CourtListener 10351515•People v. Roberts CA1/3
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Filed 3/6/25 P. v. Roberts CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169695
v. (Humboldt County
DYLAN ROBERTS, Super. Ct. No. CR2202204)
Defendant and Appellant.
After pleading guilty to robbery and assault, defendant Dylan Roberts
appeals on the ground the trial court improperly denied his request for
pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Charged Offenses
Defendant was charged with assaulting or battering three people,
robbing one, and damaging a jail. According to evidence at the preliminary
hearing, on August 8, 2022, defendant approached one of the victims, Michael
G.,2 as he was walking down the street and punched him, causing him to fall
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 In the interest of privacy, we refer to the victims by their first names,
intending no disrespect.
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over. Michael suffered cuts and bruises, a broken jaw, a broken nose, and a
fractured hip. Defendant punched a second victim, Phillip A., in the face. He
approached a third victim, Roger K., with clenched fists in a parking lot as
Roger was loading groceries into his vehicle, punched Roger in the face, and
took a case of beer from him, saying, “ ‘I’m taking my beer, mother fucker.’ ”
When Roger followed him, defendant said to him, “ ‘You punk ass bitch, I’m
the man; I’m the man,’ ” and tried to charge at him. Video surveillance
showed defendant also pushed an additional, unidentified, victim in the
parking lot.
Defendant was arrested that day and sent to the county jail. While in a
holding cell, he punched another inmate, Justin Q., several times. When he
was placed in a cell on his own, he hit the window, causing it to break.
Defendant later reported he had blacked out from methamphetamines
at the time of the offenses. Based on his alleged actions, defendant was
charged with seven counts: felony second degree robbery of Roger K. (§ 211;
count 1); felony assault on Michael G. with force likely to produce great bodily
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), with a special allegation that he inflicted
great bodily injury on a victim 70 years of age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c));
misdemeanor assault and battery on Phillip A. (§§ 240, 242; counts 3 & 4);
misdemeanor assault and battery of Justin Q. (§§ 240, 242; counts 5 & 6); and
misdemeanor damaging a prison or jail (§ 4600, subd. (a); count 7). As to
counts 1 and 2, the information also alleged the crimes involved great
violence, great bodily harm, or threat of great bodily harm, and that the
victim was particularly vulnerable. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
Motion for Mental Health Diversion
In April 2023, before trial, defendant brought a motion for mental
health diversion under section 1001.36, arguing that he suffered from
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multiple mental health disorders that played a significant role in the charged
offenses and that the disorders were reasonably treatable.
Dr. Kelly’s Opinions
In support of his motion, defendant attached a report by a licensed
psychologist, Kevin T. Kelly, who had examined defendant in April 2023. Dr.
Kelly diagnosed defendant with three conditions that were significant factors
in the charged offenses: substance abuse disorder, schizophreniform
disorder, and “Cluster B type, Borderline and Antisocial” personality
disorder. As treatment, he recommended residential rehabilitation for
substance abuse disorder, followed by intensive substance abuse treatment;
psychiatric medication; counseling for anger management; and case
management.
According to Dr. Kelly’s report, while in jail soon after his arrest,
defendant broke the window to his cell, crawled out, and wandered the unit
making “grandiose statements,” and he reported to a psychiatrist that he was
“ ‘[t]he Messiah,’ ” with a “ ‘special message to deliver to everyone.’ ”
Defendant told another doctor he was a “ ‘great man’ ” and had made the
Golden Gate Bridge of “ ‘diamond metal.’ ”
In September 2022, while in custody after the charged offenses,
defendant had been diagnosed with “mixed, severe” bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder, and substance abuse
disorders, in remission in a controlled environment. He was taking
prescribed psychiatric medications at the time of Dr. Kelly’s report, and said
he was no longer hearing voices. He reported a history of using alcohol,
marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and psychedelics, and said he had
suffered brain injuries in the past.
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Defendant experienced auditory and visual hallucinations, which began
about a year previously, when he was 23 years old, at the time he began
using methamphetamine. He also reported blackouts lasting days or weeks,
which he attributed to his methamphetamine use, as well as psychosis, “ ‘like
I’m seeing shadows.’ ” According to Dr. Kelly, blackouts are not commonly
associated with methamphetamine use, and Dr. Kelly opined that defendant
had likely experienced psychotic breaks, probably induced by
methamphetamine, which can trigger underlying schizophrenia. Defendant
reported that he had been taking medications for seven months while in jail
and that they were working well.
Defendant acknowledged to Dr. Kelly that he had “ ‘hurt [three] guys in
the community and [one] while at booking,’ ” said he had “ ‘never been that
way before,’ ” and said he did not know why he was “ ‘angry with the world.’ ”
He said he had no memory of those events.
Defendant’s mother had confirmed that he suffered auditory
hallucinations and delusions.
Dr. Kelly opined that defendant acted irrationally at the time of the
offense due to schizophreniform disorder, bipolar disorder, or
methamphetamine induced hypomania. Antisocial and borderline features
were significant parts of his personality, but he likely would have managed
those symptoms more peacefully, but for his schizoid and bipolar processes
and his methamphetamine induced psychosis.
According to Dr. Kelly, defendant’s mental health disorders were
treatable, with treatment for the personality disorder “ancillary to direct
treatment” for his other disorders, and there was good reason to believe
treatment over a two-year period would control his symptoms so as to prevent
further offenses. Dr. Kelly recommended a “dual diagnosis treatment plan of
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residential substance use treatment accompanied by psychiatric medication,
counseling, and anger management to treat co-occurring mental health
symptoms.” However, if defendant began using substances again or ceased
taking his medications, he might act violently and unpredictably toward
others.
Dr. Kelly testified at a July 24, 2023 hearing on defendant’s motion for
mental health diversion. He explained that he labeled defendant’s
personality disorder under “cluster B” because there were elements of both
antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder, with a
degree of narcissism. Although personality disorders are not directly
treatable with psychiatric medications and not particularly responsive to
counseling, abstinence from substances and substance abuse treatment could
“do quite a bit” to mitigate the effect of personality disorders on a person’s
behavior, and antipsychotic medication could reduce the person’s agitation,
further reducing the likelihood of “act[ing] out.”
Dr. Kelly opined that defendant posed a risk of violence “during an
acute period” of both intoxication and experiencing symptoms of
schizophrenia and personality disorder, and that the risk of violence was
“greatly reduced perhaps” with treatment. To achieve that goal, Dr. Kelly
opined that defendant should be sober and abstinent for a “long period” and
receive “extensive inpatient rehabilitation,” followed by an intensive
outpatient substance abuse treatment program.
Dr. Kelly could not specify the roles defendant’s substance abuse,
mental illness, and personality disorders variously played in the charged
offenses; each of those diagnoses could have resulted in his behavior, and he
considered each a significant factor in the charged offenses. He noted,
however, that those offenses represented the only time defendant’s mental
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health problems had resulted in violence, which would be unusual in someone
with a “more severe level of antisocial personality disorder or bipolar
disorder.” Defendant appeared to be motivated to make use of treatment,
and if he were medicated, abstinent from alcohol and drugs, and supervised
by a clinician, he would not create an unusual danger from violent outbursts.
Evidence at the hearing also showed that before the crimes at issue,
defendant had attended an inpatient rehabilitation program at Waterfront
Recovery Services (Waterfront) and participated in drug and alcohol
counseling and an anger management program.
Hearing on Motion and Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court acknowledged that there was “pretty clear evidence”
that defendant’s mental disorders were a substantial factor in the
commission of the offenses. But, it went on, defendant was dangerous to the
community if untreated and he needed significant supervision to prevent
further random acts of significant violence. The court explained that the
Department of Health and Human Services would not be willing to provide
defendant with services in the community, due to his dangerousness and to
difficulties in obtaining funding, and that the probation department would be
unable to provide an adequate level of supervision in the community.
At a further hearing a few days later, the trial court concluded the
evidence did not show defendant would be likely to commit a “super strike” if
placed on diversion, and it found he was eligible for diversion. However, the
court explained, defendant would be a danger to the community if he began
using substances again or failed to comply with his treatment or medication,
and any treatment program would have to address his personality disorder
and provide “some significant amount of supervision.” The court gave
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defendant the opportunity to “come up with [a] treatment program” that
would be suitable.
Defense counsel informed the court he had identified a year-long multi-
phase program, Visions of the Cross, which had inpatient, intensive
outpatient, and sober living components. At a further hearing on October 9,
2023, however, counsel said that he had been unable to secure a long-term
dual-diagnosis program for defendant, in part because defendant was unable
to attend an intake interview while in custody. Waterfront, the only program
to which defendant had been accepted, was limited to 90 inpatient days, and
defense counsel acknowledged it did not satisfy the court’s requirements.
The court denied defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. It
concluded that, while the offenses charged resulted from defendant’s mental
health issues, defendant posed a sufficient danger to the community that he
required a level of supervision Waterfront could not provide, and that no
suitable program was available.
Plea. Verdict. and Sentencing
On December 6, 2023, defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 2, as well
as to an amended allegation of personally inflicting great bodily injury under
section 12022.7, subdivision (a). On January 11, 2024, the trial court
sentenced him to the agreed-upon term of five years for the robbery, with the
terms for the remaining count and enhancement to run concurrently. This
timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background
Section 1001.36 establishes criteria and procedures for a trial court to
order pretrial diversion to mental health treatment. As originally enacted in
2018, the statute provided that a court may grant pretrial diversion if it
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found all of the following: “(1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental
disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of the
charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental health
treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her
speedy trial right; (5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and
(6) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
[as defined in section 1170.18] if treated in the community.” (People v. Frahs
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626–627 (Frahs); former § 1001.36, subds. (b)(1)–(6);
Stats. 218, ch. 34, § 24.) The court had discretion to grant pretrial diversion
if all threshold eligibility requirements were met and the defendant and
offense were suitable for diversion, and if the trial court was satisfied that
the recommended program of treatment would meet the defendant’s
specialized mental health needs. (Frahs, at p. 627, citing former § 1001.36,
subds. (a), (b)(3) & (c)(1); People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Doron).)
Effective January 1, 2023, section 1001.36 was amended to “ ‘simplify
the procedural process for obtaining diversion by presuming that a
defendant’s diagnosed “mental disorder” has a connection to their offense’
and permit the court to deny diversion if the People rebutted the
presumption.” (Doran, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) The statute now
establishes two criteria for eligibility for diversion and four for suitability.
Specifically, a defendant is eligible for diversion if he or she has been
diagnosed within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert with
a diagnosed mental health disorder identified in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and the mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36,
subds. (b)(1) & (2); Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.) The statute specifies that such a
mental disorder includes bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective
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disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder, but it excludes antisocial
personality disorder and pedophilia. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) At the time of
the trial court’s ruling on the motion for diversion—but not at the time of the
judgment—borderline personality disorder was also specifically excluded, but
in Assembly Bill No. 1412 (Assembly Bill 1412), the Legislature eliminated
this exclusion effective January 1, 2024. (Former § 1001.36; see Stats. 2023,
ch. 687, § 1.1.)
If these eligibility requirements are satisfied, the trial court must
consider whether the defendant is suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).) The defendant is suitable if (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the symptoms of mental disorder related to the criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant
consents to diversion and waives a speedy trial; (3) the defendant agrees to
comply with treatment; and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the
community. (§ 1001.36, subds. (c)(1)–(4).) The defendant has the burden to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility and that the defendant and the
offense are suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) If the defendant is
eligible and suitable for diversion, “the trial court must also be satisfied ‘that
the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the
defendant.’ ” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892
(Sarmiento), italics added, quoting § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); accord, Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627; People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079
(Gerson).)
If all these requirements are met, the trial court has discretion to grant
pretrial diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Doran, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
9
p. 9.) This discretion must be exercised consistently with the principles and
purposes of the law. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891 (Qualkinbush).) The primary
purposes are to reduce the likelihood that people with mental disorders will
enter and reenter the criminal justice system while protecting public safety,
to allow local discretion in developing and implementing diversion programs,
and to provide “diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and
support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)–
(c); Qualkinbush, at p. 886.) These purposes evince a “strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.”
(Sarmiento, at pp. 892–893.)
We review the trial court’s factual findings under section 1001.36 for
substantial evidence, and its diversion eligibility determinations for abuse of
discretion. (Negron v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1016
(Negron).) To the extent an issue on appeal turns on statutory interpretation
and the application of a statute to undisputed facts, our review is de novo.
(Ibid.)
II. Effect of Assembly Bill 1412
Defendant’s first challenge to the trial court’s ruling is that the trial
court should have considered the effect of a recent amendment to section
1001.36, which broadened the range of disorders that may serve as a basis for
mental health diversion.
Dr. Kelly diagnosed defendant with a personality disorder with
elements of antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality
disorder. At the time of the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion for
diversion, both of these conditions were excluded from those eligible to serve
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as a basis for diversion. (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) But effective
January 1, 2024, shortly before judgment was entered, Assembly Bill 1412
became effective, amending section 1001.36 to remove borderline personality
disorder (but not antisocial personality disorder) from the list of excluded
conditions. (Stats. 2023, ch. 687, § 1.2.)
The parties agree, as do we, that Assembly Bill 1412 applies
retroactively to this case. (See Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 631–632; Doron,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 6–7.) If it appears that the trial court applied
the wrong standard in light of the new law, we reverse unless the record
clearly indicates it would have reached the same conclusion even if it had
been aware of the current scope of its discretion. (Doron, at p. 10.)
It is clear from this record that the trial court would have ruled no
differently had it had the benefit of Assembly Bill 1412 at the time of its
ruling. The bill removed borderline personality disorder from the set of
conditions that renders a defendant eligible for mental health diversion.
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) But a defendant who has been diagnosed
with one excluded condition may still be eligible for diversion if there is also a
diagnosis of an included mental health condition that was a significant factor
in commission of the charged offense. (Negron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1009, 1016–1018.) Consistent with this rule, the trial court expressly
found defendant eligible for mental health diversion based on his qualifying
diagnoses, even though his personality disorder included elements of two
then-excluded disorders. The presence of borderline personality disorder in
defendant’s diagnoses did not alter the trial court’s view of his eligibility.
We are also confident that the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
was unsuitable for diversion would have been no different had borderline
personality disorder not been excluded from the eligibility determination
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when the court made its ruling. Defendant points out that, in expressing the
need for a secure program, the trial court noted that defendant had ineligible
as well as eligible mental health disabilities. But that was still the case even
after enactment of Assembly Bill 1412, in light of the continuing presence of
antisocial personality disorder among the excluded conditions. The court
expressly considered whether defendant’s mental health problems, including
his personality disorder, would respond to treatment, and defendant makes
no showing that it was improper to do so. Diversion may be ordered only
“subject to” the trial court’s satisfaction that the recommended program will
meet the defendant’s specialized mental health treatment needs (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)), and defendant can scarcely argue that his specialized needs
do not encompass the personality disorder that Dr. Kelly opined was a
significant factor in the charged offenses.
Defendant argues that application of Assembly Bill 1412’s amendments
might have affected the trial court’s assessment of whether he could receive
effective treatment for his personality disorder. We see no basis for this
argument. The amendment says nothing about how a court should
determine whether a program will address a defendant’s mental health
treatment needs. And defendant raises no challenge to the evidence actually
presented before the court made its ruling, which showed that personality
disorders are neither directly treatable with psychiatric medications nor
particularly responsive to counseling, but that their effects could be mitigated
by abstinence from substances, substance abuse treatment, and antipsychotic
medication.
We see no need to remand to allow the trial court to exercise its
discretion anew in light off Assembly Bill 1412.
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III. Risk of Danger
One of section 1001.36’s criteria for suitability is that the trial court
find “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Section 1170.18 defines “ ‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’ ” as “an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will
commit a new violent felony within the meaning of [section 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)].” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) That provision, in turn,
enumerates specific serious or violent felonies, colloquially referred to as
“ ‘super strikes’ ”: specified “ ‘sexually violent offense[s],’ ” certain sexual
offenses against children, homicide or attempted homicide, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and a serious or violent felony
punishable by life imprisonment or death. (People v. Jefferson (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242; § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)
The trial court found that defendant did not pose an unreasonable risk
of committing a super strike if treated in the community. Nevertheless, when
considering what type of program would be appropriate for mental health
diversion, the court explained that defendant required “a secure program,”
“something more than the usual inpatient treatment program,” one with
“adequate supervision” that would “assure the safety of the community,”
although not necessarily “lockdown supervision.” The court elaborated that it
would require “a facility that’s going to address the specific . . . unique
combination of [mental] illnesses that [defendant] presents . . . in a fashion
that ensures public safety.” That was because of the nature of the charged
offenses, involving “random acts of significant violence on persons unknown
to [defendant] in the community,” which presented a “[s]ignificant level of
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danger.” As a result, according to the court, defendant needed “direct and
significant supervision with medication in order not to be a danger out in the
community to commit random acts of violence,” for instance if he returned to
substance abuse or failed to take his prescribed medication or comply with
treatment. The court also explained that, for reasons defendant does not
challenge on appeal, neither the probation department nor the Department of
Health and Human Services would be willing or able to supervise him
adequately in the community.
Defendant had been accepted into a residential program for 90 days at
Waterfront, to be followed by outpatient services with weekly case
management, and had unsuccessfully sought a long-term residential dual-
diagnosis program. Defendant had attended Waterfront in the past, before
the offenses at issue here, as well as an alcohol and drug program and anger
management counseling.
The trial court concluded Waterfront lacked the capacity to provide the
necessary level of supervision. Its opinion appears to have been influenced in
part by the court’s own experience in releasing to Waterfront another
defendant who promptly committed a robbery. The court expressed its
frustration with the lack of an available appropriate program for defendant,
saying, “[i]t seems like there should be something for [him]. We are not
simply going to keep him locked down forever, and . . . the only way he is
going to function in the community is through some degree of ongoing
supervision and medication compliance. But given where we are right now,
and I trust that [defense counsel] has done his due diligence in evaluating
available services[,] [i]t doesn’t appear there is a suitable program given what
[defendant] presents.”
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Defendant contends the trial court erred in relying upon public safety
concerns that did not rise to the level of an “unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18”—that is, an unreasonable risk
that he would commit a super strike—in denying mental health diversion
after it had found he was not at unreasonable risk of committing a super
strike. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
A number of appellate decisions have considered similar contentions.
Among them is the recent case of Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 882, upon
which defendant rests much of his argument. The trial court there found the
petitioner met both of section 1001.36’s eligibility standards, and, as to
suitability, that she had consented to diversion and agreed to comply with
her treatment plan. (Sarmiento, at p. 889.) But it nevertheless concluded
the petitioner was unsuitable for treatment, both because of her past failures
in drug treatment and because she posed an unreasonable risk to public
safety. (Id. at p. 890.) This last finding was made, not based on a risk that
the petitioner would commit a super strike offense, but assertedly within the
court’s “ ‘residual’ discretion.” (Ibid.)
The appellate court concluded this ruling was error. In doing so, it
recognized that section 1001.36 allows a trial court to exercise its discretion
to deny diversion even if a defendant makes a prima facie showing that all
the express statutory requirements are satisfied. (Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 892, citing Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079, &
Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) And the court must also be
satisfied that the recommended treatment program will meet the defendant’s
specialized mental health treatment needs, a requirement that “appears to
contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive
appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion
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program.” (Sarmiento, at p. 892; § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(1).) Even with all
requirements met, the court may still exercise its discretion to deny
diversion; however, this discretion must be exercised in a manner
“ ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law,” ’ ” and
the court’s statement of reasons should reflect consideration of those
purposes and explain why diversion would not promote them. (Sarmiento, at
pp. 892–893, citing Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 891–892; see
Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 134 (Vaughn).)
Applying these principles, the court in Sarmiento concluded the trial
court erred in two respects: First, it erred in concluding that the petitioner’s
past lack of success in drug treatment showed that a program to address her
underlying mental health diagnoses of depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder, coupled with substance abuse treatment, would not meet her
specialized mental health treatment needs and yield better results.
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 894–895.) And second, the court
erred in deciding that residual concerns for public safety not arising to a
likelihood of a super strike justified denial of diversion. (Id. at p. 896.)
We are not persuaded that Sarmiento leads to the conclusion that the
trial court here similarly erred. Before deciding whether to grant a request
for pretrial diversion, in addition to determining whether the six eligibility
and suitability criteria are met, the court must consider whether the
recommended treatment program will meet the defendant’s specialized
health care needs. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) The court in People v. Moine
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 451–452 (Moine), explained that under this rule,
even if a defendant does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety as
defined in section 1170.18, a court may still properly consider whether he or
she can be safely treated in a proposed mental health facility. And, as
16
explained in People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 861–862 (Bunas)—
where the defendant committed unprovoked assaults against two victims, at
least one of them resulting in significant injuries—even if the charged offense
is not one of those rendering a defendant statutorily inappropriate for
diversion, the court may take into account the circumstances of the charged
offense in deciding whether diversion is suitable.
The trial court’s ruling was based on these proper factors, although it
did not expressly refer to subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) of section 1001.36. The court
explained that, although it could not find defendant posed an unreasonable
super strike risk, the charged offenses involved significant violence against
random strangers, and as a result he required a “significant amount of
supervision” initially. We cannot say this conclusion was unreasonable: the
charged crimes included at least three unprovoked assaults on strangers, one
of them causing a victim to suffer a broken jaw, a broken nose, and a
fractured hip. The trial court could reasonably conclude that a program that
did not protect defendant from committing further such unprovoked violence
while he received intensive treatment for his mental health disorders did not
meet his “specialized mental health treatment needs.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 451–452 [court may
consider whether defendant may be safely treated in proposed program]; see
also Bunas, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 861–862 [court may consider
circumstances of charged offense].)
The trial court did not conclude that no mental health treatment
program could provide suitable diversion for defendant—indeed, it expressed
its frustration with the unavailability of such a program. But for reasons not
challenged on appeal, it appears that Waterfront was the only inpatient
program then open to defendant. Apparently based on both the brevity of the
17
90-day inpatient program offered by Waterfront and the court’s own
experience of its level of supervision, the trial court concluded Waterfront’s
program was insufficient. Defendant asserts that Waterfront’s program is
consistent with Dr. Kelly’s recommendation of a dual diagnosis plan of
residential substance abuse treatment followed by “intensive” substance
abuse and recovery services in the community. But it is worth noting that
Dr. Kelly recommended treatment over a two-year period, and defense
counsel acknowledged below that he had been unable to locate a long-term
dual diagnosis program for defendant. On this record, we cannot conclude
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding a 90-day program, followed
by outpatient services with weekly case management, was inadequate in
light of defendant’s mental health treatment needs.
IV. Correct Version of Section 1001.36
Defendant’s final contention is that the trial court erred by relying
upon an earlier version of section 1001.36, which established six eligibility
criteria for mental health diversion, rather than the operative version, which
divides those criteria into two for eligibility and four for suitability. While we
agree that some of the trial court’s comments were less than precise,
defendant has not shown any reversible error.
As we have explained, section 1001.36 was amended effective January
1, 2023 such that the original six criteria for mental health diversion
eligibility were divided into two criteria for eligibility (that the defendant is
diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder and that the disorder is a
significant factor in the offense) and four criteria for suitability (that the
symptoms would respond to treatment, and that the defendant consents to
diversion and waives a speedy trial, agrees to comply with treatment, and
18
will not pose an unreasonable risk). (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c); Stats. 2022,
ch. 735, § 1.)
Defendant contends some of the trial court’s comments showed its
ruling was based on the earlier form of the statute rather than the version
then in effect, and he asks us to remand the matter for the trial court to
consider his motion for mental health diversion anew under the correct
standards. Specifically, at a hearing on July 25, 2023, the court expressed its
concerns about the level of supervision defendant would require and said that
it did not know if it should therefore find him ineligible for diversion. At a
hearing a few days later, before finding defendant eligible for diversion, the
court noted that it could not find that defendant posed an unreasonable risk
of committing a super strike. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
As defendant points out, the current eligibility criteria address neither
the necessary level of supervision nor public safety concerns (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)), and he argues the trial court’s comments at the first hearing
suggest it mistakenly believed these factors were relevant to eligibility. But
regardless of whether the trial court’s phrasing was inartful, it in fact did
find defendant eligible for pretrial diversion. In the absence of any adverse
effect on its determination regarding eligibility, we see no need for
reconsideration of the question.
Defendant also contends that the trial court relied on improper factors
in deciding he was unsuitable for mental health diversion. In a hearing on
September 7, 2023, the trial court noted that it had not yet found defendant
suitable for diversion and said that suitability would depend on a treatment
plan. Similarly, during the October 9, 2023 hearing at which it denied
diversion, the trial court stated that the issue before it was the “suitability of
a treatment program for [defendant].” Defendant argues these comments
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show the trial court applied the law incorrectly because the appropriateness
of a treatment program is not one of the four statutory criteria for suitability.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)
Again, we see no indication that the trial court misconstrued the
statute in a manner that affected the result. As we have explained, before
ordering pretrial diversion, the court must be satisfied that the recommended
mental health treatment program will meet the defendant’s specialized
needs. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) Although this requirement is not
framed as an additional criterion for suitability, it is indisputably a factor the
court must consider before granting diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c); Vaughn,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134; Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 892.) For the reasons we have already discussed, we are satisfied the trial
court appropriately considered whether the only program available would
meet this defendant’s specialized needs, and it did not abuse its discretion in
deciding it would not and, on that basis, denying diversion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
People v. Roberts (A169695)
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