CourtListener 10352174•People v. Johnson CA1/1
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Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Johnson CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169957
v.
ANTHONY EJANE JOHNSON, (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
Nos. SCR-31910-1, SCR-31911-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2002, defendant Anthony Johnson was convicted in two separate
jury trials of numerous felonies, including rape and conspiracy to commit
murder. He was sentenced to 50 years to life plus 25 years in prison,
including two one-year enhancements for prior prison terms under Penal
Code former section 667.5, subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)).1 He appealed,
and this division affirmed the judgment. (People v. Johnson (Mar. 21, 2006,
A104051) [nonpub. opn.].)
Several years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No
. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483). The bill invalidated
certain prior-prison-term enhancements imposed before 2020 and entitles a
defendant whose judgment contained such an enhancement to a full
resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 2; § 1172.75, subds. (a), (c); People v.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.) Johnson sought resentencing under
the new law, and the trial court struck the two section 667.5(b)
enhancements but otherwise imposed the same sentence.
Johnson now appeals from the resentencing order, claiming the trial
court violated section 1170, subdivision (b), as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567), by reimposing the
upper term for three counts in the absence of a “certified record of conviction”
supporting the aggravating factors on which the court relied. He also claims
the court erred by staying the sentences for three other counts under
section 654 without first imposing terms for each and not calculating and
awarding custody credits through the resentencing date. The Attorney
General concedes that a remand is required to address the latter two issues
but claims the court properly imposed the three upper-term sentences.
We conclude that Johnson forfeited his challenge to the imposition of
the upper terms. We also reject his claim that his counsel below rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the evidence on which the trial
court relied to find the aggravating factors at issue. Therefore, we remand
for the court to impose terms on the stayed counts and award custody credits
but otherwise affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are set forth in our prior opinion. Briefly, in 2001,
Johnson sexually assaulted and robbed the victim while she was working in a
Santa Rosa thrift store where he had also worked. He then threatened to kill
her if she reported him. After Johnson was arrested for these crimes, he
arranged from jail for his wife to pay a hit man—who turned out to be an
undercover police officer—to murder the victim.
2
The following year, a jury convicted Johnson of forcible rape, forcible
oral copulation, forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object, second degree
robbery, second degree burglary, criminal threats, and dissuading a witness.2
The jury also found true allegations under the One Strike law that he tied or
bound the victim and committed a sexual offense during a burglary, and he
admitted two prior prison terms under section 667.5(b).3 Two months later,
in a separate trial, a second jury found Johnson guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder and solicitation to commit murder.4
In April 2003, the trial court sentenced Johnson in both cases to a total
term of 50 years to life plus 25 years in prison. The indeterminate sentence
was composed of a term of 25 years to life for rape and a consecutive term of
25 years to life for conspiracy to commit murder. The determinate sentence
was composed of five years (the upper term) for robbery and consecutive
terms of two years (the midterm) for dissuading a witness, eight years (the
upper term) each for oral copulation and sexual penetration, and one year
each for the section 667.5(b) enhancements. Sentencing for the remaining
convictions was stayed under section 654. The court also awarded 505 days
2 Johnson was convicted of these crimes under former section 288a,
subdivision (c)(2) (oral copulation), and sections 261, subdivision (a)(2) (rape),
289, subdivision (a)(1) (sexual penetration), 211 (robbery), 459 (burglary), 422
(criminal threats), and 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) (dissuading witness).
3 The One Strike allegations were found true under section 667.61,
subdivisions (a) and (e)(2) (burglary) and (6) (tying or binding). Johnson
served the prior prison terms for 1996 convictions of inflicting corporal injury
on a spouse or cohabitant under section 273.5 and receiving stolen property
under section 496, subdivision (a), and a 1998 conviction of another violation
of section 273.5.
4 These convictions were under sections 182, subdivision (a)(1), and
187, subdivision (a) (conspiracy), and 653f, subdivision (b) (solicitation).
3
of actual credits and 75 days of conduct credits in the sexual-assault-related
case and no custody credits in the murder-related case.
Nearly 20 years later, in March 2023, the trial court appointed counsel
for Johnson after he was referred for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483.
Johnson filed a motion for resentencing in which he claimed the court was
required to strike the former section 667.5(b) enhancements and reduce his
sentence by two years. He also claimed the court was required to conduct a
full resentencing under which he was entitled to the benefit of intervening
changes in the law. In particular, he argued that section 1170, as amended
by Senate Bill No. 567, precluded the court from reimposing the upper term
for the three counts on which he originally received that term because no
aggravating factors were stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury.
The prosecution opposed the motion. Besides arguing that Johnson
was ineligible for resentencing because the nature of his offenses placed him
outside the “spirit” of Senate Bill No. 483, the prosecution urged the trial
court to reimpose the upper terms based on his criminal history. The
prosecution also submitted several documents, including the probation
report, Johnson’s CLETS criminal history report, and portions of his C-file
showing prison rule violations. With the parties’ agreement, the trial court
admitted and considered these documents.
At a hearing on March 1, 2024, the trial court recalled Johnson’s
sentence and resentenced him. The court struck the two section 667.5(b)
enhancements, but it declined to alter the sentence otherwise. After noting it
was unclear whether Senate Bill No. 567 applied to the resentencing, the
court “nonetheless [did] its own independent analysis of the factors . . . under
the current state of the law for the imposition of [the upper term].” “Setting
4
aside” the aggravating factors related to the crimes under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a), the court “looked at the various . . . factors” under
rule 4.421(b) related to the defendant that “remain[ed] within the court’s
discretion to find true.” The court then found that based on the records it had
reviewed, the following aggravating factors were established and
“outweigh[ed] any mitigating factors”: (1) Johnson’s convictions were
“numerous or of increasing seriousness” (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (2) he had served a
prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)); (3) he was on parole when he committed
the offenses (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (4) his prior performance on probation or
parole was “unsatisfactory” (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
The trial court resentenced Johnson to a total term of 50 years to life
plus 23 years in prison. Except for the stricken section 667.5(b)
enhancements, the sentence was the same as that originally imposed,
including the upper terms for robbery, oral copulation, and sexual
penetration, and the stay of sentence without imposing a term for burglary,
criminal threats, and solicitation to commit murder. The court did not award
custody credits.5
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Johnson’s Challenge to the Upper-term Sentences Fails.
Johnson claims the trial court failed to comply with Senate Bill No. 567
in imposing the upper-term sentences because it did not rely on a “certified
record of conviction” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3)) to find true the four aggravating
factors based on his criminal history. Assuming, without deciding, that
Senate Bill No. 567 applies in resentencing proceedings under
5 Our record contains a minute order from the resentencing hearing but
no abstract of judgment. On remand, the trial court must ensure that an
amended abstract is prepared.
5
section 1172.75, we conclude that Johnson forfeited this claim. We also reject
his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
challenging the evidentiary basis for the aggravating factors.
Under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), “[a]ny sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to [section 667.5(b)],
except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” Section 1172.75 describes a process for
identifying people in custody whose sentences included an invalid
enhancement so that the sentencing court can “recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(c).) In doing so, the court
must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) In addition, “[t]he court may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated . . . .” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).) Thus, “[b]y its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the . . . court strike the newly ‘invalid’
enhancements.” (People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
As amended by Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170 provides that “[w]hen
a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the [sentencing] court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) The upper term may be
imposed “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
6
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) “Notwithstanding
[these provisions], the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
There is a split of authority on whether a trial court resentencing a
defendant under section 1172.75 must comply with Senate Bill No. 567 to
reimpose the upper term. The disagreement stems from subdivision (d)(4) of
section 1172.75, which provides that “[u]nless the court originally imposed the
upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Italics added.) In
People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, the Third District
Court of Appeal held that “section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4)[,] carves out an
exception to the general rule that all ameliorative changes to the law must be
applied at a section 1172.75 resentencing and does not require aggravating
factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was
previously imposed.” (Id. at p. 458.) The Sixth District Court of Appeal then
disagreed with Brannon-Thompson, holding that Sixth Amendment concerns
warranted interpreting section 1172.75 to prohibit reimposition of the upper
term “in the absence of aggravating factors stipulated to by the defendant or
proven beyond a reasonable doubt” under section 1170, subdivision (b).
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329.) The Attorney General
urges us to follow Brannon-Thompson, and Johnson urges us to follow
Gonzalez.
7
We need not weigh in on the disagreement to resolve this appeal.
Assuming, without deciding, that Senate Bill No. 567 applies to resentencing
proceedings under section 1172.75, we agree with the Attorney General that
Johnson forfeited his claim that the trial court failed to comply with
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). Notably, Johnson does not argue that the
court was precluded from relying on the relevant aggravating factors absent
a stipulation or jury determination, an argument that would implicate an
issue pending before our state Supreme Court. (People v. Wiley (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 676, review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283326; see People v.
Morgan (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 488, 517–518, review granted Oct. 2, 2024,
S286493 [discussing split in authority about which aggravating factors can be
determined by court].) Rather, he claims the factors were not “based on a
certified record of conviction” as statutorily required.
Senate Bill No. 567 went into effect over two years before Johnson’s
resentencing. Thus, “[t]he lack of certified copies of [his] convictions
presented at the sentencing hearing was a foundational, evidentiary issue
[Johnson] could have, and should have, raised in the trial court.” (People v.
Hall (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1101, review granted Feb. 28, 2024,
S283530, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, 768–769.) Although we are not convinced that Johnson forfeited his
claim merely by generally agreeing to the admission of the records the court
did consider, it was incumbent upon him to object if he thought additional
records were required to prove the aggravating factors based on a certified
record of conviction. The prosecution would then have had the opportunity to
correct any deficiencies in the evidence of his criminal record, which likely
“could have been readily resolved.” (Hall, at p. 1101.) Since Johnson did not
raise the issue below, we decline to consider his claim on the merits.
8
Anticipating this conclusion, Johnson alternatively argues that his
counsel below rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
absence of any certified record of conviction. To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate “that
counsel’s performance was deficient,” such that “counsel was not functioning
as the ‘counsel’ [constitutionally] guaranteed,” and “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687;
People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.) Thus, a defendant must show
both that (1) “counsel’s performance . . . fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” and (2) there is “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “defer[]
to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel
acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed
for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
In his opening brief, Johnson claims there could have been “no rational
tactical reason for [his] counsel [below] to fail to take steps that could result
in a more favorable disposition for her client.” The Attorney General
responds that counsel may have decided not to object in light of then-existing
case law supporting the conclusion that a CLETS criminal history report
qualifies as a certified record of conviction under section 1170,
9
subdivision (b)(3). (Citing People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 403–
404, vacated and transferred for further consideration in light of People v.
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730 and Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S.
821.) The Attorney General also states that counsel may have not objected
because she concluded “the document accurately conveyed [Johnson’s]
criminal history,” meaning there was nothing to be gained by insisting the
prosecution obtain additional documentation. We agree that these possible
reasons, either individually or collectively, would satisfactorily explain
counsel’s decision not to object. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) As a
result, Johnson fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. A Remand Is Required to Address Two Sentencing Errors.
Johnson also claims, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial
court erred by not imposing terms on the stayed counts and not awarding
custody credits. We agree with the parties that a remand is required to
address these issues.
First, “when a court determines that a conviction falls within the
meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence but to stay the
execution of the duplicative sentence.” (People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787,
796.) If the court “impose[s] no sentence or . . . stay[s] imposition of the
sentence,” the result is an unauthorized sentence requiring a remand for the
court to impose a term and stay its execution. (People v. Mani (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380.)
Second, under section 2900.1, “[w]here a defendant has served any
portion of [the] sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which
judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the
term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent
sentence [the defendant] may receive upon a new commitment for the same
10
criminal act or acts.” This provision requires a court to “recalculate and
credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has
already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since [the
defendant] was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.”
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37.) The calculation of post-
sentence conduct credits remains the responsibility of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 29–30; People v. Dean (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397.) Thus, a remand is also required for the court to
update the original award of custody credits to include the actual credits
Johnson accrued after his original sentencing.
Finally, we briefly address the scope of the remand. Citing People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, Johnson claims the section 654 error warrants
“a full resentencing hearing.” The Attorney General does not directly
respond, although he states the remand should be “for the limited purpose of
imposing sentence on the counts stayed . . . and recalculating [Johnson’s]
custody credits.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) As relevant here,
Buycks explained that “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on
remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so
the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’ ” (Buycks, at p. 893.) We question whether remedying the
section 654 error warrants a full resentencing under Buycks, but we leave it
to the trial court on remand to resolve this issue.
III.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to impose and stay terms on
the counts of burglary, criminal threats, and solicitation to commit murder;
award custody credits consistent with this opinion; and conduct any further
resentencing it deems appropriate. The court shall ensure that an amended
11
abstract of judgment is prepared and a certified copy is forwarded to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
12
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
People v. Johnson A169957
13
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