s claims on appeal, just as we would
to those litigants who are represented by trained legal counsel.
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; accord,
County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861 [a
self-represented litigant “is entitled to the same but no greater
consideration than other litigants”].)
Kibby has failed to overcome the presumption of validity
favoring the family court’s order, requiring affirmance of the
order. (See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296
[appeal resolved against appellant where failure to include
settled statement of proceeding “make[s] it impossible for us to
determine” whether trial court erred]; 569 East County Boulevard
LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
426, 434, fn. 9 [“if the record on appeal does not contain all of the
documents or other evidence considered by the trial court, a
reviewing court will ‘decline to find error on a silent record, and
thus infer that substantial evidence’ supports the trial court’s
13
findings”]; Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317
[“‘When appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, all
material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely
their own evidence. [Citation.] Failure to do so amounts to
waiver of the alleged error.’”].)
B. The April 11, 2023 Minute Order Declaring Kibby a
Vexatious Litigant Is Not an Appealable Order
Kibby’s notice of appeal identifies the minute order entered
on April 11, 2023 as the order from which he appeals. Likewise,
the civil case information statement attached the April 11, 2023
minute order as the order Kibby is appealing. As discussed, the
April minute order directed Daly’s counsel to prepare a written
order to be approved by Kibby and submitted to the family court
for signature. Accordingly, the minute order is not an appealable
order. (See Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 304
[dismissing appeal, explaining where “a further or formal order is
required, an [] appeal does not lie from a minute order”]; Luo v.
Volokh (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1312, 1326 [“‘A minute order that
directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself
appealable.’”]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2) [“if the
minute order directs that a written order be prepared, the entry
date [for purposes of appeal] is the date the signed order is
filed”].)
The record does not include a written order prepared after
the April 11, 2023 hearing, nor does our review of the family
court docket indicate that such an order was filed. On
February 10, 2025 we sent a letter to Kibby directing that he
submit a signed written order after hearing or, if no written order
after hearing had been filed with the family court, he confer with
Daly’s counsel (or, if no counsel, with Daly) to obtain a signed
14
order. We cautioned Kibby that his failure to submit a signed
order or letter explaining why he had not submitted a signed
order would result in dismissal of his appeal. Kibby did not file
an order or letter in response. In the absence of an appealable
order, we dismiss the appeal. (See Herrscher v. Herrscher, supra,
41 Cal.3d at p. 304.)
DISPOSITION
The March 7, 2023 order denying Kibby’s December 12,
2022 RFO is affirmed. The appeal from the April 11, 2023
minute order declaring Kibby a vexatious litigant is dismissed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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