CourtListener 10353136•People v. Sumler CA2/2
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Filed 3/10/25 P. v. Sumler CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334120
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA106154)
ELAJAH TIMOTHY SUMLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________
Elajah Timothy Sumler appeals the judgment after a jury
trial in which he was convicted of one count each of battery
causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)),1
battery on a police officer (§ 243, subd. (b)) vandalism (§ 594,
subd. (a)), mayhem (§ 203), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)); and two counts of resisting, obstructing, or delaying
a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties (§ 148,
subd. (a)). Appellant was sentenced to nine years in state prison.
Appellant contends reversal is required due to the
erroneous denial of his motion for self-representation, various
evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and cumulative error. He also argues that
insufficient evidence supports his mayhem conviction. We reject
appellant’s challenges and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. The Prosecution Case
A. Appellant’s theft and fight with the security guard
On March 3, 2022, appellant entered a Vons grocery store
in Santa Monica, walked “straight to the candy aisle,” and
“stuff[ed] . . . his pockets” with candy until it overflowed onto the
floor. Appellant made eye contact with the store’s security guard
before leaving the store without paying. Appellant returned to
the store several minutes later wearing a backpack with a large
metal cane and skateboard affixed to it. The guard informed the
store manager, and then accompanied him to tell appellant to
leave. While they escorted him out of the store, appellant told
each of them, “You a bitch,” and “I’m gonna slay you.” He also
cussed at customers in the store and called them “bitches.” Once
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
the three men left the store, appellant fell silent, and the guard—
believing the confrontation was over—turned and walked back
toward the store.
As the guard walked away from him, appellant followed the
guard and swung his metal cane at him, striking him in the
mouth. Appellant said, “Yea. I told you [I’m gonna] slay you,”
and swung his cane a second time, but the guard grabbed it
before it struck him. A fistfight ensued. After swinging at the
guard and missing, appellant grabbed him in a “bear hug” and
repeated, “Ima slay you. I told you [I’m gonna] slay you.” To
escape from appellant’s grasp, the guard hit appellant in the
forehead. Appellant then pulled his skateboard out and tried to
hit the guard with it. The guard grabbed the skateboard and
threw it at appellant’s legs. The fight eventually “just stopped,”
and appellant walked away.
B. The guard’s injuries
The blow to the guard’s mouth shattered his teeth, “pushed
back” his gums, and left his “raw nerve” exposed to the wind,
causing pain that was a “12” “on a scale of one to 10.” He “ended
up getting four root canals,” “three different bridges,” and no
longer has a “beautiful smile,” in part because his “gums are
pushed back,” making his front teeth appear bigger. Since the
injury, eating has felt “weird.”
C. Events after the police arrived
When the police arrived, they told appellant to “sit down
and drop what was in his hands.” Appellant did not comply, and
a struggle ensued during which appellant “thrash[ed] his body
side to side,” “bucking” the officers away and taunting them.
When the police finally arrested appellant, they took him to the
3
hospital. He was cleared and then taken to the jail in Santa
Monica.
Officer Steven Jaen and his partner Officer Alexander
Aleshkevich were tasked with taking appellant from Santa
Monica to the inmate reception center in downtown Los Angeles.
As Officer Jaen placed appellant into his car, appellant “vomited
on the left side of [Officer Jaen’s] pants . . . and [the] vehicle.”
Appellant was taken to the emergency room in Santa Monica for
medical attention, where he vomited on three separate occasions
in front of staff. “[E]very time a new staff member or nurse or
doctor showed up . . . he vomited in front of them.” Appellant was
medically cleared and placed back into the patrol car to be taken
to the inmate reception center.
While in the back of the patrol car, appellant managed to
unbuckle his seatbelt. He then lay across the backseat and
maneuvered his handcuffs to the front of his body. When the
three men reached the reception center, the officers got out of
their car to retrieve appellant from the back seat. Appellant
pretended to sleep, but Officer Jaen observed him opening and
closing his eyes. Officer Aleshkevich shook appellant to get his
attention, and appellant became “aggressive and physically
violent with the officers.” Appellant reached with both his hands
to grab Officer Aleshkevich’s arm and wrist, and the officer
pulled away. Appellant stated multiple times that he was
“having a mental breakdown.” He destroyed the camera in the
backseat of the patrol vehicle. The officers took appellant to be
evaluated by a nurse at the jail center. When the nurse arrived,
appellant vomited at her while she examined him. The facility
declined to house him, and Officer Jaen took appellant back to
the Santa Monica jail.
4
II. The Defense Case
The defense investigator interviewed a witness of the
incident at the Vons, who reported that he was leaving the store
when he saw the guard and appellant interacting. He said he
“saw security put a bear hug around [appellant] as he’s walking
him out.”
Appellant testified in his own defense. He explained that
he went to Vons to “purchase” some candy, and that the security
guard and manager followed him in the store. Appellant told
them that if they kept following him, “we’re going to have to fight
and I don’t want to fight.” The guard walked in front of him, took
his badge off, and placed it on the ground, saying “come at me.”
Appellant responded, “No, I’m not going to attack you. If you
want to fight you’re going to have to hit me first.” Appellant
denied calling the guard a “bitch” or saying “I’m going to slay
you.” The guard walked toward appellant and “grab[bed] and
push[ed] [his] head,” at which point appellant “swung [the cane]
around” and “hit him in the face.” Appellant “didn’t intend to
swing the cane” or hit the guard. In any case, the cane “barely
touched him,” and appellant “didn’t even hit him that hard.” The
guard grabbed appellant’s face and hit him “multiple times” in
his “head, on [his] arms, everywhere.” The guard hit appellant
“30 or 40 times and [appellant] didn’t hit him back at all.”
The next thing appellant knew, officers were “telling [him]
to get on the ground.” The police did not tell him why he was
being arrested. They just told him to get down, and “out of
nowhere . . . one of them just hopped on [him] . . . from behind . . .
and then [appellant] was really nauseous.”
5
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Denying Appellant’s Untimely Faretta2 Motion
A. Background
On August 7, 2023, days before trial was to begin,
appellant moved for new counsel under People v. Marsden (1970)
2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The trial court held a hearing, and
appellant complained about his counsel’s trial strategy; that she
had told him she had no defense for him; her failure to subpoena
a critical witness; and her “complete disregard” for his “side of
the story.” Appellant expressed that “no one even tried” to obtain
surveillance camera footage, and defense counsel explained that
it was a tactical choice not to introduce such footage. The court
denied the Marsden motion, finding that defense counsel was
performing to standard. It also denied appellant’s request for a
continuance to hire private counsel.
Appellant then stated his desire to “go [] pro per.” The trial
court responded, “That request is denied at this time.” Appellant
asked, “What is your reason?” and the court responded, “Because
you would not be ready to proceed to trial. You are going [] pro
per? You are ready right now?” Appellant responded, “I’m ready
right now.” The court then told him to “discuss it with
[department] 100 when [he] get[s] there.”3 The court handed
appellant a Faretta waiver form to fill out for the next hearing,
but appellant refused to take it.
2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525,
45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta).
3 Appellant was wheelchair bound, so was transferred to an
accessible department for trial.
6
On August 10, 2023, appellant and his counsel appeared
before the trial judge. Defense counsel told the court that
appellant wished to represent himself, and appellant then
completed a Faretta waiver form. The trial court asked appellant
why he wanted to represent himself. Appellant explained that he
felt he was “better than [his] counsel” and had successfully
represented himself at a preliminary hearing in the past, and his
counsel had told him that she had no defense for him. Appellant
also asserted that a critical witness had not been subpoenaed, to
which his counsel responded that “she was successfully
subpoenaed,” but that counsel did not intend to call her because
she had not seen the whole incident and “appear[ed] to be
mentally unwell.”
Before stating its findings, the court noted for the record
that appellant was present “in court in a suicide vest [and]
wearing a helmet.” The court continued, “[Appellant] presents as
mentally ill. I don’t have an alienist report, but given the reports
that are in the court file I have serious doubts about whether
[appellant] is mentally competent to represent himself. Certainly
his rambling presentation in court this afternoon causes me to
have some problems with that. But, more significantly, . . . my
take is that he does not really wish to represent himself. The
notes from the other court are replete with references to him
obtaining other counsel, him having Marsden hearings, never a
discussion about him representing himself. And I don’t think
that that’s what he wants. I think he wants a different attorney.”
Appellant spoke up: “I told [my counsel] when I first met
her I was going to represent myself and that’s the first thing we
talked about, the first conversation that we had. And you can
ask her and she could tell you the truth about that. . . . And she
7
told me, ‘Well, if you’re going to represent yourself I’m not going
to do anything.’ I said, ‘That’s fine.’ ”
The court responded: “Mr. Sumler, the other concern I
have is that as we’ve gone through these proceedings this
afternoon you do not seem to be able to control yourself in court.
You talk over me. You interrupt and disrupt the proceedings.”
“So, based on that, the fact that I don’t think there’s a free and
voluntary waiver of counsel, I’m concerned about Mr. Sumler’s
competence to represent himself.”
The trial court then denied appellant’s Faretta motion.
While the court explained that his counsel would continue to
represent him, appellant interjected: “You’re forcing me to go to
trial with somebody that I don’t want to be represented by when I
wanted to represent myself. And that’s my right by law.”
The trial court asked appellant if he wanted to wear the
helmet and suicide vest to trial, and appellant responded, “You’re
forcing me to lose in trial. She says she has no defense for me.”
The court reassured appellant that it was not forcing him
to lose and began to repeat his question when appellant stated, “I
feel very suicidal because of your ruling. I feel like if you put me
in civilian clothes I’ll do my best . . . to kill myself.” The court
replied, “That settles it then.”
Defense counsel and the court turned to discuss appellant’s
custody credits, and appellant interrupted multiple times. The
court told appellant, “We have this constant interrupting that
makes me feel better and better about my ruling . . . not allowing
you to represent yourself because you can’t comport yourself [in]
court appropriately. If you keep interrupting me[,] we’ll send you
back to the lockup and we’ll proceed without you. Clear?”
Appellant responded, “Absolutely.” Later in the hearing,
8
appellant asked the court a question, and the court told him not
to address the court directly and to speak to his attorney.
B. Law governing the right to self-representation
“A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to forgo
the constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel and to
represent himself at trial.” (People v. Kirvin (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515; see generally Faretta, supra, 422 U.S.
806.) “A trial court must grant defendant’s request for self-
representation if the defendant knowingly and intelligently
makes an unequivocal and timely request after having been
apprised of its dangers.” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73,
97–98 (Valdez); Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) The right to
represent oneself is not absolute, however. (Indiana v. Edwards
(2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171 [128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345];
People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 206.)
For example, the trial court has discretion to deny a
defendant’s request to represent himself if the request is
untimely (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 (Lynch),
abrogated on another ground by People v. McKinnon (2011) 52
Cal.4th 610, 636–637; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121,
124, 129, fn. 6 [an untimely request is based on nonconstitutional
grounds and whether to grant it rests “within the sound
discretion of the trial court”]; accord, People v. Frazier (2024) 16
Cal.5th 814, 843–844), or if he engages in disruptive conduct that
“seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial” (People v.
Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 6; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th
701, 735).
C. The Faretta motion was untimely
The People argue that the denial of appellant’s Faretta
motion should be affirmed because it was untimely and thus a
9
matter of the court’s discretion. (See Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 103.) Appellant responds we may not rely on untimeliness
because the trial court did not consider it, citing People v. Orosco
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348, 362, and People v. Best (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 747, 762. On this point we disagree with appellant,
Orosco, and the majority opinion in Best. That the trial court did
not expressly find the motion untimely does not preclude us from
affirming its ruling on that ground. (People v. Halvorsen (2007)
42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 [“[e]ven when the trial court does not
state it is denying a Faretta motion on the ground of
untimeliness, we independently review the record to determine
whether the motion would properly have been denied on this
ground”], citing People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218; People
v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703; Best, at p. 773 & fn. 5 (dis.
opn. of Brown, J.); People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295,
fn. 12 [“ ‘[W]e review the ruling, not the court’s reasoning, and, if
. . . correct on any ground, we affirm’ ”].)
A Faretta motion is timely if it is made “ ‘ “within a
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” ’ ” (People
v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 436 (Wright); People v. Johnson
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499.) In determining whether a Faretta
motion is timely, a court may consider “not only the time between
the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as
whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of
witnesses . . . , the complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial
proceedings, and whether the defendant had earlier opportunities
to assert his right of self-representation.” (Lynch, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 726.) The “reasonable time” requirement must not
be used to limit a defendant’s constitutional right of self-
representation, but rather to prevent the defendant from
10
misusing the Faretta mandate to unjustifiably delay a scheduled
trial or obstruct the orderly administration of justice. (Wright, at
p. 436; People v. Johnson, at p. 499.) The Supreme Court has
“declined to articulate what standard a reviewing court should
apply in determining whether a request for self-representation is
timely.” (Wright, at p. 437.) Appellant’s motion was untimely
whether we apply de novo review or a more deferential standard.
The complexity of the case weighs against finding
appellant’s motion timely: He faced seven counts, involving six
different offenses and multiple victims. There were numerous
witnesses to the underlying events, several of which were called
to testify. Appellant unequivocally moved to represent himself
only after his case had been transferred to the trial department
and after both sides had announced their readiness to go to trial.
(See People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 853–854 [court
properly concluded motion was untimely where made “after the
case had been called for trial, both counsel had answered ready,
and the case had been transferred to a trial department for
pretrial motions and jury trial”].) Although appellant sought to
represent himself at the prior hearing, that request was
equivocal—he made it out of apparent frustration, immediately
after the court’s denial of both his Marsden motion and his
subsequent request for a continuance to hire new counsel.4
(People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1206 (Scott) [request
made immediately after denial of motion for new counsel was
equivocal; context showed motion was made “out of frustration”
“rather than from a genuine desire to represent himself”].)
4 To the extent the trial court’s statements suggest
appellant had not made any prior request, this was at least
correct insofar as he had not made an unequivocal request.
11
Appellant thereafter refused to accept the Faretta paperwork—
behavior which suggests an inability to conduct himself in an
orderly fashion were he to represent himself. The trial court
concluded, after reviewing “the notes from the other court,” that
appellant did not genuinely want to represent himself, implying
it saw his request as a means to “obstruct the orderly
administration of justice.” We agree and conclude that
appellant’s motion made on the eve of trial was untimely.
(Wright, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 436 [the “ ‘ “reasonable time” ’ ”
requirement is intended to prevent the defendant from misusing
Faretta to “ ‘ “unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice” ’ ”]; People v. Marshall
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27 [Faretta motion made for purpose of delay
properly denied]; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 [“we have
held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the
eve of trial are untimely”].)
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
Because appellant’s Faretta motion was untimely, we
evaluate the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for an abuse
of discretion. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 398–399.)
Relevant factors for the court to consider are “ ‘ “the quality of
counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior
proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the
length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay
which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of
such a motion.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 399.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion
if it acts “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner” ’ ” “or ‘when its ruling “falls outside the bounds of
reason.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
12
Consideration of the relevant factors shows the trial court
acted within its discretion in denying appellant’s motion.
Appellant had a proclivity to seek to substitute counsel: He filed
a Marsden motion, and when that was denied, requested time to
retain private counsel. The outcome of the Marsden motion and
the trial court’s discussion with appellant’s counsel at both the
Marsden and Faretta hearings provided a basis to find that
appellant’s counsel was doing the best she could under the
circumstances.5 Appellant appears to have made the Faretta
motion out of frustration at having his request for new counsel
denied. Appellant cited as a reason for his Faretta request his
disagreement with his counsel over trial tactics, which is “ ‘an
insufficient reason to grant an untimely Faretta request.’ ”
(Scott, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206, quoting People v. Wilkins
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 299, 309, fn. 4.) Appellant made his
request on “the eve of trial,” and trial was expected to last five to
seven days. This timing, paired with the complexity of the case,
number of witnesses, appellant’s repeated interruptions during
the Faretta hearing, and his threat to kill himself after the court
expressed its intention to deny his motion all suggest that
significant delay and disruption would result if appellant were
allowed to represent himself. The denial of appellant’s motion
was thus within the bounds of reason.
II. Prior Misconduct Evidence
Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting certain
evidence of appellant’s prior misconduct, requiring appellant to
5 Defense counsel told the trial court at the Marsden
hearing that appellant had called her “numerous times” each day,
was “abusive on the phone,” and had also called “numerous
managers, other lawyers,” and “supervisors” every day.
13
answer questions about whether officers had lied, and failing to
admonish the jury after the prosecutor stated he was not going to
go into appellant’s “whole criminal history.” We review
challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 962.)
A. Appellant’s prior felony convictions
1. Relevant proceedings
The prosecutor asked appellant if he was convicted of
“multiple felony thefts,” and appellant responded, “I would
suppose.” The prosecutor continued, “In fact, those involved
violence, right, those events of theft?” Appellant replied, “I don’t
think so. I don’t know.”
The prosecutor then asked him whether he was convicted of
“stealing from someone’s immediate person on January 6, 2014?”
Appellant questioned the relevance of his criminal record. The
prosecutor continued, “So it’s possible you were convicted of that.
Here’s one from June 26, 2015. On that day you walked into
Home Depot and you stole. Police officers responded and you
used force to resist?”
Defense counsel objected: “I believe that has to be a
question regarding whether or not it was a conviction.” The court
replied, “I think under the circumstances of the case that’s not
correct.”
The prosecutor asked, “On June 26, 2015, you walked into
Home Depot. You stole. Police came and you forcefully resisted
them, right?” Appellant responded, “Isn’t that my story?” The
prosecutor asked, “And you were convicted of petty theft and two
counts of resisting an executive officer from force, right?”
Appellant responded, “I suppose. Yes. . . . Yes to all of it.”
14
2. Governing law
“Evidence of circumstances underlying a conviction is
admissible to impeach credibility if the proponent demonstrates
the evidence has ‘any tendency in reason’ to disprove credibility.
(Evid. Code, § 210; see ibid. [defining relevant evidence as
‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact . . . of consequence to the determination of the action’
including ‘evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness’]; Evid.
Code, § 780 [‘the court or jury may consider in determining the
credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his [or her]
testimony at the hearing . . .’].)” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7
Cal.5th 166, 214 (Dalton).) To be admissible, past misconduct for
impeachment must show moral turpitude, which is defined as
“ ‘readiness to do evil.’ ” (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284,
296; People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 157, fn. 24.) Trial
courts retain discretion to exclude such evidence under Evidence
Code section 352 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate
undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Dalton, at p. 214.)
Although evidence of the underlying conduct may be
admissible subject to the court’s discretion, the fact of a
misdemeanor conviction is generally not. (People v. Cadogan
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1514 (Cadogan).) This is because
“ ‘a misdemeanor conviction comes within the statutory rule of
15
inadmissible hearsay.’ ”6 (Cadogan, at p. 1514, quoting Wheeler,
supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 298–299.) Section 788 of the Evidence
Code treats felony convictions differently, however, allowing their
use for impeachment through “examination of the witness or by
the record of the judgment,” subject to the trial court’s discretion
under Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code, § 788; People v.
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 407.)
3. Analysis
Appellant argues that the trial court should have sustained
his objection to the prosecutor’s questioning on the conduct
underlying his prior convictions because the only felony
convictions from that date were for resisting an officer (§ 69), not
theft, and there was no evidence showing appellant committed
theft. Appellant’s argument fails because it (1) is based on a
probation report that appellant admits “was not in evidence,” and
(2) fails to recognize that a prior felony conviction used for
impeachment “may be shown by the examination of the witness”
(§ 788). Thus, appellant’s affirmative response when asked
whether he had been convicted of “multiple felony thefts” is
evidence of his prior felony convictions, even though he now
attempts to raise doubt as to the accuracy of his testimony.
Appellant asserts that the trial court “failed to apply
[Evidence Code] section 352 . . . to the prosecutor’s questioning,”
but he forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below. (People
v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 437–438 (Doolin); Evid. Code,
6 Evidence Code section 452.5 creates an exception to the
hearsay rule by allowing prior convictions, including
misdemeanors, to be shown through certain official records.
16
§ 353, subd. (a).)7 Even if we interpret defense counsel’s
statement, “I believe that has to be a question regarding whether
or not it was a conviction” as an objection under section 352, the
admission of appellant’s theft-related conduct and subsequent
violence did not create undue prejudice to the extent that its
admission would amount to an abuse of discretion.
Appellant relies on People v. Gutierrez (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 85 (Gutierrez) to suggest that the prosecutor should
have been prohibited from asking about the theft-related conduct
underlying his prior convictions for resisting an officer. Gutierrez
observed that where evidence of conduct underlying a prior felony
used to impeach a witness has no additional bearing on
dishonesty beyond the fact of the conviction itself, the trial court
should “ordinarily . . . exclude evidence of the underlying
conduct” because it is “likely to be more prejudicial than
probative.” (Id. at p. 90.) However, the Gutierrez court went on
to distinguish itself from such cases because the conduct
underlying the defendant’s prior felony conviction of evading
police officer—taking a car without the owner’s consent—
“substantially augmented the showing of dishonesty” where the
defendant was charged with attempted carjacking and was
claiming that he had asked the owner for his keys and that there
had been a misunderstanding. (Id. at pp. 87, 90–91.) Similarly
here, the theft-related conduct underlying appellant’s prior felony
7 We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that
additional objections would have been futile, “given the court’s
other rulings and frustration with appellant.” The record shows
the court separately and duly considered each objection made,
and gives us no reason to agree with appellant that any
objections would have been futile, even if meritorious.
17
convictions augment the showing of appellant’s dishonesty
beyond the fact of his convictions because appellant here testified
that he entered the Vons to “purchase” some candy, that he
hadn’t “do[ne] anything wrong,” and that the police officers “just
hopped on [him]” “out of nowhere.” (See Evid. Code, § 780
[credibility may be determined based on consideration of “any
matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the
truthfulness of [the witness’s] testimony”].)
Appellant further argues that the court erred in admitting
the evidence because the prosecutor said he would use only one
section 69 conviction. We disagree with this characterization of
the record: Immediately before appellant was called to testify,
defense counsel suggested that appellant “could perhaps make a
record of” the “certain impeachment evidence or testimony” the
prosecutor planned to introduce. The prosecutor responded, “It’s
the convictions, from all the convictions. A [section] 69 he was on
probation for. He had a [section] 243(c) [battery against police
officer] with a cane. So—” The court said, “Okay.” Defense
counsel stated, “Objection,” the court responded, “Overruled.”
The prosecutor’s statement he intended to use “all the
convictions” for impeachment purposes belies appellant’s
assertion that he “chose to testify after the prosecutor
represented he would use only two felony convictions for
impeachment.”
B. Evidence regarding prior incidents with officers
1. Relevant proceedings
The prosecutor asked appellant if he had been “convicted of
using a cane as a weapon,” and appellant responded, “In trial and
I lost.” The prosecutor then asked him if his story at trial was
that he was “a street performer.” Appellant testified, “A deputy
18
said I swung my cane at him. They had a video of the incident.”
The court directed appellant to answer the questions. Appellant
denied spitting at the officers or saying, “Fuck you.”
The prosecutor then asked about an incident with “a
different police officer.” Appellant denied that he lifted a
skateboard over his head and swung it at the officer and denied
spitting on a police car and saying “fuck you” on this occasion.
The prosecutor asked whether “If [he] brought a police officer in
here to say [appellant] did exactly that,” would he be lying?
Appellant responded, “Of course.”
The prosecutor proceeded, “Well, I guess let’s go through
the convictions and you tell me which police officers are lying.”
The prosecutor asked whether on a certain occasion officers lied
that appellant had resisted arrest, and appellant responded,
“Yes.”
The prosecutor asked appellant if “in 2019 [he was]
arrested for resisting arrest and [was] ultimately convicted of it,”
to which appellant responded, “I’m not sure. I don’t recall.” He
then asked appellant, “So you don’t recall being convicted on
January 3, 2020, of misdemeanor resisting arrest?” Appellant
responded, “I’m not sure.” Defense counsel objected, stating “It’s
improper.” The court asked, “What’s improper about it?”
Defense counsel responded, “Misdemeanor conviction.” The court
said, “It’s still an act involving moral turpitude. Overruled.”
Defense counsel responded, “I believe it would require something
different.” The court said, “The form of the question is incorrect.
So ask the question.”
The prosecutor next asked, “Was the police officer involved
in that incident lying?” Appellant explained that he did not
remember the incident and asked, “Was there any other charge
19
tied to these charges or just a bunch of resisting arrest charges?”
The prosecutor said, “I’m not going to go through the whole
criminal history—” and defense counsel objected to “counsel
testifying” and argued “There’s no evidence that there is a whole
criminal history.”
The parties approached the bench and the court asked, “Do
you really want to go into the whole criminal history?” Defense
counsel said, “No. I . . . asked [appellant] about the whole
criminal history and my understanding when I asked him was to
assume that [the prosecutor] would be limiting his questions to
what’s not remote, not misdemeanor convictions because that has
to be proved by the actual behavior.” “The way misdemeanors
are handled is the question is, ‘Did you do whatever it was on
such and such date?’ And, if not, the record of conviction is
admissible to prove it.”
On rebuttal, Sergeant Elbaz testified about an occasion in
which he saw appellant swinging his cane, and then—upon
making eye contact with officers—appellant took an aggressive
stance and lifted his cane. Appellant spat in Sergeant Elbaz’s
direction, saying, “Fuck you.” The prosecutor asked him how he
reacted, and he responded, “I was in fear.” Sergeant Elbaz
explained that he was afraid “because [he] had encounters with
[appellant] in the past,” and that “[appellant has] fought with
police officers.” Defense counsel objected, stating, “Calls—calls
for—” the court interjected: “It’s his state of mind and it will be
limited to his state of mind.” The prosecutor proceeded to ask
whether appellant has “fought with police officers as well as
patrons in the area?” Defense counsel objected based on hearsay
and foundation, and the court responded, “It goes to his state of
20
mind and it’s being admitted solely to establish his state of mind,
not for the truth of anything that’s asserted therein.”
2. Appellant’s challenges to the prior
misconduct evidence are without merit
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to the question of whether appellant had been convicted
on January 3, 2020, of misdemeanor resisting arrest; in ordering
“appellant . . . to answer ‘were officers lying’ about the conduct
underlying felony convictions appellant admitted”; and in letting
the prosecutor ask appellant about the facts underlying his felony
convictions. Appellant has forfeited these arguments by failing to
raise them below. Defense counsel did not object to the “were
they lying” questions, and the grounds stated for her objection to
one of the questions regarding a misdemeanor conviction were:
“it’s improper”; “misdemeanor conviction”; and “it would require
something different.” These utterances are too vague to preserve
any argument on appeal. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1, 22 [“An objection to evidence must generally be
preserved by specific objection at the time the evidence is
introduced; the opponent cannot make a ‘placeholder’ objection
stating general or incorrect grounds . . . and revise the objection
later . . . stating specific or different grounds”].)
Nor did appellant object on hearsay grounds to preserve
any argument that the trial court improperly admitted evidence
of his misdemeanor conviction. (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 300 [“defendant waived any hearsay claim” with respect to
admission of misdemeanor conviction by failing to object on that
specific ground]; Cadogan, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1515
[same].) In any case, even though the court responded
“overruled” to appellant’s objection, it then required the
21
prosecutor to ask a different question—and that question
involved the conduct underlying the conviction and not the fact of
the conviction. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 373
[evidence of past misdemeanor conduct is admissible in the
court’s discretion, although misdemeanor convictions themselves
are not because they constitute hearsay if offered “to show that
the witness committed the underlying criminal conduct”]; People
v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1459.)
Appellant alludes to section 352 in his opening brief and
refers to the “inflammatory” nature of the prosecutor’s
questioning on “the fact of misdemeanor conviction,” but he
neither objected under section 352 below nor does he elaborate on
appeal why its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value. (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 286
[“Reviewing courts will generally not consider a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence unless there was a ‘ “ ‘specific and
timely objection in the trial court on the [same grounds] sought to
be urged on appeal’ ” ’ ”]; Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 437–438
[failure to assert section 352 challenge below results in forfeiture
on appeal].)
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s statement that he was
“ ‘not going to go through [appellant’s] whole criminal history,’ ”
and not admonishing the jury with respect to that statement.
Appellant objected that the prosecutor was testifying. (People v.
Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 52 [“a prosecutor may not examine a
witness solely to imply or insinuate the truth of the facts about
which questions are posed”].) But it was not in dispute that
appellant had a criminal history; indeed, defense counsel had
asked appellant on direct examination about some of his prior
22
convictions. The prosecutor’s mere statement that he would not
go into that history did not amount to testimony or give rise to
improper inferences, particularly given that the prosecutor was
merely responding to appellant’s question of whether “there [was]
any other charge tied to” the charges the prosecutor was referring
to.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling
defense counsel’s objections to Sergeant Elbaz’s statements that
appellant has fought with police officers and patrons because
those statements lacked proper foundation. The context of that
testimony (he had just testified to having “had encounters” with
appellant before) supports a reasonable inference that he had the
requisite personal knowledge. (People v. Johnson (2018) 6
Cal.5th 541, 583 [only if no jury could reasonably find that the
witness had personal knowledge may the trial court exclude a
witness’s testimony on that ground].) Appellant urges that “[t]he
court failed to apply Evidence Code section 352” to Sergeant
Elbaz’s testimony, but he forfeited this challenge by failing to
raise it below. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 138.)
Finally, appellant argues that the conduct Sergeant Elbaz
described of appellant’s waving the cane and acting aggressively
toward him lacked sufficient similarity to the charged offense to
be admitted to show “intent.” We disagree. “The least degree of
similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent.” (People v.
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) Appellant’s prior conduct is
sufficiently similar to the charged act of swinging the cane at a
security guard to permit the inference that appellant was acting
as an aggressor rather than in self-defense or by accident when
he hit the guard with his cane. (Cf. People v. Cortes (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 873, 884, 916 [prior fistfights where defendant was
23
the aggressor were sufficiently similar to charged offense of
murder (by stabbing) to support inference that the defendant
harbored the same intent in each and “did not act accidentally . . .
or in self-defense”].) Therefore, even if appellant is correct that
Sergeant Elbaz’s state of mind was irrelevant, the evidence
regarding his swinging the cane and acting aggressively was
properly admitted to show “intent.” (See People v. Cowan (2010)
50 Cal.4th 401, 473, fn. 25 [“ ‘ “we review the ruling, not the
court’s reasoning and, if . . . correct on any ground, we
affirm” ’ ”].)
C. Admission of criminal history under section 1101,
subdivision (b)
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in sua sponte
admitting all the criminal history evidence to show “intent”
under section 1101, subdivision (b), and not just for impeachment
purposes. He also argues the court did so “without a section 352
balancing.”
While discussing jury instructions outside the presence of
the jury, the court explained it would give CALJIC No. 375 as a
prophylactic measure because “there are a couple of different
ways to look at [appellant’s prior convictions] and the difference
in dealing with his credibility, which is the actual fact of the
convictions, the circumstances of those convictions would tend to
be relevant to his intent and whether . . . it was a result of
accident.”
Appellant does not cite any part of the record where the
trial court made a ruling contrary to its explanation for giving
CALJIC No. 375. Nor did appellant object under section 352
when the trial court made this statement. The trial court had
generally overruled appellant’s objections to the testimony about
24
appellant’s prior misconduct, and the jury instruction it gave
properly instructed the jury on the purposes for which it could
consider such evidence.8 (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 443 [we
presume the jury followed instructions].) Appellant’s argument
also fails to recognize that the issue of appellant’s credibility—
with regard to his claim that he hit the guard by accident or in
self-defense—and the issue of his “intent” are “inseparably
intertwined.” (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 118.)
Appellant relies on People v. Hall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
576 to argue that the trial court’s decision to admit the prior
conviction evidence to show “intent” deprived him of his
Constitutional rights (to due process, confrontation, and effective
assistance of counsel), but Hall is readily distinguishable. There,
the prosecutor stated that he would not use the defendant’s prior
convictions for section 1101, subdivision (b) purposes, conceding
that “ ‘their probative value is likely substantially outweighed by
their prejudicial effect,’ ” but stated that he would only use them
if the defendant opened the door about weapons or violence.
(Hall, at p. 585.) The trial court ruled on a motion in limine,
8 The jury instruction (CALJIC No. 375) included the
language: “If you decide that the defendant committed the
uncharged offenses, you may, but are not required to, consider
that evidence for the limited purposes of deciding whether: [¶]
The defendant acted with the intent to deter and prevent an
executive officer from performing that officer’s duty by means of
force and violence; and, [¶] The defendant’s alleged actions were
the result of accident. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Do not consider this evidence
for any other purpose except for the limited purpose of
determining the defendant’s credibility. [¶] Do not conclude from
this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is
disposed to commit crime.”
25
excluding the defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for carrying a
dirk or dagger under section 352 because it was too prejudicial
given that the defendant was charged with stabbing the victim.
(Hall, at pp. 585–587.) But after the defendant testified that he
lied to police because he was “ ‘deterred by fear,’ ” the trial court
reasoned that this statement implied he was a peaceful person,
thereby opening the door to evidence showing his violent
character. (Hall, at pp. 585–589.) The Court of Appeal disagreed
with this reasoning and held that the trial court’s unjustified
“midtestimony reversal of its prior ruling impermissibly
burdened defendant’s exercise of his right to testify without
impeachment by evidence the court had already deemed more
prejudicial than probative, deprived him of the right to counsel’s
intelligent assistance on whether to exercise his rights to testify
or not to testify, and impaired his right to a fair trial.” (Id. at
p. 599.) This case is distinguishable because the prosecutor never
conceded that the evidence of appellant’s prior misconduct was
inadmissible under section 352, the court never so ruled and thus
never reversed such ruling, and appellant placed his “intent” at
issue by claiming he hit the guard with his cane by accident and
in self-defense.
Appellant’s assertion that the prosecutor said he would
only use two convictions is not borne out by the record. The
prosecutor told the court he would use “all the convictions.”
Defense counsel was thus on notice that appellant’s convictions,
including the misdemeanor conviction, could be used to impeach
appellant, which here went hand in hand with section 1101,
subdivision (b)’s provision that nothing in section 1101 prohibits
the use of evidence to show “intent.” The same reasons lead us to
reject appellant’s related claim of prosecutorial misconduct
26
(which we reject for the additional reason that he failed to assert
any prosecutorial misconduct below).
III. Officer Jaen’s Lay Testimony that Appellant Did Not
Appear to be Having a Mental Breakdown
A. Relevant proceedings
Officer Jaen testified that while he and another officer tried
to get appellant out of the patrol vehicle to take him into the
detention facility, appellant stated repeatedly that he was
“having a mental breakdown.” The prosecutor asked, “Did it
appear to you like . . . [he] was having a mental breakdown?”
Defense counsel objected based on lack of foundation, and the
court overruled the objection, stating “it’s his lay opinion.”
Officer Jaen responded, “Based off my interactions with the
defendant up to that point I didn’t believe that it was happening.”
Officer Jaen also testified that appellant was “vomiting at this
point as well,” which “appeared [to be] something he was able to
control.”
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting
Officer Jaen’s testimony that appellant did not appear to be
having a mental breakdown and that appellant seemed to be able
to make himself vomit. Appellant forfeited his challenge to the
vomit-related testimony by not objecting to it below.
Lay opinion testimony is admissible if it is “[r]ationally
based on the perception of the witness,” and “[h]elpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony.” (Evid. Code, § 800, subds. (a)–
(b); People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1026.) When a
lay witness offers testimony that goes beyond the facts personally
observed, it is inadmissible. (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 231;
People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 602.) Examples of when the
27
admission of lay testimony has been upheld include when it was
based on personal observation and concerned the extent of an
accident victim’s pain and suffering; whether a defendant was
acting rationally; and whether a defendant was intoxicated.
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1307.)
The trial court properly admitted Officer Jaen’s testimony
because it was based on his own observations—he commented on
whether it appeared to him that appellant was having a mental
breakdown, “based [on his] interactions with [appellant] up to
that point.” Officer Jaen supplied further foundation for his
observation in stating he had “training and experience” that
included “12 plus years . . . in dealing with a lot of types of
medical injuries and illness,” and “train[ing] on placing subjects
on [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 holds as far as
evaluating them and having mental health illnesses.” There was
no abuse of discretion here.
IV. It Was Within the Trial Court’s Discretion to Refuse
to Admit Evidence on Reason for Appellant’s
Wheelchair and Helmet
At the outset of appellant’s direct examination, his counsel
asked him why he could not walk any more, even though he had
been able to walk with a cane on the date of the incident. The
trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to this question
based on lack of relevance. Defense counsel then asked why
appellant was wearing a helmet. The trial court sustained
another objection for lack of relevance.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit appellant’s testimony to explain how he became unable to
walk after the incident and why he was wearing a helmet.
Beyond stating, “It was . . . relevant for the jury to understand
28
why appellant presented as he did in court,” appellant fails to
explain said relevance, and none is apparent. In any case, any
possible relevance is too remote for us to find an abuse of
discretion.
V. Appellant Forfeited His Prosecutorial Misconduct
Claims
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
in improperly questioning appellant on “multiple felony thefts”
involving violence, the facts underlying his felony convictions,
and his being on probation and parole when he committed the
crime at issue; and in arguing appellant lied based on a
comparison of his testimony denying having lifted a skateboard
against Sergeant Elbaz’s testimony that appellant had waved a
cane, which did not contradict appellant’s statement.
Appellant concedes his counsel made no objections to
preserve these claims on appeal. (People v. Thomas (2011) 51
Cal.4th 449, 491–492 [“ ‘ “As a general rule a defendant may not
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely
fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be
admonished to disregard the impropriety” ’ ”].) He argues that
“such objection[s] would have been futile, in light of this record,”
and refers to his earlier argument that the trial court erred in
overruling various objections during appellant’s cross-
examination. We rejected that earlier argument, and we reject
appellant’s otherwise bare assertion that objecting to
prosecutorial misconduct would have been futile.
VI. Appellant’s Counsel Was Not Ineffective
Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately object to the prosecutor’s use of appellant’s
29
criminal history, lay opinion testimony that she had successfully
objected to at the preliminary hearing, and Sergeant Cooper’s
testimony that the officers had cause to believe appellant had
committed a violent assault.
“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two
elements: a defendant must show that their counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88;
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) “[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.” (Strickland, at p. 697.) Prejudice means “a
‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676.)
Appellant does not explain how his counsel’s purported
shortcomings prejudiced him, and our review of the record shows
no reasonable probability of a different outcome had defense
counsel objected as appellant urges she should have. Even had
such objections been made and sustained, the remaining evidence
of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming: The guard, the manager,
and multiple officers all attested to the facts supporting the
various charges against appellant. The evidence in his defense
was relatively weak.
VII. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Mayhem
Conviction
Appellant argues that the injury he inflicted on the guard
was not sufficiently serious to support his mayhem conviction.
Section 203 provides: “Every person who unlawfully and
30
maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or
disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the
tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
mayhem.” (§ 203.) The statue “ ‘protects the integrity of the
victim’s person.’ ” (People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1004
(Santana).) “Disfigurement of the body ‘ “impairs or injures the
beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or thing . . . [or]
renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some
manner.” ’ ” (People v. Romero (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 387.)
Case law has “ ‘grafted’ onto section 203 the requirement that a
disfiguring injury be permanent” (Santana, at p. 1007), but it has
also clarified that an injury can be “permanent” even “if modern
technology effectively repairs the injury.” (Romero, at p. 387.)
Appellant asserts that “chipped” and “shattered” teeth “are
simply below the level of injury sufficient to establish mayhem.”
He neither cites any authority to support this position, nor
addresses any cases that tend to undermine it. (See, e.g., People
v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 267, 281 [“The law of mayhem
has evolved to such a degree that a number of cases have
affirmed mayhem convictions based on relatively minor
injuries”]; People v. Caldwell (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 952 [a
bitten-through lower lip was mayhem]; People v. Keenan (1991)
227 Cal.App.3d 26, 35–36 [cigarette burns to both breasts
supported mayhem]; People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443,
457 [blinding of an eye from a kick was sufficient for mayhem].)
Appellant also ignores the substantial evidence of the severity of
the guard’s injury: The guard testified that the blow to his
mouth rendered his “raw nerve” exposed, “pushed back” his
gums, altering his smile, and that eating has felt “weird” for him
since the injury. He “ended up getting four root canals” and
31
“three different bridges.” This evidence was sufficient for the
jury to find a serious and permanent disfigurement for the
purpose of mayhem. (See Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1012.)
VIII. Cumulative Error and Constitutional Arguments
Appellant contends that he suffered prejudice from the
cumulative effect of all the errors he has claimed, even if any
error was alone harmless. “ ‘[A] series of trial errors, though
independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by
accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.’ ” (People
v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.) Because we have
rejected all of appellant’s claims, we also reject his claim that he
suffered prejudice from a cumulation of errors and that he was
thus deprived of his right to due process.
Appellant asserted violations of his constitutional rights
with respect to various of his claims. Because we have rejected
those claims, we necessarily reject his corresponding
constitutional claims. (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400,
416, fn. 5 [no separate constitutional discussion is required when
rejection of claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection of
constitutional theory].)
32
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
33
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