People v. Macias CA2/2

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Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Macias CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B333919

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA158250)
v.

ADRIAN MACIAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Gabriel Bradley,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Adrian Macias (defendant)
appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of first
degree murder. Defendant contends the conviction should be
reversed or reduced to second degree murder because insufficient
evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation and
deliberation, and because he submitted postconviction evidence
regarding the science of youthful brain development. Finding no
merit to defendant’s substantial evidence contention, and no
appealable issue raised by defendant’s youth contention, we
affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by amended information with
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a),1
with the allegation he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). It was also alleged pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) and (b)(1): the offense involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, and
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness; and that defendant engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society. A jury convicted defendant
of first degree murder and found the firearm allegation true.
Defendant waived a jury trial on the aggravating factors.
After considering the law and hearing the argument of counsel,
the trial court found the aggravating factors true beyond a
reasonable doubt. On September 13, 2023, defendant was

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

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sentenced to life in prison with a minimum parole period of 25
years on the first degree murder conviction. As to the firearm
enhancement, a consecutive high term of 10 years was added.
Defendant filed a premature notice of appeal from the
judgment, which is deemed timely.
Prosecution evidence2
Jasmine Godinez testified that, while walking with her
boyfriend Ernest Aguirre on February 25, 2020, around 2:45 p.m.,
they saw a friend. Aguirre approached the friend and stood at
the apartment complex gate to speak to him from the sidewalk.
Godinez walked about six feet further and waited for him. After
a few minutes she saw Aguirre walking toward her when a man
passed next to her “shoulder-to-shoulder” toward Aguirre, saying
“ey” as he passed. The man, later identified as defendant, held a
black semiautomatic gun with both hands and began shooting at
Aguirre, who was holding a paint can and was unarmed except
for a pocketknife attached to his waistband. Aguirre ducked,
turned and ran to the school on the other side of the street.
Defendant immediately followed and continued to fire in
Aguirre’s direction, while Godinez screamed at the shooter to
stop. She heard six shots total and then the shooter was gone.
Godinez ran across the street and found Aguirre unresponsive on
the sidewalk with a gunshot wound to his head and his knees in a
running position. Godinez identified surveillance footage clips
from the video that captured the action she described as it was
played before the jury.

2 Defendant presented no defense evidence.

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Aguirre died as a result of one gunshot wound to the back
of his head though he also sustained a gunshot wound to his
upper thigh.
Following defendant’s February 1, 2021 arrest, he was
interviewed twice by Los Angeles Sheriff’s detectives. In the first
interview, defendant denied knowing Aguirre or being involved in
the shooting. In the second interview, a short time later,
defendant again denied involvement. As the detectives continued
to urge defendant to tell the truth, he said, “Well, this guy was
actually tryin [sic] to come after me.” Defendant identified
Aguirre in a photograph and said he felt threatened by Aguirre
because he tried to shoot defendant once and could have killed
defendant. Defendant admitted when he saw Aguirre, who
seemingly did not recognize him, defendant walked up and
started shooting. Aguirre lived down the street and defendant
knew him by his nickname, Peewee. Defendant said, “He just
made something so personal[.] . . . I felt like I had no choice,”
and, “There would be times where I’ll see him and he’ll try to . . .
come up and do something.” Defendant said Aguirre was
confrontational, like “trippin” and “aggressive” on these prior
occasions.
Defendant claimed he was not looking for Aguirre on the
day of the shooting but just happened to see him and recognized
him as someone who “could’ve taken my life away.” Defendant
told detectives he got out of the car armed with a gun, walked up
to Aguirre, took the gun out and started shooting. Looking as
though he had just recognized defendant, Aguirre started to run
away, and defendant chased him while continuing to shoot.
Defendant did not recall how many shots he fired, but he stopped
shooting when the gun jammed, and he then “took off.” Later,

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defendant saw a video on Facebook of Aguirre lying on the
ground after having been shot.

DISCUSSION
I. Substantial evidence supports first degree murder
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the murder was premeditated
and deliberate.
“The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
“Although we assess whether the evidence is inherently credible
and of solid value, we must also view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of
every fact that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that
evidence.” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 488.)
“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court
resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. . . .
Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the
exclusive province of the trier of fact. . . . Moreover, unless the
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.”
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181, citations omitted.)
Reversal on a substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’”
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “[B]ecause ‘we must
begin with the presumption that the evidence . . . was sufficient,’
it is defendant, as the appellant, who ‘bears the burden of

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convincing us otherwise.’” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430.)
“All murder that is perpetrated by means of . . . willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first
degree.” (§ 189.) “‘“A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first
degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill.
[Citation.] ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’
means thought over in advance.”’” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52
Cal.4th 1056, 1069.)
Defendant does not claim he had no intention to kill
Aguirre, but that he acted rashly on impulse triggered by
adrenaline and fear. Defendant contends the sighting of Aguirre
was unexpected, and thus a reasonable jury could not conclude
that the seconds that passed before the “actual” killing was a
sufficient time to permit a careful weighing of the considerations
for or against the action.
The only evidence suggesting the defendant’s sighting of
Aguirre was unexpected or that defendant acted rashly came
from defendant’s statements to detectives in the second police
interview. In the first interview defendant denied knowing
Aguirre or being involved in the shooting. In the second
interview, defendant initially denied involvement and, later in
the interview, claimed the victim was coming after him. A jury is
not required to believe the defendant’s statement to law
enforcement. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 254.) As
the jury found premeditation and deliberation beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is apparent the jury did not believe
defendant.

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In addition, defendant supported his claim that just
“seconds” passed before the “actual killing” by counting the time
on the surveillance video which captured the shooting. He counts
six seconds after he got out of the car and began firing the first
shots toward Aguirre. Then five “or more” seconds until the
shooting stopped, a total of 11 seconds or more. This suggests
premeditation must occur for more than six seconds. If so, we
disagree. “‘“‘Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief
interval. “The test is not time, but reflection. ‘Thoughts may
follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.’”’”’” (People v. Mendoza,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069.)
Defendant agrees premeditation may be demonstrated by
categories of evidence suggested by our Supreme Court in People
v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 (Anderson), such as
planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of killing.
(People v. Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069.) There is no
requirement that all three factors be established or that any one
factor must be shown by direct evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2
Cal.4th 1117, 1124–1125.) Here substantial evidence, including
defendant’s admissions, supported all three factors such that the
jury could find premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Planning may be reasonably inferred from the evidence
defendant armed himself before the shooting. (See, e.g., People v.
Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1050; People v. Villegas (2001) 92
Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.) Defendant recognized Aguirre, who
lived near him and was well-known to him. The jury could
reasonably infer defendant recognized Aguirre while still in the
car. Indeed, defendant acknowledges he got out of the car armed

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with a gun after he saw Aguirre and admitted he carried the gun
as he approached Aguirre.
Second, defendant admitted a preexisting motive: he felt
threatened and claimed Aguirre had previously tried to shoot
him. Defendant claimed Aguirre was aggressive, confrontational,
and made it “so personal.” Defendant told detectives he felt he
had no choice, as he recognized Aguirre as someone who “could’ve
taken [his] life away.”
The trial court instructed the jury on imperfect self-
defense, the actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend
oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury at
the time of the killing, which could result in manslaughter.3 But
the jury rejected this defense. Presumably the jury reasonably
inferred the consideration defendant weighed, before he got out of
the car, to kill Aguirre before Aguirre decided to kill him.
Defendant essentially asks us to accept his proffered inferences
and reject the reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.
This we may not do. (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999,
1020.)
Finally, the manner of the killing gives rise to a strong
inference that defendant premeditated killing Aguirre before
getting out of the car. Defendant admitted he exited the car
armed with a gun, approached Aguirre, immediately started
shooting as Aguirre ran away, and chased after him while
continuing to shoot. Defendant stopped shooting at Aguirre only
when the gun jammed. “The firing of multiple shots at close
range strongly supports a finding of premeditation and

3 See generally, People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 134–
137.

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deliberation.” (People v. Casillas (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 135, 152.)
In addition, an inference of premeditation and deliberation arises
where the manner of killing is a close-range shooting without any
provocation or evidence of a struggle. (People v. Gonzales and
Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295.)
Defendant cites testimony from the medical examiner,
Dr. Ukpo, that “close range” is generally considered between one
to three feet from the barrel of the gun to the skin of the victim.
Based on the gunpowder on Aguirre’s body, he testified it could
have been more than three feet between the victim and the
shooter unless there was something blocking the skin from
gunpowder, such as clothing or hair. Dr. Ukpo was qualified as a
medical expert and gave a medical opinion regarding cause and
circumstances of death. He was not a legal expert and did not
offer a legal opinion as to the meaning of “close range.” The
California Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held “close
range” for the purpose of finding premeditation can include six
shots fired from up to 25 feet away. (See People v. Villegas,
supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1224–1225.)
Nevertheless, Godinez testified she was about six feet away
from Aguirre on the sidewalk when he was walking toward her.
She saw defendant pass her “shoulder to shoulder” as he moved
toward Aguirre while holding a semiautomatic gun. As
defendant passed Godinez while Aguirre walked toward her,
defendant would have been within about six feet of Aguirre when
he started shooting. As the People note, if Aguirre was no longer
in close range when the fatal shot entered his head, it was only
because he was running away as defendant continued to fire.

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The remainder of defendant’s argument regarding the
Anderson factors of planning, motive, and manner of killing4
consists of comparisons with other cases, which found or did not
find premeditation under facts defendant points to as existing or
not existing. As to those facts defendant finds comparable to
facts in this record, he draws his own inferences, different from
those reasonable inferences that exist here. As substantial
evidence supports the first degree murder conviction, we reject
defendant’s proffered inferences. (See People v. Watkins, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 1020.) “To conclude there was ‘no evidence of X’
does not constitute a finding of ‘not X.’ This is because ‘[a]n
absence of evidence is not the equivalent of substantial evidence.’
[Citation.] ‘No finding can be predicated on the absence of
evidence.’” (People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 485, 498; see People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489,
552.)
Moreover, a comparison between facts of different cases to
demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence is not useful, as each
case necessarily depends on its own facts. (People v. Thomas,
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 516.) This is especially so when, as here,
the issue is the defendant’s state of mind. (See People v.
Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1075.) We thus do not discuss
such cases cited by defendant.
II. Request for consideration of defendant’s youth
Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed or
reduced to second degree murder because substantial evidence
showed the killing resulted from youthful rashness and
impulsiveness, not premeditation and deliberation. Defendant

4 See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pages 26–27.

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acknowledges the evidence he deems substantial was not before
the trial court during trial, but is contained in his Franklin
report, filed after his conviction. (See generally People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.) Defendant’s argument and
authorities in support of his contention relate primarily to the
science of the adolescent and young adult brain. However the
question of defendant’s youth and its bearing on the mental state
required for first degree murder was not at issue at trial.
As relevant here, section 1237, subdivision (a) permits a
felon to appeal from a final judgment of conviction, a sentence, an
order granting probation, as well as an order after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. Both
subdivision (a) and (b) allow the appellate court to review any
order denying a motion for a new trial or an after judgment order
affecting a party’s substantial rights. In his statement of
appealability defendant lists the only order appealed as “a final
judgment of conviction after jury trial and is authorized by Penal
Code section 1237, subdivision (a).” (Fn. omitted.) Defendant
points to nothing in the trial court record such as an order or
request for relief that might relate to the science of the youthful
brain and is thus made appealable by section 1237, subdivision
(a).
Nor has defendant cited authority or made a reasoned legal
argument supporting his contention this issue may be raised for
the first time on appeal based upon evidence not presented at
trial and without appealing from the sentence imposed. Failure
to develop an argument or cite any authority in support of a
contention ordinarily results in the forfeiture of the issue on
appeal. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2.)
In addition, “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate

11
law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed
correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th
1567, 1573.) Defendant has failed to identify any error here.
As defendant has failed to show appealability of his
contention or error, we will not address the subject.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
RICHARDSON, J.

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